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Rowan Williams, David Ford and others have drawn attention to the importance of the 
‘informal theology’ of ordinary believers, its validity as representing genuine insights, and the 
risk of detachment that occurs if academic theologians do not take it into account. Jeff Astley 
has examined the phenomenology of informal theology (which he calls ‘ordinary theology’) 
and the processes that have been and can be followed in examining it. Largely, however, he 
has not surveyed the actual content of believers’ informal theology. 
This thesis examines the most basic, yet profound, theist concept, that of ‘God’, in historical, 
academic theology since the Second World War, and in contemporary informal theology 
measured by an exercise in practical theology. The historical theology consists of a review of 
academic and popular writings by professional United Kingdom Anglican theologians (as they 
have taken into account logical positivism, human suffering and scientific insights). This review 
is presented according to a series of eight themes. The thesis then describes the preparation 
and execution of a survey of the understanding of God on the part of a sample of Anglican 
church-attenders in Winchester, carried out by questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, 
together with analysis of the results.  
Most importantly, the thesis then sets the results of this exercise in practical theology against 
the views of academic theologians, draws out areas of commonality and deviation, and offers a 
distinctive contribution in this respect. The writer’s thesis is that the informal theology of 
ordinary believers coincides in most ways with academic theology over fundamental issues of 
understanding God. The practical research contributing to this thesis has revealed many 
ordinary believers’ capacity to assimilate and hold a variety of views of God, and to do so in 
creative tension, sometimes despite paradoxes of apparent contradiction. The thesis sets out 
some proposals for further research, and makes some recommendations as to how the 
findings within the thesis could inform practice in the Church of England. However, its 
distinctive contribution to scholarship lies in its relating the content of some informal theology 
to a wide spread of Anglican academic theology, and its finding considerable spiritual and 
theological insight within a sample of ordinary believers.  
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1  The focus 
Conceiving God has probably always been as difficult for some as it is natural for many. In the 
Jewish narrative, Jacob wrestled with God for God’s blessing, was not vouchsafed God’s name, 
but, despite the lingering mystery, still believed he had seen God’s face.1 Moses was granted 
the name, but it remained mysterious and ambiguous, ‘YHWH’;2 he recounted that, at the 
delivery of the Ten Commandments, ‘You heard the sound of words but saw no form; there 
was only a voice’.3  Solomon told God that ‘even heaven and the highest heaven cannot 
contain you’, but still prayed for his prayers to be answered’;4 and God was recognised as a 
‘God who hides himself’.5 Paul wrote that ‘now we see in a mirror, dimly. . . . Now I know only 
in part’.6 The Christian tradition is of revelation to the extent of incarnation, and immanence in 
the prevailing presence of God’s Spirit. Tom Wright notes that the common usage of the word 
‘God’ as a proper noun is foreign to biblical practice, with ‘YHWH’ or a phrase such as ‘Israel’s 
god’ preferred in Jewish culture, and often ‘ho theos’ among early Christians.7 So the mystery 
remains, and this thesis is an exercise in wrestling. 
Wright is clear that:  
in every age sophisticated thinkers have been perfectly well aware of the 
problematical nature of pre-critical language about God and its referent: one 
distressing modern phenomenon is the spectacle of a would-be Christian positivism 
which imagines that god-language is clear and unequivocal, and that one can have the 
kind of certainty about it which Logical Positivism accorded to scientific or even 
mathematical statements.8 
Nevertheless, the physical sciences are seen by many as providing convincing explanations of 
many phenomena often previously attributed to God.  So challenges remain for many people 
of faith in the fundamental process of conceiving and speaking of God.  This does not relate 
simply to traditional images of God, but to the very act of conceiving a Being for whom even 
the attribution of existence can seem nonsensical or meaningless.  The issue has always 
confronted academic philosophers and theologians, and has come to the fore and entered the 
consciousness of many ‘ordinary’ believers in the wake of logical positivism and twentieth and 
                                                 
1 Genesis 32. 22-32. 
2 Exodus 3. 13-14. 
3 Deuteronomy 4. 12. 
4 I Kings, 8. 27-28. 
5 Isaiah 45. 15.  
6 1 Corinthians 13. 12. 
7 Wright, N. T., The New Testament and the People of God, Minneapolis, Fortress, 1992, pp. xiv-
xv, 473. 
8 Wright, The NT and the People of God, p. 128. 
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twenty-first century cultural shifts.  Some popular theology writers have attempted to meet 
such needs of ‘ordinary’ believers,9 sometimes to rebut claims by popular atheists.10 
The expression, ‘ordinary believers’, refers to believers without academic theological training. 
Rowan Williams’s term ‘informal theology’11 denotes the living theology of ordinary believers 
who think and speak about God, and has the same meaning as Jeff Astley’s ‘ordinary 
theology’.12 ‘Informal theology’ will be examined at greater length in this thesis. ‘Academic 
theology’ refers to theology produced by professional academic theologians (including 
philosopher-theologians), usually working within higher education. The term ‘popular 
theology’ is used to refer to the writings of academic theologians who use their professional 
understanding and insights to address the needs of ordinary believers (and disbelievers) in 
ways that are sensitive to the instinctive and learnt positions that emerge within informal 
theology.  These distinctions are not rigid, and often there is overlap between different kinds 
of believers and different kinds of theologies. Whilst  ‘concepts of God’ refers in this thesis to 
the mental images people have of God, ‘conceiving and speaking of God’ refers to the process 
of forming and expressing actual concepts of God. 
 
This thesis focuses on conceiving God in the period since the Second World War. It offers an 
analytical review of academic and popular theology written by UK Anglican theologians 
(henceforth styled ‘Anglican theology’, but not implying that Anglican theologians write other 
than as independent professionals), and compares that theology with the informal theology of 
Church of England attenders, represented by empirical research with a sample group in 
Winchester. No comparable, categorised study of UK Anglican academic theology, no 
comparable empirical research into conceiving God, and no comparison with informal theology 
have been found such as this thesis undertakes.  
The empirical research carried out for this thesis as part of practical theology (defined below in 
the Methodology chapter) has demonstrated a considerable variety of theistic (and deistic) 
views of God, an appreciation (conscious or unconscious) of analogy, and an ability to hold 
together abstract views of God and concrete images. The researcher’s view, like that of David 
Ford, Williams and Astley, is that such informal theology has a validity that should be taken 
                                                 
9 Notably, Robinson, John, A.T, Honest to God, London, SCM, 1963. 
10 For example, Ward, Keith, Why There Almost Certainly is a God: Doubting Dawkins, Oxford, 
Lion, 2008, responding to Dawkins, Richard, The God Delusion, London, Bantam, 2006. 
11 Williams, Rowan, On Christian Theology, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, p. xiii. 
12 Astley, Jeff, Ordinary Theology: Looking, Listening and Learning in Theology, Farnham, 
Ashgate, 2002, pp. 1, 56. 
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seriously in the Church’s worship and mission, however unsystematic, even unformed, it might 
be. Williams writes that suspicion of academic theology in the churches: 
 overlooks the preconscious reflection, the ‘informal’ theology of prayer, art and holy 
action.  It’s no use pretending that there is a real and recognizable religious practice 
that does not include this . . . . And what is more . . . the would-be professional 
theologian can so understand his or her task as to forget their practical and historical 
rootedness in the informal theologizing of the community as it develops.13 
The writer of this thesis supports this position. The twentieth century saw greater participation 
by lay, as opposed to clerical, theologians in UK academia, together with a less 
denominationally confined approach, which broadened the Church’s outlook; and the Anglican 
propensity to divergence is likely to encourage a variety of informal theology. Comparing 
academic theology with informal theology will indicate the degree of coherence or 
incoherence between the two.  
The restrictions of the present study to UK Anglican theologians and to Church of England 
believers have been for pragmatic reasons. Certain branches of theology have been excluded: 
Christology and Trinitarian theology, because the thesis is mostly concerned with the concept 
of God as a single divine entity, rather than as understood in the Trinity; and the wealth of 
specific images of God, except when they have proved particularly important for conceiving 
God. Most importantly, this thesis does not deal directly with the existence of God, but rather 
with the conceivability of God and the ways God is conceived. 
Contributions to philosophical theology about conceiving God have emerged mostly from the 
Catholic or ‘central’ sections of the Church of England. Although there have been some notable 
academic contributions from the Evangelical wing, such as those by Anthony Thiselton and 
Wright, there is greater Evangelical reliance upon Scripture and revelation as the basis for the 
givenness of concepts of God, particularly in popular theology. So Evangelical theology, apart 
from Thiselton’s and Wright’s , has not generally contributed to this thesis, as fundamental 
issues relating to the actual conceiving of God are not usually addressed.  
The theological position of the author of this thesis may be described as, on the one hand, 
broadly Catholic Anglican (under the influence of upbringing, ministerial training and 
appreciation of liturgical drama), and on the other hand as liberal and in sympathy with the 
deist inclinations of Maurice Wiles and the non-realism of Don Cupitt. At the same time, the 
author is able to appreciate the power and usefulness of conventional, Catholic expressions of 
                                                 
13 Williams, Rowan, On Christian Theology, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, p. xiii. 
10 
 
the Christian faith, not only for those whose appreciation is more realist, but also, for the 
author, as interpretable in ‘poetic’ or ‘metaphorical’ terms. 
1.2  Historical background within the Church of England 
Mark Chapman characterises the modern Church of England as searching for a source of 
authority: one search ‘in the direct experience of God in the heart or in God’s Word as set 
forth in Scripture’; and the other ‘in God’s appointed messengers, the bishops’.14 These 
summarise two of the main influences upon the Church of England since the nineteenth 
century and during the period since 1945, those of its Evangelical and Anglo-Catholic wings. 
They have been complemented by modern liberal theology, with all three responding to 
feminist concerns and matters of sexuality, and influencing doctrine and liturgy – all of which 
have affected how the conceptualisation of God has developed. Appendix 1 illustrates some of 
the ways in which the Evangelical wing and the Anglo-Catholic wing (represented, in this 
thesis, respectively, by Christ Church and Holy Trinity Church, in Winchester) have contributed 
to mainstream informal theology: for example, the Evangelical hymnody, informality of 
worship and Alpha courses, and the Anglo-Catholic centrality of the Eucharist and liturgical 
reforms following the Second Vatican Council. 
The third strand of modern, broad or liberal theology, represented now by Modern Church,15 
has combated fundamentalist tendencies and relates theology to other disciplines.16 
‘Modernism’ had its Anglican origins in Lux Mundi of 1889 and subsequent publications 
questioning established doctrine.17 1963 saw the publication of John Robinson’s semi-popular 
Honest to God, seminal and salutary for the whole Church, which will figure later in this thesis. 
Not so much ‘a “party” within the Church, but rather a genre of thinking’, according to Martyn 
Percy,18 liberal theologians pay considerable attention to the fundamental issue of conceiving 
God. 
Despite benefits to the whole Church from more Evangelical and more Catholic teaching, 
issues of sexuality remain which set some followers of the two wings at odds with mainstream 
Anglican churches, sometimes uniting the two wings.  Part of the Evangelical wing in particular 
                                                 
14 Chapman, Mark, Anglicanism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, OUP, 2006, p. 3. 
15 Previously, among other titles, The Modern Churchmen’s Union. 
16 Chapman, Anglicanism, p. 125. 
17 Moorman, John R. H., A History of the Church in England, London, A. & C. Black, 1953, pp. 
394, 396 (referring to Gore, Charles, ed., Lux Mundi: A Series of Studies in the Religion of the 
Incarnation, London, John Murray, 1889). 
18 Percy, Martyn, ‘The New Liberalism’, Clatworthy, Jonathan, ed., The New Liberalism: Faith 
for the Third Millennium, Modern Churchpeople’s Union, 1998, p. 12. 
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is opposed on biblical grounds to any accommodation of homosexuality; and sections of both 
wings oppose the ordination of women, on grounds of biblical tradition and/or authority in the 
whole Catholic Church. These tendencies have become more overt since the latter part of the 
twentieth century, influenced by the numerically superior non-UK Anglican churches, more 
progressively from the United States and more conservatively from Africa. Feminism’s concern 
with the experience and full inclusion of women in the whole life and structures of the Church 
has produced a considerable body of theology. The process of persuasion and protest that 
began after 1945 reached partial fruition in 1992 with the General Synod approving the 
ordination of women to the priesthood, though with excepting provision for dissenting 
parishes.19 The issues have resurfaced over the ordination of women as bishops, and polarised 
the wider debate about inclusiveness of theological and liturgical language.20 
The 1928 revision of The Book of Common Prayer, never authorised (because rejected by 
Parliament), but much of it used in practice, led to experimental liturgical revisions that began 
in the 1960s:  the Series 1 and Series 2 rites, and the first use of contemporary English in the 
Series 3 rites. This culminated in The Alternative Service Book 1980, which was itself replaced 
ten years later by the various liturgies and volumes of Common Worship, with additional 
material commended by the House of Bishops.21 Changes in Roman Catholic liturgy since the 
1962-65 Second Vatican Council were influential during this period, with common texts and 
simplification of liturgical practice, as, to a lesser extent, were changes in other Anglican 
provinces and other denominations. Some change in hymnody also took place, most notably 
with a wealth of Evangelical hymns and choruses, some of which found their way into 
mainstream Anglican worship, but also with more sedate revisions and additions to the 
distinctively Anglican hymnodies, English Hymnal and Hymns Ancient and Modern.22 
There has been a significant reduction, by most measures, of Church of England membership 
since the optimistic signs of the 1950s.23 The move in 1970 to a new system of synodical 
government signalled greater lay participation and consensus,24 the General Synod’s role being 
to guard worship and doctrine alongside episcopal leadership.25 Alongside decisions that some 
                                                 
19 Furlong, Monica, The C of E: The State It’s In, London, H&S, 2000, p. 136. 
20 Furlong, C of E, p. 349-51. 
21 Church of England, Liturgical Revision, http://www.churchofengland.org/prayer-
worship/worship/texts/introduction/litrevis.aspx, downloaded 21.08.13. 
22 Welsby, Paul. A., A History of the Church of England 1945-1980, Oxford, OUP, 1984, p. 160. 
23 Hastings, Adrian, A History of English Christianity 1920-1985, London, Collins, 1986, p. 444. 
24 Welsby, History of the Church of England, pp. 208-10; Davies, Rupert, E., The Church of 
England Observed, London, SCM, 1984, pp. 18, 29, 53. 
25 Furlong, C of E, p. 176. 
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consider perverse, like the rejection of unification with the Methodist Church in 197226 and, 
due to an insufficient majority in the House of Laity, the temporary rejection of women 
bishops in 2012,  positive contributions have included Faith in the City,27 the 1985 report by  
the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Commission on Urban Priority Areas, perceived by some as a 
critique of Government policy,28 but producing enduring results. 
Post-second world war trends within the Church of England that have exerted influence on its 
life, theology and worship can thus be summarised as Evangelicalism, Catholicism, Liberalism 
and Feminism, influencing the Church’s liturgy and hymnody, ordained ministry – and 
theology. Other powerful influences have included the phenomena discussed below. 
1.3  The influence of the Holocaust 
Theological consideration of God’s relationship with human suffering has inevitably been 
influenced by the Holocaust, which has led to some, particularly in process and liberation 
theology, to question God’s impassibility, and to rework their theodicy. In informal Jewish 
theology, Elie Wiesel writes of horrific childhood experiences in Auschwitz and Buchenwald: ‘I 
did not deny God’s existence, but I doubted His absolute justice’; and ‘What are You, my God . 
. . ? What does Your greatness mean . . .?’;29 a Rabbi concluded: ‘It’s the end. God is no longer 
with us. . . . Where is the divine mercy? Where is God’.30 The Christian theologian, Robert 
McAfee Brown, describes how Wiesel witnessed three Jewish scholars’ trial of God in a 
rabbinic court, at the end of which a unanimous verdict was given: ‘the Lord God almighty, 
Creator of Heaven and Earth, was found guilty of crimes against creation and humankind’. 
Then, after an ‘infinity of silence’, the scholars turned to their evening service.31 This 
ambivalence is an important part of Wiesel’s theology, with rage against God being ‘still a way 
of telling Him that He’s there, that He exists’.32 With unconscious, or possibly conscious, 
Christian allusion, Wiesel records how, when someone asked at a public hanging, ‘“Where is 
                                                 
26 Beeson, Trevor, The Church of England in Crisis, London, Davis-Poynter, 1973, pp. 9, 119, 
127-34; Welsby, History of the Church of England¸ pp. 149-50. 
27 Archbishop of Canterbury's Commission on Urban Priority Areas, Faith in the City - A Call for 
Action by Church and Nation: Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Commission on Urban 
Priority Areas, London, Church House, 1985. 
28 Worrall, B. G., The Making of the Modern Church: Christianity in England Since 1800, London, 
SPCK, 1988, p. 293; Furlong, C of E in Crisis, p. 130. 
29 Wiesel, Elie, Night, London, Penguin, 1981, pp. 44, 57, 78. 
30 Wiesel, Night, p. 88. 
31 Brown, Robert McAfee, ‘Introduction’, 1995, Wiesel, Elie, The Trial of God (as it was held on 
Feburary 25, 1649, in Shamgorod), New York, Schocken Books, 1979, p. vii. 
32 Brown, ‘Introduction’, p. xvi (quoting Wiesel, Elie, The Town Beyond the Wall, New York, 
Schocken Books, 1982, p. 123). 
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God now?” . . . I heard a voice within me answer him: “Where is He? Here He is – He is hanging 
here on this gallows”’.33 Indeed, one contemporary rabbi saw the parallel with Jesus’s innocent 
death: ‘The Golgotha of modern mankind is Auschwitz. The cross . . . was replaced by the gas 
chamber’.34 Wiesel hints at ‘the death of God’ when he writes of ‘those moments which 
murdered my God and my soul . . .’.35 For Richard Rubenstein, although no-one can know for 
certain that God is dead, ‘we do live in the time of the “death of God” [as] a cultural fact.’36 He 
thus raises conceptual questions about the ‘death of God’ in Christianity, as in Judaism: 
whether it is God or the concept of God that has allegedly died; whether ‘the death of God’ is 
an objective or subjective ‘fact’; and to what extent it relates to the death of Jesus. Indeed, it is 
not always clear when the academic and informal theologians surveyed in this thesis are 
referring to God as a single entity, or God in Christ,  particularly when considering the concept 
of God suffering. 
Arthur Cohen argues that a constructive post-Holocaust theology must be consistent with the 
presence of evil and God’s presence, and with God’s relationship and involvement with the 
whole of creation. Otherwise, God ceases to be anything other than ‘a metaphor for the 
inexplicable’37 – or, it could be said, a god of the gaps. The Holocaust was thus influential in 
encouraging honesty in the theological tension over the enormity of earthly suffering, evident 
in liberation, panentheistic and process theologies. 
1.4  Postmodernity 
The Holocaust has contributed to the rejection of the grand narratives38 of history and 
modernism, and of Enlightenment rationality in philosophy, theology and morality – this 
rationality more recently put in question by worldwide suffering, modern science, relative 
affluence and Western questioning of inherited morality.  ‘Postmodernity’ refers to the 
situation that exists with this rejection, and, with ‘modernity’, is used in this thesis to refer to 
states of societal mind; ‘modernism’ and ‘postmodernism’ relate to the promotion of the 
                                                 
33 Wiesel, Night, pp. 76-77. 
34 Rubenstein, Richard L., After Auschwitz: History, Theology and Contemporary Judaism, 
Second Edition, Baltimore and London, John Hopkins University, 1992, pp 159-64 (quoting 
Matbaum, Ignaz, The Face of God after Auschwitz, Amsterdam, Polak and Van Gennep, 1965, 
p. 36). 
35 Wiesel, Night, p. 45. 
36 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, p. 172 (quoting Rubenstein, Richard L., After Auschwitz: Radical 
Theology and Contemporary Judaism, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merill, 1966, pp. 151-52). 
37 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, p. 192. 
38 Lakeland, Paul, Postmodernity: Christian Identity in a Fragmented Age, Minneapolis, 
Fortress, 1997, p. x (quoting Jean-François Lyotard).      
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associated characteristics.39  ‘Postmodernism’ often brings scepticism about conventional 
theology, together with opportunities for theological restatement. Gerald West and David 
Tacey use ‘postmodernism’ to refer to freedom from fixed conventions, presumably as framed 
in credal and inherited theology, to enable more contextual theology and useful divine images 
to be created.40 Radical Orthodoxy speaks of ‘the nihilistic drift of postmodernism’, but views it 
as ‘a supreme opportunity’ for ‘an indeterminacy that is not impersonal chaos but infinite 
interpersonal harmonious order, in which time participates’.41 Thiselton looks for ‘co-operation 
of temporal and spatial imagery [to] provide major “qualifying” dimensions which cancel out 
unwanted resonances otherwise set up by each piece of imagery alone’ [to] address the 
postmodern condition’.42 Ralph Norman finds a continuity of mysticism between the apophatic 
tradition and postmodernism in terms of the ineffability of God: ‘God is beyond language 
itself’.43 
So, although postmodernism has undoubted negative connotations for theology, it also has 
capacity for positive developmental opportunity. This opportunity arises from 
postmodernism’s dethroning of science from a prior right to interpret the world, thereby 
liberating theology from a secondary role: modernism allowed only consideration of how 
people talk about God, whereas postmodernism allows the possibility of actually talking about 
God. Some academic theology that is examined will display postmodernist divergence from the 
received narrative. Current psychological freedom to create one’s own theology, sometimes 
divergent from the conventional theological narrative, will to a limited degree be revealed by 
analysis of the questionnaires and interviews with a sample of Winchester churchgoers.  
1.5 This thesis 
Against this background, and following the Literature Review and Methodology chapters, this 
thesis will survey UK Anglican academic theology since 1945. This survey will be by themes 
                                                 
39 This accords with Paul Hedges’s definitions: Hedges, Paul, ‘A Reflection on Typologies: 
Negotiating a Fast-Moving Discussion’, Hedges, Paul and Race, Alan, Christian Approaches to 
Other Faiths, London, SCM, 2008, p. 28. 
40 Tacey, David, The Spirituality Revolution: The Emergence of Contemporary Spirituality, Hove, 
Routledge, 2004, p. 154 (quoting Maitland, Sara, A big-Enough God, London, Mowbray, 1995, 
p. 155); West, Gerald O., The Academy of the Poor: Towards a Dialogical Reading of the Bible, 
Sheffield, Sheffield Academic, 1999, p. 25-26. 
41 Milbank, John, Ward, Graham and Pickstock, Catherine, ‘Introduction: Suspending the 
material: the turn of radical orthodoxy’, Milbank, John, Pickstock, Catherine and Ward, 
Graham, eds., Radical Orthodoxy: A new theology, London, Routledge, 1999, pp. 1-2. 
42 Thiselton, Anthony C., Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self, Edinburgh, T&TC, 1995, pp. 
122-124, 146. 
43 Norman, Ralph, ‘Rediscovery of Mysticism’, Jones, Gareth, ed., The Blackwell Companion to 
Modern Theology, Oxford, Blackwell, 2004, pp. 455, 460-62. 
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relevant and significant for informal theology: Analogy, God’s immanence, God’s passibility 
and other aspects of process theology, contextual and feminist theology in the context of 
cultural relativism, liberal theology since 1960, attempts to reclaim tradition, and pastoral 
theology.  (‘Cultural relativism’ is not used in the thesis in any pejorative sense, but to indicate 
the relativity of cultural settings in which thinking and activity develop.) The thesis will then 
describe some examples and accounts of informal theology, before recounting the exercise in 
practical theology, with an assessment of informal theology derived from quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of questionnaire data and interview interpretation. Uniquely, this 
understanding of informal theology will be set against the themes of Anglican academic 
theology, some conclusions being drawn about the extent of coherence between the two kinds 
of theology. 
The writer’s thesis is that the informal theology of ordinary believers coincides in most ways 
with academic theology over fundamental issues of understanding God, largely differing only 
in the degree to which formal analysis takes place. The practical research contributing to this 
thesis has revealed many ordinary believers’ capacity to assimilate and hold a variety of views 
of God, and to do so in creative tension, sometimes despite paradoxes of apparent 
contradiction. The thesis will set out some proposals for further research, and some 
recommendations as to how the findings within the thesis could inform the life and mission of 
the Church of England. However, its distinctive contribution to scholarship lies in its relating 
the content of some informal theology to a wide spread of Anglican academic theology, and its 









Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  Introduction 
This literature review considers a wide sample of historical theological surveys, key texts 
published since 1945. The aim is to identify different approaches and methods in responding 
to issues raised in conceptualising and speaking of God in the light of changing linguistic, 
cultural and scientific understanding and attitudes. Joerg Rieger's work is included as being 
methodological and about theology, as well as addressing the important subject of the 
excluded sections of society.  Astley’s work, not itself a theological survey but a 
phenomenological examination of ‘ordinary theology’, is included as being closely related to 
the aims of this thesis, and to demonstrate that Astley has not covered the same ground as 
this thesis.  All other works are theological surveys: the majority by individual authors; some 
collections of essays (from which relevant essays are reviewed); all from Protestant and 
Anglican writers except those by Fergus Kerr and Philip Kennedy; and including undergraduate 
text-books by Kennedy and Alister McGrath. The works are surveyed in approximate 
chronological order, apart from Astley’s. 
The review will provide a context for this thesis, and demonstrate its originality, in that no 
previous survey has been published of Anglican UK theology over the period, and no survey 
relating particularly to issues raised by conceiving of God. 
2.2 John Macquarrie 
Macquarrie’s Twentieth-Century Religious Thought ranges across European and American 
theologians and philosophers.1  Religion, he writes, should be: reasonable (i.e. without 
contradictions or conflicting with natural reason, science or commonsense); contemporary (i.e. 
chronologically not escapist, but relevant to the present day and current problems); 
comprehensive (i.e. relating to all aspects of religion rather than selective of particular 
aspects); and ‘on the way’ (i.e. recognising the need for further development).2 
Macquarrie includes theologians who examined the Christian faith in a world of logical 
empiricism, Austin Farrer and Eric Mascall,3 and some British ‘post-liberal theology’4. He refers 
to the popular debate engendered by Honest to God, and characterises Robinson’s later 
Exploration into God as espousing panentheism and ‘the doctrine of a God who has indeed an 
                                                 
1 Macquarrie, John , Twentieth-Century Religious Thought: The Frontiers of Philosophy and 
Theology, 1900-1970, London, SCM, [1963], 1971, pp. 15, 17. 
2 Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, pp. 373-74. 
3 Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, pp. 289-90. 
4 Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, pp. 340-44. 
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unchanging essence but who completes himself in an advancing experience’.5 Lastly, in British 
post-war theology, Macquarrie refers to the balanced approach to secularisation offered in the 
work of Ronald Gregor Smith, for whom, Macquarrie, relates:  
God is not a metaphysical reality beyond history, but neither can he be reduced to a 
mythological expression for our co-humanity or anything of that sort. He is the ‘more’, 
the transcendent, that we encounter within history itself.6  
Briefly, too, he mentions Ian Ramsey’s ‘application of analytic philosophy to the problems of 
theological and religious language’.7  
Macquarrie finds, through the maelstrom of philosophical and theological views raging at the 
time, a trend in the direction of relativism, with ‘absolute and final truth on the question of 
religion . . . just unattainable’. A course, he believes, must be steered between the extremes of 
‘absolute divine revelation’ which is inevitably ‘interpreted in fallible words’, and dogmatic 
scepticism.8 Finally, Macquarrie finds 1960s interest in God focused on God’s activity in the 
world and human affairs, with God to be found in depth rather than height – all indicative of a 
‘humanistic thrust’, as the principle of transcendence is discovered within ‘man’.9 
2.3 Heinz Zahrnt  
Zahrnt, in The Question of God, acknowledges the profound changes confronting humankind 
and the need for theology to ‘vindicate once again the language it uses about God’.10  He raises 
issues represented by those he surveys, including some significant ones described here. Over 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘God is dead’, Zahrnt adopts Martin Heidegger’s explanation, that its 
context is the end of the western metaphysics that preferred ‘the world beyond the senses’ as 
more real and determinative than ‘the world of the senses’: ‘When Nietzsche now proclaims 
that God is dead, this does not merely signify that there is no more God, but that the basic 
structure of being as a whole is shattered.’  Similarly, Zahrnt argues that atheism itself has 
become secularised in the modern world, as people ‘have passed beyond the problem of God’: 
‘How can one speak of God in a secularised world?’11 Friedrich Gogarten and Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer confronted these issues in the context of human maturity, Bonhoeffer’s writings 
                                                 
5 Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, pp. 386, 274. 
6
 Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, p. 388. 
7 Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, p. 390. 
8
 Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, p. 372. 
9
 Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, pp. 393-94. 
10 Zahrnt, Heinz, The Question of God: Protestant Theology in the Twentieth Century, London, 
Collins, 1969, p. 12. 
11 Zahrnt, Question of God, pp. 126, 130, 131. 
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from prison considering the possibility of an end to religion and the foolishness of relying on a 
‘God of the gaps’,12 and Gogarten emphasising secularisation as ‘a post-Christian phenomenon, 
brought about by the Christian faith’. Zahrnt notes how ‘supranaturalism’, based on Greek 
dualism, underlay the early days of the Church, but has now been challenged with the arrival 
of ‘critical historical method’.  He considers that attacks on God: 
conceal a longing, a longing for a greater God – a God who is not merely 
comprehended in transitory ideas, images and concepts, who does not dwell in the 
gaps and deficiencies in our human knowledge, who does not encounter us merely at 
the margins and boundaries of life, ruling over a Christian enclave, a few acres marked 
off as belonging to the Church, but a God who is greater, vaster, more free, more 
sovereign, more universal, more awesome and more fruitful . . . .13 
Zahrnt highlights Herbert Braun’s conviction that God ‘is certainly not considered as an 
Existent existing in himself, as a species definable by that term’, but rather: ‘the goal towards 
which I am being driven’; ‘where the security and the obligation which I derive from my fellow 
man comes from’; ‘a particular kind of common humanity’; ‘where I have an obligation, where 
I am committed’ unconditionally.14  Helmut Gollwitzer’s reaction was concern ‘for the meaning 
of theology as language about God’, and that, for Braun, ‘God and Jesus disintegrate into 
humanism’. Braun had indeed, in Zahrnt’s words, ‘carrie[d] [Rudolf] Bultmann’s existentialist 
interpretation of the New Testament to its logical conclusion’.15 
Paul Tillich demonstrated similar concern for intelligibility: ‘You must save concepts before you 
can save souls’.16  Zahrnt describes Tillich’s development of ‘a new terminology and . . . a new 
conceptual tool . . . in order to recapture’ ‘the archetypal language of the Bible and liturgy’ 
‘and make . . . [it] intelligible once again [in] “the changing experiences of individuals and 
groups, their varying questions and their categories of perceiving reality”’.17 Zahrnt writes: 
The content of absolute faith, if one can speak here of a ‘content’ at all, is the God 
above God, that is, the God who lies beyond the symbol of  ‘God’, who transcends all 
                                                 
12 Zahrnt, Question of God, pp. 131-40. 
13 Zahrnt, Question of God, p. 140 (quoting Gogarten, Friedrich, Was ist Christentum?, 
Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956, pp. 73, 206-07, 169). 
14 Zahrnt, The Question of God, p. 275 (quoting Braun, Herbert, Die Problematik einer 
Theologie des Neuen Testaments, Unveränd. Nachdr, 1971, p. 17). 
15 Zahrnt, Question of God, pp. 277, 283. 
16 Zahrnt, Question of God, p. 299 (quoting Bartley, William W., The Retreat to Commitment’, 
New York, Knopf, 1962, p. 73, quoting sermon by Paul Tillich). 
17 Zahrnt, Question of God, pp. 300, 302 (quoting Tillich, Paul, The Protestant Era, London, 
Nisbet, 1951, p. xxxvii). 
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conceptions of God, who is not a person and has no name and cannot be expressed in 
any image.18 
By contrast with the foregoing, after the tendency, for two or three centuries, to ‘magnif[y] 
man at the expense of God’, Karl Barth restored a balance between ‘man-encountering God 
and God-encountering man’. Analogy for Barth is only in a God-to-human direction, reliant 
totally on the grace of God. It is analogia relationis or analogia revelationis, and not analogia 
entis. On that basis, in Zahrnt’s words, Barth ‘revels’ in analogy alongside revelation.19 
Zahrnt’s The Question of God surveys some Protestant twentieth century theologians, most of 
them German or of German origin, who confronted the philosophical and practical difficulties 
in conceptualizing God. He considers Barth’s particular understanding of analogy and the 
nature and limitations of theological language. In this light, Zahrnt advocates the widest view 
of God beyond supranaturalism, as developed in an existentialist direction. 
2.4 Jaroslav Pelikan 
Pelikan’s Twentieth Century Theology in the Making comprises a series of pre-war German 
essays surveying earlier twentieth century theology. Pelikan, a Lutheran turned Orthodox, 
raises various issues relevant to this thesis, and touches on matters that mark out the 
twentieth century in terms of a new, rational and sometimes radical approach within theology, 
not least in conceptualising God.  
For Paul Althaus, God’s eternity and ultimacy are seen not as just in a world above, but in the 
future, eschatologically: ‘the eternal is the “ultimate” no longer simply in the sense of the 
essential present, beyond and outside time, but in the sense of the final end of time’. With the 
parousia, ‘theology must remain conscious of the fact that it does speak here in parables’;20  
what is applicable to the parousia and Christ in glory is applicable to God. The figurative nature 
of language about God is further highlighted by Pelikan’s inclusion of Tillich, who explores the 
origins of the term ‘myth’ and associated allegorical, psychological and psychoanalytical 
theories, along with his own more positive symbolic-realistic theory. Tillich views myth ‘as a 
symbol, built up from elements of reality, for the Absolute, the being beyond beings’.  Myth, 
                                                 
18 Zahrnt, Question of God, p. 345. 
19 Zahrnt, Question of God, pp. 85, 86, 99-100. 
20 Althaus, Paul, ‘Eschatology in the Philosophy of Religion and Dogmatic Theology’, Pelikan, 
Jaroslav, ed., Twentieth Century Theology in the Making, London, Fontana, 1969, 1970, vol. I, 
pp. 278, 281. 
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even when religion tries to distance itself, says Tillich, is inescapable: ‘the mythical is an 
element of all religion: myth is a religious category’.21  
A mystical example of figurative language is provided by Hans Leisegang, quoting Meister 
Eckhart: ‘The eye in which I see God is the same eye in which God sees me. My eye and God’s 
eye is one eye, and one countenance, and one knowledge and one love’; and adding: 
Here all distinction between God and the world disappears. God is in all things, and all 
things are in God. Thus man too is in God, and God in him. But God himself, who is 
everything, also becomes, as a direct consequence of the fact that all recognizable 
distinctions are done away in him, and that he is the highest concept comprehending 
all others, a concept utterly empty of meaning, to which one can only ascend by a 
series of total negations, leading to complete nothingness.22 
To this panentheistic example, Leisegang adds dependency of God upon humankind, with 
Scheffler’s claim that ‘without me God cannot live for an instant, and that if I became nothing 
he must necessarily expire’, and Eckhart’s, that ‘if I did not exist, God would not exist’. Thus, 
says Leisegang, ‘God needs man and man needs God for each to live his own true life’.23 
Thus are raised issues of later twentieth century concern in conceptualising God: the figurative 
and mythical nature of language, panentheism and God’s dependency. 
2.5. Alasdair Heron 
Although Heron’s A Century of Protestant Theology includes years before 1945, the start of this 
thesis’s period, the more prominent theologians considered remain influential. His intention is 
descriptive, with no overarching theory discernible. 
Heron describes effects of the Enlightenment and reason: the questioning of biblical authority 
and the nature of miracles; and David Hume’s and Immanuel Kant’s challenges to arguments 
for the existence of God.  From the nineteenth century German Protestant scene, he includes 
G. W. F. Hegel’s concept of the Absolute Mind (or Spirit), and Ludwig Feuerbach’s idea of God 
as a human projection. 
Barth insists that ‘there is absolutely no continuity, similarity or resemblance between God and 
man, no analogia entis . . . between God and ourselves . . .’, but, rather, reliance upon the 
analogia fidei, God’s self-revelation ‘the key to his being as God’. Heron dislikes Bultmann’s 
                                                 
21 Tillich, Paul, ‘Myth and Mythology: The Concept and the Religious Psychology of Myth’, 
Pelikan, Twentieth Century Theology, Vol. II, pp. 343-44, 346. 
22 Leisegang, Hans, ‘The Concept of Mysticism’, Pelikan, Twentieth Century Theology, Vol. II, p. 
357. 
23 Leisegang,‘ Concept of Mysticism’, p. 359. 
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contrasting programme of demythologization, arguing that ‘Mythical talk about God 
misrepresents his real nature. . . by picturing him as “a being” among others, and fitting him 
into a supernatural world running somehow parallel to our own, and interacting with it’; and 
attributing to Bultmann an ‘almost deistic position’.24 
Heron acknowledges the challenges from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s linguistic analysis and A. J. 
Ayer’s logical positivism and verification principle. He surveys: the contributions from Antony 
Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre, D. Z. Phillips and Ramsey; the defences of natural theology by 
Farrer and Mascall; and developments in American theology from Reinhold Niebuhr and Tillich, 
with Tillich’s understanding of God as Being-itself and the ground of all existence. He considers 
Charles Hartshorne’s process theology, that suggested ‘that God’s being is in some ways 
absolutely perfect, but in other ways dependent upon a relation to what is other than itself’,25 
with God thus combining an unchanging element with his actualisation in relationships. 
Robinson’s Honest to God26 Heron sees as representing 1960s secular, radical and political 
theologies. 
Heron’s book provides a summary and critique of twentieth century Protestant theology up to 
1980, including theologians who responded to the challenges to conceiving of God presented 
by linguistic analysis and doubt about supernaturalism. It is descriptive in nature, and 
uncontroversial. 
2.6 Peter Hodgson and Robert King 
Langdon Gilkey’s essay, ‘God’, (the relevant part of Hodgson and King’s Christian Theology) 
opens by acknowledging the challenges to: 
the very possibility of an idea of God, its knowability, its coherence, and its meaning; 
to much of modernity such an idea is on a number of grounds an impossible idea and, 
as a consequence, the whole enterprise of a theistic religion appears as a futile, 
expensive, and even harmful activity.27  
The greater awareness of the problem of evil in modern culture has led, he writes, to ‘denial of 
the absoluteness and aseity of God’, with God ‘only one of a number of correlated and primal 
ultimate “factors” constitutive of finite actuality’.28 Indeed, another trend, Gilkey writes, is to 
                                                 
24 Heron, Alasdair I.C., A Century of Protestant Theology, Guildford, Lutterworth, 1980, pp. 11, 
77, 93, 103-04, 115. 
25 Heron, Century of Protestant Theology, pp. 122-23, 139, 146-47 
26 Robinson, Honest to God. 
27 Gilkey, Langdon, ‘God’, Hodgson, Peter and King, Robert, eds., Christian Theology: an 
Introduction to its Traditions and Tasks, London, SPCK, 1983, pp. 62-63. 
28 Gilkey, ‘God’, pp. 62-63, 72, 82.  
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emphasise God’s self-limitation, with some autonomy on the part of his creation, which thus 
has the freedom to accept grace or not. Alfred North Whitehead’s ‘process’ view is of God 
‘intrinsically related to the world of change’ and sharing in ‘the metaphysical categories of 
process: temporality, potentiality, change, relatedness, development, and dependency or 
passivity’.  Gilkey describes liberation theologies (‘eschatological’, ‘adversarial theologies’) that 
look to ‘the God of the future’, but makes no explicit link between these theologies and 
process theology. Gilkey rejects both ‘any . . . “process” views of God which deny that God is 
the source or ground of finite reality’ and ‘those forms of “orthodoxy” which have insisted on 
the active omnipotence or total sovereignty of God in the coming-to-be of finite events’. Yet 
the process of temporal change is the context for God being ‘conceived [as] active in the 
coming-to-be of our temporal being, in its preservation over time, and in its movement 
through time into the future’.29  
Thus, Gilkey’s theology responds to the cultural trends of the day, and particularly the 
perception of a transient and changing world.   
2.7 Stanley Grenz and Roger Olson 
Grenz and Olson’s 20th Century Theology stresses the importance of retaining balance between 
divine transcendence and immanence for ‘a proper relation between theology and reason or 
culture’.30 Their account is thematic, describing theology’s response to the intellectual 
postmodern despair engendered by twentieth century conflict.  
They move from nineteenth century immanence to twentieth century ‘transcendence in neo-
orthodoxy’, with Barth’s and Emil Brunner’s emphasis on revelation. They explore Bultmann’s 
existentialist interpretation through ‘transcendence of the kerygma’; and Tillich’s ontologically-
centred apologetic theology, with the ‘ground of being’ or ‘being itself’ the antidote to anxiety 
about non-being. Process theology is viewed eschatologically, with: ‘the present world [seen] 
in the light of what it will become’; science and theology reconciled by locating God in the 
processes of change and evolution; and God and the world interdependent, God working in 
the world through persuasion and suffering with the world. Process theology, Grenz and Olson 
write, escapes pantheism, but embraces panentheism: ‘one cannot conceive of God apart from 
                                                 
29 Gilkey, ‘God’, pp. 79, 81-85.  
30 Grenz, Stanley J & Olson, Roger E, 20th Century Theology: God & the World in a Transitional 
Age, Carlisle, Paternoster, 1992, pp. 11-12. 
23 
 
the world’. But their critique of process theology is over the loss of God’s transcendence, 
unchangeability, control of creation and potency in the face of evil.31 
Grenz and Olson view the 1960s as a time of ‘fads’ in theology, in its radical search for a new 
kind of immanence, often inspired by Bonhoeffer, with his understanding of God as 
transcendent, yet ‘the Beyond in the midst of our life’, and his insistence that ‘we should find 
God in what we do know, not in what we don’t’.32 They describe Thomas Altizer and William 
Hamilton’s short-lived ‘Death-of-God’ Movement as characterised by Hamilton’s insistence 
that ‘We are not talking about the absence of the experience of God, but about the experience 
of the absence of God’, leading to Altizer’s Christian atheism, with God’s immanence in 
humanity dispersing all transcendence. With pastoral intention, Robinson’s Honest to God 
found God in the depth of our being and of personal relationships, the transcendence of God 
representing the ultimacy of these phenomena, and being found within immanence. But from 
theological desperation, write Grenz and Olson, a theology of hope arose, God’s 
transcendence being reasserted within the systematic and Trinitarian theology of Jürgen 
Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg.33 
However, after the 1960s, immanence reasserted itself in black and liberation theology, at 
some expense to transcendence, the authors asking: ‘Does God have any existence above and 
apart from human history?’ Feminist theology then questioned the habitual masculine 
presentation of God, with Rosemary Ruether requiring female as well as male metaphors, and 
identifying Tillich’s ‘ground of being’ with ‘the primal Matrix’ or ‘God/ess’, identified with the 
whole of nature. The authors cite criticisms of Ruether as creating a new dualism between 
transcendence and maleness on the one hand and immanence and femaleness on the other.34 
By contrast, Grenz and Olson recover from Karl Rahner God’s nature as of ‘absolute mystery’, 
‘holy mystery’, neither an individual nor impersonal, but personal in an analogical way, with 
God’s personhood ‘left open to the ineffable darkness of the holy mystery’ and God remaining 
‘the absolute person’.35 Hans Küng’s concept of God would ‘transcend-while-preserving’ both 
traditional theism and panentheism, avoiding both ‘naïve anthropomorphism’ and deism,36 
leading to a new conception of God based on a dialectic of love, instead of Hegel’s dialectic of 
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knowledge, with God in the world, transcendence in immanence, and traditional immutability 
and impassability needing reconsideration.37 
Grenz and Olson capture historically and constructively the abiding tension between 
transcendence and immanence, and in particular the trends in the direction of immanence, 
particularly liberation and feminist theology. Their reference to some 1960s ‘fads’38 is 
unfortunate in view of genuine British efforts to relate the Christian faith to those for whom 
traditional concepts were difficult. 
2.8 George Newlands 
Newlands’s intention in God in Christian Perspective  ‘is to work out a modern restatement of 
the Christian doctrine of God’, denying that we are left with ‘a framework of philosophical 
positivism which simply lets us say nothing about God [and is] useless for constructive 
theology’. Rather, ‘Love is . . . the central characteristic of God in himself and in relation to the 
created order’.39 This theme Newlands earlier explores in Theology of the Love of God, a largely 
incarnational theological work that explores many of the fundamental puzzles for theology, 
such as the personal agency implication of attributing love to God, the metaphorical nature of 
our language for God and the possibility of a category mistake in attributing personal 
attributes to a transcendent God. 
Important as analogy is for speaking of God, ‘the doctrine of analogy is not then a means of 
knowing God but an analysis of the words we use to name God’. While recognising the 
apparent remoteness of some theological discourse from the ‘problems of how to speak of a 
living God who is both creator of time and active in times’,40 he analyses classical concepts 
such as ousia, hypostasis, substance and person, and considers various aspects of God’s 
personal nature. 
Thus Newlands explores concepts that are inherent in this thesis and the difficulties of 
speaking of God in the modern and post-modern world. He expresses dissatisfaction with 
some traditional expressions of God’s being and nature, and sets out his understanding of the 
role of analogy in speaking of God. 
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2.9 Gregory Baum 
Baum’s edited work, The Twentieth Century: A Theological Overview41 comprises a partly 
historical and partly thematic collection of essays that illustrate twentieth century theology.  
Ruether describes the work of the Jewish Irving Greenberg, for whom the issue of adequacy of 
language about God is broadened from philosophical concerns to pragmatism over gross 
human suffering: 
The failure of human projects of redemption . . . is experienced as an absence of the 
divine presence in the modern world. We live in the time of the silence of God. . . . We 
have entered into a time of profound silence that no longer knows how to speak 
adequately of God. The test of adequate language about God has become the burning 
children of the crematoria. 42  
Harvey Cox, distancing himself from his earlier insistence43 that God is present in the ‘secular’, 
as opposed to ‘religious’, spheres of life, now believes that ‘current religious movements have 
vigorously reclaimed many of these “secular” spheres as places where the holy is present 
within the profane’.44 Susan Ross’s feminist essay mentions Elizabeth Johnson’s ‘retrieval of 
the Wisdom tradition [to] aid in expanding the human vision of the divine’.45 The essay on 
black theology, womanist theology and disadvantaged American groups refers only obliquely, 
despite an underlying assumption, to God being aligned with the dispossessed.46 
Michael Scanlon describes the postmodern emphasis on what he calls ‘gnoseological humility’ 
in the apophatic tradition, sharing with the mystical tradition ‘the profound experience of 
divine “alterity” – the most radical otherness there is – lead[ing] to silence, to a “fear and 
trembling” that overwhelms any attempt to grasp God in human language’.47 The 
transcendence of God relates to difference, not to distance. Scanlon then describes Jacques 
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Derrida’s interpretation of apophatic theology as a ‘“hyperessentiality” in which God is 
presented as God beyond being or Being beyond being or God beyond God’.48  
Baum is concerned to identify how theology has responded creatively to current human and 
philosophical issues.  These issues are only partially addressed (for instance in response to 
suffering and to social disadvantage), and the instinctive, fundamental philosophical difficulties 
with conceiving God are not tackled.  
2.10  Joerg Rieger 
Rieger's God and the Excluded arises from his concern that theology has often failed to 
‘connect’ with the marginalized and excluded sections of society. Theologians, he suggests, are 
located somewhere between God and the excluded, with their blindness towards the excluded 
risking a blindness towards God. Rieger aims to reorientate theology to everyday life and the 
excluded, to enable theology to rediscover God and contribute to restructuring the Church and 
society. He regards modern theology as having four turns, which he addresses as Self, the 
Wholly Other, Language and the Text, and Others.49  
Turning to Self, Rieger, like Friedrich Schleiermacher, stresses experience at the heart of 
understanding God. God must be totally Other, yet language must relate to human experience. 
Rieger concludes that it is the middle classes that are ‘at the heart of the modern world and 
modern theology’, and that church inclusivity can easily turn out to be inclusivity just of those 
who conform.50 
In relation to the Wholly Other, we cannot rely solely on revelation or faith, but, since 
‘theological reflection needs to face its ultimate limit: we do not own God’; or, quoting Barth, 
‘God shatters every syllogism,’ with ‘God’ ‘signif[ying] a priori the fundamentally Other’.51  
The third ‘turn’ is to Theology and Postmodernity, with George Lindbeck as exemplar, stressing 
the primary importance, above reason or experience, of how a religion uses language, 
grounded in Scripture, to express itself. Rieger’s concern is that what he and Lindbeck deem 
the post-liberal, postmodern approach should appeal to excluded as well as educated classes, 
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and questions whether this approach can embrace ‘the excluded, particularly those excluded 
by the structures of the global economy’.52  
His fourth ‘turn’, to Others, insists that ‘there is a close connection between respecting other 
people and respecting the divine other’. Feminism is an area for demonstrating inclusivity, 
particularly feminism in a context of ‘Third World’ suffering.53 Loyalty to God and loyalty to the 
stranger go together in church tradition. Experience of God comes from encounters with God 
in the tensions of life and communal experiences, like glimpses of truth in worship that 
includes the marginalized.54   
To use Hans Frei’s categories, God and the Excluded is ‘an exercise chiefly about rather than in 
theology’;55 it is methodological, rather than substantive in content. Rieger combines concern 
for the excluded with experience (including suffering) as a foundation of theology. However, 
his theology of difference, or otherness, relies on experience of the numinous. Despite his 
concern for the less educated, and recognition of the problem, he offers no solution for those 
without such experiences: 
‘Nobody seems to be more aware of the current dilemma of theological reflection 
than those who have been excluded from the mainstreams of theology. For those at 
the margins of society and the church, there are few illusions left, and here the most 
challenging questions are raised.’56  
The thesis will consider further the need for theology to relate conceptually and linguistically 
to ordinary people with their reactions to traditional theism based on modern interpretations 
of the world. 
2.11 Gareth Jones 
These essays from Jones’s The Blackwell Companion to Modern Theology are most relevant.  
Although Garrett Green’s essay, ‘Modernity’, considers Bultmann’s and Tillich’s existentialism, 
the effects of the Second Vatican Council, liberation, black and feminist theologies, and the 
challenge from postmodernism, it does not expand in terms of conceptualising God.57 John De 
Gruchy describes Bonhoeffer’s preference for God being spoken of ‘not on the boundaries but 
at the center, not in weakness but in strength’, rather than as ‘a deus ex machina who is only 
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called upon when everything else has failed’.58 James Byrne relates Bultmann’s decision that, 
since we cannot speak of God in himself, and do not want to lapse into silence, ‘every 
assertion about God is simultaneously an assertion about man and vice versa’. Tillich, on the 
other hand, while also concerned for the Christian message in the modern world, proceeded 
on the basis of a ‘“theonomous culture” in which concern for the unconditioned and ultimate 
is retained (thus “ultimate concern”)’. Byrne outlines the development of Tillich’s systematic 
theology, based on the principle of ‘correlation’ and on a reappraisal of the major ‘symbols’ of 
the Christian tradition. In terms of ‘God’, correlation implied ‘an analysis of the ontological 
question as asked by the human condition and a corresponding analysis of the symbol “God”, 
which is theology’s answer to this question’. ‘God is being-itself, beyond both essence and 
existence . . . .’59  
Ralph Norman touches on the ineffability of God, God being ‘beyond language itself’, and 
traces the history of this aspect of mysticism through the apophatic tradition and into 
postmodernism.60 Bruce Marshall focuses on Rahner’s statement that ‘the “economic” Trinity 
is the “immanent” Trinity, and conversely’. ‘God in his saving action “for us”’, explains 
Marshall, ‘is the same as (or identical with) God “in himself”, the Trinity ad extra is the same as 
the Trinity ad intra’. This is important in Marshall’s thesis, as is Trinitarian definition, because 
‘On the ability to identify God largely depends the sort of relationship it is possible to have 
with God’.61 (Although Marshall does not say so, the reverse might also be true). Karen Kilby’s 
consideration of Rahner focuses more on his concept of Vorgriff [‘defined as ‘pre-
apprehension’] auf esse, the basis for Rahner’s belief in every person’s natural awareness of 
God to some degree.62 Mark McIntosh recounts Hans Urs von Balthasar’s attributing to the 
processes of human aesthetic perception ‘an awareness of the enrapturing power of Being’, of 
which ‘the visible form (the Beautiful) of the concrete universal (Being)’, can only be perceived 
in Christ. This crystallises von Balthasar’s Christocentric approach, together with his emphasis 
on beauty as implicit in the nature of God. The principle behind the incarnation defines von 
Balthasar’s theology: ‘The divine act of existence is . . . constrained by no putative laws of 
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“divine essence” but rather the divine essence is itself the eternally constituted event of the 
free, mutual self-giving of the Divine Persons’.63 
Robert Russell’s and Kirk Wegter-McNelly’s ‘Science’, portrays the epitome of theology’s 
engagement with the contemporary world, attributing to Ian Barbour: ‘models that are 
analogical, extensible, coherent, symbolic, and expressed through metaphors’; and his 
conviction that religion ‘serv[es] non-cognitive functions missing in science, such as eliciting 
attitudes, personal involvement and transformation’.64 
Jones’s work is impressive in its presentation of a great variety of material, but does not 
explicitly develop the subject matter in the direction of informal theology. 
2.12 David Ford 
In a series of The Church Times essays on British academic theology,65 Ford records what he 
describes as the ‘trauma’ for British theology in the first half of the twentieth century from 
logical positivism and analytical philosophy, whose reductionism challenged with such 
questions as ‘But how can you prove . . .?’ and ‘But what do you really mean by . . .?’. Ford 
surveys under generic headings the work of British theologians who have worked against this 
background. In ‘Networks and Movements’, he highlights some who have pursued themes 
associated with ‘movements’, such as liberation theology, feminism, ‘Sea of Faith’ and ‘Radical 
Orthodoxy’. These essays provide a succinct summary of contemporary theology, fully aware 
of the difficulty presented for some by conventional theological concepts. 
Ford’s The Modern Theologians draws on Frei’s types of Christian theology,  identifying five 
types of theology (though reversing Frei’s order), three of which he finds relevant to modern 
Christian theology:  
 primarily Christian, but engaging seriously with the world for greater 
understanding and reinterpretation, for example, Barth, Bonhoeffer, Tom 
Torrance, Donald MacKinnon, Michael Ramsey and Williams; 
 balancing Christianity with modernity on a more even basis, for example, 
Tillich, Edward Schillebeeckx and Küng; and 
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 taking modern philosophy as a way of integrating Christianity with an 
understanding of modernity, for example, Pannenberg and Bultmann, on the 
basis of existentialism.66  
These distinctions are indicative of the twentieth century struggle to make sense of 
Christianity amid advances in the natural sciences, fresh philosophical approaches that have 
infected both academic and popular mindsets, and a less subservient and more questioning 
public attitude.  
Elements of the book relevant to this thesis include commentary on Bonhoeffer’s use of 
analogy and his concern about a ‘god of the gaps’,67 and Tillich’s strategy of mediating 
between contemporary culture and historical Christianity.68 Peter Sedgwick’s chapter on 
British Anglican theology touches on the concept of God in Farrer, and to a lesser extent 
MacKinnon.69 Gavin D’Costa describes John Hick’s liberal, pluralist, theocentric (as opposed to 
Christocentric) approach.70 Philip Clayton deals with particular issues within science, with 
panentheism as a means of reconciling theology with scientific accounts of the world.71 Celia 
Deane-Drummond includes a critique of Richard Dawkins’s writings on genetic natural 
selection and Keith Ward’s response,72 but was published just too soon to deal with Dawkins’s 
The God Delusion73 and Ward’s response in Why There Almost Certainly Is a God.74 
Sedgwick’s chapter on British Anglican theology highlights Farrer’s ‘investigation of biblical 
symbolism and imagery.’  He quotes Farrer: ‘Poetry and divine inspiration have this in 
common, that both are projected in images which cannot be decoded, but must be allowed to 
signify what they signify of the reality beyond them’.75 Its salience is in indicating the 
limitations of language, and the potential of images or symbols to communicate what is 
otherwise incommunicable.  
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The Modern Theologians is thematic, rather than systematic, providing an introduction to a 
range of influential twentieth century theologians and a range of ways in which theology has 
responded to some twentieth century demands. Although some of the essayists deal explicitly 
or implicitly with conceptualising God, informal conceptualising and difficulties in speaking of 
God do not figure where they might have done, in the ‘Theology and Spirituality’76 and 
‘Pastoral and Practical Theology’ chapters.77 
2.13 Philip Kennedy 
Kennedy’s works surveyed here are text books, but are included as surveys of theology. In his 
basic A Modern Introduction to Theology, he recounts the history of the concept of God from 
the earliest times. The greatest challenge to Christianity’s view of God as omnipotent and 
omni-benevolent he reckons to be horrific human suffering since Hiroshima in 1945.78  
As Kennedy ranges across the rise of modernity and the Enlightenment, he mentions: 
seventeenth century English deism; Kant’s rejection of dogmatic metaphysics, ontological and 
a posteriori arguments for the existence of God, and the possibility of knowing God; and 
Nietzsche’s ‘God is dead’. For Hegel, God is ‘neither immovable nor unchangeable’, but 
‘immanent in the world as a spiritual process’, for ‘Without the world God is not God.’79  . 
Feuerbach went further, believing that Christianity is the product of psychological projection, 
so that, ‘to speak of God speaking, forces divine revelation to conform to human nature and 
physiology’. Küng similarly states ‘that in belief in God human beings . . . extract their human 
nature and see it as something outside themselves, separate from them’.80 
Kennedy is sympathetic to Gustavo Gutiérrez’s liberation theology; and to Mary Daly’s ‘if God 
is male, then the male is God’: avoiding male pronouns to refer to God ‘is not a matter of 
appeasing feminists. It is a matter of idolatry. . . . by definition . . . the recognition as absolute . 
. . that which is finite’.81 
Kennedy deplores designations of God based on pre-modern thinking:  ‘The task of completely 
revising language about God in the light of [modern] cosmology has barely begun’. The failure 
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ever to depict God adequately is because ‘Whatever theologians state about God is muttered 
against the profound silence of a much deeper and inescapable nescience’.82 Theology, he 
says, ‘is always stammering because the object of its discourse, God, is ungraspable, 
atemporal, indecipherable and extraphenomenal’: ‘The greatest theologians of the twentieth 
century were the most negative’, in ‘being vividly aware that God is best discussed in terms of 
what God is clearly not’, and were ‘attentive to the problem suffering causes for fatuous 
discourses that God is good and cares for people.’ Bonhoeffer’s awareness of suffering led him 
to believe that ‘only the suffering God can help’, and recognised the possibility that, having 
come of age, the world no longer had need for the ‘working hypothesis’ called ‘God’, with the 
possibility of religionless Christianity, in which Christ was ‘really the Lord of the world'.83 
Moltmann’s wartime experience led him to conclude that ‘God suffers in response to human 
suffering’, although differently from creatures, and Mercy Amba Oduyoye has reached similar 
conclusions about the suffering of God, whose ‘womb becomes agitated at the sight of 
suffering and meanness’ – the basis of her African liberation theology.84   
Kennedy observes that atheists and theists can agree with Tillich’s statements that ‘God is not 
anything! . . . The being of God is being-itself’, that is, not a being alongside other beings. 
Kennedy writes: ‘The recognition that Christological and theological terms are symbolic is a 
lynchpin of Tillich’s thought’, and ‘for liberal theologians . . . it becomes difficult . . . to regard 
Christian teachings as true and credible if they are regarded as facts on a par with empirically 
demonstrable evidences’.85 
For Gordon Kaufman, God is ‘a symbol and . . . “cultural construct”’, the word ‘God’ being 
problematic because of its connotation of transcendence, and therefore removed from the 
reaches of human experience.  Eventually, Kaufman replaces the traditional idea of God as a 
transcendent Father-Lord-Creator with God as ‘a serendipitous creativity in the world’,86 
including the cosmological Big Bang. Despite the attractiveness of this, Kennedy objects: 
If God is in the world, God will die, because everyone and everything in the world is 
finite, as the Second Law of Thermodynamics instructs. As ingenious as Kaufman’s 
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works are, it will probably prove difficult for people to love, worship and take as the 
ultimate focus of their lives, the abstract metaphor of Serendipitous Creativity.87   
Cupitt, says Kennedy, is not an atheist, but has ‘renounced . . . a Greek understanding of God 
and a Platonic understanding of reality’ with their respective implications of ‘God as other and 
beyond’.88 ‘Cupitt latterly thinks that God is a religious ideal and symbol . . . .For Cupitt . . . Life 
is God . . . . To love life is to love God’.89 Thus Cupitt is led to apophatic theology.90 
There is commonality between these two works, in that both suggest that Christian theology, 
including its concepts of God, are so culturally rooted in the past as to be unfit for purpose in 
the twenty-first century. The earlier, Modern Introduction, is the more radical, more 
castigating in its view of theology as held for the most part within the Christian Church. The 
second is more accommodating, in terms of the search for alternative approaches. Both 
encapsulate the twentieth and twenty-first century challenges to theology from modernity in 
academia and in the popular mind. They portray the challenge to inherited concepts of God, 
culturally conditioned in cosmological, philosophical, geographical and gender terms, and the 
beginnings of some twentieth century solutions. 
2.14 Alister McGrath 
McGrath’s Christian Theology, like Kennedy’s work, is for entry theological study, summarising 
the main theological categories over Christian history, and the debate between philosophy and 
theology: the arguments for the existence of God, the apophatic and kataphatic approaches, 
analogy, metaphor and accommodation.  
When McGrath turns to wider theological movements, feminism, liberation theology, black 
theology, postliberalism and Radical Orthodoxy, brief hints are offered of alternative ways of 
conceiving God: as female as well as male; as being on the side of the poor; as ‘concerned for 
the black struggle for liberation’; as emphasising once more ‘the particularity of the Christian 
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faith, in reaction against the strongly homogenizing tendencies of liberalism’;91 and as the 
subject of a self-confident Christianity, free of modern and postmodern secularisms. 
McGrath tackles Moltmann’s theory of a suffering God in reaction to wartime horrors. He 
progresses to the death of God, originated by Friedrich Nietzche, followed by Hamilton’s 
‘experience of the absence of God’. Paul van Buren, on the basis that the word ‘God’ had 
ceased to have meaning, ‘sought to ascertain how the gospel might be stated in purely 
atheological terms’; and Altizer suggested that, even if belief in God could not be retained, it 
was still possible to speak of God being Jesus in order to give authority to his words and deeds. 
Process theology, pioneered by Whitehead, found God in the processes of change in the 
universe, with his omnipotence redefined in terms of influence within the world process.92 
So, McGrath describes some of the intellectual challenges for conceptualising God in the post-
war period, and theological responses that have been made.  However he does not explicitly 
describe the decline in theism during this period, or propose any remedies that would prove 
persuasive in the world of ordinary believers  
2.15 Fergus Kerr 
Kerr’s Twentieth-Century Catholic Theologians contains biographies of ten twentieth century 
Roman Catholic theologians with varying degrees of conformity to Vatican norms,93 two of 
whose work is relevant to this thesis, addressing the philosophical issues arising from 
conceptualising God. 
Although ‘there is no question of “a natural intuition of God as an original apanage of the 
human mind”’, Henri-Marie de Lubac contends that, in contrast to Thomist natural theology 
with God as the conclusion of an argument, a preliminary and underlying idea of God, however 
tenuous, is necessary in order to develop one’s thinking about God. He identifies the apophatic 
approach as a ‘classical form of Thomism’; Kerr adds that ‘The idea of God, which is not a 
concept, is a reality: “the very soul of the soul; a spiritual image of the Divinity, an eikon”’.94 
Through de Lubac, Kerr offers insight into the psychology of belief, highlighting the sequence 
of initial perception, concept formation and the development of language.  
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With Rahner, God’s ‘absolute fullness of being’ makes for incomprehensibility and mystery for 
human finitude. However, this produces true human perspective: being is ‘bestowed . . . by the 
mystery’, and ‘essential human capacity for truth’ is established by the mystery of 
transcendence.95  
2.16  Jeff Astley 
Astley’s concern in Ordinary Theology, is ‘to take seriously the beliefs of “non-theologically 
educated” churchgoers and other Christian believers, and of those outside the churches’, to 
which, he says, insufficient attention has been given, even by practical theology. His 
expression, ‘ordinary theology’ (‘informal theology’ in this thesis), denotes the ‘theological 
beliefs and processes of believing that find expression in the God-talk of those believers who 
have received no scholarly theological education’.96  
Astley’s work is fundamentally different from any other considered in this literature review, 
but is directly relevant to this thesis. Within the discipline of academic theology, it deals with 
informal theology, and stands at the interface between the two. It is a work about theology, 
however, more than about the content of ordinary theology. Astley outlines the ways and 
context in which religion and religious content are learned, and analyses the difference 
between knowing about God and knowing God.  He moves to ordinary theology, mentioning 
some deistic responses in a survey about God, some feminist tendencies and Don Cupitt’s 
commending of ‘democratic ordinariness’. He outlines some appropriate research and study 
methods for ordinary theology. Astley defends ordinary theology against charges that being 
‘Too Concrete and Anthropomorphic’ in terms of images of God necessarily diminishes 
theology.97 
Astley’s Exploring God-talk98 is wholly different, written not for academic study but as a study 
tool for individuals and groups who wish to take further their basic study of Christianity. 
Although an exercise in practical ordinary theology, it is not for ordinary believers, being 
couched in academic language and exploring concepts like metaphor, model, myth, analogy 
and mystery: this is a serious handbook with a pastoral slant. Exploring Ordinary Theology,99 is 
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an edited compilation, with Leslie Francis, of essays describing the experiences and language 
of ordinary believers. It includes three essays relating directly to the subject of the thesis, two 
by Astley, one general and one about the relationship between ordinary and academic 
theology, and one by Tania ap Siȏn about the concepts of God implied on a cathedral prayer 
board (to be described later in the ‘Informal Theology’ chapter, where Astley’s work will also 
be considered further). 
2.17 Conclusion 
Although it is not possible to draw hard lines between one and the other, Frei’s distinction 
between ‘an exercise chiefly about theology’ and an exercise ‘in theology’100 is useful in 
considering the works included in this literature review. Many of the writers discuss theology’s 
response to changing philosophy and culture on the matter of conceptualising God or at least 
concepts of God. This includes Ford, McGrath, Baum and, with, his examination of responses 
to logical empiricism, Macquarrie. Gilkey’s essay in Hodgson and King offers an historical 
account of concepts of God, and of current difficulties presented by the natural sciences and 
current theological thinking, although he does not deal with linguistic issues. 
Concepts are relative to their contexts, both historical and geographical, as Gilkey suggests 
with respect to liberation theology.  Grenz and Olson, Kennedy and McGrath mention 
Moltmann’s concept of a suffering God that emerged from wartime experience, offering a 
reminder that, if some concepts of God ‘fail’ with the passage of time or changes in human 
experience, then difficulties in actually conceiving are likely to arise, although other concepts, 
like that of a suffering God, may thrive. Robinson, in Honest to God, seems to acknowledge 
this, with the popularity of his book indicating its contextual relevance. Concepts are 
inescapable in a consideration of conceiving of God with informal concepts as important as 
credal, ontological statements. 
The literature under review, even the most academic writing, is addressing that fundamental 
issue of human nature, how to speak of God, who by definition is beyond human definition, 
description or even comprehension.  Some post-1945 theologians have moved in an apophatic 
direction, almost to the post of atheism. It may be a similar, more instinctive, conclusion that 
has led sections of humanity generally not to bother trying to speak of God.  General 
awareness of ‘image’ and ‘symbol’ as characteristics of language – and essential to theological 
language – may have been partially lost, even though other visual images and ‘icons’ figure 
prominently in daily life, particularly in advertising. The theologians whose work has been 
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included in this literature review have responded in different degrees to this academic and 
pastoral challenge, particularly Macquarrie to philosophical trends. Rieger has described 
theology based on experience, and communicating with excluded and less educated sections 
of society.  
Although Darren Marks and his contributors101 respond to social events and issues, and David 
Fergusson102 to issues of belief, unbelief and disbelief, their work has not been included, since 
they do not constitute surveys of theology.  
Astley’s work is included as most directly relevant to the subject of this thesis, especially when 
he deals with the conceptualisation of God by ‘ordinary’ people doing their ordinary theology. 
However, Astley largely does not examine the content of informal theology or examine in 
detail the relationship between difficulties in conceptualising God on the part of academic 
theologians and ordinary believers.  So there is no evidence that the topic of this thesis has 
already been explored in the way that is now envisaged – either by Astley or by any other 
writer who has been surveyed. It is therefore hoped that this present thesis will make an 
original contribution to this field of investigation. 
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Chapter 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This methodological description will set out: 
 the approach to historical theology; 
 practical theology and the empirical research study: 
o gathering sociological evidence; 
o considering writings about ‘informal theology’; 
o the questionnaires and interviews ; and 
o the models of quantitative and qualitative research being used; and 
 intentions by way of conclusions. 
3.2 The approach to historical theology 
A major part of this thesis consists of historical theology, which, although limited to UK Anglican 
theology, includes references to other theologians whom this research has found to be influential to UK 
Anglican theology, including Bultmann, Bonhoeffer, Tillich, Hick and Rahner. Popular theology is, in 
view of the immensity of this field, limited to that emanating from theologians of more or less liberal 
tendency, more conservative popular theology generally not addressing the basic conceiving of God.  
For Colin Gunton, historical theology is: ‘that discipline whose task is to expound the course of Christian 
theology through time, within its different historical and cultural contexts’, with two assumptions:  
that there is no such thing as pure objectivity, but that all interpretation involves some kind of 
provisional judgement that arises from the personal involvement of the scholar in the subject 
matter [and that] our doctrinal past is best understood if its representatives are taken seriously 
as living voices with whom we enter into theological conversation.1 
He notes the inter-relatedness of systematic theology, asking, with relevance for this thesis, ‘whether 
the formation of Christian theology in the early days with the assistance of concepts borrowed from 
Greek philosophy is helpful or harmful as we attempt to articulate Christian theology systematically 
today’.2 This is consistent with McGrath’s observations that: ‘Christianity often unconsciously absorbs 
ideas and values from its cultural backdrop’; that ‘there is a provisional or conditional element to 
Christian theology, which is not necessitated by or implied in its foundational resources’; and that 
‘certain ideas which have often been regarded as Christian ideas may turn out to be ideas imported 
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from a secular context’.3 Context is important for this thesis, in terms of the changing British cultural 
assumptions that underlie the development of UK Anglican theology from 1945 to the present.  
Grace Davie, among others, describes how UK church attendance has declined significantly and 
progressively since 1945, as has underlying Christian belief, though less dramatically.4  These 
shifting cultural factors have lent impetus to theological writing and the search for Christian 
restatement for a post-modernist age of conscious and unconscious deconstruction and 
scepticism in some academic and popular thinking. Note has been taken of the responses of 
academic theologians in this respect, as they have taken a more provisional and contextual 
approach than was shown in past times.  
3.3 Practical theology 
The term ‘practical theology’ in this thesis includes not only the features outlined below but 
also the researcher’s exercise in empirical research. It is distinguished in this thesis from 
pastoral theology, the latter being identified here not as a branch of practical theology but as 
theology written with particular pastoral intent. 
James Woodward and Stephen Pattison explain that, in the German Protestant tradition, where, they 
say, the term ‘practical theology’ originated in the late eighteenth century, this branch of theology 
extended beyond matters of pastoral care ‘to specialist interest in worship, preaching, Christian 
education and church government’, with the purpose of ‘apply[ing] theological principles to these 
activities’.  So practical theology is ‘concerned with how theological activity can inform and be 
informed by practical action in the interests of making an appropriate, effective Christian response in 
the modern world’.  ‘Practical theology’ thus ‘impl[ies] a more mutual, dialogical process (with, for 
example, mission and evangelism) than the simple application of theological truths and conclusions in 
practice’.5  
Pattison and Gordon Lynch settle for five characteristics of practical theology: 
 (1) reflection upon lived contemporary experience; 
 (2) adoption of an interdisciplinary approach; 
 (3) critical dialogue between theological norms and contemporary experience;  
 (4) preference for liberal or radical models of theology; 
                                                 
3 McGrath, Christian Theology, p.108. 
4 Davie, Grace, Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging, Oxford, Blackwell, 
1994, pp. 45-56, 105-8, 112-114; ‘Social Surveys’ Appendix. 
5 Woodward, James and Pattison, Stephen, eds., The Blackwell Reader in Pastoral and Practical 
Theology, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, pp. 2, 3. 
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 (5) need for theoretical and practical, transformation [presumably individual, ecclesiastical and 
societal].6 
A summary of the authors’ exploration of each, and a comment in terms of this thesis follow.  
 (1) implies the theologian’s own experience or others’ experience (gained from empirical 
research or reading). This present thesis arose from the researcher’s perception of some 
attitudes in the Christian community and will be shaped by research within that community.  
 (2) implies the use of human sciences like psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science 
and cultural studies. This thesis uses informal sociological survey methods.  
 (3) implies a ‘deductive, applicationist approach’, with data used inductively and directly to 
inform theology, and with interaction and mutual affect between experience and traditional 
theology. This thesis explores relationships between academic, popular and informal theology 
over the period in question.  
 (4) generally implies a greater emphasis on certain forms of theology. This thesis explores 
whether more liberal or radical forms of theology offer respite for any who have difficulty in 
conceiving God.  
 (5) implies an expectation of a positive effect. This thesis provides useful insights for the Church 
of England’s pastoral and liturgical practice.   
In summary, all of Pattison and Lynch’s characteristics of practical theology are reflected in this thesis. 
Similarly, the thesis reflects the principles included in John Swinton and Harriet Mowat’s definition of 
practical theology as: 
dedicated to enabling the faithful performance of the gospel and to exploring and taking 
seriously the complex dynamics of the human encounter with God. . . . [It] takes seriously the 
idea of performing the faith and seeks to explore the nature and in particular the faithfulness of 
that performance.7 
Swinton and Mowat distinguish practical theology from applied theology on the basis of practical 
theology’s role in challenging the Christian community’s practices to ensure they ‘remain faithful to the 
“script” of revelation’.8 This is intriguing, since the challenge might have been to ensure faithfulness to 
                                                 
6 Pattison and Lynch, ‘Pastoral and Practical Theology’, p. 410. 
7 Swinton, John and Mowat, Harriet, Practical Theology and Qualitative Research, London, 
SCM, 2006, p. 4. 
8 Swinton and Mowat, Practical Theology, p. 6. 
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human experience: the conundrum is not explicitly resolved, but is soluble, though at risk of some 
circularity, by interpreting ‘the “script” of revelation’ as referring to revelation as interpreted in the light 
of human experience. Interaction between revealed theology and human experience occurs in this 
thesis, as a balance is struck between experiences of conceptualising God over two thousand years and 
of conceptualising God over the last mere seventy years.  
Woodward and Pattison write that the work of practical theology is ‘to help generate concepts, norm, 
and actions that will be of practical utility and make a difference . . . help[ing] to direct and shape the 
concrete service of the Christian community in the world’. The authors’ description of the way theology 
had to adjust to the horrors of the Holocaust, for example with Moltmann’s idea of the ‘crucified God’, 
finds echoes in this thesis.  They advocate flexibility, interdisciplinary learning and skill in ‘selecting and 
interpreting evidence from many sources’, including historical and textual methods, empirical surveys 
and questionnaires ‘to establish the nature of contemporary beliefs and behavior [sic]’; with reflection 
and articulation; and  a process of induction, to complement deduction, so that principles or general 
truths are formulated on the basis of observations.9  
a. Sociological evidence 
The first stage of practical theology in this thesis was examining sociological evidence of the 
background to the demise of much traditional Christian belief during the period in question. 
This includes academic sociological and historical writings, together with direct source material 
from opinion polls, surveys and statistical data.  Although most does not relate to detailed 
beliefs, reference has been made to overall trends.  
b.  Informal theology 
The second stage was to survey writings about, and examples of, informal theology, with a 
chapter devoted to this topic. 
c. Questionnaires and interviews 
Astley stresses the validity of ordinary theology, and the opportunities presented by research 
interviews and questionnaires, provided that they are accompanied by self-reflection and 
genuine listening on the part of the researcher.10 The interview and analysis process followed 
                                                 
9 Woodward and Pattison, Blackwell Reader, pp. 7-10. 
10 Astley, Jeff, ‘The Analysis, Investigation and Application of Ordinary Theology’, p. 4. 
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the principles established beforehand and listed in Appendix 2, and corresponds with the 
process of questionnaire and interview briefly described by Pete Ward.11 
A process of questionnaires and interviews has been followed with a sample of thirty-two 
Church of England attenders. The limitation of restriction to Winchester was recognized, with 
Winchester not socially typical of Britain, containing no large areas of multiple deprivation, 
despite areas of partial social housing, and little ethnic diversity.12 The relatively high average 
level of education and above-average average age within the largely self-selected sample lent 
strength to the survey approach, in that participants quickly grasped the purpose of the 
research, mostly had significant experience to draw on and were confident in expressing their 
views. As far as possible, objectivity by the researcher characterised the questionnaire and 
interview process and the recording and evaluation stages. To this end, the work of Riet Bons-
Storm13, Ian Fraser14 and Ellen Clark-King15 offered helpful pointers. The questions included in 
the questionnaires and interviews were drawn from the historical and informal theology 
surveys.  
To some extent, the selection of those, all lay-people, interviewed was determined by which 
clergy indicated willingness to participate and by which individuals within the church 
communities agreed to be interviewed.  A few participants were recommended to offer 
themselves by others who had taken part. The sample included participants from churches of 
different traditions of ‘churchmanship’ and from churches in socially different parts of 
Winchester.  Although comparative data was obtained from Winchester City Council about 
indices of affluence and deprivation, it did not prove possible to relate them usefully to 
participants’ residences or their church’s parishes, given the considerable fluidity over church 
attendance in Winchester. 
                                                 
11 Fiddes, Paul S., ‘Ecclesiology and Ethnography: Two Disciplines, Two Worlds?’, Ward, Pete, 
ed., Perspectives on Ecclesiology and Ethnography, Cambridge, William B. Eerdmans, 2012, p. 
22. 
12Winchester City Council, http://www.winchester.gov.uk/data/economic-social-data/index-
multiple-deprivation-2010/, and ‘Around 92% of Winchester's population is 'White British' 
(approximately 10% higher than England & Wales average)’, 
http://www.winchester.gov.uk/data/census/census-2011/ethnicity-amp-religion/ both 
downloaded, 11.04.2014.  
13 Bons-Storm, Riet, The Incredible Woman: Listening to Women’s Silences in Pastoral Care and 
Counseling, Nashville, Abingdon, 1996. 
14 Fraser, Ian M., Reinventing Theology as the People’s Work, Glasgow, Wild Goose, 1980, 
revised 1988. 
15 Clark-King, Theology by Heart: Women, the Church and God, Peterborough, Epworth, 2004, 
pp. 5, 7, 9, 10. 
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Participants were offered individual or group interviews, although all opted for individual 
interviews. The questionnaire and the topics for interview are in Appendices 3 and 4. The 
process with each participant consisted of: 
i. a questionnaire, to provide some quantitative data and to help participants focus on 
the issues;  
ii. a semi-structured interview. This featured:  
opening with an introduction about the process, and an early reference to a 
point of interest within the questionnaire responses;  
the researcher ensuring that, in the course of the dialogue, most of the of the 
planned points were covered;  
opportunity for participants to tell their stories of faith (after the pattern of 
Bons-Storm16), with prompting to ensure they included their history of 
meaningful and non-meaningful concepts of God, and ease and difficulty in 
conceiving of God; and 
  principles adapted from a set enunciated by Fraser as:17 
 never to transpose the burning concerns of people into some alien 
sphere of thought; 
 never to rob people of their own language in favour of an in-language 
which does not communicate with them where they are; and 
 always to take seriously the complexity of situations.  
d.  Quantitive and qualitative analysis 
The questionnaires lent themselves to quantitative analysis, with tabulation of personal data 
and responses to questions. Little correlation between personal factors and responses was 
discernible, but interesting trends emerged, as described in the ‘Questionnaires and 
Interviews’ chapter. Although judgement was needed in grouping unexpected answers for 
statistical purposes, scope for undue subjectivism on the part of the researcher was much less 
with quantitative than with qualitative analysis. 
Stressing the distinction between quantitative and qualitative research and the variety of 
approaches to qualitative research, Swinton and Mowat write: 
                                                 
16 Bons-Storm, Incredible Woman, pp. 36-45, 
17 Fraser, Reinventing Theology, p.68. 
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 Qualitative research . . . assumes that human beings are by definition ‘interpretive 
creatures’; that the ways in which we make sense of the world and our experiences 
within it involve a constant process of interpretation and meaning-seeking . . . with 
‘the world’ . . . the locus of complex interpretive processes within which human beings 
struggle to make sense of their experiences including their experiences of God. 
Identifying and developing understandings of these meanings is the primary task of 
qualitative research.18 
Narrative is a key aspect of qualitative research, and ‘narrative knowledge . . . legitimate, 
rigorous and valid’. However, though narrative-based, qualitative research must be ‘careful 
and rigorous’. It will include knowledge of the other, knowledge of phenomena and reflexive 
knowing.  All three kinds of knowledge have been applied in the course of the practical 
theology for this thesis.  The experiences, narratives and actual believing and disbelieving of 
British residents will be ‘knowledge of others’, and have been discovered from sociological 
writings, opinion polls and, most important, questionnaires and interviews.  Knowledge of 
phenomena was discovered tangentially, as common patterns of believing in God emerged 
from reactions to particular events, like those involving suffering. Reflexivity involved 
awareness of the assumptions that the interviewer risked bringing to the process, and is: ‘the 
process of critical self-reflection carried out by the researcher throughout the research process 
that enables [him] to monitor and respond to [his] contributions to the proceedings’.19 
It has been important to hold in mind what Swinton and Mowat, following Lincoln and Guba, 
call ‘constructivism’20 – that is, recognising that truth, knowledge and perception are 
constructed by human beings and their communities, that ‘reality’ is open to a variety of valid 
interpretations and ‘can never be accessed in a pure, uninterpreted form’. This researcher has 
therefore been mindful ‘that the researcher will be involved in the research process not as a 
distant observer, but as an active participant and co-creator of the interpretive experience,’ 
and that ‘within the constructivist paradigm the boundaries between the researcher and the 
subject of the research process are blurred and interconnected’. The remedy in this research 
analysis has therefore been constant self-awareness, or ‘personal reflexivity’ and sensitivity to 
people and situations, particularly through interviews and qualitative analysis.21 
The researcher was not aware of interviewees being over-accommodating in accepting the 
researcher’s interpretation of their informal theology, as Astley suggests might occur, and tried 
                                                 
18 Swinton and Mowat, Practical Theology, pp. 44, 29-30. 
19 Swinton and Mowat, Practical Theology, pp. 38, 31, 33-34, 59. 
20 Swinton and Mowat, Practical Theology, p. 35, following Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G., 
Naturalistic Enquiry, London, Sage, 1985; similarly, Clark-King, Theology by Heart, p. 5. 
21 Swinton and Mowat, Practical Theology, pp. 35, 59-66. 
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to ensure that no view remained unrecorded, whether or not particular informal theology was 
‘faithful to Christian norms’.22  
A model of research process for this thesis was provided by Swinton and Mowat’s own 
example, and included: 
 questionnaires relating to basic understanding of God; 
 a series of in-depth interviews, recorded and transcribed; 
 the researcher immersing himself in the texts, themes beginning to emerge 
and themes being collected; 
 thematic analysis of each transcript; 
 data being collated and final reflection and writing started, the texts being 
compared and contrasted in a search for patterns; and 
 drafting and rewriting the text.23 
Swinton and Mowat refer to a need for ‘theoretical sensitivity’, a term drawn from B. G. 
Glaser, referring to: 
 a personal quality of the researcher.  It indicates an awareness of the subtleties of 
meaning of data. . . . [It] refers to the attribute of having insight, the ability to give 
meaning to data, the capacity to understand, and capability to separate the pertinent 
from that which isn’t.24 
Despite this advocacy of sensitivity, however, it has been important for the researcher to maintain 
proper objectivity,25 even in the analysis of data.  The researcher has tried to avoid over-generalisation, 
as considered by Swinton and Mowat, particularly in the light of the relatively small size of the sample 
of interviewees and the limited context of one small, southern city. So the results can be treated as a 
useful ‘snapshot’, pointers to an understanding of how some ordinary believers may be viewing God: 
they are not the result of a truly scientific survey. Yet research only has purpose in general application, 
and indeed the very nature of practical theology would suggest that the thesis should have the 
potential for some practical impact and usefulness. The keys to resolving this dilemma and to testing 
for transferability are, for Swinton and Mowat, ‘identification and resonance’.26 It will be for others, if 
                                                 
22 Astley, ‘Analysis, Investigation and Application of Ordinary Theology’, pp. 6-7. 
23 Swinton and Mowat, Practical Theology, pp. 117-19. 
24 Swinton and Mowat, Practical Theology, p. 57 (quoting Strauss, A. and Corbin, J., Basics of 
Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques, Newbury Park, Sage, 1990, 
p. 42, referring to Glaser, B.G., Theoretical Sensitivity, Mill Valley, Sociology, 1978). 
25 Swinton and Mowat, Practical Theology, p. 61. 
26 Swinton and Mowat, Practical Theology, p. 46-47. 
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so minded, to establish whether other people in the same context and other contexts can identify with 
the findings of the research and find resonance with its conclusions. 
3.4 Intentions by way of conclusions 
The thesis brings together research conducted according to the methodologies of historical 
theology and practical theology, analogous to ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ mathematics, and compares 
them for validity in terms of each other. The drawing of conclusions has been more cerebral, 
with importance attached to retaining as much objectivity as possible and avoiding projection 
of presumed conclusions.  The intentions have been: 
 to produce some conclusions about the extent to which the understanding and 
expectations, positive and negative, (including logical and philosophical 
difficulties) described by academic theologians match the actual, informal 
theology of ordinary believers, and vice versa; and   
 to highlight some areas of theology and pastoral practice where there are 






In this section, post-1945 UK Anglican theologians are explored thematically.  The fundamental 
need for Analogy in relation to God’s nature and relationships with the world leads into a 
consideration of God’s Immanence and thus into issues raised by Process Theology and the 
Passibility of God.  Cultural Relativism’s effects within theology include Feminist Theology, 
and it has contributed to Liberal Theology Landmarks since 1960. Alongside this, efforts to 





Chapter 4: ANALOGY 
4.1.  Language about God 
Language, the basis of theology, is indispensable in our conceiving of God. Yet Ayer’s 
verification principle, in his logical positivist Language, Truth and Logic1 (just preceding the 
period of this thesis), casts doubt on the meaningfulness of metaphysicical and theological 
language. However, Wittgenstein’s emphasis on ‘language games’2 allows religious language to 
acquire linguistic respectability within the religious language game. Gerald Loughlin implies a 
language-game in the Christian community: what is important is ‘learning a language, 
assimilating a culture, entering a textual world’.3 He characterises the issue as: 
turn[ing] on where theology stands to view the world:  outside or inside the religious 
text or semiotic system.  Is the signification of ‘God’ determined by the reality to which 
it refers or the experience it symbolises, or does its meaning depend upon how it is 
used, and thus how it helps to shape the experience of people within the Church?  
Does its meaning depend upon something outside the Christian system (extratextual), 
or upon the system itself (intratextual)?4 
Lindbeck answers that the way to determine what ‘God’ signifies: 
 is by examining how the word operates within a religion and thereby shapes reality 
and experience rather than by first establishing its propositional or experiential 
meaning and reinterpreting or reformulating its uses accordingly.5 
D. Z. Phillips questions whether the same criterion of rationality applies both within and 
without religion: ‘the reality of God cannot be assessed by a common measure which also 
applies to things other than God’. Asserting that God is no thing is, he argues, not the same as 
asserting that God is nothing; and enquiring about the beginning and end of God’s existence is 
‘ungrammatical’, nonsensical.6 William Alston wonders if ‘a certain nonstatemental way of 
understanding the content of religious beliefs’ lies behind D.Z. Phillips’s position, such that 
assertions ostensibly about ‘a reality that transcends the natural world’ are in fact ‘expressing 
attitudes towards the world of nature and human life’, and are, particularly in worship, 
expressive of worship of God rather than ‘referring expressions’ about ‘some object called 
                                                 
1 Ayer, A.J., Language, Truth and Logic, London, Victor Gollancz, 1936. 
2 Wittgenstein, Ludwig,  Philosophical Investigations, London, Blackwell, 1953.  
3 Loughlin Gerald, Telling God’s Story: Bible, Church and Narrative Theology, Cambridge, CUP, 
1996, p. 94. 
4 Loughlin, Telling God’s Story, p. 39. 
5 Lindbeck, George A., The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, 
London, SPCK, 1984, p. 114. 
6 Loughlin, Telling God’s Story, pp. 93-94 (quoting Phillips, D. Z., ‘Religious Beliefs and Language 
Games’, Faith and Philosophical Enquiry, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970, p. 85). 
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God’.7  However, Alston concedes a half-way position, with just some theological vocabulary 
dependent upon participation in Christian community understanding, such as ‘grace’, ‘love’, 
‘spiritual’ and ‘glory’, with wider concepts, such as truth and existence,  being more 
fundamental and drawing on language also used in a non-theological sense.8 Either way, for 
Loughlin, coming to belief in God is not so much a matter of reasoning, as ‘learning a language, 
assimilating a culture, entering a textual world. . . . Criteria of rationality, intelligibility and 
meaningfulness are not universal’.9 
Alston considers removing from language about God human elements that conflict with God’s 
immateriality or atemporality, thus arriving at a position of partial univocity. An example is 
allowing an attribution to God of psychological ‘willing’, while removing the temporal human 
stages of decision-making and action.  Alston’s partial univocity relies on ‘metaphorical, 
symbolic, model-dependent’ language to deal with what remains after the univocal core has 
been identified, with metaphor, or model, a phenomenon between univocity and the pure via 
negativa. However, his construing some statements about God (such as ‘God comforted me in 
my distress’) as more about the human effect than the divine origin, as he tries to salvage 
some assertions about God as literal rather than metaphorical, is more questionable, since it is 
difficult to see how the literalness applies to God.10  
William Alston points out that Jesus made unselfconscious, metaphorical use of the term 
‘Father’, rather than engaging in prayer to an abstract ‘source of the being of everything other 
than himself’.11 Janet Martin Soskice insists on the indispensability of metaphor and the 
Christian inability to translate concepts of God into ‘supposedly imageless speech’.12  
Basil Mitchell, ‘a professional philosopher who is a Christian’,13 consciously writing in the wake 
of logical positivism, observes that some non-sense is profound, and wishes to move from pure 
                                                 
7 Alston, William P., ‘Religious Language’, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, 
Oxford, OUP, 2005, p. 226. 
8 Alston, ‘Religious Language’, pp. 226-27. 
9 Loughlin, Telling God’s Story, pp. 94-95. 
10 Alston, ‘Religious Language’, pp. 234-40, 242. 
11 Alston, ‘Religious Language’, p. 242. 
12 Soskice, Janet Martin, Metaphor and Religious Language, Oxford, Clarendon, 1985, pp. 67-
71. 
13 O’Donovan, Oliver, ‘The Reasonable Man: An Appreciation’, Abraham, William J. and Holtzer, 
Steven W., eds., The Rationality of Religious Belief: Essays in honour of Basil Mitchell, Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1987, pp. 2-3; and Hebblethwaite, Brian, ‘Basil Mitchell: Anglican Philosopher’, 
Theology, Vol. CXII, July/August 2009, p. 266. 
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logical positivism to a more useful linguistic analysis of theological statements,14 in defence of 
traditional theism. Considering whether the grace of God is an active force in the world or an 
expression of human attitude or praise, he explores the attribution of activity to God; he 
concludes that a psychologist or a sociologist would not detect the presence of divine activity, 
but would provide alternative descriptions to theological descriptions of what a believer might 
describe as the effect of God’s grace in the world.15 As in the 1981 Doctrine Commission 
report,16 he agrees that predicates applied to God, such as ‘father’, ‘loving’ and ‘wise’, are 
analogical. However, as much of the original, non-analogical, meaning as possible should be 
allowed to stand, so far as is compatible with other descriptors that are thought to apply. Thus, 
for example: ‘That God is incorporeal dictates that “father” does not mean “physical 
progenitor”, but the word continues to bear the connotation of tender, protective care’; and 
God’s wisdom ‘does not . . . have to be learned, since he is omniscient and eternal’.17 Brian 
Hebblethwaite comments: ‘Mitchell brings out both the experiential source of Christian talk of 
God’s grace, and also the analogical nature of the language used to speak of it’.18 
After considering the concepts of analogy and metaphor, this chapter will turn to those post-
1945 UK Anglican theologians who have offered the most sustained contributions on them.  
4.2 Analogy and Metaphor 
Strictly speaking, ‘analogy’ refers to the relationship between the two subjects being 
compared, and ‘metaphor’ to the figure of speech itself. ‘Analogy’ is ‘a form of reasoning in 
which a similarity between two or more things is inferred from a known similarity between 
them in other respects’;19 or, in theological usage: 
 the relationship between two or more different uses of a word such that the use is 
neither equivocal (the meanings on each occasion are utterly diverse and unrelated) 
nor univocal (the meanings are the same).20 
However, for most purposes, ‘metaphor’ and ‘analogy’ have come to have similar meaning, 
and are generally used interchangeably within this thesis. Gunton, Thiselton and Donald 
                                                 
14 Mitchell, Basil, ed., Faith and Logic: Oxford Essays in Philosophical Theology, London, George 
Allen and Unwin, 1957, pp. 3-7. 
15 Mitchell, Basil, The Justification of Religious Belief, London, Macmillan, 1973, pp. 16-18; 
Mitchell, Faith and Logic, pp. 153-56, 173-74. 
16 Mitchell, Basil, ‘I Believe: We Believe’, Believing in the Church: the Corporate Nature of Faith: 
A Report by the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England, London, SPCK, 1981, p. 19. 
17 Mitchell, Justification of Religious Belief, p. 19. 
18 Hebblethwaite, ‘Basil Mitchell’, p. 263. 
19 Hanks, Patrick, ed., The Collins Dictionary of the English Language, London, Collins, 1986, p. 
52. 
20 Ford, David, ed., Modern Theologians, p. 763. 
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MacKinnon are happy with interchangeability, although Soskice and Sue Patterson are ranged 
against it. 
Thiselton describes metaphor as, as ‘provok[ing] the hearer into some kind of reaction’ and 
into seeing something in a new light,21 and Dan Stiver as ‘exemplif[ying] something like Gilbert 
Ryle’s “category mistake” . . . at one level in order to establish meaning at another’.22  Gunton 
cites Nelson Goodman’s delightful ‘teaching an old word new tricks’ and ‘an affair between a 
predicate with a past and an object that yields while protesting’;23 and Anthony Kenny 
emphasizes the ‘irrational’, though expressive, nature of much metaphor: 
Metaphor . . . is . . . taking a word which has a role in one language-game and moving it 
to another. The predicates which we apply to God – predicates, for instance, 
concerning knowledge and love – are taken from other language-games, and used in 
the absence of the criteria which give them their meanings in the language-games in 
which they have their home.24  
Soskice’s starting-point is Aristotle’s simple explanation as the ‘transferred use of a term that 
properly belongs to something else’, with metaphor not always replaceable by literal 
statement, but a linguistic figure of speech that ‘can be extended . . . until the length of our 
speaking of one thing in terms suggestive of another makes us forget the “thing” of which we 
speak’.25 A metaphor (such as ‘leaf of the book’ or ‘flow of electricity’) becomes dead when it 
has ceased through usage to have metaphorical connotations with the source of the 
metaphor.26 
Over-extension of divine metaphors can be detrimental to overall understanding of God, as 
sometimes with theories of the Atonement (for instance, with redemption, being over-
extended by the notion of compensating a present owner) or, for Stiver, with God as father 
being taken to imply masculinity.27 Thiselton writes similarly of the risk of imbalance, or 
preoccupation with a single metaphor, for instance ‘that God is a stern father; that the Church 
is . . . mother’. This highlights the risk of ‘forget[ting] that it is metaphor [and being] seduced 
                                                 
21 Thiselton, Antony C., Language Liturgy and Meaning, Nottingham, Grove Books, 1986, p. 26. 
22 Stiver, Dan, The Philosophy of Religious Language: Sign, Symbol and Story, Oxford, Blackwell, 
1996, p. 118. 
23 Gunton, Colin E., The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the 
Christian Tradition, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1988, p. 28 (quoting Goodman, Nelson, Language 
of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Oxford, OUP, 1969). 
24 Kenny, Anthony, The Unknown God, London, Continuum, 2005, pp. 16-17. 
25 Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, pp. 6-9, 15-23. 
26 Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, pp. 71, 83. 
27 Stiver, Philosophy of Religious Language, p. 118. 
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into speaking nonsense’.28 Soskice’s preference is for ‘incremental theories’ of metaphor (such 
that additional meaning is added) rather than ‘substitution theories’ (such that the matter 
could be expressed otherwise equally effectively) or ‘emotive theories’ (such that the only 
addition is emotional). Relevant factors include the speaker’s intention, the hearer’s reception, 
the context, the mutual beliefs of speaker and hearer and the patterns of inference the hearer 
employs.29  
For Wright, metaphors: are ‘more basic within human consciousness than apparently “factual” 
speech’; ‘invit[e] the hearers into a world where certain things can be seen more clearly 
through this lens’; and enable true words to be spoken in relation to God, ‘a  reality which 
cannot be reduced to terms of the metaphor itself’.30 Patterson requires a ‘correspondence 
between proposition and reality’, and, viewing analogy-making as a secondary language-game 
based on a primary one which provides the subject matter with worldly reference, proposes 
that a secondary language-game directed at God itself becomes the primary one when the 
world’s total dependency on God is appreciated. It can only be from a position of realist faith, 
rather than from analysis of the use of language, that ‘within Christianity predications of 
something to God must assume ontological primacy over predications of the same thing to a 
creature or aspect of the world’. 31  Her priority of faith over reason is akin to a Christian 
language game. 
Soskice’s distinction between analogy and metaphor, roughly followed by Kenny,32 enables her 
to argue, with Aquinas, that saying God is one, wise or good is analogical as a form of literal 
speech, not enlarging the description; whereas saying God is heavy or sweet or happy is 
metaphorical, ‘generat[ing] new perspectives’.33 For Alston, also writing from a Thomist 
perspective, even ‘pure perfection terms’ like ‘goodness’, which seem to be applicable to 
human beings and God alike, cannot be so applied because their modes of application are 
different, remaining inadequate in describing God, but being used literally, he says, of both 
humans and God.34 However, the legitimacy of all these distinctions is uncertain, since analogy, 
particularly in the case of God, does enable the speaker and hearer to gain understanding that 
                                                 
28 Thiselton, Language Liturgy and Meaning, p. 25. 
29 Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, pp. 31, 44. 
30 Wright, New Testament and the People of God, pp. 40 and 61-80, and Wright, Tom, Simply 
Christian, London, SPCK, 2006, pp. 129-30, 135, 164-68. 
31 Patterson, Sue, Realist Christian Theology in a Postmodern Age, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, p. 
97-98. 
32 Kenny, Unknown God, pp. 38-39. 
33 Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, pp. 65-66. 
34 Alston, ‘Religious Language’, p. 242. 
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would not otherwise be available – it is not tautological to say that God is one, wise or good. 
However, the limitations of all language for God are reiterated by Julian Hartt: 
 The philosophical theologian is not licensed to cruise the world hoping to bag 
similitudes of Deity. God is truly not like anything we know and of ourselves. . . . The 
proper ontological categories . . . rightly used provide an orientation upon Deity rather 
than a description of the divine nature.35 
Despite the arguments of those who separate analogy and metaphor, for practical purposes 
there is little between them. What these writers have reinforced is the essential and effective 
nature of both. 
4.3 Analogy and images for Austin Farrer, Eric Mascall, and Donald Mackinnon 
Mascall’s intention is ‘to vindicate, against the generally positivist attitude of Anglo-Saxon 
philosophy . . . , a fundamentally and unashamedly metaphysical approach to theism’.  He does 
not use the term ‘language game’, but the key to understanding theistic language is ‘to enter 
into the linguistic community of those who affirm [God’s existence and nature]’.36 
Understanding comes by ‘get[ting to know God better . . . as a matter of personal experience’37 
– in other words, by faith backed by analogy. Farrer and Mascall are both committed to 
Thomist-inspired analogy, vital and inescapable, even for those Farrer describes as 
‘revelationists’, since God ‘shares no identical characteristic with anything else’, and so 
anything said about the transcendent God has of necessity to be said in words that apply 
literally only to the finite world. 38  Mascall invokes Aquinas, ‘with God’s fundamental attribute 
. . . of self-subsistent being’, and ‘his existence . . . identical with his essence’. He distinguishes 
Anselm’s ‘cogitari’ (‘be thought’) in ‘aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest’ from ‘be imagined’ 
or ‘be visualised’, stressing that, although we cannot imagine God, we can conceive God: ‘We 
know that God is rather than what he is’. And God ‘is not merely the ens maximum, the 
greatest being that exists, but the maxime ens, that which completely is’. For Mascall, the loss 
of a referent through emphasis on the supra-temporal, eternal nature of God’s existence 
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makes the concept of analogy difficult,39 although analogy remains the solution to the problem 
of how ‘to speak about the ineffable and to describe the indescribable’,40 since ‘our attitude is 
confidently realist’.41  Rebutting Robinson’s contentions in Honest to God, Mascall stresses that 
‘any mental picture of God may be a hindrance if it is taken univocally in its unqualified sense . 
. .’.42 Analogy, he concludes, satisfactory for describing the relation between God and the 
world, has to be a combination of analogy of proportionality (when a term applies to both, but 
in ways proportional to their natures) and analogy of attribution (when a term applies literally 
to one, but by association with the other).43 
Analogy for Farrer is at play even when he asserts that ‘it is only through, in, and as creative 
activity that the infinite can be grasped by the finite’.44 God’s activity is, for Farrer, of a Thomist 
double-agency nature, as God acts both to create the world and also acts through finite 
events, including human activity.45  However, just as the analogies of activity and will cannot 
be checked with the referent, so with God as personal: 
We find ourselves withheld from thinking of God as ‘a Person’ simpliciter; we have to 
think of Him as a somewhat in a certain not exactly defined relation to personality. Of 
course we may if we like say ‘God is a Superperson simpliciter; but that is merely to 
cover the mental hiatus with verbal plaster’.46 
God, Farrer asserts, must be at least personal, although, as with other divine attributes, this 
can only be verified on the basis of individual or collective understanding and experience of 
God: ‘in the case of supernatural divine revelation, nothing but the image is given us to act as 
an indication of the reality’.47 It is indeed revelation, or inspiration, upon which Farrer fastens 
for a solution, even with the circularity entailed by uncertainty as to whether the inspiration is 
genuinely divine. Hick describes Farrer’s position: 
                                                 
39 Mascall, E. L., He Who Is, London, DLT, 1943, Libra Edition, 1966, pp. 10-13, 99-100. 
40 Mascall, Word and Images, pp. 1, 101-103, 105-108; Mascall, E.L., Existence and Analogy: A 
Sequel to ‘He Who Is’, London, Longmans Green, 1949, chapter 5, pp. 92-121 (reproduced, 
Mascall, Eric L., ‘The Doctrine of Analogy’, CC, no. 4, summer 1951, pp. 38-57). 
41 Mascall, ‘Doctrine of Analogy’, pp. 40-41. 
42 Mascall, E.L., The Secularisation of Christianity: An Analysis and a Critique, London, DLT, 
1965, Libra Edition, 1967, p. 117. 
43 Mascall, ‘Doctrine of Analogy’, p. 50. 
44 Farrer, Finite and Infinite, p. 26. 
45 Farrer, Austin, Faith and Speculation: An Essay in Philosophical Theology, Edinburgh, T&TC, 
1988, pp. 52-67, especially p. 66; and Hebblethwaite, Brian, The Philosophical Theology of 
Austin Farrer, Leuven, Peeters, 2007, p.3. 
46 Farrer, Finite and Infinite, p. 28. 
47 Farrer, Glass of Vision, p. 58. 
55 
 
When we look at the world with the perceptiveness of a poet, not imposing our 
cultural categories upon it but letting it affect us in its unique concrete particularity, 
our minds are led through the world by a rational path to its infinite creator and 
sustainer.48 
Farrer speaks of ‘a process of images which live as it were by their own life and impose 
themselves with authority’,49 even though no image can be final: ‘When we proceed to live the 
promises [of God’s grace] out, the images are crucified by the reality’.50 Stephen Platten writes 
that Farrer’s ‘argument is always in the direction of remythologisation – images may need to 
be reborn, but certainly they are not dispensable . . .’. However, the question remains as to 
‘whether such images are directly God-given, as Farrer suggests, or rather whether they arise 
from man’s analogical imagination’.51  
Mascall’s appreciation of analogy means that his language about God can be spiritual and 
‘poetical’, as, for example, he writes about the inner life of God in Trinity. God is ‘a personal 
Being of unimaginable splendour, bliss and love’, for which ‘we may well find the poets more 
helpful than the theologians’. Nevertheless, God is immanent as well as transcendent, 
because, if it were not for God’s ‘incessant creative action’, every finite being ‘would collapse 
into non-existence through sheer insufficiency’.  Thus, for Mascall, transcendence alone can 
easily lapse into deism, and immanence alone into pantheism.52  
With regard to ‘poetic image’, Farrer regrets a contemporary general lack of contemplation, 
and a reliance upon technical knowledge rather than a wondering appreciation that can lift 
minds to higher and more intense existence.53 Platten and Edward Henderson are, however, 
concerned: that to ‘allow such imagination to become the preserve of a religious élite would 
be to create a modern Gnosticism of a kind which was quite the opposite of Farrer’s 
intention’,54 with a risk that the ability to know God might be seen as requiring ‘some special 
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cognitive ability with which some are and some are not blessed’.55 Insisting on the 
indispensability of metaphor, Gunton deplores assertions that ‘meaning and truth are 
successfully conveyed only by means of concepts of an intellectual kind which have been 
purified as completely as possible from all imaginative or pictorial content’.56 
For Mackinnon, The Book of Common Prayer exemplifies the limitations of images when it 
addresses God as ‘high and mighty, king of kings, lord of lords’, risking ‘a levelling down of the 
transcendent to the form of a magnified, supra-human reality’ after the model of a Henry VIII. 
He describes the difficulty of knowing how our experiential concepts relate to God’s being, and 
the difficulty with the concept of God commanding – with the irony that God commanded that 
no images be created of God (even verbal images, we may infer), so that silence is the only 
appropriate response to God’s (anthropomorphic) command.57 However, MacKinnon 
commends analogy as a middle way between agnosticism and anthropomorphism, with 
anthropomorphism ‘the worse offence against the metaphysical’.58 As Paul Murray observes, 
‘theology must endure a discipline of silence even to the extent of it bordering on a "healthy 
agnosticism" at times’.59  Silent in the face of the ‘Deus absconditus’, he recognises that even 
the notion of the hiddenness of God employs a metaphor, since God’s hiddenness is not liable 
to discovery in the normal sense.60 Metaphor ‘is perfectly compatible with the allowance that 
such speech is intentionally referential’,61 although the problem of reference remains: 
 Illusion it may prove in the end to be; but, if it does, it will prove itself so, because we 
seek by our sometimes deliberate, sometimes hardly noticed, verbal innovation to 
approach the frontiers of the ultimate, the unknown, though supposedly . . . not finally 
unknowable.62 
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The ‘summum analogatum’ for MacKinnon is ‘the presence of God to his creation’, ‘the 
relation to eternity of the historical action’ of kenosis and the Cross.63  He is seeking a ‘kind of 
awareness’, in the way that an artist may portray a scene on the basis of analogy,64 or, writes 
Sedgwick (with Farrer, concerned ‘to develop a theology of transcendence which denied the 
force of the claims of logical positivism’), ‘a metaphysics which would thrust against the limits 
of language’.65   
MacKinnon’s particular contribution to this thesis – including his influence on Williams and 
John Milbank – is his emphasis on the inadequacy even of analogy to come close to God.  His 
final resort, therefore, is to silence and the hiddenness of God, alongside God’s action in Christ. 
4.4 Analogy for Radical Orthodoxy 
Milbank summarises the basis of Radical Orthodoxy’s approach to God thus: ‘It is only 
Aquinas’s agnosticism which really exemplifies the principle that there is no ratio [i.e., 
‘proportional relationship’] between finite and infinite, and upholds the ontological 
difference’.66 God’s transcendence cannot be prejudiced, and reciprocity in human 
relationships with God appears only by the Holy Spirit within the Christian revelation. But, 
once established, reciprocity leads to participation on an analogical basis, analogy originating 
in God and drawing the Christian community nearer to God’s own knowing. ‘Analogy leads us 
to participation in the life of God’,67 is Steven Shakespeare’s summary.  
Graham Ward expands upon analogies, described as ‘webs of relation and differences’. As in 
reciprocity, ‘we receive analogy’, and are able to do so because ‘we are ourselves analogical in 
being made in the image of’ and because ‘the process of discipleship is anagogical. The 
analogical relations and the anagogical process are themselves nothing other than the 
operations of the divine within creation.’68 By this means, Catherine Pickstock adds, human 
knowledge is ‘able to draw analogically towards God’s manner of knowing’; God is not 
inscrutable, but ‘super-abundantly knowing’, so that ‘we can know something . . . of God’s 
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knowing of Himself . . .[and] analogically predicate knowledge of God’.  God, writes Pickstock, 
‘is pure Mind without remainder’, ‘a more spiritual kind of knower than human beings’, but 
with knowledge ‘more concrete than ours’, because, with Aquinas, ‘God’s mind, although 
immaterial, is mysteriously commensurate with matter, since God creates matter’ and 
therefore knows it.69  
It seems that ‘analogy’ in Radical Orthodoxy is more than the ‘analogy’ that other theologians 
use as virtually a pseudonym for ‘metaphor’, but defines not only in adjectival terms with 
respect to the subject of metaphor, but also adjectivally of human beings themselves, in 
nominal terms of what human beings receive, and adverbially of how the process works. There 
is an air of mystery, and God’s transcendence is well preserved. Key words for Radical 
Orthodoxy’s approach to God are Aquinas’s ‘participation’ and ‘analogy’, although the Thomist 
principle of analogy tends to be assumed more than discussed.   
4.5 Existentialist analogy for John Macquarrie 
Macquarrie recognises the non-literal, evocative and sometimes paradoxical nature of 
language about God,70  with analogy-avoiding theological language being dismissed as 
‘mumbo-jumbo’.71  He operates on two planes, existentialist philosophy and traditional 
Christian imagery and spirituality.  
The notion of gracious Being enables God to be seen as both transcendent and immanent, and 
this, he writes, enables analogia entis ‘neither to assimilate God to man nor yet to put an 
unbridgeable gulf between them’.72 Affinity between God and goodness is implied in the 
analogy between the emotion that the conception of good evokes in us and the emotion that 
God evokes.73 Although not literally true of God, ‘good’ is more appropriate than ‘not good’, 
and represents Being as the ‘prior enabling condition of all goodness’. Divine and human 
relationships may be analogical, as with ‘As a father pities his children, so the Lord pities those 
who fear him’.74 The analogues of king, judge and shepherd emphasize dependency, disclose 
Being not as Being is in itself but as Being relating to us, and  emphasize theological 
statements’ ‘existential-ontological character’. Although all beings have the capacity to be 
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symbols of Being, some symbols take on particular historical significance, such as the Cross, 
fatherhood, the suffering servant and even Christ himself.  As Macquarrie says, his symbolism 
is similar to traditional analogy, but with more stress on existential response and less on 
similarity. He rejects a totally univocal approach to symbolism, since such an approach would 
imply treating Being as a being, but is cautious of equivocality, since such symbolism would 
then offer no insight into Being. So there must be a balance, and sometimes an acceptance of 
paradox.75 Even abstract attributes are difficult to apply to God, including immutability (in the 
light of process theology) and supranaturalism and omnipotence (in the light of scientific 
progress). ‘Omnipotence’ is ‘an evocative image or symbol rather than a philosophical concept 
that can be precisely analysed’. All attributes applied to God are ‘approximate and symbolic’, 
with a balance retained between, for example, God’s omnipotence and love, which together 
constitute the creativity by which God confers being on a ‘letting-be’ basis,76 which, H. P. Owen 
points out, only God, as opposed to Being, could do.77 
Paul Fiddes notes Macquarrie’s dialectical theism,78 and indeed Macquarrie balances: ‘being 
and nothing’; ‘the one and the many’; ‘knowability and incomprehensibility’; ‘transcendence 
and immanence’; ‘impassibility and passibility’; and ‘eternity and temporality’.79 ‘God’, in 
Macquarrie’s existentialist understanding, is ‘the word which the religious man uses for the 
transcendent source of grace’, grace being the remedy for mankind’s despair and 
estrangement – though, as Macquarrie recognises, this gives little content to the notion of 
God.80 He rejects Tillich’s concept of ‘the ground of being’ as implying a substratum or 
substance ‘supposed to underlie the phenomenal characteristics of beings’,81 and notes 
ambiguity in Tillich’s using ‘being’ in two senses, in ‘being itself’ and in ‘the ground of being’.82 
It is unclear, as Fiddes comments, whether ‘being’ for Macquarrie is the only non-analogical 
language applicable to God, or another example of symbolic language.83 The transcendence of 
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Being is not transcendence in the sense of standing above the world, but implies immanence, 
since all things share in Being, with humanity having the special feature of awareness of this.84  
Macquarrie is charting a course between classical transcendence and the ‘the organic model’ 
of immanence, by which the relationship between God and the world is more ‘symmetrical’, 
more reciprocal and mutual. By this approach, there is a strongly implied element of God 
needing the world, as well as the world needing God, with God in some ways vulnerable and 
affected by creation as well as affecting it, the approach bordering on panentheism. In support 
of this organic model, Macquarrie cites Hosea’s image of God as husband and Christ as the 
head of the body.85  
Macquarrie rejects the possibility of ‘an “I-thou” meeting between God and man’ through 
personal revelation, because a meeting between persons requires some physicality, reciprocity 
and mutual knowledge, none of which is possible in relation to Being.   And, although personal 
language is more appropriate than impersonal in relation to God, both are inadequate. Even 
when God is thought of as a person, it is ‘a strange metaphysical kind of person without a 
body’, who ‘“dwelt” metaphorically beyond the world . . .’.86  Avery Dulles is ‘disturbed by 
Macquarrie’s apparent reluctance to assign personal attributes to God’,87 although it is 
describing God as a person that Macquarrie rejects, not the use of personal language for God. 
Macquarrie operates on two parallel planes of the intellectual-abstract and the spiritual-
devotional, and asks: ‘who ever addressed a prayer to necessary being?’88 Rather, ‘In any 
actual theology, the bare language of existence and Being becomes clothed, so to speak, in the 
concrete symbolism of a particular religious faith’, with Christ such a symbol.89 This is 
exemplified when Macquarrie reverts to traditional imagery and anthropomorphism: ‘God 
does not dwell apart, but takes the risk of meeting men in the midst of the world.  This good 
news about God must also be incarnated in the world’s language’.90  
In equating God with ‘holy being’, Macquarrie provides an ontological meaning for ‘God’ in 
terms of being, and an existential meaning in terms of faith commitment.91 Existentialism, the 
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dominant philosophy of the time, articulates Christian theology, but recognizes the danger of 
resorting to spirituality to fill logical gaps. Theology and spirituality are complementary: 
 While theology aims at conceptualisation (though it never quite dispenses with 
images), the language of spirituality is closer to poetry than to science, and makes free 
use of image, metaphor and symbol.  Theology may try to conceptualise God as 
‘necessary being’, or in some other way, but one could hardly pray or sing a hymn to 
necessary being. So spirituality is more likely to think of God as shepherd or king or 
even as spouse, concrete images that are not literally applicable, but which evoke the 
appropriate personal responses in the approach to God. But eventually spirituality may 
lead beyond all words and images to a silent adoration which gathers up all the 
separate images and responses into an inexpressible fullness.92 
4.6 Non-verbal analogy for David Brown 
In his later writing, Brown turns to metaphor as a non-verbal aspect of art, with landscape and 
abstract paintings having the potential to embody truth claims about God's relationship with 
the world. The abandonment of some one-to-one correspondence in some twentieth century 
art, he says, is an effective way of presenting metaphysical or religious claims.  He writes: 
What in effect we discover is religious art moving away from the use of explicit 
Christian symbols and towards an alternative, more neutral set of metaphors – based 
predominantly or exclusively on form and colour alone – where the artists' intention 
has in effect become to offer a new version of natural theology, with truth claims 
made about the existence of God and his relation to the world by means of these new 
metaphors.93 
Art and theology both have: 
symbolic worlds where the relation between symbol and literal fact is at last 
acknowledged to be a highly complex one. That complexity is underscored by a much 
canvassed modern analogy, the far from simple relation between music and 
representation.94  
Brown’s use of ‘metaphor’, and ‘analogy’ with these non-verbal references is a reminder that 
conceptualising God and speaking of God are not the same thing: conceptualising does not 
have to be verbalised, and may remain experiential and internalised, with any consequent 
expression sometimes being artistic. However, the non-verbal reference of ‘metaphor’ and 
‘analogy’, applied to symbolic art, makes use of these terms itself metaphorical or analogical. 
He gives examples where deliberate Christian symbolism may be discerned through subjective 
interpretation, examples that awaken a sense of God in the beholder, and examples where 
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God’s immanence, transcendence or creative and sustaining nature is, consciously or 
unconsciously, in view.  Icons in particular, he says, emphasise transcendence by their style, 
but provide access for worshippers through God’s immanence.95 
When Brown states that ‘God is omnipresent; so is literally neither “in” or “beyond” the world, 
but everywhere or nowhere equally’, he fails to notice that ‘present’, and therefore 
‘omnipresent’ too, must be just as metaphorical when applied to God as the other adjectives 
he is describing. When he refers to ‘the way in which God can come sacramentally close to his 
world and vouchsafe experiences of himself through the material’, he seems to accept the 
metaphorical nature of the two verbs applied to God. So with transcendence and immanence, 
since: 
God is neither quite ‘beyond’ the world nor ‘in’ it. More is really being said 
about how God is consequently perceived, and what that means for our 
relationship with him. It is my conviction that both perspectives are in fact 
essential for any adequate theology.96  
4.7 Models and Qualifiers for Ian Ramsey and Anthony Thiselton 
Ramsey’s Religious Language opens with believers claiming that God is indescribable and 
ineffable, yet talking a great deal about him, and describing him as transcendent yet 
immanent, and impassible yet loving. He acknowledges the suspect meaningfulness of any of 
this if Ayer’s verification principle is accepted.97  But Ramsey’s aim is to justify language about 
God as expressing mystery rather than factual knowledge.98 ‘Religious language’, he writes, ‘is 
odd’, a key to ‘disclosure’ or ‘discernment’, when the penny drops and sense is made of 
otherwise unusual and incomprehensible situations. Questionably, he claims ‘God is Love’ to 
be tautological, though an effective and meaningful way of expressing emotional and 
voluntary commitment to God. Equally questionable is Ramsey’s reference to ‘Love’ as the 
‘logical synonym’ for ‘God’. However, when he insists that description of God as loving must be 
qualified as ‘God as infinitely loving’,99 he is presumably implying that human love is not pure 
love. 
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Although Ramsey dismisses analogy in favour of models, analogy is, as Macquarrie and Jerry 
Gill observe, what he is about,100 restating analogy, with elements of analogia entis and 
analogia gratiae in the form of disclosure and resulting commitment. His ‘models’ are 
accompanied by ‘qualifiers’, with expectation of ‘disclosures’ to derive from and contribute to 
the models. Models: 
must arise in a moment of insight or disclosure. . . . There must be something about 
the universe and man’s experience in it which, for example, matches the behaviour of 
a loving father . . . something about certain cosmic situations which matches those 
situations in which men find themselves in the presence of a judge or a king.101 
A model must ‘fit’ like a shoe, without being so tightly fitted to the phenomenon as to pinch, 
and be able to match a wide range of phenomena and needs – what Ramsey calls ‘the method 
of empirical fit’.102   
Soskice distinguishes model from metaphor: ‘An object or state of affairs is said to be a model 
when it is viewed in terms of some other object or state of affairs’. A model need not be a 
metaphor, or even linguistic, as with a model train or ‘the mechanism of the computer being 
used to explain the supposed action of the brain’. However, if the model is developed from 
electrical circuitry into neural programming, a shift to metaphor has occurred, since 
programming does not have the same sense in computer and brain contexts. Similarly, in 
theology, she says, fatherhood is a model that can develop our understanding of God, but talk 
of God’s loving concern for his children is a development into metaphor.103 
Retaining ‘immutability’ and ‘impassibility’ for God means that experience of change becomes, 
Ramsey says, a ‘model’, and the negative of it the ‘qualifier’. Abstract characterisations of God 
like ‘Unity’, ‘Simplicity’ and ‘Perfection’ are extrapolations from their opposites, derived from 
our experience of multiplicity, complexity and imperfection – all examples of ‘negative 
theology’ based on models with their essential qualifiers – with  God as love not a negative 
contrast, but an extension from human experience.104  Donald Evans categorises Ramsey’s 
qualifiers as universalising qualifiers (like ‘universally loving’), perfecting qualifiers (like 
‘infinitely loving’) and negating qualifiers (like ‘im-passible’).105 But theology remains 
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‘ground[ed] in permanent mystery’, and dependent on ‘a cosmic disclosure’ to reveal ‘the 
topic of any and every theological utterance’,106 and constituting ‘the most consistent, 
comprehensive, coherent, and simple discourse from as many models as possible’.107  
Ramsey argues that ‘we may attribute “personality” to God if there occur . . . cosmic situations 
of a disclosure kind, whose patterns are isomorphic with disclosures of personal reciprocity’ 
(such as ‘kindness and loving concern’).108 With other models that he cites (such as father, 
judge, king, shepherd), he relies on suitable, sometimes complex, qualifiers to make human 
personality models more appropriate to God, so that the personality of God proves to be 
‘totally integrated, invariably displaying positive qualities, etc.’109 God ‘integrates a variety of 
cosmic disclosures’, for example, through personal encounters, appreciation of nature, 
aesthetic wonder, acceptance of duty.110 The apparent incompatibilities that sometimes occur 
between models, for instance between God as impassible and loving and between God’s 
justice and mercy, are resolved for Ramsey, in William Austin’s view, by the fact that each 
results in a separate disclosure (presumably of different aspects of God’s nature).111 However, 
certain qualifiers could negate certain models (as with Flew’s parable of the invisible, 
intangible, insensible gardener112), or undermine value or risk tautology, such as with 
‘infinitely’ or ‘perfectly’, as in ‘perfectly loving’.113 ‘Necessary existence’114 is particularly 
opaque, other than as a philosophical notion which logical positivism would question.115 Even 
Ramsey acknowledges that the merit of negative qualifiers is meditative and ‘evocative’,116 
which seems to underline the suspect logical character of qualifiers.  
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Furthermore, Ninian Smart suggests that, if qualified models are only ‘techniques of 
engineering disclosures’ and ‘their cognitive side disappears’, they do not ‘correspond to the 
way most religious folk conceive their own statements, [and do not constitute] an analysis of 
the way religious language works’.117 David Edwards records: R. B. Braithwaite’s difficulty in 
introducing Christianity to non-Christians without the all-important disclosures; R. W. Hepburn 
asking ‘how . . . we know when such disclosure is or is not veridical’; and several critics noting 
the possibility of disclosures simply reflecting the predispositions of those experiencing 
disclosure.118  
Thiselton warns against being unduly restricted by a picture or model one has adopted as a 
way of handling reality. Language ‘hands on an inherited tradition which then makes it easier 
or more difficult for a later generation to raise certain questions, or to notice certain aspects of 
life’.119 The transmission and reiteration (and, he could have added, reinforcement) of 
corporate memory occurs through a range of verbal and non-verbal means,120  with only fresh 
visions and insights enabling us to reverse or refine the content of these pictures.121 This seems 
akin to accepting the limitations inherent in analogy.  
For Thiselton, words such as ‘God’, ‘love’ and ‘salvation’:  
draw their meaning in the first place from the role which these words play in the lives 
of Christian believers . . . . As Paul van Buren puts it, ‘To examine the word (i.e. “God”) 
in isolation from its context in the life of religious people is to pursue an 
abstraction’.122  
Thiselton supports Wittgenstein’s observation that words can have different connotations in 
different contexts,123  and Bultmann’s contention that it is sinful to speak of God without 
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reference to ‘the concrete existentialist (existentielle) position of the speaker’.124 Context, for 
Thiselton, is thus hugely important. 
In the context of post-modernist and deconstructionist approaches to biblical interpretation, 
he commends the telling of a variety of stories:125  
 No one analogy, metaphor, or overlapping language-use, can ever be adequate if 
language about God or Christian experience is to be intelligible. We need a number of 
fixed points in everyday experience from which cross-bearings can be taken, in order 
to map out semantic areas which would otherwise lie beyond the edges of our 
conceptual map.126 
Repeatedly, Thiselton dwells on the indispensability of metaphor, image, analogy, model, 
symbol, parable, picture and myth for biblical and hermeneutical linguistic expression, despite 
their limitation:127 ‘The reality . . . transcends the language that is used’, and ‘attempts to 
speak of God [are] like the attempt to cup hands around the ocean’;128 any personal model 
‘needs to be qualified by divine transcendence and hiddenness’ and understood analogically. 
However, ‘While cerebral concepts and factual reports reflect already-perceived actualities, 
metaphors and narratives create possible ways of seeing or understanding the world and 
human life’.129 What are needed, following Ramsey, are ‘“qualifying” dimensions which cancel 
out unwanted resonances otherwise set up by each piece of imagery alone’. And the imagery 
that conveys the promise is the transcendence prominent in the Bible and, in the incarnation, 
the immanence of God.130  
Thiselton is not interested in the complexity of Thomist analogy, possibly reflecting his more 
Evangelical outlook than that of most of the theologians surveyed here. He insists that all such 
linguistic devices assume meaning within the context of individual and collective Christian 
belief (like a Wittgensteinian language-game) but that their meaning before God’s 
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transcendence is limited, and they must be qualified and sometimes escaped in favour of fresh 
insights. His default position is traditional language, such as in ‘Love derives from God because 
God chooses not to be self-contained but deeply involved with others’ and Trinitarian 
theology.131  
4.8 Church of England Doctrine Commission Reports132 
The first Doctrine Commission report of 1938, outside the period of this thesis but relevant as 
background, was, Geoffrey Lampe133 and Paul Avis134 explain, appointed to find a common 
statement of Anglican faith in the wake of various theological disputes. The Convocations 
welcomed the report, though not as a declaration of the Church’s doctrine.135 It contrasts two 
anonymous statements, that: ‘God is that living Being who is at once the ultimate existence 
and the supreme and all-inclusive good’, which it says is ‘an initial statement of what God is in 
Himself’; and ‘God is that which we can, and must, worship’, which, it says, is a statement ‘of 
what God is in relation to us’. The report defines God as ‘perfect Goodness, perfect Beauty and 
perfect Truth’, ‘Holy Love’, the initiator and fulfilment of ‘all moral effort’, ‘ultimate Existence’, 
‘Personal’, and ‘Creator’.136 The logical relationships between these descriptors are unclear, 
with scant distinction between philosophical attributions and expressions of faith. In relation 
to ‘The Living God’, an ‘Appended Note’137 neatly balances revelation and reason as mutually 
dependent, but with ‘Divine action’ remaining prevenient. ‘Though essentially orthodox’, Avis 
writes, the report ‘reveals a remarkable hospitality to symbolic interpretations’.138 But 
linguistic issues are not explored. 
Christian Believing, published nearly forty years later,139 Avis describes as ‘a useful 
compendium of liberal consensus in Anglican theology at the time’.140  Stephen Sykes refers to 
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the Church of England’s acknowledgement of the different approaches to the Creeds being 
held in ‘creative tension’141 (probably referring to Robinson’s recent Honest to God and Wiles’s 
The Remaking of Christian Doctrine142). Much of the divergence of approach to the Creeds 
relates to the nature of the language, and the variety of approaches to the underlying 
concepts.   Such concepts, the report suggests, can be viewed as valid within their historical 
context, and may be symbolic, replaceable in principle, or even of little relevance for living the 
Christian life.143 Language is limited when it comes to matters of God, and religious language 
communicates most effectively within the religious community. The via negativa is implied as 
the necessary complement to positive statements about God such as biblical images, in view of 
God’s transcendence and the inadequacy of all language. Earlier work, particularly Ramsey’s, is 
recognised: 
Even a word like ‘Creator’ . . . is only an image derived from human experience, and 
has to be heavily qualified when applied to God, in order to make clear that it cannot 
be used of him purely in the way we use it of human creativity. Our images then are 
models. The human realities to which they ordinarily refer reflect in a limited and 
earthly way something that is in an eternal and unique manner true of God.  If we are 
to use any model properly, we have to be aware of the ways in which the earthly 
reality does or does not apply.144 
The use of positive statements about God ‘in their ordinary literal or univocal sense’ is to 
‘make God in our image and fall into idolatry’; their use ‘in an entirely different or equivocal 
sense’ leads us into having ‘no reason for using one word rather than another, and we are lost 
in agnosticism’. A partial solution, the report says, is the principle of analogy, which, ‘though 
applicable only to abstract concepts, can provide a useful logical check against saying either 
too little or too much’.  The joint part of the report expresses dislike of the term ‘poetic’ as a 
description of religious language, as being vague, sometimes misleading and interpretable as 
‘suggesting that religious beliefs have no definite content’, so that any interpretation might be 
valid ‘so long as it commends itself to the individual spiritual judgement’.145 However, Wiles 
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disagrees: ‘language about God . . . is necessarily indirect – even poetic in character, a word 
with which I am much less unhappy than the report as a whole’.146 
The 1976 report was never passed to the General Synod or officially commended, but ‘was . . . 
quietly and rapidly buried’,147 although the writer of this thesis recalls some debate taking 
place in dioceses and deaneries. 
Another Commission was convened in 1978, soon after the challenge to orthodoxy posed by 
The Myth of God Incarnate, and reported in 1981 with Believing in the Church. Mitchell points 
to ‘the use of metaphors, analogies, images’, which provide ‘a genuine, although limited 
understanding of the truth which these figures point to’, and describes as reasonable and 
natural the development over time of a variety of interpretations.148 Thiselton points to 
Christianity’s anthropomorphic way of describing God as personal, which, for many, ‘brings us 
to the heart of what may be said to constitute myth’, and similarly refers to the use of 
‘analogy, model, metaphor or symbol’, where ‘the reality . . . transcends the language that is 
used’.149 Similarly, John Baker refers to the danger of ‘using as propositions hallowed 
traditional language which is really poetic, analogical or symbolic’.150 This report concentrates 
on the process of believing, rather than the content of belief.  So it does not apply the role of 
analogy, etc., to aspects of Christian theology, or demonstrate how judgements can be made 
about which analogies are appropriate. The report was debated in the General Synod and 
commended for study in the Church. 
Whereas the foregoing reports concentrate on ‘what it means for Christians . . . to believe’, We 
Believe in God, from 1987, is the first of a series focusing on ‘what Christians believe’. The 
report acknowledges that theology must take account of challenges from science, suffering, 
and logical positivism, and recognises that much ‘imagining, describing or thinking’ about God 
will prove with time to have been incomplete or incorrect. However, ‘Revelation enables us to 
speak reliably and with confidence of God’, tempered with the need for an element of the via 
negativa, since not even Scripture can be exhaustive and final in its description of God.151 
Ramsey’s influence of is again evident in the importance attached to models which, as in 
science, are ‘procedures for enabling us to think about the unobservable’, which, ‘whether 
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boldly pictorial or philosophically abstract, are creative precisely because they are not literal 
descriptions’, and which can constantly be checked against our human experience – though 
not against a referent. Models and religious images can collapse or die, though without 
implication that God has died. The report offers the masterly simple ‘There is rarely any 
experience of God which is not at the same time experience of something else’, and combines 
realism and pastoral sensitivity in: 
We should not hesitate to use deeply traditional images in hymns, poetry, liturgy and 
art, as well as evolving new ones.  But at the same time we do not suppose that the 
sign is identical with what it signifies. Any one of those images is limitless in what it can 
bring us to be and to understand and to do, as we live with it as an expression of God’s 
relation to us, and of ours to him.  Such pictures reinforce and supplement one 
another, and none can capture the whole reality of God.152 
Although the report values anthropomorphic biblical imagery (such as judges and parents), it 
recognises the inherent dangers (from corruptible judges and failing parents). More reliable, 
the report suggests, are impersonal metaphors (such as sun, rock, tower or fire), which cannot 
be taken literally, which are not so open to misunderstanding and which better convey God’s 
eternity. However, the report misses the potentially destructive effects of these phenomena 
(all metaphors of strength), and fails to grasp the pervasive problem of how to check analogies 
against their referent. The distinction between univocal analogy and univocity is recognised, in 
suggesting that it is possible to use the same words (including personal language) about God in 
ways other than about human beings. Although ‘the hand of the Lord’ and ‘The Lord is my 
shepherd’ are metaphorical in nature, that is not the case, it is claimed, with ‘talk of God as all-
knowing, faithful or loving’. When Charles Wesley wrote of ‘love divine, all loves excelling’, ‘he 
was not using human love as a “metaphor” for divine love, but stretching the use of “love” in 
its human context to represent the perfect love of God’.153 
The report rejects the notion that the languages of devotion and metaphysics are at odds with 
the language of (analytical) philosophy, and defends the poetic language of devotion as 
expressing an alternative world-view through worship. Traditional doctrinal formulae can be 
difficult, particularly for Western Christians, but in contemplative prayer the interplay between 
and with the persons of the Trinity can become real. Within worship, the report argues, a 
personal relationship with God is presupposed, ‘though the meaning of the word “personal” is 
very evidently stretched beyond its everyday uses’. While largely unacceptable in critical 
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biblical study, allegory remains acceptable in devotional practice,154 which accords with the 
trend in the various reports to view poetic language as appropriate for worship but 
inappropriate for much theology. 
In ‘The Suffering of God’,155 God is seen as suffering whenever God’s children do not follow his 
purposes and whenever God’s creatures suffer. However, Ward points out,156 the impassibility 
of God has not been as completely discarded as the chairman claims in his preface, since the 
passibility to which the report refers is largely, though with some ambivalence, confined to the 
person of Christ.157 It is curious, as Ward also notes,158 that emphasis on the passibility of God 
does not lead to a consideration of process theology. 
The series of reports responds to the need for linguistic clarity, but is clearly set in the context 
of the Church’s life of faith and worship.  Whether consciously or unconsciously, there is a 
reiteration of many of the concerns and solutions offered by Farrer, Mascall,159 and Ramsey, 
particularly over the principle of analogy (and related expressions) at the heart of religious 
language. Little, if anything, was new, and none of the reports had an immediate or dramatic 
effect on the life of the Church. Although some issues, like the authentication of analogies and 
process theology, are sidestepped, the progression of thinking marks the Church of England’s 
formal acceptance of essential principles about religious language.  
4.9 Conclusions  
The 1938 Doctrine Commission report happily offers an array of descriptors of God, without 
considering their linguistic nature or Ayer’s recent challenge to meaningfulness; despite 
omissions, later reports follow the movement of academic theology.  Mitchell, Farrer and 
Mascall develop the concept of analogy for twentieth century theology: God is transcendent, 
and only analogy can come close to enabling useful description.  God is not less than personal, 
but this can only be grasped on the basis of experience.  Thus the existential quality of analogy 
is detected, with its dependency on response.  Closely allied is the matter of context, with the 
Christian community the place where religious language is most meaningful. Macquarrie 
emphasises the need for balance in all things, including transcendence and immanence, 
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incomprehensibility and knowability, and dwells on the existential nature of theological 
expression.  Ramsey’s substitute for analogy is ‘model’, by which he too responds to logical 
positivism, and relates to the world of science; what is significant about models is the need for 
qualifiers, which, while logically suspect, have the effect of making models similar to analogies 
and metaphors. Ramsey also introduces the concept of disclosure, by which models achieve a 
kind of verification, though with an inevitable risk of over-subjectivism. 
George Woods advocates ‘the creative power’ of analogies, always imperfect, which we 
invent, modify, discard and use, and which ‘express sameness in difference and difference in 
sameness’. Even ‘transcendent’ is analogical, with its literal meaning of climb[ing] over an 
obstacle, and so is ‘experience’, based upon our experience of ordinary physical objects. 
Analogies for God based upon impersonal concepts are unhelpful, with analogies drawn from 
personal being more likely to be more illuminating.160 
Radical Orthodoxy’s use of ‘analogy’ emphasises the mystery of the transcendence of God, as 
does MacKinnon’s response of silence before the hiddenness of God. Metaphor and analogy 
are indispensable for theology to begin to describe the indescribable, not an abuse of 
language, as some rationalists have claimed, consigning metaphor to a rhetorical function, but 
essential for true insights to be expressed. In order to avoid intellectual and cultural poverty, 
Gunton writes, ‘The first lesson to learn is that rationalism is one thing, the claims of a reason 
that wishes to encompass life in its richness quite another’.161  On this basis, true rationalism 
has to encompass insights that can only be expressed in metaphor and analogy. 
Aquinas’s use of the term ‘analogy’ drew on Aristotle and sought a middle way between the 
univocal and the equivocal; but his approach is not always totally consistent, leading some to 
view him as having described rather than defined analogy.162 So his espousal of analogy does 
not imply that he would necessarily have dismissed metaphor if he had been writing today. 
Despite distinguishing between analogy and metaphor, Soskice still views metaphor as the 
more creative option, due, perhaps, to its borrowing wording from one language-game for use 
in another. There is in fact considerable interchangeability of terminology, and it is possible to 
attempt over-precision over terms that are used by different theologians to suit their 
particular emphases.  So, for example, Farrer wishes to emphasise continuity with Aquinas, 
and Ramsey with the world of science.  While Soskice’s analysis originates in her linguistic 
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concerns, Gunton is relaxed about precise definition, viewing metaphor as ‘such a pervasive 
feature of our language that any tight definition would very likely exclude many respectable 
instances’.163  
Indeed, a careful observation of most writing and conversation reveals that the use of analogy 
or metaphor is rife in common parlance. In this thesis, and despite Soskice’s concern, 
mentioned above, they will be taken as interchangeable. They are a means of using language 
applicable in one situation or experience to refer to another, and so extend the degree and 
value of description and understanding. So they are creative in purpose, and effective, 
provided culture and experience lead to the understanding that was intended.  Some analogies 
and metaphors are wholly or partly ineffective because they do not communicate in the way 
intended: their content may be anachronistic, or have been over-extended to the point of 
being counter-productive or nonsensical. It is only by revelation or faith on the part of the 
users that metaphorical assertions about God can find a point of reference, correspondence or 
verification. Mitchell detects a possible loss in society of imaginative skills, although the 
popularity of modern imaginative literature164 indicates otherwise.  Even for some without 
religious faith, but who are able to grasp truth by ‘poetic’, ‘illustrative’ or non-literal means, 
the medium of analogy or metaphor provides the best and only way to ‘approach’ the depths 
of human experience, and God. Analogy has in this chapter been shown to be indispensable 
for academic theology.  Whether or not this is true also for informal theology will be 
demonstrated.
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Chapter 5: IMMANENCE 
5.1 Transcendence and immanence 
The tension over the centuries between transcendence and immanence is exemplified as 
Williams illustrates how humans are aware of God by existential perception and in personal 
communication, divine initiative, and transcendence with immanence: 
God is first and foremost that depth around all things and beyond all things into which, 
when I pray, I try to sink.  But God is also the activity that comes to me out of that 
depth, tells me I’m loved, that opens up a future for me, that offers transformations I 
can’t imagine.  Very much a mystery but also very much a presence.  Very much a 
person.1 
Williams’s understanding, in Rupert Shortt’s words, is that ‘God is transcendent; but he 
transcends his transcendence, expressing his unknowable “essence” in his “energies” – this, his 
manifestation in the world’.2 He dismisses both concepts of a deist watch winder and a 
constantly interventionist god, and speaks of ‘an eternal activity which moment by moment 
energises, makes real, makes active, what there is’ – all of this ‘in orderly and cohesive ways’, 
such that the world ‘makes sense, interlocks, balances, works together . . . with what we mean 
by natural laws’, based on divine rationality.  This he views as a tradition shared by Augustine, 
Aquinas, the divine energy of Eastern Orthodox tradition that penetrates creation, and Gerard 
Manley Hopkins’s ‘charged with the grandeur of God./It will flame out like shining from foil 
shook’.3  Williams continues more challengingly: 
Can we imagine certain circumstances in which the action of God in relation to one of 
these coherent bits of the world is, to use a rather weak analogy, that much closer to 
the surface than it habitually is? We may not be able to understand what the rule of 
that is, or the regularity of it, but if what is sustaining every reality is the energy, the 
action, of God, then is it so difficult to believe that from God’s point of view and not 
ours, there are bits of the universal order where the fabric is thinner, where the 
coming together of certain conditions makes it possible for the act of God to be a little 
more transparent? And when we talk of miracle, it’s that.4 
This raises the question of the nature of a rationality that is discernible to God but not to 
humankind. Unless the argument is based on incompleteness of human perception – which 
would indicate a new kind of ‘god of the gaps’ approach – this identification of miracles implies 
a very interventionist God, challenging scientific rationality and universality (which conforms 
                                                 
1 Shortt, Rupert, Rowan’s Rule: The Biography of the Archbishop, London, H&S, 2008, p. 14, 
citing (untraceable) broadcast interview with Melvyn Bragg. 
2 Shortt, Rowan’s Rule, p.79. 
3
 Shortt, Rupert, God’s Advocates: Christian Thinkers in Conversation, London, DLT, 2005, p. 7. 
4 Shortt, God’s Advocates, p. 7-8. 
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with Williams being critical of scientism). For Williams, one aspect of God is ‘what we have not 
yet understood, the sign of a strange and unpredictable future’.5 God is neither distant nor 
interventionist: rather, ‘God’s relation . . . is his own accessibility, the resource that is there in 
God for any situation which makes it possible for that situation to be transfigured or taken 
forward’, with ‘the glory and energy of God pretty near the surface’.6 Williams describes how 
we sense God’s prompting, warning, reassuring or guiding, not by ‘the fabric of the finite order 
being interrupted, but rather ‘with certain configurations of finite agencies, the texture of the 
environment . . . more clearly transparent to the simple act of divine self-communication’.7  It 
is not always clear whether Williams is offering ontological or spiritual insights, and he would 
probably not differentiate.  
God’s ‘need’ for human beings, Williams says, is not need in the ordinary sense, but a ‘need’ 
for us to be what we are, to be.8 Concerned to respect God’s aseity, he queries what kind of 
‘need’ this can be, removed from the norm of human relationships.  However, we exist 
through ‘unconditional generosity’, without intention of anything in return, ‘God[’s] . . . eternal 
happiness overflow[ing] into the act of creation’.9  So the way to describe God’s need lies in 
analogy, which he takes further: ‘There is nothing that as it were stays at home while bits of 
the godhead go out to understand things and enjoy and love things . . .’.10 
5.2 Balance in other theologians 
Macquarrie goes further in postulating an element of God needing the world, as well as the 
world needing God, with God (more than in Christ) in some ways vulnerable and affected by 
creation as well as affecting it, the approach bordering on panentheism. He charts a course 
between classical transcendence and the immanence that he describes as ‘the organic model’, 
by which the relationship between God and the world is more ‘symmetrical’, more reciprocal 
and mutual, with various biblical pointers, such as those previously cited.  David Jenkins, too, 
takes a middle position, not ruling out the possibility of divine intervention, but questioning its 
                                                 
5 Higton, Mike, Difficult Gospel: The Theology of Rowan Williams, New York, Church, 2004, p. 
49 (quoting Williams, Rowan, The Wound of Knowledge, Second Edition, London, DLT, 2002, p. 
58). 
6 Shortt, God’s Advocates, pp. 8, 7. 
7 Higton, Difficult Gospel, p. 46 (quoting Williams, Rowan, ‘Reply: redeeming sorrows’, Phillips, 
D. Z., ed., Religion and Morality, New York, St Martin’s, 1996, p. 144). 
8 Williams, Rowan, Ponder These Things: Praying with Icons of the Virgin, Norwich, Canterbury, 
2002, p. 26. 
9 Williams, Rowan, Tokens of Trust: An Introduction to Christian Belief, Norwich, Canterbury, 
2007, pp. 12-13. 
10 Shortt, God’s Advocates, p. 19. 
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compatibility with God’s loving and gracious nature revealed in deciding to become one of us. 
He points out that serious questions of theodicy are raised when God does not intervene: God 
is ‘not the mastermind of vast construction activity . . . moving to a predetermined and 
preconceived end.  He (and She and It . . .) is more like a master artist (and a mistress artist) . . . 
committed . . . to an infinite creative activity’, characterised by freedom and risk.11 For Jenkins, 
God’s fulfilment in Christ relates only to God’s fulfilment ‘under the conditions of materiality 
and history’. So it is unacceptable to replace transcendence with immanence: such 
replacement, Jenkins says – with teasing paradox – ‘is destructive of man via the demotion of 
God.  Transcendence without immanence makes nonsense of God, immanence without 
transcendence makes nonsense of man’.12 In other words, human kind needs a transcendent 
context in order to be fully human, as was the case with Christ.  Kenneth Leech too retains a 
balance, though with a conviction about immanence that fuels his social action. ‘God is at the 
same time both unapproachable and close, beyond our vision and within our hearts’, he 
writes. He contrasts ‘conventional religion’ with true Christianity thus: 
The god of much conventional religion is a being who dwells . . . above and beyond the 
world. He may express ‘interest’ in it and in us from time to time, but he is essentially 
uninvolved. . . . The God of Christian prayer is an involved God, a social God. . . . God is 
involved in humanity. . . . God is not private, but personal and social, Being in 
relationship. That is the meaning of the symbol of the Trinity.13 
For Wiles, the matter of immanence through intervention is subsumed into the one great 
divine creative act, to the extent that a suspicion of deism arises, and a risk that the concept of 
divine relationship with humanity might disappear except as a human projection. 
5.3 Radical Orthodoxy 
Radical Orthodoxy’s approach to God, despite variations in emphasis between proponents, is, 
overall, very different. As already noted, Milbank insists that there is no ‘proportional 
relationship’ between finite and infinite, but, rather, ontological difference.14 Similarly, at root, 
‘between God and humanity there is no reciprocity: God in his transcendence can receive 
nothing from us’, even though ‘we only receive existence, life and reasoning from God in 
                                                 
11 Jenkins, David E., God, Politics and the Future, London, SCM, 1988, p. 109; God, Miracle and 
the Church of England, London, SCM, 1987, pp. 4-6, echoing Vanstone, William Hubert, Love’s 
Endeavour, Love’s Expense: The Response of Being to the Love of God, London, DLT, 1977, pp. 
47-49. 
12 Jenkins, David E., The Glory of Man, London, SCM, 1967, pp. 100 (italics added) and 104. 
13 Leech, Kenneth, True Prayer: An Introduction to Christian Spirituality, London, Sheldon, 1980, 
pp. 11, 7-8. 
14 Milbank, Word Made Strange, p. 9. 
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returning ourselves to God’, with God’s giving being part of our participation in God. It is only 
when, by the Holy Spirit, we are caught up into the reciprocity between Father and Son, that a 
reciprocity between God and us is established.15 The basis for this is Aquinas’s Platonic theory 
of participation, by which, Pickstock writes, ‘he regards our capacity for thought not as a 
ruefully humiliated endeavour, but as a partial receiving of divine intellection on a 
transcendental level’.16 Although the principal of God’s participation in creation and creation’s 
in God is as important for Ford as for Radical Orthodoxy theologians, for him it occurs in the 
form of ‘corporate participation in the incarnate, crucified and risen Jesus Christ, and, through 
him, in the Trinity’.17 
Milbank has little place for immanence on God’s part apart from in Christ. But Radical 
Orthodoxy sometimes uses ‘immanence’ and ‘immanent’ to refer to the created order rather 
than to an aspect of God. So, James Smith finds transcendence to be, in Radical Orthodoxy, an 
essential feature of material reality: the relationship between Creator and creation is that of 
participation, ‘in which the immanent and material is suspended from the transcendent and 
immaterial’.  Smith explains that ‘suspension’ has a dual meaning, that, firstly, ‘the created, 
immanent order is linked to the transcendent divine’, and, secondly, that the created order ‘is 
always interrupted by the transcendent, the site for the in-breaking of the transcendent’.  So, 
for Milbank, once the difference is abandoned, transcendence disappears, leading to nihilism 
and postmodernism. Some within Radical Orthodoxy see immanence not as a feature of God’s 
life or activity within the created order, but as offering the potential for the created order and 
humans to be united with God by participation. Smith explains Radical Orthodoxy’s ontology of 
participation on the basis of a strong doctrine of ‘transcendence as an essential feature of 
material reality’, with ‘theological materialism’ the result.  He writes: ‘Nature’ – which “is” only 
insofar as it participates in God – is suffused with the divine and hence with grace’.18 Milbank, 
Pickstock and Graham Ward write: ‘Participation . . . refuses any reserve of created territory 
[later described as ‘a zone apart from God’], while allowing finite things their own integrity’.19 
However, measured in terms of its ability to offer to ordinary Christians an intelligible system 
for conceptualizing God and a rationale for their actual experience of God’s immanence, 
Radical Orthodoxy, with its enigmatic nature, is unlikely to succeed. 
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16 Pickstock, ‘Radical Orthodoxy and the Mediations of Time’, p. 71. 
17 Ford, David F., ‘A Response to Catherine Pickstock’, SJT, vol. 54, no. 3, 2001, pp. 423-24. 
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19 Milbank, Pickstock and Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy, p. 3. 
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5.4 Russell Stannard 
A totally different approach is taken by three scientist theologians.  
The particle physicist, Russell Stannard’s, unexceptional view of God is expressed in popular 
style. His starting point is the impenetrability of the divine, with ‘a frontier of the knowable: 
beyond lies that which, to the human mind, will never be completely understood’. So, for 
example, Stannard does not want to eliminate on grounds of logical impossibility the notion of 
God ‘as someone to whom all of time – past, present and future – is known’, on a par with a 
scientist plotting the history of a particle against the passage of time.20 God is ‘both in time and 
outside of time’.21 Stannard proposes that, if the Big Bang proves to be merely an event in a 
perpetually oscillating universe, then the universe, and God too, might have always existed. 
Indeed, on the basis of the possibility of particles being present in a number of different places 
at the same time, we should not write off the possibility of the same principle applying to God, 
with the idea of God’s being available for every person thus being vindicated.22  God’s 
understanding of each human being is such that he is able to predict what people will do in 
particular circumstances (as with long-married couples), without undermining human freewill.  
Freewill might be preserved by the indeterminacy of sub-atomic movement (by Heisenberg’s 
Uncertainty Principle), in contrast with the determinacy that operates at less minute levels. 
God might even use chaos theory to enable ‘random quantum probabilities at the atomic level 
. . . [to be] magnified by the chaos theory mechanism to produce significant changes at the 
macroscopic level where we humans operate’.23 Furthermore, after the pattern of relativity 
theory, it is possible that God’s foreknowledge and human freewill ‘derive from incompatible 
or complementary viewpoints’, for both of which Stannard provides biblical evidence,24 after 
the pattern of scientists examining brain activity being able to predict a person’s next action, 
without undermining that person’s freewill to decide on that action.25 God may have ‘the 
ability somehow to take in the whole of four-dimensional reality from some “external point” of 
view lying beyond the confines of that four-dimensional world’, giving meaning to God’s 
transcendence. It might even be useful to pray about a past event of which the outcome is 
                                                 
20 Stannard, Russell, Science and the Renewal of Belief, London, SCM, 1982, pp. 132, 142-43. 
21Stannard, Russell, Doing Away with God? Creation and the Big Bang, London, Marshall 
Pickering, 1993, p. 52. 
22 Stannard, Science and the Renewal of Belief, pp. 144-45. 
23 Stannard, Russell, The God Experiment, London, F&F, 1999, p. 40. 
24 Stannard, Science and the Renewal of Belief, pp. 179, 183; cf. Stannard, Doing Away with 
God?, p. 50; Stannard, God Experiment, p. 40. 
25 Stannard, Doing Away with God?, p. 122. 
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unknown, on the basis of an all-knowing God, aware of the forthcoming prayer, being able to 
take it into account in determining the outcome’.26  
Although preferring a stronger basis of process theology, Joseph Bracken approves Stannard’s 
attempt: 
To reconcile the opposing viewpoints represented by classical metaphysics and 
process-oriented modes of thought, God knows the future of the cosmic process in its 
fullness but does not by that fact predetermine it. This is possible only because God 
exists beyond time in eternity.27 
Stannard offers a novel exposition of Trinitarian exposition, as ‘God over us, God with us, God 
in us’, with God as Father ‘an amalgam of the Hebrew creator and the Greek sustainer of the 
universe’.28 The principle that love must have an object was, prior to creation, satisfied by 
God’s ‘inner self-relatedness’, by which Stannard presumably means God’s as yet unrevealed 
Trinitarian nature.  ‘Creation, therefore’, Stannard writes, ‘marked not so much the start of 
God’s relationships, as the outward expression of the inner structure of his own being’, with 
the person of Jesus the second inevitable outworking of God’s love. Evil in creation is the foil to 
God’s goodness, such that the goodness would not be recognized if the evil were not there, by 
a matter of ‘logical necessity’. Later, Stannard recognizes that this may not do justice ‘to the 
sheer power and depth of evil’, but still relies on his doctrine of logical necessity: although God 
is wholly good, God is forced by ‘some logical imperative’ ‘into allowing evil to have a place in 
his created world’, with God’s omnipotence undiminished by this logical necessity. But the evil 
that Stannard considers is largely humanly generated, and his theodicy tends to relate evil 
natural occurrences back to human failures.29 Stannard accepts the Anthropic Principle (‘the 
Designer of this world has bent over backwards to make it user-friendly!’), provided that 
neither the Anthropic Principle nor the argument from design is limited in such a way that they 
appear to be defending a limited ‘God-of-the-gaps approach’.30 In a section entitled ‘God’s 
involvement in suffering’ Stannard does not consider the possibility of God being affected in 
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any way by human suffering, so much as God’s responsiveness to prayer and God’s experience 
through Jesus.31 
5.5 Arthur Peacocke 
Peacocke prefers a ‘top-down’ approach in biology and theology, rather than the tendency 
towards analysis and reductionism.32 Rather than seeking God’s involvement at the 
microscopic level of evolution, Peacocke focuses his attention on God’s ‘top-down’ interaction 
– ‘indirect, through a chain of levels acting in a “downward” way’.33 God is immanent, 
constantly creative through ‘natural processes of the world unveiled by the sciences’ and often 
through ‘chance’ within the ‘law-like framework’ of the created order.  So there is no need to 
seek gaps for God’s creative activity,34 since the necessity should have faded with the 
movement away from a purely mechanistic understanding of the cosmos towards, with 
Darwin, ‘a more developmental and organismic framework of thought’, with gaps now seen 
theologically as impertinently limiting God.35 For Peacocke, although God is not present more 
at specific times or places, some events are perceived more as acts of God than others: the 
more personal the event in which God is immanently present, supremely the Incarnation, the 
more able that event is to express God’s nature. Peacocke describes randomness in relation to 
molecular, genetic mutations, not necessarily observable at a macroscopic level,36 even though 
the effects are seen as phenomena of the universe and cosmos.37 Presumably, the reason for 
randomness not being regarded as a theological ‘gap’ is that microbiologists deem it 
necessarily random and inexplicable, not subject to future deterministic explanation, although 
Peacocke is critical of John Polkinghorne’s apparent consignment of God’s activity ‘to those, to 
us, unclosable gaps in the predictability of the natural world’.38 Hugh Montefiore identifies 
Peacocke’s position with deism, since it would be a remote God who relied on chance and 
necessity, which ‘may produce creativity but . . . cannot produce purpose’.39 On the contrary, 
Peacocke argues, the interplay of chance and law give rise to the complexity expected by the 
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35 Peacocke, A. R., Science and the Christian Experiment, London, OUP, 1971, p. 130. 
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laws of thermodynamics and chemical kinetics, and underlies ‘the increase of sentience and 
freedom of the individual organism’ which leads to such qualities in humanity.40 Moreover, 
evolutionary science and a theistic view of God’s constant and continuing creative involvement 
coincide in making deistic theory irrelevant.41 With self-limited omniscience, God does not 
know the whole future; and, indeed, the indeterminacy of some sub-atomic events just does 
not exist, for God to influence the natural order at either a micro- or macro-level. Within the 
natural order there is a ‘genuine degree of open-endedness and unpredictability required for 
the interplay of chance and law in its creative processes and, eventually, for real human 
freedom to emerge’.42 
Peacocke suggests that ‘the notion of top-down causation from the integrated, unitive 
mind/brain state to human bodily action’, together with ‘unity of the human mind/brain/body 
event’, provides a useful model of God’s interaction with the world. (Regrettably, he 
unnecessarily confuses the model by identifying mind with brain, thus mixing the categories of 
a concept and a physical entity.)43 The model illustrates God ‘exerting continuously top-down 
causative influences on the world’ as a total system, and interacting with the world without 
breaching the laws of nature.44 This then is the basis for ‘transcendence-in-immanence’, by 
which God’s agency comes into play ‘all the time’ in relation to ‘the whole physical causal 
nexus’. Thus Peacocke finds some affinity with process theology, with God having two poles or 
aspects, which he associates with Whitehead’s ‘a primordial nature and a consequent nature’ 
and Hartshorne’s ‘God’s abstract essence and God’s concrete actuality’, and which he 
interprets as representing God’s Creative Love and God’s Responsive Love. Where Peacocke 
departs from process theology is in insisting that God is the Creator of actuality, and not just 
an influencer of occasions.45  He tends in a panentheistic direction: everything is in God and 
God is in everything, but God transcends everything in time and space, as Beethoven is in his 
Seventh Symphony during every performance but unable to interfere in the performance.46  
He finds panentheism exemplified in Augustine, as a means by which God can be interacting 
with the world without breaking the laws of science.47 However, he prefers the panentheistic 
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model of a woman’s creation of an embryo within herself (in contrast to the man’s external 
contribution), and finds biblical material in rough support of this approach.48  
Communication is part of God’s essence, God having endowed humanity with the ability to 
discern his word in creation. God’s causal effectiveness is analogous to an input of information, 
or, as Peacocke prefers, ‘a “communication” by God to the world of his purposes and 
intentions through those levels of the hierarchy of complexity capable of receiving it’. This 
indicates a movement beyond physical intervention, even at a micro-level, to moral influence. 
However, defining God as ‘the continuing, supra-personal, unifying and unitive influence upon 
all-that-is’ suggests a wider influence than any directed just at human or sentient beings, and 
indeed, Peacocke frequently insists that ‘God’s action is on the world-as-a-whole’.49 There may 
here be a hint of process theology’s portrayal of God ‘luring’ humans in particular directions. 
Peacocke follows Michael Langford50 in describing God’s involvement as like the role of a 
mountain leader, in first planning the expedition (creative and sustaining), then leading the 
party safely (final cause and general providence) and then handling emergencies, predictable 
in general though not in detail (special providence and miracles). The reference to miracles is 
problematical, with Peacocke himself uncertain as to whether miracles should be viewed as 
divine interventions. He resists expectation of intervention as a requirement of theism, since it 
implies that God is exterior rather than immanent, and undermines the rationality and 
regularity of God, almost as if God regrets the law that he created.  However, he allows ‘very 
rare occurrences’ where supposed interventions manifest ‘the existence of “higher laws” or a 
“profounder rationality” than have yet to become clear to us’. This ambivalence is unhelpful, 
even if any implied gaps are ‘necessary’ gaps.  It would be reasonable for him to insist that God 
would always be acting within the framework of laws he has created, and that any apparent 
departure would always and necessarily reflect an inadequate human comprehension of the 
fullness of those laws. Indeed, Peacocke proceeds to highlight the moral objection to a God 
who sometimes intervenes but does not do so to avert natural and human-made disasters as 
evidence that he does not intervene at all.51  
In summary, Peacocke stresses the ‘top-down’ nature of God’s interaction with the world, 
taking the world-as-a-whole as God’s starting point, rather than the world at its micro-level. 
Chance plays a part alongside law in nature, but identified as the location for necessary gaps in 
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our understanding. Locating God’s activity in gaps would conflict with the ‘top-down’ 
approach. Panentheism, on a model of pregnancy, offers much in expressing God’s 
relationship with the world.  God is self-limiting, and even suffers with creation.52 On a 
personal model, God ‘communicates’ with humanity and individuals as part of his ‘top-down’ 
interaction and discloses himself at a variety of levels (in nature, inspiration and guidance, for 
instance), and supremely in the Incarnation. 
5.6 John Polkinghorne 
Polkinghorne, a theoretical physicist, writes: 
There is no particular difficulty scientifically in envisaging God as outside space and 
time . . . ‘looking down’ on the whole evolution of the universe laid out before him.  
However so atemporal a deity is too close to the God of the Greek philosophers for 
Christian comfort. The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, who is active in the affairs of 
men, who suffers when his people suffer, cannot be so wholly above the struggle of 
life.53 
Thus God is eternal and unchanging on the one hand, but self-limiting and self-emptying on 
the other, with Christ’s ascension implying that in Christ ‘humanity is taken into the divine 
nature. As part of that mystery the Eternal accepts the experience of temporality’.54 
Polkinghorne recognizes ‘the utility of both personal and impersonal models of divinity, one 
for expressing the experiences of revelation, the other for expressing the insights of natural 
theology’.  Thus, he says, a healthy tinge of deism is restored, and ‘we do not have to choose 
between the dangerously anthropomorphic55 God of the Bible and the dangerously remote 
God of the philosophers, for both are models of aspects of the complexity of the divine 
nature’.56  
Wiles’s deistically-inclined subsuming of God’s activity into a single creative act preserves 
God’s consistency against impressions of capriciousness or interference with the laws of 
nature. However, Polkinghorne believes that God is by this ‘in danger of becoming no more 
than the abstract ground of possibility’. It would be inconsistent with the freedom God has 
given human beings not to have similar freedom himself. So he prefers to view God as 
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continuously interacting with the world, with his personal nature entailing specific responses 
to particular individuals, tailored to particular circumstances.57  God’s and our freedom to act 
‘opens up the possibility of a complementary metaphysic in which the mental and the material 
are related as poles of the world-stuff in varying degrees of indeterminate/determinate 
organization’. Thus the modern scientific view of the world does not render the possibility of 
God’s providential action incoherent, but allows ‘location of his action in the flexibility of 
process’. Given this flexibility, there may be scope for miracles, which are simply ‘the 
providential in unusual circumstances’,58 not contrary to the laws of nature, but ‘more 
profound revelations of the character of the divine relationship to creation’. ‘The God who 
interacts with the history of the universe must be a dipolar God, possessing a temporal pole as 
well as an eternal pole’, and ‘neither God nor man is perceived as caught in the grip of 
relentless causal rigidity’.59 
So Polkinghorne finds place for the action of God in the total flux of the cosmic process in 
nature, demonstrated by the uncertainty of modern quantum physics, the ‘modern theory of 
exquisitely sensitive dynamical systems (rather inaptly called “the theory of chaos”)’. But this 
would not extend to God’s being, since, ‘in the traditional language of the theologians of the 
Eastern Church, God acts in the world through his energies, not his essence.’ Revelation may 
be understood – rather as for Williams – as ‘a reference to events or people particularly 
transparent to the divine presence, rather than understood as some mysteriously endorsed 
knowledge of what otherwise would be ineffable’.60  And perfection may reside: 
not in the absence of change, but in perfect appropriateness in relation to each 
successive moment. It is the perfection of music rather than the perfection of a statue.  
I do not think that God is necessarily simply eternal, so that he can only relate to time 
in a holistic way.61  
Polkinghorne’s preferred understanding of God’s timelessness embracing our past, present 
and future is as ‘an unfolding process within which God is certainly at work but, in Peacocke’s 
striking phrase, as “an Improviser of unsurpassed ingenuity” rather than as the composer of a 
                                                 
57 Polkinghorne, Science and Providence, pp. 5-7, 41-43, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 
London, SPCK, 1998, p. 67 and, Science and Christian Belief: Theological Reflections of a 
Bottom-Up Thinker, London, 1994, p. 54. 
58 Polkinghorne, Science and Providence, pp. 2, 24-25. 
59 Polkinghorne, Science and Providence, pp. 93, 3, 13. 
60 Polkinghorne, Science and Christian Belief, pp. 27, 54; Reason and Reality, p. 2. 
61 Polkinghorne, Science and Christian Belief, p. 59. 
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fixed musical score’. Thus, Polkinghorne concludes, ‘God has a relation to time which makes 
him immanent within it, as well as eternally transcendent of it’.62   
God’s omnipotence is, in Polkinghorne’s view, limited to the extent that ‘he can only will what 
is in accord with his character’, God being ‘internally constrained by the consistency of his own 
nature’. ‘The rational God must respect reason’, which includes mathematical logic and not 
implying that 2 + 2 = 5; the faithful God will not intervene arbitrarily; and the world a loving 
God relates to will not be totally subservient. Polkinghorne acknowledges that the crediting of 
these qualities could be seen as ‘restor[ing] the Platonic world of pre-existent forms as 
constraints upon divinity’, and that they could be seen as mere tautologies.63 But he fails to 
notice the paradox of the alternative constraint of these rationalities having been devised by 
humanity before being applied to God. 
In earlier works, Polkinghorne recognises our limited understanding of human psychic life,64 
and comes close to locating God’s activity in a gap, when he suggests that the medium for 
God’s interaction with humanity might be the Jungian archetypal world of the unconscious, 
sometimes with psychosomatic effect. Despite his desire to the contrary, Polkinghorne 
sometimes exerts his scientific understanding of flexibility and indeterminacy to find gaps 
where God’s activity might be located.  For instance, he rejects praying for an alteration to the 
seasons of the year as ridiculous, but accepts the possible usefulness of praying for rain 
because God’s immanent action ‘will always lie hidden in those complexes whose precarious 
balance makes them unsusceptible to prediction’.65 This tendency is even clearer later, when 
he proposes the possibility of God interacting with his creation through ‘information input’, 
which he associates with the work of the Holy Spirit, and predicates on possible ‘holistic laws 
of nature presently unknown to us but capable of eventual scientific discovery’.66 He still 
considers some gaps for God legitimate when he writes, on the basis of ‘top-down intentional 
causality’, of intrinsic “gaps” (an envelope of possibility) in the bottom-up account of nature to 
                                                 
62 Polkinghorne, Science and Christian Belief, pp. 60 (quoting Peacocke, God and the New 
Biology, p. 98), 61. 
63 Polkinghorne, John, Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding, London, SPCK, 
1988, pp. 51-52. 
64 Polkinghorne, One World, p. 70. 
65 Polkinghorne, Science and Providence, pp. 9-10, 34, 32. 




make room for intentionality causality . . . . There is nothing unfitting in a “God of the gaps” in 
this sense . . . .’.67 
By 1998, Polkinghorne rejects limiting God’s influence to the depths of the human psyche, 
since this would neglect God’s work before human beings existed and rely on ‘a separate 
realm of spiritual encounter, divorced from the physical/mental reality of a dual-aspect 
monistic world, in which providence can act’.68 Any god of the gaps, he says ‘is well and truly 
dead’; rather, God is to be found everywhere.  He effectively enlarges on this when he 
separates as different categories of statement: the origin of the world in the big bang; and 
God’s creating the world, God being understood ‘not as working with or against the grain of 
physical law, but as the guarantor of that law . . . sustain[ing] the world in being’. Thus, the 
concept of God is in no way threatened by theories of the world’s physical origin, since ‘He is 
the ground of physical process, not a participant in it’,69 and ‘the author and producer of the 
play, not a particularly striking actor upon the stage’. Aquinas’s first cause he interprets as 
representing ‘logical hierarchy rather than temporal priority’, so that God is not ‘an originating 
cause in the remote past . . . but . . . the fundamental cause in and of the present’.70 
Polkinghorne, like Peacocke, recognizes the dipolarity of God as a positive gift from process 
theology: ‘There must be both temporal and eternal poles to divinity’. There is a simultaneity 
about God in his temporality, such that ‘God is not a localised observer in the chosen frame 
but omnipresent within it. . . . [Across time,] God will experience every event, as, where and 
when it happens, and know all such events in their correct causal interrelations.’ But, as 
Polkinghorne concludes one of his later books, it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that he is still 
seeking gaps. His proposals of ‘active information’ and of causality seem to suggest that there 
is a need for specific loci or conduits for God to play a part, rather than a more overwhelming 
need to see God at work in the whole.  Polkinghorne would see this latter need as tending in a 
panentheistic or even deist direction.  But it is difficult to see how justice can be done to the 
notion of God without such a tendency.  Indeed, sometimes his concepts are totally holistic.71 
                                                 
67 Lennox, John C., God’s Undertaker: Has Science Buried God, Oxford, Lion, 2009 edition, pp. 
189-90 (quoting Polkinghorne, John, ‘The Laws of Nature and the Laws of Physics’, Russell, 
John, Murphy, Nancey and Isham, C. J., eds., Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature: 
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, Vatican City, Vatican Observatory, 1999, p. 438). 
68 Polkinghorne, John, Belief in God in an Age of Science, New Haven, Yale University, 1998, pp. 
54-55. 
69 Polkinghorne, One World, pp. 60, 65-67. 
70 Polkinghorne, Science and Creation, pp. 13, 11. 
71 Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, pp. 69, 71-72, 74. 
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Polkinghorne’s science and theology sometimes interact, but are not interwoven.  Here is his 
strength: for all his lapses towards gaps for God, he respects the category distinction between 
the two disciplines and views them largely as alternative descriptions of how things are. He is 
reluctant to understand God’s activity as a way of interpreting the unfolding of the created 
order and events within it, as too close to deism. Yet he maintains the proper duality of God’s 
eternity and temporality, and ‘a world kept in being by the divine Juggler rather than by the 
divine Structural Engineer, a world whose precarious process speaks of the free gift of Love’.72 
5.7 Summary 
The trend among these theologians is towards balance between immanence in the context of 
transcendence, with reluctance to attribute intervention to God. However, Williams – for 
whom ontological definition is inseparable from spiritual insight – implies that divine activity is 
part of God’s nature, and comes closest to God breaking into the world. The most reluctant 
over intervention is Wiles, for whom such involvement is subsumed into one creative act. For 
Milbank, concerned to avoid diminishing transcendence, the concept of divine need for 
humanity and for human response, or even for reciprocity, is suspect, as is even God’s 
immanence apart from Christ (although some Radical Orthodox writers use ‘immanence’ with 
reference to the created order). For Radical Orthodoxy, there is no place where God is not, 
with the possibility for all things of participation in the divine.73 Of the three scientists 
surveyed, Stannard finds no need to rethink ‘God’. Peacocke approximates to Wiles’s 
deistically-inclined position, in that God’s immanence is recognisable by events that are not by 
direct intervention but by a ‘top-down’ chain of creative processes, and by a similar means of 
‘communication’. There is ambivalence, however, when Peacocke posits the possibility of 
‘higher laws’ by which rare interventions might occur, although an adequate theodicy would 
be difficult if God intervened sometimes but not in the face of evil. Microbiological 
randomness may play a part in this, but certainly not as a gap for God’s activity, since gaps, for 
Peacocke, would ‘impertinently’ limit God’s field of operation. God is, however, deliberately 
self-limiting, and Peacocke tends in the direction of process theology and panentheism, 
without accepting either entirely. Peacocke cannot accept Polkinghorne’s seeming 
consignment of God’s activity to apparently unclosable gaps in the predictability of the natural 
order. Polkinghorne in his earlier writings is more ready than Peacocke to find locations for 
God’s activity, such as the subconscious mind, sub-atomic indeterminacy or yet-to-be-
discovered of laws of nature. This tendency diminishes later, as Polkinghorne more definitely 
                                                 
72 Polkinghorne, Science and Creation, p. 67. 
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rules out gaps for God, though he sometimes reverts. Despite some sympathy, he criticises 
process theology for marginalizing God’s role and providential care. Thus is represented from 
this sample of theologians the inevitable dichotomy between transcendence and immanence 
with their implications for the way God interacts with the creation. The study of informal 
theology and the exercise in practical theology will demonstrate the degree to which God’s 





Chapter 6: PROCESS THEOLOGY AND PASSIBILITY 
Process theologies, in their diversity, unite in attributing to God involvement in, and being 
affected by, the world’s temporal processes. This implies temporality, mutability and even 
passibility, which conflict with conventional theology. However, process theology has 
resonance for academic and informal theologians for whom the Incarnation reflects the wider 
nature of God; and the notion of God’s passibility for those who take this principle further in 
terms of Jesus’s suffering and the whole gamut of suffering in the world. 
6.1 Norman Pittenger 
Pittenger, the main Anglican UK proponent of post-war process theology following his 1966 
retirement in England from America, acknowledges the influence of Whitehead and 
Hartshorne.1  His position is that: 
any model or picture or concept of God which is to make sense must be one that 
includes his self-identification with a processive world, his serious use of time and his 
existence as sharing in temporal succession (even if not exactly as we finite creatures 
know it), his being as active and alive, his relationship with all that is not himself, his 
freedom from decision amongst relevant possibilities, his ‘dipolar’ nature as including 
both abstract existence and actual concrete selfhood, his expressing or revealing 
himself in particular events which thus acquire ‘importance’, and (above all and first of 
all) his character as sheer Love-in-action.2 
Earlier, he presents process theology in contrast with a deist approach and in the context of 
the self-sufficient scientific evolutionary world-view, writing:  
A conception of God as essentially immutable being, with no continuing relationship to 
his creation save a logical one, is patently inadequate to the facts which we now have 
available about the world in which we live.3  
He is responding to the constantly changing, dynamic nature of the world and of humanity, 
including Teilhard de Chardin’s evolutionary theme; and to the inter-relatedness of the 
‘occasions’ of the world, society and events, such that ‘we are not able to make sharp 
distinctions of an ultimate and definitive kind’.  The ‘occasions’ (a Whitehead expression) of 
past events, contemporary exterior factors and the ‘lure’ of the future together create the 
present.  For Whitehead and Pittenger, it is the way these factors are ‘brought to a focus . . . 
                                                 
1 Pittenger, W. Norman, Goodness Distorted, London, Mowbray, 1970, p. 33; Picturing God, 
London, SCM, 1982, pp. 22, 29-44. Whitehead’s influence is most explicit in Pittenger, Norman, 
Process-Thought and Christian Faith, Welwyn, Nisbet, 1968. 
2 Pittenger, Norman, Unbounded Love: God and Man in Process, with study guide, New York, 
Seabury, 1976, p. 13. 
3 Pittenger, W. Norman, The Word Incarnate: A Study of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, 
Welwyn, Nisbet, 1959, p. 147. 
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and make their impact’ that amounts to causation, with the whole causative process 
‘characterised’ by God’s ‘subjective aim’. God takes into himself all that has occurred, whether 
good or evil, and is ‘ceaselessly working towards the most widely shared good’.4 Our 
experience of God is based on worldly experiences, with God the ultimate extension and 
fulfilment (or ‘supreme instantiation’) of those experiences.  Expressed like that, his 
conceptualization would sound almost Platonic, were it not for its object being set so firmly in 
this world, and his distancing the conceptualization from the element in Greek philosophy that 
‘often made deity a metaphysical “monster”, irrelevant and meaningless to . . . human 
experience’. There is mutuality of relationship between God and the world on the basis of 
love, with mutual influencing and affecting: ‘God is in real and internal relationship with [the] 
world, not in a merely logical and external relationship’. His independence is restricted to self-
consistency in unfailing goodness, just-ness and faithfulness to purpose,5 with aseity not a 
primary attribute.6 Process theology Pittenger sees as the natural outworking of the Christian 
presentation, with its emphases on God’s ‘becoming’, rather than ‘being itself’, suffering and 
persuasive. God thus becomes ‘supremely the cosmic Lover’.7  
However, process theology is at odds, not only with the deistic streak in concepts such as 
‘unmoved mover’ and omniscience, but also with conventional theism’s insistence on God as 
absolute and transcendent. Pittenger interprets God’s transcendence not as remoteness but as 
inexhaustibility of ‘God’s resources of loving care and concern’, Charles Wesley’s ‘pure 
unbounded love’.8 But process theology accords with classical theology, Pittenger claims, in 
not limiting God’s creation to an event, or the start of an époque before which God ‘existed 
entirely alone in majestic isolation’. He cites evidence from scholastic theology and from F. W. 
Dillistone in support of his view that creation is a doctrine of dependence upon God, who 
possessed ‘a formless concentration of energy’ before and after the creation of the world; and 
he interprets ex nihilo as referring to a prior ‘absence of that particular occasion with its 
potentialities’.9 The more conventional theology with which Pittenger contrasts process 
theology, he suggests, is often deistically inclined, for instance when ‘God is . . . related only 
                                                 
4 Pittenger, Process-Thought and Christian Faith, pp. 7-8, 12-13, 14-16, 32. 
5 Pittenger, Norman, Catholic Faith in a Process Perspective, New York, Orbis, 1981, pp. 6, 7, 9-
10. 
6 Pittenger, Process-Thought and Christian Faith, p. 27. 
7 Pittenger, Norman, The Lure of Love Divine: Human Experience and Christian Faith in a 
Process Perspective, New York, Pilgrim, and Edinburgh, T&TC, 1979, pp. 79-81; Picturing God, 
pp. 15, 60. 
8 Pittenger, Process-Thought and Christian Faith, p. 24; Unbounded Love, p. 17. 
9 Pittenger, Picturing God, pp. 69-71 (quoting Dillistone, F. W., The Christian Faith, London, 
H&S, 1964, page unstated). 
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“logically” to the world and is entirely unaffected by what goes on within it’.10 Panentheistic 
process theology obviates the need for postulating occasional divine interventions, once God’s 
constant presence and involvement in the world is recognized.11 As Pittenger submits, 
following Hartshorne, it also accords with the common Christian concept of human service for 
God.12 God, Pittenger writes, ‘calls us into partnership with him’,13 into partnership as 
‘surrogates’ or ‘agencies’, though not, hubristically, as ‘substitutes’.14  
It is in this loving relationship, with the relativity that it incurs, that, for Hartshorne, God’s 
perfection is to be found. God’s creative activity (which is an indispensable part of his nature, 
such that there never was a time before he created) is a matter of self-expression, stemming 
of necessity from the divine nature itself. For Pittenger, God ‘does not need to “intrude” into 
the world, for he is already there – or rather . . . the world is “in” him who is the 
circumambient Reality “outside” whom nothing can exist’; there is thus no intrusion, or even a 
‘divine rescue expedition’ in Christ.15 
Pittenger writes that God cannot be an exception to the societal, relatedness nature of the 
world; otherwise he would be ‘irrelevant and utterly unrelated’; in fact, ‘God is participant in 
process too, and God is supremely related’. He is the chief cause, alongside creaturely cause, 
and the supreme effect, influenced by what happens in the continuing activity of creation. We 
affect God, who rejoices or suffers, is enriched or is deprived. ‘We count for God’, with the 
mutuality of relationship characteristic of true love. Providence and omnipotence are not 
coercive, but lovingly maximise opportunity; omniscience does not limit free choice, but sees 
the relevant possibilities. Pittenger describes humanity as ‘a “becoming” movement towards 
fulfilment’ and God as ‘luring, enticing, inviting, soliciting his children towards their own best 
good’, with an identical approach to the world at large. The divine Love operates by persuasion 
rather than coercion, and is how Pittenger would redefine omnipotence. (However, it can be 
noted that coercion is hardly a mark of conventional theology, and that it is a fine dividing line 
between persuading and coercing, as with modern advertising.) Omniscience he redefines 
within ‘the new model, in which time is taken seriously’, as avoiding any sense of determinism 
(although theologians have not generally claimed omniscience was deterministic), but rather 
knowing the possibilities for the future. ‘Omnipresence’ refers to ‘the availability of the divine 
                                                 
10 Pittenger, Goodness Distorted, p. 37. 
11 Cf. Pittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 149 and Process-Thought and Christian Faith, p. 41. 
12 Pittenger, Goodness Distorted, pp. 37-38. 
13 Pittenger, Norman, God in Process, London, SCM, 1967, p. 17. 
14 Pittenger, Norman, After Death: Life in God, London, SCM, 1980, p. 34. 
15 Pittenger, Word Incarnate, pp. 55-56, 154. 
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Love to all people at all times and in all places and in any circumstances.16 While Pittenger’s 
reinterpretations may represent Christian truths and be pastorally useful, they do not reflect 
the  conventional meanings of ‘omnipotence’ ‘omniscience’ and ‘omnipresence’; it would be 
preferable for process theology to deny or assert these attributes for God, rather than trying 
artificially to accommodate them. 
God's activity, for Pittenger, respects the characteristics within creation, with the past effective 
on the present and integral possibilities for the future. God is active throughout, but 
particularly so with invitations or lures as each event (or ‘occasion’) develops, while respecting 
human freedom to choose. God is not unaffected, and each ‘occasion’ ‘makes a difference to 
God and in God’, with joy, anguish, suffering, and new opportunities for God resulting. God’s 
love turns things to good account, and ‘In God’s “consequent nature” – that is, in deity as 
affected by what goes on in the creation – there is nothing more than “the kingdom of 
heaven”’, with a resulting stream of loving influence back into creation.17 
6.2 Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne 
For Peacocke, God is constantly creative through ‘natural processes of the world unveiled by 
the sciences’,18 with God’s agency as transcendent-in-immanence constantly active in relation 
to ‘the whole physical causal nexus’.19 Thus Peacocke finds some, but not total, affinity with 
process theology, and interprets God’s two poles20 as representing God’s Creative Love and 
God’s Responsive Love; he is open to the idea of God suffering within the processes of the 
world through the implications of love.21 Where he departs from process theology is in 
insisting that God is the Creator of actuality, and not just an influencer of occasions.22  
Peacocke tends unmistakably in a panentheistic direction: everything is in God and God is in 
everything, although God transcends everything in time and space. Allusion has already been 
made to Peacocke’s analogy of Beethoven being in every Seventh Symphony performance,23 
yet unable to interfere in the performance.  He finds panentheism exemplified in Augustine, as 
a means by which God can be interacting with the world without breaking the laws of 
                                                 
16 Pittenger, Goodness Distorted, pp. 88, 89, 32, 5; Picturing God, pp. 83-85; cf. Pittenger, God 
in Process, p. 100.  
17 Pittenger, Norman, ‘The Divine Activity’, Encounter, 47, no. 3, Summer 1986, pp. 262-64. 
18 Peacocke, Paths from Science towards God, pp. 136-37. 
19 Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science, p. 140. 
20 Whitehead’s primordial nature and consequent nature; Hartshorne’s abstract essence and 
concrete actuality. 
21 Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, pp. 113-34. 
22 Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science, pp. 140-41. 
23 Peacocke, God and the New Biology, pp. 96-97. 
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science.24 Even so, as already noted, he prefers a model based upon the human female’s 
creation of an embryo within herself.25 
John Polkinghorne acknowledges the scope in process theology for ‘divine interaction with a 
person or a proton’, thus avoiding the problem of the pre-human millennia, but detects some 
difficulties. He characterizes process theology as relying on series of events, which he 
describes as showing ‘discrete “graininess”’ and which he says quantum physics, with its 
continuous development and sharp discontinuities, does not display. He believes that process 
theology’s reliance on God’s persuasion, with ‘the event itself lead[ing] to its own completion’, 
makes God’s role marginal, rather than reflecting true providential care;26 and that it 
concentrates on present enrichment at the expense of hope for God’s action and the future, 
including life after death.27  He prefers Ward’s solution of ‘a God whose internal complexity is 
such that he can embrace both the necessary and the contingent’, with ‘divine 
complementarity of being and becoming’, so that God, through the process of creation and 
kenosis, makes room for something other than himself.28 Nevertheless, Polkinghorne finds that 
‘the flexible openness of process [is] the locus of God’s interaction with his creation, without 
there being an improper bridging of the ontological gap between the Creator and that 
creation’. Although God remains omnipotent, ‘it is not in accordance with his will and nature 
to insist on total control’.29 Even chance has a role in the world as God has created it, with ‘the 
antinomy of chance and necessity within the freely evolving creation that he allows to be’, 
accounting, for instance, for the cancer that God has allowed but does not determine. God is a 
God of process, within ‘the precariousness of the divine creativity’.30 God’s relinquishing total 
control and omniscience ‘requires us to take God’s temporality very seriously’, and insist that 
‘his hand is positively active in all that happens’.31 
6.3 God’s passibility 
While potentially controversial in the context of later Christian understanding of God’s 
immutability, feeling and suffering are not unknown in ancient Jewish theology.  James Atwell 
points to the Yahwist’s attribution of intense sorrow that he had made humans and animals 
                                                 
24 Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, pp. 158-59 (quoting Augustine, Confessions, VII.7. 
25 Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science, pp. 141-44 (referring to Matthew 23:37, Luke 
13:34, Genesis 1:26-27, Proverbs 8, Wisdom 9). 
26 Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, p. 56. 
27 Polkinghorne, Science and Christian Belief, pp. 65-8. 
28 Polkinghorne, Science and Creation, p. 61. 
29 Polkinghorne, Science and Christian Belief, p. 81. 
30 Polkinghorne, Science and Creation, pp. 63-64. 
31 Polkinghorne, Science and Christian Belief, p. 81. 
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which caused God to inflict the Flood, and Hosea’s of strong emotion with ‘How can I give you 
up, Ephraim? How can I hand you over, O Israel? . . . .  My heart recoils within me; my 
compassion grows warm and tender’.32  
Panentheism and God’s passibility begin to emerge for Pittenger in 1959, writing that God is: 
‘in’ the world  – or better, the world is ‘in’ him – since his wisdom, goodness, and 
power are continually operative through the created order . . . . And in so doing, God is 
himself affected by the creation in which he works: he is not aloof, not utterly 
unchanging and unchangeable being.33 
As Pittenger rightly points out, to portray God ‘as in no sense thus affected would be alien to 
the general biblical picture’.34 Indeed, ‘The Jewish-Christian tradition’, he writes, ‘has never 
really been content with an “unmoved mover” as the final principle of explanation’, or with 
God being ‘described in substantial terms of a kind which leave [sic] little room for his 
boundless energizing activity in the world’.35 
Despite Pittenger’s general acceptance of God being passible as part of his immanent 
involvement, he remains cautious, distinguishing between the physiological-psychological 
suffering of human experience and a kind of suffering ‘which is more like the deepest and most 
intimate compassion or sympathy’ and more attributable to God.36 Even so, God: is ‘affected’ 
by the world; shares in the evil in the world; is a fellow-sufferer; turns every occasion to good 
account if at all possible; and wins victories over evil only in ways consistent with his loving 
nature and respect for freedom. God has to overcome worldly obstacles of selfish 
recalcitrance, arising from the ‘radical freedom’ that characterizes the world.  The persuasion 
needed of God to accomplish his will ‘requires a subtlety of divine operation rather than a 
direct and immediate manipulation of created or creaturely occasions’.37 
Polkinghorne too espouses the concept of a suffering God – a fellow sufferer, but not 
overcome by suffering, as focused in Christ’s passion. He resolves the tension between God 
suffering and Christ suffering when he writes: ‘The dialectic of a suffering God finds its 
historical expression in a crucified Messiah’.  He respects Brown’s caution about too easy an 
anthropomorphism, but suggests that God, with divine temporality, must share the 
uncertainty that Jesus experienced about the vindicating outcome of suffering.  Over issues of 
                                                 
32 Atwell, James, The Sources of the Old Testament: A Guide to the Religious Thought of the 
Hebrew Bible, London, T&TC, 2004, p. 54, citing Genesis 6. 5-8, Hosea 11. 8-9. 
33 Pittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 147. 
34 Pittenger, After Death, p. 32. 
35 Pittenger, Process-Thought and Christian Faith, p. 21. 
36 Pittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 149. 
37 Pittenger, Goodness Distorted, pp. 38, 32. 
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theodicy, with the mystery of suffering and apparently random healings, Polkinghorne 
concludes that ‘in his great act of creation, God allows the whole universe [including humanity] 
to be itself’,38  or, more picturesquely, that ‘Not all that happens is in accordance with God’s 
will because God has stood back, making metaphysical room for creaturely action’.39  
For Newlands, God ‘must be able simultaneously to suffer with those who are in distress and 
to rejoice with those who rejoice’ to be worthy of belief.40 However, in accordance with 
Newlands’s principle of analogy as a means of analysing our descriptions of God, noted above: 
to speak of God as suffering is to use language analogically.  But not all elements of our 
talk of God are analogical, certainly not analogical in the same way. . . . To speak of 
God as suffering is no more and no less intelligible than to speak of God as not 
suffering, not subject to change, not affected by happenings in the world. We cannot 
escape the anthropological pole of theology simply by resort to negative theology.41 
Newlands recognizes a danger of the paradoxical concept of God suffering turning into 
nonsense when pressed too far, when he writes:  
We must be very careful about how we use analogies in relating language concerning 
Jesus to language concerning God. . . . We may perhaps use the events concerning 
Jesus as paradigmatic clues given by grace to the understanding of God . . . . We 
cannot however simply extrapolate from the man Jesus to the divine nature as if there 
were some authorised one to one correspondence, whether through analogy of grace 
or being.42 
For Jenkins, ‘The embodiment of the pattern of personalness of God is the pattern of the 
personalness of Jesus Christ’, so suffering must have a real place in the former. God must 
suffer: ‘For if God does not suffer, but produces his purposes out of suffering [presumably 
creaturely suffering, including Christ’s] by a divine condescension proceeding from absolute 
detachment, then it is exceedingly difficult to see how he can be regarded as other than a 
cosmic monster’. He goes further, arguing that, on the basis of the suffering of Jesus, who, in 
Jenkins’s words, experienced atheism, God did likewise.  Jenkins is ambivalent, however, 
retaining the ‘traditional theistic notion of the impassibility of God’, with God’s love 
responding to need but not in essence being changed in the process. Nevertheless, God’s 
                                                 
38 Polkinghorne, Science and Christian Belief, pp. 63 (quoting Brown, David, Continental 
Philosophy and Modern Theology, Oxford, Blackwell, 1987), 45, 83. 
39 Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, p. 13. 
40 Newlands, Theology of the Love of God, p. 98. 
41 Newlands, God in Christian Perspective, p. 83. 
42 Newlands, God in Christian Perspective, pp. 115-16. 
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‘godness’ includes ‘God’s practical capacity for involvement and identification’, and, therefore, 
God suffers.43 
There is similar ambivalence when the 1987 Church of England Doctrine Commission report, 
turns briefly to ‘The Suffering of God’:44 God suffered and still suffers whenever his children do 
not follow his purposes or his creatures suffer. However, as Ward points out,45 the 
impassibility of God is not as completely discarded as the chairman claims. The passibility that 
the report acknowledges is largely confined to the person of Christ, though with some 
ambivalence on the point at the end of the discussion.46 As Ward notes,47 it is curious that the 
evident interest in God’s passibility does not lead to considering process theology, with its 
appeal to some in making speaking of God more accessible. 
Bill Vanstone describes the popular impression that ‘God is pure activity, always subject and 
never object, “impassible”’; that God is wholly self-dependent, controlling every situation, with 
‘no dependence, no waiting, no exposure, nothing of passion or possibility . . .’.  Alternatively, 
God might be ‘passible’, which in the light of other analysis, he would probably define as ‘liable 
to suffering’, rather than simply ‘suffering’. Applied to God, it would imply that ‘“it is in the 
nature of things” that God should be exposed to or affected by or dependent upon that which 
happens in the world’, with ‘a relationship of mutuality or fundamental interdependence 
between God and the world’, and needing the world ‘in order that the passible, affective, 
receptive aspect of His nature may be fulfilled’.48 Indeed, in his earlier illustrations of diligent 
model making and the surgeon’s heroic work, Vanstone highlights the mutability and 
vulnerability of creator figures.49  But there is a shift of emphasis, with Vanstone coming to 
believe that such interdependence and mutual necessity would result in the concept of God 
losing distinctness, with ‘God and the world becom[ing] merged into one complex interacting 
reality; and the differentiation of one part of that reality as “God” becom[ing] almost 
arbitrary’. So, for Vanstone, God is definitely impassible, with no possibility of God being 
dependent upon, exposed to or affected by the world, but rather with God always ‘the active 
and initiating subject, never the receptive object’.50   
                                                 
43 Jenkins, David E., The Glory of Man, London, SCM, 1967, pp. 106-10. 
44
 We Believe in God (1987 edition), pp. 157-160. 
45 Ward, ‘God of the Doctrine Commission’, p. 1. 
46 We Believe in God, pp. ix, 158-160. 
47 Ward, ‘God of the Doctrine Commission’, p.1. 
48 Vanstone, W. H., The Stature of Waiting, DLT, 1982, pp. 64-65, 89-92. 
49 Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, Love’s Expense, pp. 32, 62. 
50 Vanstone, The Stature of Waiting, pp. 92-93. 
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There is a contrast in Jesus, who ‘places Himself in men’s hands and becomes exposed to 
whatever they will do’, and who, ‘in handing Himself over, in passing of His own will from 
action to passion, enacts and discloses that which, at the deepest level, is distinctive of 
divinity, distinctive of God’.51  The contrast and apparent contradiction are justified, Vanstone 
argues, by a conclusion that neither assertion nor denial of God’s passibility is adequate, and 
that God is Deus non passibilis sed passus. However, his conclusion relies on some faulty 
linguistic analysis.  Among his comparative examples, he claims that ‘laudable’ means ‘expects 
to be praised’ whereas in fact it means ‘can be praised’. This leads him to claim that 
‘Unpardonable insults are sometimes forgiven’, which is incorrect, since ‘unpardonable’ means 
‘cannot be pardoned’. So his so-called paradox of an unlovable child finding itself loved is 
based on faulty logic, leading to the self-contradiction inherent in Deus non passibilis sed 
passus.52  It is true that in Jesus God may be said to be passus, and in the context of Trinitarian 
theology the full phrase is legitimate.  However, it would have been better presented simply as 
such, rather than with the extensive attempt at linguistic justification in relation to God as a 
basic concept. Nevertheless, in insisting on Deus non passibilis sed passus and elsewhere,53 
Vanstone makes very clear that his sympathy with process theology (although he does not use 
the expression) is limited. 
John Milbank goes further, with no place at all for God-in-his-entire-being suffering with 
humankind, and moves straight to the suffering of Christ:  ‘Evil cannot fully see itself as evil, 
therefore only the uncontaminated good, God himself, can fully suffer evil – not in eternity, 
which is beyond suffering, but in the human creation: hence the necessity for the Deus 
Homo’.54 To suggest that God, separately from Christ, suffers, would be to diminish divine 
transcendence. 
6.4 Summary 
Pittenger, as the only thorough exponent of process theology and panentheism in this study, is 
responding, in a way that Peacocke and Polkinghorne do more cautiously, to the nature of the 
world order as currently experienced, to find God not in any niche but in the whole worldly 
process. God is immanent not through intrusive events but by constant involvement, with his 
                                                 
51 Vanstone, Stature of Waiting, p. 89; cf. p. 111. 
52 Although quoted as if an established tag, Internet search has not revealed any source 
beyond Vanstone. 
53 Vanstone, Stature of Waiting, pp. 89-94, 111. 
54Milbank, John, ‘Postmodern critical Augustinianism: a short summa in forty-two responses to 
unasked questions’, Milbank and Oliver, The Radical Orthodoxy Reader, p. 55 (this chapter, 
Modern Theology, 7(3), 1991, pp. 225-37). 
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influence occurring through hidden persuasion, through ‘luring’. This is undoubtedly at some 
expense to traditional transcendence, although some would contend that such transcendence 
is no longer an intelligible concept. Others would argue that Pittenger is reacting unnecessarily 
to a deistically inclined theism.  Polkinghorne in fact sees process theology as something of a 
threat to conventional theism by lessening God’s involvement and activity. 
Ward sympathises with process theology’s principles, pointing out the difficulty for Thomist 
immutability from the essential theist understanding of God who is personal, acts and 
therefore changes in response to and in relation to his creation.  He sees ‘a trend towards 
holding God to be temporal, capable of suffering and bliss, dynamic and creative’.55  Yet Ward 
retains two essential aspects: ‘Only if God is temporal, can he be a free creator of a universe of 
free creatures; only if he is eternal, can he possess that necessity which is the foundation of 
the intelligibility of the world; only if he is dipolar, can he be both’. In process theology, he sees 
a risk of God becoming a mere spectator of the world he includes, himself part of a creative 
process he cannot control, ‘wedged helplessly between creativity . . . and the countless actual 
occasions which project the world into the future’. We do not want God to be a monarchical 
tyrant or just the remote designer of the machine, but neither do we want him to be ‘the 
helpless experient of all [the world’s] feelings, a “fellow-sufferer” who never himself appears 
to act’. The world must certainly be accorded autonomy, but God must be seen as actually 
acting, controlling and guiding.56  
For Milbank, the idea of God suffering is totally contrary to his emphasis on transcendence. 
But with others there is sympathy, but also reluctance to jettison either God’s impassibility or 
overall transcendence, with reliance on the theological paradox of God suffering only in Christ, 
despite the many Old Testament clues to the concept of God suffering with his people. 
Nevertheless, process theology constitutes a strong response to human need for a personal 
God to whom one can relate.  God thus presented is viable as the object of relationship, 
religion and prayer, as Pittenger certainly realises, and is more likely to be an object of 
religious experience than (to caricature) an abstract, theoretical being.57 Whether it is Milbank 
or Pittenger’s approaches which proves to be echoed within informal theology will be 
considered. 
 
                                                 
55 Ward, Keith, ‘Recent Thinking on Christian Beliefs, II. The Concept of God’, ExpTim, 88, no. 3, 
December 1976, pp. 69, 71. 
56 Ward, Keith, Rational Theology and the Creativity of God, Oxford, Blackwell, 1982, pp. 230, 
209. 
57 Pittenger, Process-Thought and Christian Faith, pp. 33-35. 
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Chapter 7: CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND FEMINIST THEOLOGY 
7.1  Introduction 
‘Cultural relativism’ is used in this thesis, not in any pejorative sense, but as a neutral, 
descriptive term for the nature, relative to each other, of different temporal, ethnic and social 
cultures, and for the assumptions and expressions that emanate from those cultures. Thiselton 
provides an example of how its insights can be contentious. Cultures contribute to different 
theological presuppositions and outlooks (as Thiselton would accept), or are a basis for 
different, sometimes new, self-consciously contextual theological expression (with which 
Thiselton would have difficulty – see below). It is the basic, often unstated, assumptions that 
propel many liberal theologians into restating Christian doctrine.  
It has already been shown that Mascall, Loughlin, Soskice and the 1976 Doctrine Commission 
report, among others, note the importance of participation in the religious community for 
effectiveness of religious language. Thiselton writes that ‘the meaning of “God” is seen in the 
first instance by the role which it plays in the actual life of the Christian community, including 
the tradition of life and experience which nourishes it’,1 and concludes that, once language is 
adapted to the needs of its users, ‘it hands on an inherited tradition which then makes it easier 
or more difficult for a later generation to raise certain questions, or to notice certain aspects of 
life’. Transmission and reiteration of corporate memory occur through a range of verbal and 
non-verbal means,2 and only by fresh insights do we reverse or refine their content.3   
There is close kinship here to Wittgenstein’s concept of language games, which provide some 
protection against the implications of logical positivism, since an overall demand for 
verification or falsification is weakened if particular language has a symbolic purpose among a 
particular group of people. However, it is phenomena like logical positivism and the scientific 
revolution that have radically shifted intellectual culture. More particularly, the relationship 
between Scripture (i.e. the language of the community) and human experience is explored by 
Williams, where he contests Lindbeck’s: ‘Intratextual theology redescribes reality within the 
scriptural framework rather than translating Scripture into extrascriptural categories. It is the 
text, so to speak, which absorbs the world, rather than the world the text’. Williams views this 
as over-simple, pointing out that Scripture cannot be detached either from its historical 
                                                 
1 Thiselton, Language Liturgy and Meaning, p. 13 (quoting van Buren, Edges of Language, pp. 
70-71).    
2 Thiselton, ‘Knowledge, Myth and Corporate Memory’, Believing in the Church, p. 52 (quoting 
Thiselton, Two Horizons, p. 137), p. 53. 
3 Thiselton, Two Horizons, pp.137-38, 404, 432. 
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settings or from continuing interpretation on the basis of experience and fresh circumstances.4  
This chapter will focus on three theologians who have assumed cultural relativism in their 
writing, one (Thiselton) who is resistant to cultural relativism, one whose cultural relativism 
has led towards liberation theology, and several whose response has led to feminist theology 
and inter-faith theology. 
7.2 Dennis Nineham 
Nineham notes that, when religions speak of God, the meaning of the metaphor is governed 
by its literal use at any given time and place, unchanging though God may be. Although basic 
human nature and emotions are not greatly affected by cultural change,5  ‘religion is not an 
entirely transcultural phenomenon’, having ‘language and beliefs about God in any community 
. . . inextricably tied in with its language and beliefs about everything else’. Nineham quotes 
Cupitt’s observation of the way in which a Muslim, when speaking of God, is speaking of God 
only as known through Islam, and ‘does not suppose that true belief in the one True God, 
Allah, is abstractable from this very detailed context’.6 To Cupitt’s awareness of cultural 
relativism he adds emphasis on the inadequacy of the gospel evidence for a full and accurate 
account of Jesus: ‘the great cultural gap which is fixed between his day and ours’, and the 
doubtfulness of ‘an unchangeable fundamental structure of the human spirit’7 over the ages. 
Although he is referring to perceptions of Jesus, it is reasonable to infer a similar approach to 
perceptions of God.8 The cultures of the Old and New Testament ages, he insists, are so 
different from that of today, for example with different understandings of history and 
miracles, that theist claims cannot be substantiated from the biblical sources.9 This cultural 
relativism Brown interprets as indicating ‘the stronger version of the deist claim’, namely, ‘not 
merely that there is no evidence for an interventionist God, but that on a priori grounds we 
know that there could be no such evidence’. Brown’s own position is ‘that one has either to 
accept an interventionist God or abandon rational justification of belief in God . . .’.10 However, 
                                                 
4 Williams, On Christian Theology, pp. 29-31, 33, 40 (quoting Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, p. 
118). 
5 Nineham, D. E., The Use and Abuse of the Bible, London, Macmillan, 1976, pp. 1-2. 
6 Nineham, D. E., Explorations in Theology 1, London, SCM, 1977, pp. 150-151 (quoting Cupitt, 
Don from unpublished broadcast talk entitled ‘Justification of Belief in God’). 
7 Nineham, Dennis, ‘Epilogue’, Hick, Myth of God Incarnate, pp. 192, 200; reaffirmed, Edwards, 
David, Tradition and Truth: The Challenge of England’s Radical Theologians 1962-1989, 
London, H&S, 1989, pp. 299-300.  
8 Nineham, D.E., The Study of Divinity: An Inaugural Lecture, London, SPCK, 1960, p. 22-23 
begins development of theme. 
9 E.g., Nineham, Use and Abuse of the Bible, pp. 21-22, 57, 110. 
10 Brown, David, The Divine Trinity, London, Duckworth, 1985, pp. 5, 26-32. 
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Brown’s accusation of deism is not supported by any citation from Nineham, and it does not 
follow from a conclusion that the biblical sources no longer form a foundation for theism that 
theism is irrational or impossible. Indeed, Nineham mentions some of the other sources that 
contribute to personal Christian faith, largely derived from Christian community life, other 
writings and art.11  
He is unwilling to limit God, or allow any kind of positivism to rule out a priori the validity of 
‘well-based belief in God and his relations with his creatures’, and makes theistic assumptions 
that God ‘intended’ things for the Church, ‘produced the community’ and ‘made events 
significant’.12 However, he writes cautiously: ‘We may only believe that he has intervened in 
history in certain exceptional events if he has given us good ground for thinking he has done 
so’. Moreover, he has sympathy for those who ‘are puzzled about a God who makes, if not 
salvation, at any rate present reconciliation and communion with Himself, dependent on 
ability to answer certain relatively vexed historical questions in a particular way’ (by which, he 
means ‘interpreted within the terms of the Bible itself and at variance with the understanding 
of most modern contemporaries’), with the risk of ‘some sacrificium intellectus’.13  
Nineham explores this further in terms of the Incarnation, which can be accepted (even by 
Bultmann) as God intervening par excellence, or else accepted as ‘story’ in continuity with Old 
Testament narratives, in contrast with ‘history’, with matters of historicity becoming less 
important than experiential interpretation, described as ‘imaginative objectification’. He 
sympathizes with those who cannot conceive of God ‘under the forms of traditional 
supranaturalism’, with a separate divine realm that ‘perforates this world [by] supranatural 
intervention’. He wants to retain God objectively, and yet changing culture makes it difficult 
now to comprehend God in the way that biblical generations could do. He favours ‘pictures’, 
but does not provide any new ones. When he writes of God calling us into relationship with 
him, it is in the context of God possibly calling us into a different kind of relationship from 
those of biblical times, even possibly, as Bonhoeffer suggests, calling us ‘to live and act etsi 
deus non daretur’.14 
                                                 
11 Nineham, Use and Abuse of the Bible, p. 217. 
12 Nineham, Chapter 2. Christian Believing, p. 85. 
13 Nineham, Use and Abuse of the Bible, pp. 81, 93, 181. 
14 Nineham, Use and Abuse of the Bible, pp. 175-79, 183-86, 188, 246 (quoting Robinson, John 
A.T., But That I Can’t Believe!, London, Collins, 1967, pp. 13-15), 254 (quoting Bonhoeffer, 
Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 121). 
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Nineham’s growing self-acknowledged scepticism,15 is largely due to this increasing insistence 
on the changing nature of culture. His reluctance to espouse explicit divine intervention lays 
him open to Brown’s charge of deism; but, without systematic explanation, he remains 
theistic. He can describe the Bible as in the providence of God and ‘a kaleidoscope of writings, 
traditions and fragments . . . reflecting . . . some vivid experience of life, usually, though not 
always, life touched by the hand of God’;16 he assumes the possibility of a happy relationship 
between God and human beings.17 There is tension, therefore, between Nineham’s scepticism 
based on cultural relativity, and his faith. 
7.3 Maurice Wiles  
Wiles goes further, with his revisionism predicated on substantial cultural relativism, with a 
huge shift between the biblical and pre-modern era and the present. Even within early 
Christianity, he notes cultural tension between the Platonic view of a transcendent, eternal 
and changeless God, and the Jewish tradition of God’s involvement with his people with 
Christian conviction of God’s decisive action in Jesus. Wiles highlights the modern tension 
between scientific understanding of the world, and attempts to identify and locate God’s 
action.18 Our understanding of God tends to reflect what is problematical, so that: 
Where death, disease and natural disaster are frequent and little understood features 
of human existence, faith is liable to stress the contrasting character of God as wholly 
removed from all such change and suffering.  But where such occurrences are seen 
rather as part of an inexorable and impersonal law of the universe, then it is God’s 
character as free, personal being that is most firmly apprehended and insisted on by 
the person of faith.19  
These assertions seem over-stark. It is sometimes in more dangerous environments and 
historical periods that God’s presence and involvement, or his potential involvement through 
intervention, are most keenly felt – as in liberation theology. Moreover, with a modern, 
scientific approach to suffering, there is sometimes less active faith, as in much western 
twenty-first century society. Nevertheless, it is true that expectations of God vary across time 
and cultures, and in accordance with developing understanding of self and the world.20 
                                                 
15 Edwards, Tradition and Truth, p. 297. 
16 Nineham, Use and Abuse of the Bible, pp. 239, 193 (italics added). 
17 Most graphically, Nineham, Use and Abuse of the Bible, p. 245. 
18 Wiles, Maurice, God’s Action in the World: The Bampton Lectures for 1986, London, SCM, 
1986, pp. 3-5. 
19 Wiles, God’s Action in the World, p. 5. 
20 Wiles, God’s Action in the World, p. 11. 
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Culture is implicit when Wiles writes of the importance of human response in appreciating 
God: 
We cannot . . . speak significantly of God or of his acting in an objectified way, wholly 
separated from the human response, and it is therefore the total relationship which 
must be assessed in determining whether our understanding is true to a properly 
personal conception of God.21   
This subtle distinction depends upon the believer being able to take a self-observing role. 
Illustrating his point by reference to the vastly differing expectations of God’s activity between 
different people and across the centuries, Wiles instances the mediaeval clergy who attributed 
local disasters to punishment for profaning the Sabbath or excessive fondness for chess, and 
The Book of Common Prayer’s attribution of plague and sickness to God’s punishment.  So 
changing expectations of God are not reliable sources about God, and Wiles insists that 
believers reflect on the nature of their faith as well as on the fundamental question of whether 
there is ‘an absolute or universal referent of any kind towards which the varied forms of 
religion point’. Anthropology reveals, he says, ‘that human knowledge of anything and 
everything is limited and relative, and ‘the very recognition of that all-pervading relativity 
involves the fleeting grasp of something beyond relativity, of an objectivity that we envisage 
but cannot attain.’22  
7.4 David Brown 
Brown occupies a middle position over cultural relativism, and his approach develops over 
time.  
Earlier, in combating deism, Brown rejects Nineham’s understanding of cultural relativism, that 
biblical miracles were understood contemporarily as ‘“signs” and “wonders” rather than as 
violations of natural law [in] a world where uniformity of nature was not expected’.23  Brown 
denies: that one is prisoner to one’s own culture; that arguments have no value outside the 
thought and conditions of their time; and that there is no commonality of interpretation and 
understanding across cultural divides. Indeed, some degree of common experience must exist, 
for instance across national, racial and cultural boundaries: otherwise, there would have been 
no Christianity in Anglo-Saxon Britain, and there would be none in China or Africa today. 
Later, Brown finds tradition a developing phenomenon, and is open to the prospect of other 
expressions of Christian truth through the use of imagination.  In the context of 
                                                 
21 Wiles, Maurice, Working Papers in Doctrine, London, SCM, 1976, p. 143. 
22 Wiles, Maurice, Faith and the Mystery of God, London, SCM, 1982, pp. 7, 8, 10. 
23 Brown, Divine Trinity, p. 27, drawing on Nineham, Use and Abuse of the Bible. 
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postmodernism, he writes: ‘Theology (and revelation) always operates in intimate relation 
with developments within culture as a whole’.24  He is concerned to place Christianity 
satisfactorily in the context of modernity and postmodernity, and to widen human experience 
of God beyond the confines of the Church and the ostensibly religious to include nature, the 
garden and the built environment,25 the human body, music and dance.26 In effect, he is 
acknowledging cultural relativism and the need to respond to new cultural expectations. To 
give just one example, he writes: 
In the modern developed world there is now . . . a huge mismatch between the Church 
and how people . . . experience the divine. It is not that the latter have ceased to 
believe in the supernatural or only identify it in a very crude way . . . but that, when 
they attend a church service, the ritual no longer seems to evoke any immediate or 
intuitive response. In part this is perhaps a good thing, as the Church can scarcely claim 
to have a distinctive gospel unless there are elements that sit ill with existing 
presuppositions. . . . That is one reason why the exercise in natural religion upon which 
I have been engaged . . . seems to me of no small moment.27 
Brown outlines the scope within nature for experiencing God:  
God is found in nature and gardens, in buildings and place, in music and bodies . . . . 
Contemporary Christian theology seems willing to concede at most only an 
instrumental or utilitarian value. Buildings, for instance, are discussed wholly in terms 
of their usefulness for worship; gardens, as though exercise or relaxation were the 
only issues. That seems to me quite wrong. A God active outside the control of the 
Church needs to be acknowledged, and the implications heeded. That entails a careful 
listening exercise, the final result of which cannot be predetermined in advance. So, 
for example, I fail to see why the Christian should not concede genuine experience of 
God to be mediated through the structures of mosques and temples.28 
Although Mark Laynesmith may be over-stringent in his critique that it is unclear how one can 
be sure ‘that this body (or garden or building or art work) is really revelatory of God’,29 Brown 
himself refers to exaggerations of aspects of God’s nature that have sometimes occurred in 
bodily portrayals, as when stereotyping Christ as the Byzantine Pantocrator.30  He notes that 
aspects of nature that people now find inspiring would once have been sources of dread, but 
                                                 
24 E.g. Brown, David, Tradition and Imagination: Revelation and Change, Oxford, OUP, 1999, 
pp. 5-6 (with a similar trait, Discipleship and Imagination: Christian Tradition and Truth, Oxford, 
OUP, 2000), p. 33. 
25 Brown, God and Enchantment of Place, p. 247. 
26 Brown, David, God and Grace of Body: Sacrament in Ordinary, Oxford, OUP, 2007. 
27 Brown, God and Enchantment of Place, p. 407. 
28 Brown, God and Enchantment of Place, p. 2. 
29 Laynesmith, Mark, ‘David Brown, God and Enchantment of Place. Reclaiming Human 
Experience’, MB, Vol. 46, No. 4, Oct. 2005, p. 57. 
30 Brown, God and Grace of Body, p. 34. 
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denies that ‘all such responses to nature are really entirely determined by historical and 
cultural setting, and therefore can provide no independent access to truth about God’.31  
Some twentieth century abstract art, abandoning one-to-one correspondence, is an effective 
way of presenting metaphysical or religious claims, including claims about God's relationship 
with the world.  So one thing that art and theology have in common is ‘symbolic worlds where 
the relation between symbol and literal fact is at last acknowledged to be a highly complex 
one. That complexity is underscored by a much canvassed modern analogy, the far from 
simple relation between music and representation’.32  
At first, Brown only reluctantly recognizes cultural relativism.  But, with time, he relates 
Christianity to particular interests within twenty-first century society – a form of culturally 
relativist practice that is responsive to societal changes. 
7.5 Anthony Thiselton 
Thiselton is generally questioning of approaches based on cultural relativism. Adapting 
language to the needs of users ‘hands on an inherited tradition which then makes it easier or 
more difficult for a later generation to raise certain questions, or to notice certain aspects of 
life’.33 Only by fresh visions and insights can the content of verbal and non-verbal pictures be 
reversed or refined. His position is clearest with regard to Latin American, African and feminist 
liberation theology. He is aware of the ‘pre-understanding’, that everyone brings to the biblical 
hermeneutical process, based upon individual subjectivism, and upon cultural and political 
expectations and predispositions.34 But, rather than sympathizing with cultural relativism, he 
challenges positions founded upon what he calls ‘socio-pragmatic hermeneutics’, with an 
emphasis on political praxis. This can only be resisted by ‘socio-critical hermeneutics [which] 
seeks to unmask uses of texts which service self-interests or the interests of dominating 
power-structures’, and so leads towards theology which is truly critical, Cross-centred and 
liberating.35  
 Do the hermeneutical systems constructed or utilized by liberation theologies or by 
feminist approaches function pragmatically to filter out from the biblical text any 
signal which does anything other than affirm the hopes and aspirations of a given 
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32 Brown, God and Enchantment of Place, p. 92. 
33 Thiselton, ‘Knowledge, Myth and Corporate Memory’, p. 137. 
34 Thiselton, Two Horizons, pp. 137-38, 404, 432, 112-14. 
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social group; or do they embody a genuine socio-critical principle which unmasks 
oppression as part of a larger trans-contextual critique?36 
Later, Thiselton addresses the matter of God directly in combating Cupitt and the ‘Sea of Faith’ 
Network, which he characterizes as viewing religion ‘as a human creation, in which “God” is 
subsumed within human consciousness as a projection of value’.  He approves David Hart’s 
summary of the ‘Sea of Faith’ position as that ‘there is nothing beyond or outside human 
beings, neither God nor some other notion like “Ultimate Reality” that gives life and meaning 
and purpose. We do that for ourselves!’  Thiselton supports, too, Anthony Freeman’s rejection 
of any form of ‘projection’ of God, for example in Canaanite polytheism and post-modernism.  
And he quotes Cupitt himself, who identifies God with Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ and 
explains: ‘God is the religious requirement personified, and his attributes are a kind of 
projection of the main features as we experience them.’ Of Cupitt’s later post-modernist stage, 
Thiselton writes: ‘All talk of God as an internal symbol or focus for “unifying” a value system, 
will have vanished’, and, taking a cue from Derrida, he substitutes ‘abyss’ for ‘sea’ as 
representing his view of Cupitt’s position.37 Thiselton emphasizes the gradual, but 
considerable, shift within Cupitt’s theology, and this present thesis will return to his account 
when Cupitt is under consideration.  Thiselton offers a critique of postmodernity as it has come 
to replace the intelligible order that was the framework and product of modernity. He rejects 
cultural relativism and any liberation theology that results from a relativist position. 
7.6 Liberation theology 
Leech offers probably the most significant UK Anglican liberation theology, contextual in the 
sense of being set in the context of his pastoral concern and experience, including experience 
with some of the most disadvantaged of society. He stands in the Oxford Movement tradition 
of fostering the mysterious and the mystical alongside social action.  He draws from the 
apophatic tradition of the mysterious, essentially indefinable nature of God, with light 
emerging in the individual and collective spiritual journey toward God. In defiance of the 
prosaic, fact-concerned, conceptual, western approach, he espouses approaching God through 
spirituality, approving Nicholas Lash’s statement that ‘it is the theologian’s task to make it 
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difficult to speak of God’.38 Silence, standing before God until the end of time and recognizing 
God’s glory are paramount.39 The route is through the darkness that precedes illumination, as 
with St John of the Cross, Thomas Merton and even Barth.40 Leech’s conviction ‘that there is 
no part of the world from which God is absent’ is the foundation of his social commitment.41 
This awareness of the social nature of God, with ‘humanity . . . called to share in that divine 
life’,42 may be the basis of some process theology, with ‘the experience of God in Jewish and 
Christian history . . . that of a God who is known in the midst of the turmoil of human 
struggle’.43  However, Leech’s theology is never completely one of process: for all God’s 
identification with humankind in the Incarnation and ‘rais[ing] manhood into God’, the 
relationship for Leech is never reciprocal – it is God’s initiative that prevails. But ‘The Church is 
social and involved because God is social and involved’.44  
Leech’s constant assumption is that God is the scriptural God of justice, who expects his 
followers to work for such justice on earth. Indeed, his liberation theology is paramount when 
he writes, ‘The liberating God of the Exodus calls this oppressed and fragile people to serve 
that ultimate Freedom [from economic, political slavery and captivity to idols and false gods] 
which is Godself’.45 He declines to trivialize God by attaching specific concepts, apart from 
drawing attention to God’s social nature and God’s feminine, as well as masculine, 
characteristics, as will be seen below. 
7.7 Feminist theology 
Feminist theology is contextual in responding to new awareness of the implications of equality 
between the genders; when emanating from an oppressed group, it is a significant form of 
liberation theology. 
Ann Loades writes of those women wanting to overturn the masculine Christian emphasis who 
‘scavenge’ within Scripture and tradition for feminine references to God; she points out that 
nowhere in the Old Testament is God actually called ‘Mother’, and that some patristic and 
                                                 
38 Leech, Kenneth, Doing Theology in Altab Ali Park: A project in Whitechapel, East London 
1990-2004, London, DLT, 2006, p. 203, without  details of source. 
39 Leech, Kenneth, Spirituality and Pastoral Care, London, Sheldon, 1986, p. 19; Doing Theology 
in Altab Ali Park, p. 56. 
40 Leech, Kenneth, Soul Friend: A Study of Spirituality, London, Sheldon, 1977, pp. 160-67; cf. 
Leech, Spirituality and Pastoral Care, p. 23. 
41 Leech, Doing Theology in Altab Ali Park, p. 119. 
42 Leech, Kenneth, The Social God, London, Sheldon, 1981, p. 7. 
43 Leech, True Prayer, p. 11. 
44 Leech, Social God, p. 8. 
45 Leech, Kenneth, The Eye of the Storm: Spiritual Resources for the Pursuit of Justice, London, 
DLT, 1992, p. 45. 
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mediaeval allusions to femininity in Christ relate more to androgynous features than to pure 
femininity. ‘Fatherhood in God and Church clearly continues to provide some women with the 
nurture they need, but it is clearly failing many’, she writes.  However, ‘“Motherhood” in God’ 
language would help only if churches using it constituted themselves in such a way as to ‘repair 
the damage to women’.46 This seems to imply that truth about God relates to helpfulness of 
language and to coherence with ecclesiastical practice, rather than to objective reality or 
revelation.   
Sara Maitland’s approach is different. Although she is now a Roman Catholic, A Big Enough 
God originated in lectures given near the end of her Anglican period.47 She places less 
emphasis on church practice. God has neither biology nor, therefore, gender, she argues, and 
believing God to be female is as ‘ridiculous’, she says, as believing God to be male. Rather than 
denying the fatherhood of God, she wishes to extend the range of images and metaphors. She 
unabashedly uses feminine pronouns for God, but in conjunction with masculine language: ‘Of 
course she is Father.  She is Father Almighty. . . . God is Mother . . . God is like me; God and I 
are mothers together; we understand each other; motherhood is deified in her Motherhood, 
and so am I’.  The ideal would be for ‘men to seek God through female images’ and vice 
versa.48  
Daphne Hampson, originally Anglican,49 has left the Church, considering herself post-Christian. 
However, in her view, feminism has dealt a severe blow to the patriarchal nature of Judaism 
and Christianity with the constant male imaging of God by Jesus and in art.  She alludes to the 
675 Council of Toledo’s description of ‘a motherly father’ ‘who both begets and bears his son’, 
but sees problems with attributing female qualities to God, in that it either enlarges our 
concept of maleness, or limits understanding of women to bearing and nurturing. She is wary 
of Sallie MacFague’s substituting alternative, gender-neutral, metaphors for God, since the 
syncretistic result is unlikely to be recognizably Christian, and dislikes the confusing use of both 
                                                 
46 Loades, Ann, Searching for Lost Coins: Explorations in Christianity and Feminism, London, 
SPCK, 1987, pp. 90-93 (mentioning Isaiah 42.14, 46.4, 49.15, though with God’s love 
contrasted with a mother’s potential faulty love, Psalm 22. 9-10, Job 10.10-12 (references to 
Wisdom and the Spirit), Matthew 23.37), 91-92, 97-98. 
47 Maitland, Sara, A Big Enough God: A Feminist’s Search for a Joyful Theology, New York, 
Riverhead, 1995, Preface, un-numbered page. 
48 Maitland, Big Enough God, pp. 75, 24, 75, 2, 18, 19, 21 (quoting her 1993 radio meditation). 





personal pronouns.50 Thus Hampson proceeds beyond ‘renaming’ to more radical ‘reshaping’, 
to ‘articulate . . . differently and non-anthropomorphically what one means by God’.  ‘It’ may 
be preferable even to ‘She’ for what, with Mary Daly, Hampson calls ‘deep Reality’. But there is 
confusion when she claims that prayer is no longer based on anthropomorphic relationship or 
dialogue, but then returns anthropomorphically to ‘knowing oneself as loved and upheld’. And 
it is unclear what is meant by Catherine of Sienna’s apparently idolatrous ‘My real me is God’, 
that she commends.  Although Hampson still ‘believes[s] the word God to refer’ (though not to 
an entity), she claims: ‘Theology is predicated upon our perception of God, not on revelation, 
and the act of perceiving becomes crucial’. As for Loades, this is a matter of the subjective 
usefulness of language, rather than objective truth.51  
A more moderate example of feminist theology is provided by Angela Tilby. Although ‘Father’ 
can imply over-control and encourage over-dependency and immaturity, as well as appearing 
to deny feminine attributes, it also, like ‘shepherd’ and ‘king’ implies protective leadership, 
exasperation along with perseverance. Projecting the strong, male qualities of society, 
including those of monarch, law-giver, architect, engineer, scientist or poet, fails to reflect 
human reality and tragedy and the Cross.52 Although sympathetic to addressing God as 
‘Mother’, though not instead of ‘Father’, she finds motherhood language too generalized, 
‘tightly linked to the biological processes of mothering and being mothered’ and thus limiting 
God’s femininity and preventing God being imagined as a young girl or old woman. Tilby’s 
feminist understanding emphasizes ‘vulnerability and collaboration’ as being as much part of 
the divine nature as ‘power and control’ – though without making clear why the former 
qualities are particularly feminine.53 There is little risk here of the essentialism that would 
result in identity-based theology based on over-generalization. 
Clark-King is more self-consciously feminist, but also realistic about the extent of feminist 
theology’s coherence with the informal theology of the Newcastle women whose views she 
records. When these women describe their images of God as a powerful, elderly, male figure, 
Clark-King recognizes the dilemma of ‘how to honour the lived experience of the working-class 
                                                 
50 Hampson, Daphne, Theology and Feminism, Oxford, Blackwell, 1990, pp. vi, xi, 1-2, 92-83, 
151-55, 159,  93 (quoting Moltmann, Jürgen, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, London, 
SCM, 1981, pp. 164-65), 157-59 (quoting MacFague, Sallie, Models of God: Theology for an 
Ecological, Nuclear Age, London, SCM, 1987, p. 136), 162. 
51 Hampson, Theology and Feminism, pp. 165, 167 (quoting Daly, Mary, Pure Lust: Elemental 
Feminist Philosophy, London, Women’s Press, 1986, pp. 403-404), 169-70, 150. 
52 Tilby, Angela, Won’t You Join the Dance?: A discovery of the Christian Creeds, London, SPCK, 
1985, pp. 41-42. 
53 Tilby, Angela, Science and the Soul: New Cosmology, the Self and God, London, SPCK, 1992, 
pp. 254-55, 248. 
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women in the pews while also holding on to the best theological insights of the academy’. She 
recognizes that human experience inevitably filters divine revelation, with ‘interference from 
our own preconceptions and limited vision’ affecting all speaking of God. On the other hand, 
human beings, male and female, having been made in the imago Dei, ‘all human lives have the 
potential to reveal something of the grace and nature of God’. There is, in other words, a 
reciprocal relationship between God and humanity over revelation.54 
She approves Mary Grey’s statement that: ‘A metaphysic of connections sees the doctrine of 
God as Trinity, not in anthropomorphic terms as three males . . . but as an attempt to image a 
God in movement, in process, a God whose whole being is to be in relation, to be 
relationality’s core’. Relationships are, for Clark-King, at the heart of women’s lives and roles, 
and ‘feed into the women’s spirituality and their understanding of God’ as the source of ‘the 
perfect relationship’ and ‘unconditional love’ to fuel their daily needs and duties.  Although 
‘middle-class, affluent, socially successful academics [might wish to say that these women’s 
needs] could be met by a female image of God – a strong, womanly presence that provides 
both affirmation in the present and a model of becoming for the future’, this would only 
‘undermine the self-validation . . . they gain from their relationships with their Father/Lover 
God and trivialize their understanding of their own spiritual experiences’.55 
Clark-King’s preference is for adding female insights to the Church’s traditional imagery and 
doctrine. The Newcastle women were generally comfortable with male imagery for God, and 
anxious at the prospect of other usage in worship  – typically of many believers in not 
distinguishing conceptually between God and the Father. They did not feel excluded from God 
by their female-ness, or find male images oppressive. Indeed, some of them took comfort from 
pseudo-romantic relationships with God, in the mediaeval mystical tradition. However, other 
images occasionally appeared, such as: an (inanimate) ‘big armchair that just encircles you and 
is . . . peace, safeness . . . always the same, . . . comfort’; someone’s (female) mother-in-law, 
‘always at the door with her arms open’; and (abstract) colour and light. Clark-King’s own 
relationship with God she characterizes as one of friendship, built on a sense of likeness rather 
than of the difference implied by romance.56 In all these portrayals, illustrated by the women’s 
spiritual experiences, Clark-King relates: 
God remains both immanent and transcendent. God can be encountered in the 
emotions and sensed as a personal presence, yet he is also outside the rules that 
                                                 
54 Clark-King, Theology by Heart, pp. 57, 15, 203. 
55 Clark-King, Theology by Heart, pp. 93 (quoting Grey, Mary, The Wisdom of Fools? Seeking 
Revelation for Today, London, SPCK, 1993, p. 59), 91-119, 118, 86. 
56 Clark-King, Theology by Heart, pp. 60, 63-66, 127, 68, 71-71, 76, 189, 66-67, 127, 202. 
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govern the rest of the material universe . . . talked of both in anthropomorphic terms 
and as belonging to the realm of the supernatural, set apart from all other forms of 
interpersonal encounter.57  
Some of the women had strong experiences of the presence of God, who, though ‘in a 
different place from us’, in his transcendence is encountered most easily in the sacred spaces 
of worship, and of the immediate efficacy of prayer, particularly in times of desperation. God, 
for them, ‘is not in the same room with them, nor in the same world. However, neither is God 
inaccessible or uninterested in the minutiae of the lives of his people.  He is able to intervene . 
. . and can alter the laws of nature’.  Feminist theology, Clark-King writes, tends to favour God’s 
immanence over transcendence, with the latter ‘dismissed as irrelevant, or inimical, to ethical 
practice’.58 
Clark-King’s Theology by Heart is distinct in this chapter, as a work of practical theology. 
Stating her own feminist position, she recounts the spirituality of a particular category of 
women who find the use of female language for God unacceptable, and male language not 
disadvantageous. The masculinity, however, is tinged with gentleness in the context of 
relationality that reflects both the Trinity and the women’s own lives. She recollects the 
apophatic tradition, the inadequacy of all language for God and her preference for the ‘choral 
theology’ of different voices based on different experiences. Immanence, so important for 
feminist theology, takes a different form for the Newcastle women, retaining a transcendent 
character, but in personal relationship with a supportive God.59 
Leech quotes Mother Julian’s ‘fullest expression of the concept of the femininity of God: “God 
is as really our Mother as he is Father’, and even ‘Our precious Mother Jesus . . .”’. This, Leech 
says, is on the basis of scriptural, patristic and mediaeval images, as ‘a . . . corrective to the 
masculinity of God-symbolism’, bringing tenderness and homeliness to our understanding of 
God.60 He cites with approval several contemporary prayers that include phrases such as: 
Thou who are Wisdom and Word,  
Whom once the world adored  
for Mother love and compassion,  
We now call the ‘Father’ and ‘Lord’ . . . 
Still in the world we seek thee, 
Mother beyond compare; . . . . 
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 Mother of all, Giver of Life . . . . 
and 
 Transforming Womb of God, 
 Conceive in us.61 
The Church of England’s Doctrine Commission report, The Mystery of Salvation, recognizing 
that both genders were created in God’s image in the Genesis account, acknowledges the 
oppressive effect of masculine language for God, and accepts that ‘Christian theology has 
never supposed that God actually is male’. However, the Report records the stylistic difficulties 
in using other or additional pronouns, and the theological losses in substituting the non-
relational Trinitarian terms ‘Source’, ‘Word’ and ‘Spirit’, or the partial terms, ‘Creator’, 
‘Redeemer’ and ‘Sanctifier’. ‘Parent’ and ‘Child’ are felt to depart from the way in which Jesus 
‘perceived and expressed his own relationship with God’, and the report recommends 
retaining traditional Trinitarian terms, while using additional terms for the persons of the 





7.8 Inter-faith theology 
Awareness of the God-claims of faiths other than Judaism and Christianity has led to a variety 
of Christian responses. Alan Race prefers to exclusivism and inclusivism a pluralist approach,63 
by which: 
the transcendent Ultimate Reality, though beyond human categories, is nevertheless 
glimpsed and experienced authentically according to different cultural religious 
histories, theologies and patterns of religious life.  Backing this up is a critical-realist 
interpretation of religious language whereby our concepts and interpretations are 
                                                 
61 Leech, Kenneth, True God: An exploration in spiritual theology, London, Sheldon, 1985, pp. 
375-78 (quoting She Prays: prayers by women, Alfred Willetts and St Joan’s Alliance, 1981, and 
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62 The Mystery of Salvation: The Story of God’s Gift: A Report by the Doctrine Commission of the 
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113 
 
largely metaphorical by nature and therefore orientated on Ultimate Reality in an 
indirect manner.64 
Quoting Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Race is confident that ‘the fact that God saves through 
[various] forms of faith . . . corroborates our Christian vision of God as active in history, 
redemptive, reaching out to all men to love and to embrace them’. Moreover, the indirect 
nature of all assertions about God means that Christianity ‘need not automatically rule out 
similar assertions in another religion’. All religions, Race argues, distinguish ‘between the 
“unknowability” and the “knowability” of Ultimate Reality. . . which allows for the hypothesis 
of Ultimate Reality to be experienced and conceptualized in different symbolic/iconic forms 
according to cultural history’.  Indeed, without moving to a position that disregards difference 
within religions, Race raises the possibility that God’s will may be that many religions might 
continue in the world, on the basis of a variety of revelations of Ultimate Reality on a par with 
Christianity.65 This is cultural relativism at its widest. 
Paul Hedges believes that pluralism is inclusivist in that ‘it puts other faiths in a position related 
to your own pluralist view’.66 D’Costa, however, believes pluralism is exclusivist as ‘a form of 
secular agnosticism’ with ‘its own intolerant, illiberal, exclusivist logic’ that allows no 
alternative, single-religion interpretation.67 Race considers a similar objection to his pluralism 
that it is dependent upon the ‘“totalizing” universal rationality that characterized the 
Enlightenment just when such tendencies are being questioned’ (presumably, although Race 
does not say so, by postmodernity): an objection he dismisses as not undermining the 
contextual influence of history and culture.  He does not address another, related, possible 
objection: that attachment to pluralism is culturally determined, and may well not be 
acceptable to adherents of some religions in their historically determined cultures. However, 
he usefully observes that pluralism ‘follow[s] through the consequences of philosophical 
observations about how knowledge comes to human consciousness and then applies this in 
the realm of (plural) religious consciousness’. Race proposes ‘ineffability’ as a term to 
encompass the focal point for all traditions (including the ‘emptiness’ of Buddhism), 
emphasizing the inadequacy of any image of God, culturally conditioned as it must be, for 
‘God’s ultimacy’, but avoiding equating the approaches of different religions. The crux of the 
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matter, for Race, is that, being ‘aware of the limitations of our religious symbolic language’, 
Christians have to question any assumption ‘that the Christian faith (or any other) is “the one 
true religion”’,68 and therefore, it can be added, any closed assumptions about God or God’s 
self-revelation. However, this is not without its critics: D’Costa, for instance, says that, in 
proposing ‘to emphasize God rather than Christ, [Hick] is in danger of severing Christology 
from ontology and introducing a free-floating “God” divorced from any particular revelation’, 
whereas in fact: the Abrahamic faiths ‘have all tended to center [sic] on revelatory paradigms 
for the discourse and practice’, and Hicks’s model of ‘an all-loving God’ is not found in 
Buddhism and Confucianism; and the model quickly departs from the notion of an 
ontologically personal God if all personal qualities are deemed to be metaphorical.69  The first 
objection can be countered by pointing out that the ‘free-floating’ notion of God is proposed 
precisely to surpass individual revelatory dispensations, and the second that this is precisely 
the ontological problem that is raised over theism, irrespective of inter-faith concerns. 
The Church of England’s Doctrine Commission’s report, The Mystery of Salvation, recommends 
a position that it believes is beyond Race’s alternatives of exclusivism, inclusivism and 
pluralism. However, its alternative position in fact tends towards inclusivism, agreeing that 
God works within other religions, but then claiming that this is by God’s Spirit, with salvation 
through Jesus Christ still the ultimate goal.70 This is a retreat from pluralism towards the 
Church’s traditional position,71 and provides less scope for inter-faith dialogue with its 
insistence on the ultimacy of Christ. 
Race cites areas of agreement between representatives of a wide variety of traditions which 
made up the Snowmass Monastic Interfaith Dialogue in 1984-86, by which ‘Ultimate Reality’: 
 is experienced under the names of ‘Brahman, Allah, Absolute, God, Great 
Spirit’; 
 ‘cannot be limited by any name or concept’; 
 ‘is the ground of infinite potentiality and actualization’; and 
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 ‘can be experienced not only through religious practices but also through 
nature, art, human relationships, and service of others.72 
Whatever the underlying theory of inter-faith theology, contemporary informal Christian 
theology has probably been influenced by such agreement, and by greater awareness of other 
faith systems, stemming from increased global mobility and the profile of faiths beyond 
Christianity within the UK. Positive aspects are the recognition of the value, validity and 
compare-ability of varying faiths and cultures, balanced in both cases by recognizing the 
distinctiveness of each culture and faith and their developing nature.73 While recognizing 
distinctiveness, Hart has traced a trail of non-realism through the histories of Judaism, 
Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam, and, presumably in relation to all faith traditions, 
argues that ‘in speaking of “God”, we are celebrating the lofty but human ideals that we have 
ourselves constructed within the world of our imaginations and articulated with our poetic 
powers’.74 
7.9 Summary 
This review has argued that cultural relativism as a factor appears inescapable, particularly for 
Nineham and Wiles, but also for Brown, with his efforts to relate the Christian message to the 
artistic and similar inclinations in humanity when conventional religious practice has lost its 
cultural appeal, and even, implicitly, for Thiselton, when he focuses on religious language 
being most useful within the cultural community of the Church. Thiselton does not 
satisfactorily explain why cultural relativism is incompatible with ‘theology which is truly 
critical, Cross-centred and liberating’.  It is questionable to what extent he and Brown are 
confronting the very real problems that twenty-first century Christianity faces: of presenting 
itself other than in, for some, hopelessly anachronistic terms, rooted in biblical and other pre-
modern texts and liturgy; or of inducting people into these ancient modes of expression and 
understanding. There are some ordinary believers, as Clark-King, demonstrates, for whom 
conventional language and concepts are the way they experience and couch their faith. 
However, to some extent for Brown, and certainly for Tilby and Leech, this form of 
presentation is not inevitable.  Feminist theologians, particularly Leech, have demonstrated 
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how socially constructive theology and practice can flow from a full acknowledgement of shifts 
in culture, with relevant Christian action resulting on behalf of those in need of liberation. The 
feminist theologians surveyed have demonstrated an ability to provide elements of systematic 
theology with their concerns also being addressed. It may be that the way forward is ‘choral 
theology’, as Clark-King advocates, according with the spirit of postmodernism and cultural 
relativism, and with a broad acceptance of different modes of theological expression from 
different quarters. This includes, as for Clark-King, academia and ordinary believers, but also 
different ecclesiastical and cultural tradition, recalling reminders of the inadequacy of all 
theological language.  The challenge from inter-faith theology is whether pluralism is 
compatible with, or undermining of, individual religious traditions, particularly, for Christian 
theology, its specific tradition. But recognizing the Abrahamic faiths’ common scriptural and 
the common etymological roots of ‘Eloah’ and ‘Allah’ (with ‘Allah even used for God’ among 
some Arab Christians)75 broadens professional and informal theologians’ concepts of God 
beyond their immediate cultural contexts.  The cultural contexts to which theology must now 
be relative if to remain relevant and Catholic are various and broad. It will be important to 
note the cultural context of the survey that forms part of this thesis.
                                                 




Chapter 8: LIBERAL THEOLOGY LANDMARKS SINCE 1960 
8.1 Introduction 
There is no clear dividing line between theologians who consciously describe and respond to 
aspects of shifting background culture, described above, and many liberal theologians, who are 
also responding to perceived cultural changes, albeit with less emphasis on the cultural 
changes themselves.  Robinson’s Honest to God is, par excellence, an example of a 
phenomenon that could be placed in either chapter. The following theologians, however, in 
the author’s opinion, have constituted landmarks in liberal theology since 1960. 
8.2  J. B. Phillips 
Phillips sets the scene for later twentieth century liberal theology, aiming ‘to expose the 
inadequate conceptions of God which still linger unconsciously in many minds, and which 
prevent our catching a glimpse of the true God; and . . . to suggest ways in which we can find 
the real God for ourselves’. He outlines some popular false images of God as: 
 conscience, with its fallibility;  
 a guilt-inducing figure to replace parents, perfection that rejects the 
imperfect;  
 a ‘Grand Old Man’ out of touch with modern knowledge and more suited 
to the Old Testament than to love;  
 a god in an exclusive religious ‘box’; and 
 a god against whom we have a grievance for letting us down.1 
Rather, for Phillips, God is ‘unfocused’, unlimited by time or space, yet ‘a Person with whom 
we can establish some personal relationship’ and who can have personal claims on us. Clues as 
to this reality appear through spirituality, goodness and artistic and natural beauty, and above 
all Christ. From Christ we derive an understanding of God as ‘“the Father”, in Nature and 
Character and Operation’, though with the proviso that fatherhood is analogical.  Phillips 
implicitly rejects any idea of a god of gaps: ‘We can never have too big a conception of God, 
and the more scientific knowledge . . . advances, the greater becomes our idea of His vast and 
complicated wisdom’.2 When Phillips writes of ‘The Limitations of Science’, he is not so much 
finding gaps for God to fill as drawing attention to the need for complementary disciplines to 
answer the ‘whys’ in addition to science’s answers to the ‘hows’. He believes that a God who 
intervened in human affairs would undermine human freedom. His response to human 
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suffering is almost dismissive, being based upon innocent suffering being simply beyond 
human comprehension, with natural disasters perhaps not as bad from God’s point of view as 
they appear from ours: ‘To imagine that God looks upon physical death as many men do, or to 
think of him as impressed by numbers, violence or size, is simply to think of God as a magnified 
man – a monstrously inadequate conception’.3  
Thus Phillips rehearses ancient theological quandaries in popular, contemporary style, and 
without knowledge of the storm of revisionism that was about to break. Such revisionist 
references to God in Soundings4 (to which reference has been made in relation to ‘Analogy’) 
and Objections to Christian Belief5 are now largely unexceptionable, but both books reflect the 
climate within the influential academic section of the Church of England from which Honest to 
God emerged. 
8.3 John Robinson and Honest to God 
a. Spatial concepts 
Honest to God appeared between these aforementioned two books, out of Robinson’s 
conviction ‘that there is a growing gulf between the traditional orthodox supernaturalism in 
which our Faith has been framed and the categories which the “lay” world . . . finds meaningful 
today’.6 In a later sermon, Robinson – subsequently supported by Alistair Kee7 – outlines four 
human projections of the ‘utterly transcendent personal reality’, which he believes have 
become stumbling blocks for many:  
 mythological projection, presenting God as if human;  
 supranaturalist projection, with God ‘a super-Person living in a realm “above” 
or “beyond” this one’;  
 metaphysical projection as Reality and our existential connection with Reality; 
and 
 confinement to religion, requiring religiosity before faith.8 
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By the 1960s God ‘up there’ as part of a three-decker universe has been replaced by a God 
who is spiritually or metaphorically ‘out there’, writes Robinson, and abandoning both idols 
may be the only way of making Christianity meaningful.9 Some, like Colin Buchanan10 and 
Trevor Hart,11 counter with the inevitability of spatial imagery for communicating God’s 
otherness more effectively than Robinson’s alternative, ‘ground of our being’. Robinson does 
not recognise that removing all spatial imagery from concepts of God would imply a necessity 
to remove all non-literal imagery, and leave a sparse theology.  Cautious about personhood, 
Robinson explains, ‘Reality at its very deepest level is personal’, and God – lapsing into spatial 
imagery – ‘Love . . . the ground of our being, to which ultimately we “come home”’.12  
b. Alternative concepts 
Robinson is rightly nervous about a deus ex machina God who ‘is constantly pushed further 
and further back as the tide of secular studies advances’, and sympathetic to Julian Huxley’s 
view of God as the ‘last fading of a cosmic Cheshire cat’. So Robinson wonders, with 
Bonhoeffer and Tillich, whether we should live without God as a working hypothesis, and 
whether this would mark the end of theism.13 He substitutes – although later he recognises 
both height and depth approaches as of value14 – imagery that Paul Tillich drew from depth 
psychology, quoting Tillich’s well-known passage, starting: 
The name of this infinite and inexhaustible depth and ground of all being is God. . . . 
And if that word has not much meaning for you . . . speak of the depths of your life, of 
the source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without 
reservation.15 
For Hart, ‘ground’ and ‘Being’ are as much the product of imagination as more conventional 
expressions,16 and John Lawrence argues that spatial references do not preclude a sense of 
                                                 
9 Robinson, Honest to God, pp. 11-13, 17. 
10 Buchanan, Colin, ‘Honest to God: In Its Time and Since’, Slee Colin, ed., Honest to God: 40 
Years On, London, SCM, 2004, pp. 14-18. 
11 Hart, Trevor, ‘Behaviour and Belief: The Reduction of Religion to Ethics?’, Slee, ed., Honest to 
God: 40 Years On, pp. 95-97. 
12 Robinson, Honest to God, pp. 48-49, 
13 Robinson, Honest to God, pp. 37 (quoting Huxley, Julian, Religion without Revelation¸ 
London, Ernest Benn, 1927, p. 58), 38-39. 
14 Robinson, John, A. T., ‘The Debate Continues’, Edwards, David L., ed., The Honest to God 
Debate: Some reactions to the book ‘Honest to God’, London, SCM, 1963, pp. 235-36. 
15 Robinson, Honest to God, p. 22 (quoting Tillich, Paul, The Shaking of the Foundations, 
London, SCM, 1949 and Harmondsworth, Pelican Books, 1962, pp. 63-64). 
16 Hart, ‘Behaviour and Belief’, pp. 92-93. 
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God everywhere and within us.17 Indeed, Jenkins argues that ‘height’ may have more 
psychological validity than ‘depth’, as a challenge to ‘stretch’ ourselves, and thus ‘not all that 
irrelevant psychologically, metaphysically or theologically’.18 
Robinson proposes ‘ultimate reality’ as a more promising start for theology than trying to 
prove the existence of God: ‘One cannot argue whether ultimate reality exists. One can only 
ask what ultimate reality is like’.19 The concept of ‘ultimate reality’ is unclear, however, and an 
intention of seeking its nature of questionable legitimacy. Both Herbert McCabe20 and 
Jenkins21 justifiably take Robinson’s statement as part of an argument that ultimate reality is 
self-evidently existent; but for Robinson this does not follow, but rather, the nature of ultimate 
reality is to be sought by seeking ‘the ground of our being’.22 Jenkins rightly points out that 
concepts such as ‘ultimate reality’ are no less, but also no more, logically difficult than 
traditional theistic language.23   
c. Transcendence and Immanence 
Perhaps the concept of transcendence needs restating.  Following Tillich, Robinson detaches 
transcendence from ‘the projection of supranaturalism’ and redefines it as the depth and 
ground of this world.24 (Sometimes Tillich’s ‘supranatural’ means the same for Robinson as 
‘supernatural’, as McCabe agrees;25 later he prefers ‘supranatural’ to refer not to the reality of 
God, but to the human projection.26)  The risk is of total immanentism, which Robinson 
identifies – questionably – with pantheism and pantheism with determinism, so that 
immanentism implies determinism; the difference between the biblical (presumably 
transcendent) and immanentist outlooks is that the former ‘grounds all reality ultimately in 
personal freedom – in Love’. This strange argument feels like an attempt, near the end of 
Honest to God, to restore some validity to conventional theology.  ‘All true awareness of God is 
an experience at one and the same time of ultimacy and intimacy, of the mysterium 
                                                 
17 Edwards, ed., The Honest to God Debate, pp. 156-57 (quoting Lawrence, John, Frontier, 
Summer 1963). 
18 Jenkins, David, ‘Concerning Theism’, Edwards, ed., Honest to God Debate, p. 203. 
19 Robinson, Honest to God, p. 29. 
20 Edwards, ed., Honest to God Debate pp. 169-170 (quoting McCabe, Herbert, O.P., 
Blackfriars, July/August 1963). 
21 Jenkins, ‘Concerning Theism’, pp. 198-99. 
22 Robinson, Honest to God, p. 29. 
23 Jenkins, ‘Concerning Theism’, p. 202. 
24 Robinson, Honest to God, pp. 41, 44, 55-56 (quoting Tillich, Paul, Systematic Theology, 
Volume II, London, Nisbet, 1953, p.8). 
25 Edwards, ed., Honest to God Debate p. 173 (quoting McCabe, Blackfriars, July/August 1963). 
26 Robinson, ‘Debate Continues’, p. 35. 
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tremendum et fascinans’, Robinson writes, recognizing ‘the infinite qualitative difference 
between the Creator and the creature, between the holy God and sinful man’.27 However, his 
understanding of transcendence is unclear, with Lawrence pointing out that human relations 
pointing to something beyond themselves is somewhat different from the customary 
understanding of God’s transcendence.28 
d. Reactions to Honest to God 
Edwards records something of the immense public and academic reaction, both positive and 
negative, that Honest to God provoked. Many ‘ordinary’ correspondents expressed misgivings 
or anger, or gratitude and sympathy.29 For some, experience of God was real, even if 
conventional theology was not,30 and for some, including clergy, the book came as an 
encouragement of faith.31 Robinson’s diocesan bishop explains in The Evening Standard how 
traditional locational language for God, while presenting no problem for him, ‘often fails to 
register and gives rise to misconceptions’ in the factory, college and university audiences 
which he addresses.32  Conversely, C. S Lewis, Mascall and Nineham all write that most 
Christian lay people have abandoned the anthropomorphism of God in a localized heaven and 
do not conceive God as spatially located. They consider that these people use the terms 
imaginatively, being alive to the symbolic and non-literal character of spatial metaphors (with 
all pictures presenting problems if taken univocally).33 The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre 
reports a trend in theology that ‘retained a theistic vocabulary but acquired an atheistic 
substance’,34 and Mascall, McCabe and the non-Christian David Boulton  imply that Robinson 
may be left with no more than a humanistic account of God.35  
                                                 
27 Robinson, Honest to God, pp. 130, 131, omitting some unexplained inverted commas. 
28 Edwards, ed., Honest to God Debate, pp. 159-60 (quoting Lawrence, Frontier). 
29 Edwards, ed., Honest to God Debate, pp. 7-44, 48-81. 
30 E.g., Edwards, ed., Honest to God Debate, pp. 59-62. 
31 E.g., Edwards, ed., Honest to God Debate, pp. 63-64, 68, 74-80. 
32 Edwards, ed., Honest to God Debate, p. 33 (quoting Evening Standard, 9th April 1963). 
33 Responding to Robinson John, ‘Our Image of God Must Go’, Observer, 17th March 1963, 
three days before publication of Honest to God; Edwards, ed., Honest to God Debate, p. 91 
(quoting Lewis, C.S., Observer, 24th March 1963); Mascall, The Secularisation of Christianity, 
1965, Libra Edition 1967, p. 117; Nineham, Dennis, ‘What Happened to the New 
Reformation?’, James, God’s Truth, p. 155. 
34 MacIntyre, Alasdair, ‘God and the Theologians’, Edwards, ed., Honest to God Debate, pp. 
215, 223. 
35 Edwards, ed., Honest to God Debate, pp. 93-94 (quoting Mascall, E. L., Observer, 24th March 
1963); pp. 105-106 (quoting Boulton, David, Tribune, 12th April 1963), 168, (quoting McCabe, 
Herbert, O.P., Blackfriars, July/August 1963). 
122 
 
Bultmann reckons it is possible ‘that this existential knowledge of the depth and ground of all 
being may be contained, and as it were concealed, in all the traditional conceptions of God’, 
even though they do not provide ‘an existential relationship to God’.36 By subsuming ‘the 
depth and ground of all being’ within ‘traditional conceptions’, Bultmann escapes the category 
mistake that would occur if he implied that it was possible to have such an ‘existential 
relationship’ with the concept of ‘the depth and ground of all being’:37 it is to the personal God 
that one relates rather than a concept. Alan Richardson questions the helpfulness of ‘ultimate 
reality’ and ‘ground of being’, writing that ‘One cannot pick a quarrel with the Ground of Being 
[or] go to the stake for it either’.38 Probably with Friedrich Schleiermacher in mind, Cupitt 
places Robinson in the tradition of sense-experience as the means of knowing God, and his 
‘religion too immanent, too human and too little distinct from culture’ and wanting to find an 
alternative ‘way of overcoming religious heteronomy . . . while yet maintaining the 
transcendent . . .’.39 Hebblethwaite accepts that Robinson was no atheist, and draws attention 
to the difference between his and Cupitt’s theologies, with Robinson ‘maintain[ing] the heart 
of theism in the context of modernity’ against Cupitt’s ‘purely naturalistic view of the context 
of human life’.40  The difficulty in communicating the subtleties of theology is illustrated by O. 
Fielding Clarke’s response about the difficulty of addressing something with personal 
attributes which is not another being. However, his charge of ‘non-sense’, if ‘not heresy’,41 
indicates a failure to recognise the subtlety and provisionality of Robinson’s grappling with real 
1960s difficulties over the concept of God in the face of logical positivism and the growth of 
popular science. 
e. Longer-term reactions 
Forty years after the publication of Honest to God, Wright again questions Robinson’s 
assumptions about people’s inability to accept more traditional presentations of Christianity, 
citing evidence of contemporary popular faith and the lack of any sociological survey in 
                                                 
36 Edwards, ed., Honest to God Debate, p. 136 (quoting Bultmann, Rudolf, Die Zeit, 10th May 
1963, translated by Clarke, Frank). 
37 Edwards, ed., Honest to God Debate, p. 136. 
38 Richardson, Alan, ‘God: Our Search or His?’, Richardson, Alan, ed., Four Anchors from the 
Stern: Nottingham Reactions to Recent Cambridge Essays, London, SCM, 1963, pp. 5-9. 
39 Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, pp. 35-39, 8. 
40 Hebblethwaite, Brian, The Ocean of Truth: A Defence of Objective Theism, Cambridge, CUP, 
1988, p. 66. 
41 Fielding Clarke, O., For Christ’s Sake: A reply to the Bishop of Woolwich’s book HONEST TO 
GOD and a positive continuation of the discussion, Wallington, Religious Education Press, 1963, 
pp. 15-16, 18, 19. 
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support of his contentions.42 He locates Robinson and his problems within a particular cultural 
English background that tends towards a deist or semi-deist position, with a gap between God 
and humanity that is occasionally overcome by divine intervention.43 Wright stresses the place 
of revelation, ‘not to leap over the ontological or moral gap between a remote Deist God and 
ourselves, but to enable us rightly to recognize the laughter and the tears, the celebration and 
the judgment, of the true God’.44 In similar vein, Williams draws attention to Robinson’s 
paucity of reference to the activity of God, including activity in relation to one who prays.45 It is 
probable that in 1963 Robinson would have seen such an approach as inimical to his general 
thesis, but also conceivable, in view of developments in Exploration into God and his reported 
later regret over the Honest to God episode,46 that he would have later accepted these 
criticisms. Cupitt is unclear as to whether Robinson’s position in Honest to God is realist or 
non-realist, but concludes that his longer term position was one of realism.47  
f. Exploration into God 
In his later Exploration into God, Robinson is still reluctant to accept the inescapability of 
analogy: 
The sifting process of linguistic analysis has been one of stripping down an idol . . . . 
Any ways of speaking about [God] that are suggested in order to fill the word with 
content for a particular age or culture are not substitutes for it. None of these can be 
made into God without becoming idols.48 
Responding to the challenge of verifiability, he seeks ‘meaning’ for God-related language in 
subjective (or ‘existentialist’, as Robinson prefers), Christ-inspired, experience, conviction and 
a relationship.  Struggling as to with whom this relationship might be, he resorts without clear 
conclusion to various ‘pointers’ as to how God might be experienced without being defined.  
Alluding to Martin Buber’s ‘I-Thou’ approach, he writes ‘that the utterly personal “Thou”-
relationship in which God is known is (to use Buber’s metaphor) the umbilical cord of man’s 
very existence’, adding that the cord has to be cut and replaced by ‘a free relationship of moral 
                                                 
42 Wright N. T., ‘Doubts about Doubt: Honest to God Forty Years On’, JAS, 2005, 3 (2), p. 184. 
43 Cf. Vernon, Mark, ‘The best policy – for a theological shake-up’, Church Times, 26 April 2013, 
p. 22, where the same view is attributed to Wright, that ‘Robinson was in thrall to a deistic 
view of God that stems from the Enlightenment’. 
44 Wright, ‘Doubts about Doubt’, pp. 192-93. 
45 Williams, Rowan, ‘Honest to God in Great Britain’, Robinson, John A. T., Honest to God: 40th 
Anniversary Edition, Louisville, Westminster John Knox, 2002, pp. 168-69. 
46 Gomes, Peter J., ‘Honest to God and the Dangerous Ethic’, Slee, ed., Honest to God: 40 Years 
On, p. 73. 
47 Cupitt, Don, ‘John Robinson and the Language of Faith in God’, Slee, ed., Honest to God: 40 
Years On, pp. 42-43, citing Robinson, Where Three Ways Meet, p. 190. 
48 Robinson, Exploration into God, p. 60. 
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and spiritual responsibility’. ‘The “Thou” of God’ he adds, ‘is to be met as much through nature 
as through history’, since one can have an ‘I-It’ or an ‘I-Thou’ relationship with both people and 
things.  He draws a fine line between the ‘personalist’ approach of a ‘Thou relationship’ and his 
belief that ‘the conception of God as a Being, a Person . . . will . . . come to be seen as a human 
projection’. He questions whether ‘the nature of the ultimate must necessarily be framed in 
terms of the existence of a divine Being’, and writes that ‘to represent the spiritual reality (in 
its transcendent aspect) as a Being in another realm is to make it unreal and remote for vast 
numbers of people today’. Robinson draws a comparison with the natural way in which the 
devil is generally demythologized by most people, suggesting that ‘a God who . . . depends on 
ontological existence [probably meaning ‘definition’] for his reality is merely inviting 
secularism’.49 The import of ‘secularism’ is unclear: it could be taken as the positive outcome 
of abandoning a ‘god of the gaps’, with potential for theism then to interpret the secular 
presentation as a whole, rather than treating it as a hostile ideology. 
g. Summary 
Robinson proposed an alternative set of imagery offering fresh metaphysical and existential 
insight. However, despite the public debate that Honest to God engendered, the extent to 
which the issues were ones confronting people remains uncertain. Indeed, it was not intended 
as popular theology as Robinson and Williams later acknowledge,50 relying, as it does, upon 
familiarity with certain twentieth century philosophers and theologians. Although some would 
disagree,51 for Williams by the 1980s, Honest to God ‘seemed a museum piece’, although he 
concedes that Robinson’s concern at the practice of ‘treat[ing] God as a member of the class of 
things . . . in the universe’ remained apposite, and that the challenge remains for theology of 
restating classical theology ‘without reinstating a fundamentally mythological idiom for 
speaking of the divine action’.52 It is now legitimate to ask whether even this caveat is 
necessary, provided there is overt recognition of the inevitability of analogy. Indeed, the 
Observer’s headline, ‘Our Image of God Must Go’, shortly before Honest to God’s publication, 
did not assert that ‘any image of God “must go”’, as Edwards says some imagined was 
Robinson’s position.53 Twenty-five years after the event, Nineham indicated that ‘What people 
need is some approach to envisaging realities such as God, creation and providence 
                                                 
49 Robinson, Exploration into God, pp. 62-72, 23-26 (cf. Honest to God, pp. 48, 53.42-43), 36-38. 
50 Robinson, Explorations into God, London, pp. 9-10; Williams, ‘Honest to God in Great Britain’, 
p. 163. 
51 Including Cheetham, Richard, ‘Foreword’, Slee, ed., Honest to God: 40 Years On, pp. vii-viii. 
52 Williams, ‘Honest to God in Great Britain’, p. 178. 
53 Edwards, Tradition and Truth, p. 31. 
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imaginatively in a way which does no violence to the rest of what they know to be true’; ‘to be 
fully convincing’, a description of God in terms of depth ‘must be supplemented by a plausible 
account of how the personal and gracious character of innermost reality manifests itself in 
practice and makes a difference to the quality and outcome of life at the historical level’.54 
Robinson’s theology is experiential, immanentist and existentialist, although he reluctantly 
accepts the risk of turning theology into a form of hubristic anthropology in which the concept 
of God is superfluous. It is possible to find shades of panentheism in Honest to God, when 
Robinson contrasts ‘the depths of our individual being (however shallow) and the 
unfathomable abyss of all being in God’, and when he refers to God as the ‘depth and ultimate 
significance’ of ‘the conditioned relationships of this life’. It later becomes explicit, in 
Exploration into God, when he presents panentheism as a respectable alternative to traditional 
theism, and approvingly describes the subtleties of mutual indwelling: ‘In this way of thinking 
there is a co-inherence between God and the universe which overcomes the duality without 
denying the diversity’.55 Robinson avoids pantheism: ‘God is love’ and ‘love is of God’, but it is 
not the case that love is God;56 and Michael Ramsey and John Packer were unfair in arguing 
that Robinson had moved towards pantheism.57  
Taken overall, Robinson’s liberal writing can be seen to be a child of its time, reacting to 
preserve Christianity in the face of modernist materialism and scepticism. His attempts to 
demythologise result in alternative mythology or existential non-realism, whereas accepting 
and explaining the analogical nature of all theological language is likely to have more positive 
effect.   
8.4 Maurice Wiles 
Wiles’s revisionism sometimes leads to charges of deism. He stresses the unknowability of 
God, and describes the appeal of Platonism’s transcendence and mystical approach to the new 
Christianity: ‘the ideal forms of the eternal world’, with the Good or the One at the apex of this 
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world. This, says Wiles, lies behind the first Article of the Church of England’s describing God as 
‘without body, parts or passions’, which Wiles interprets as implying, respectively: 
transcendence and excluding anthropomorphism; emphasising monotheistic unity; and neither 
lacking nor desiring anything, though without denying concern and love. For the Fathers, he 
writes, the ineffability of God does not preclude theology, but rather implies ‘the indirectness 
and the incompleteness’ of the endeavour.   But ‘once human reason has acknowledged its 
inability to reach up to God, it may be the more ready to accept that God has chosen to 
disclose himself’.58 Wiles finds the seeds of a theological revolution even within the 
Cappadocian Fathers, who found the ‘divine ousia [‘being’] . . . both inaccessible and 
unknowable’, and preferred ‘the divine activity (ἐνέργεια) which alone impinges directly upon 
mankind’, with ‘the term godhead (θεότης) . . . expressive of the divine activity rather than the 
divine nature’.59 
While anxious that nonsense should not find respectability as paradox, Wiles nevertheless 
recognises the inevitability of paradox, and even incoherence, for theology to proceed. The 
West, he says, places incoherence between God (who is ‘pure actuality’) and the world, with 
resulting problems over how and why God creates.  Conversely, on the basis of divinization, 
the East places incoherence within the Godhead, the ultimate paradox being the distinction 
between the divine essence and the divine energies. This, he says, is a similar conclusion to 
that within process theology, where ‘God is dually transcendent and there is a distinction (but 
not division) between his primordial and his consequent natures’.60  
Wiles’s starting point for examining the epistemology of our understanding of God is that ‘The 
infinite God is infinitely resistant to our finite systematizations’; or, put differently, it is ‘the 
extreme difficulty of reasoning from experience of the world to affirmation about a 
transcendent God’, particularly with the ‘infinite qualitative difference between him and us’. 
To believe otherwise, he suggests would be both ‘an invalid metabasis eis allo genos61 and the 
grossest impiety’. The only alternative is a Barthian reliance upon God’s self-revelation, but the 
medium of revelation and our means of assessing it are still dependent upon the ordinary 
world, leading to some circularity of argument. So, for Wiles, theology can speak not of the 
transcendent God, but only of ‘the effects of God as experienced’.62 God is: 
                                                 
58 Wiles, Maurice, The Christian Fathers, London, H&S, 1966, pp. 13-14 and 16-23. 
59 Wiles, Maurice, The Making of Christian Doctrine: A Study in the Principles of Early Doctrinal 
Development, Cambridge, CUP, 1967, pp. 176-77. 
60 Maurice, Remaking of Christian Doctrine, pp. 31, 109, 118-20. 
61 Change to another kind (of subject), similar to a category mistake. 
62 Wiles, Remaking of Christian Doctrine, pp. 108, 22, 23-24, 25-26. 
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that reality of which we are aware when we have an experience of ultimate concern 
and which we cannot know by any other route. There is a reality other than the human 
experiencing, but we are only able to speak of it indirectly by speaking of those 
experiences within which we are aware of its effective presence.63 
Existentialist theology, writes Wiles, has tried not to replace objectivity with subjectivity, but to 
overcome the distinction between the two, so that God’s constant relationship with 
consciousness is through the totality of human lived experience. However, a problem remains 
for Wiles, in that experience of God is not self-evidently experience of God, and is coloured by 
cultural and religious tradition and psychological factors. So, although varied experiences may 
be genuine, it remains difficult to distinguish the true from the false. But Wiles does not limit 
understanding to human experience, and affirms the possibility of some knowledge, however 
indirect and analogical, from considering the effects of God.  He believes in ‘God’s one act . . . 
of creation . . . as a continuing and still unfinished process’, in contrast with a God who leaves 
his creation to its own devices.64 Since, for Wiles ‘there is no going back on the Christian 
conviction of creation ex nihilo’, there must be a suspicion that he is collapsing God’s 
sustaining activity into the original creative act, and thus moving towards a deist position, so 
that divine relationship with humanity becomes merely a human projection.  
Wiles is nervous at the prospect of God having a special connection with the call of individual 
Old Testament figures and Christians, as undermining ‘our normal understanding of the 
relative independence of causation within the world’. ‘Talk of God’s activity  is . . . a way of 
speaking about those events within the natural order or within human history in which God’s 
purpose finds clear expression or special opportunity’.65 Later, he describes how science’s 
removing the ‘God of the gaps’ ‘has made possible the reaffirmation of a more profound 
concept of God as the transcendent ground of there being a world at all’.66 But now he is 
explicitly conscious of the potential charge of deism, and accepts that his position is deistic ‘in 
so far as it refrains from claiming any effective causation on the part of God in relation to 
particular occurrences’, but not so ‘in that it allows for a continuing relationship of God to the 
world as source of existence and giver of purpose to the whole’.67 Sensitive to the prospect of 
his emphasis on God’s original and general creative role undermining personal understanding 
of God’s activity, Wiles acknowledges that God’s relationship with humanity ‘must never be 
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64 Edwards, Tradition and Truth, p. 287. 
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66 Wiles, Maurice, Working Papers in Doctrine, London, SCM, 1976, p. 134. 
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understood in sub-personal terms’.68 Indeed, if ‘“the ultimate” or “the divine”’ is where we are 
grounded, ‘it cannot be wholly alien in character from what it is to be a person’,69 and personal 
terms and concepts for God can never be out of place.70 ‘Act of God’, Wiles writes, does not 
refer to efficient causation, but creates a new reality: ‘certain occurrences within the world 
[commonly seen as providential or miraculous] are acknowledged and experienced as having a 
special and intimate relation to that ultimate source of love’. Rather than manipulating events, 
God enables people to ‘glimpse his purposes of love and be inspired by that vision’, such 
glimpses and inspiration being very real forms of action.71  
With the passage of time, Wiles’s deistic streak is modified, and although he still requires God 
as the source of all existence, he also recognises that ‘the doctrine of creation out of nothing 
must indeed seem a strong candidate for radical modification’ in the light of modern insights. 
He proposes that God may have created the world with independence from himself, 
deliberately limiting the scope of his activity, but not thereby nullifying his omnipotence. To 
declare this impossible would purport to limit God’s creative work. This involves ‘a 
qualification of the concept of power by that of love’, as the basis of the autonomy of his 
created agents and a reciprocal relationship between God and his creatures (as advanced by 
some process theologians). This amounts to ‘the gift of freedom to finite beings’, in contrast 
with Paul’s ‘disastrous’ insistence that God, the potter, can do what he likes with the clay. 
God’s impassibility remains important, and ‘God is never, as we are, affected by forces of 
events which come entirely from outside the sphere of his own influence’. This is not 
undermined by God’s self-limiting, since any suffering on God’s part because of what we do ‘is 
not the result of something that has happened wholly apart from God’. It is not clear, however, 
how this qualification preserves God’s impassibility.72 
Wiles outlines how God brings the world round to his intentions as ‘the gradual emergence of 
our world as . . . a purposeful occurrence’,73 citing Macquarrie’s analogy of a strong chess 
player who always brings the game back to his purposes, and John Lucas’s of a Persian rug 
maker who adjusts his work at one end to the mistakes of his children at the other end  (both 
reminiscent of Vanstone’s account of the boys turning accidents to good account in making 
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their model of a waterfall74). These analogies, Wiles writes, preserve human freedom in 
distinction from God’s actions, but outline how different ways of describing the same 
phenomenon (like Farrer’s double agency) relate to one another without treating God ‘as just 
one more causal agent alongside others’. Wiles’s analogy is of Solomon building the temple 
and instructing a workman to build the temple. At an individual level, to postulate God both 
calling for and engineering the response would exemplify bad theology as well as logic: ‘divine 
grace and human freedom are [not] competing explanations, [with] the more one ascribes to 
the former, the less can be ascribed to the latter’.  The particular psychological and social 
factors that come together to contribute to someone’s conversion to Christianity, for instance, 
‘may better be seen as characteristic aspects of a world that in its totality constitutes God’s 
action rather than as particular or discrete acts of God’. Although it would seem wrong to deny 
God the freedom enjoyed by human beings to respond and intervene within a personal 
relationship, Wiles’s reminder is that analogy is being used, that God is not a person, and that 
divine self-limitation is operative in respect of ‘personal’ interventions as in other ways. 
Denying God the freedom to act without causal restraint in the world ‘may not in fact be to 
depersonalize him but to be rather a corollary of the kind of world God has in fact chosen to 
create’.75 
So, says Wiles, we are led to ‘general statements about the kind of world God has created 
rather than to claims about particular, specifiable acts of God in history.’  This avoids theodicy-
related problems over non-intervention, and God’s self-limiting omnipotence makes 
‘miraculous’ intervention unlikely.76  Vincent Brümmer questions this,77 but fails to grasp how 
Wiles, almost mystically, sees the master-act and the subacts as parts of the same continuing 
creative process, without any need for causation between them.  Indeed, for Edwards, the 
modern believer ‘who accepts the revelation by science of the regularities in nature has to 
acknowledge that the Creator has so arranged things that he is not needed like a technician 
who is often being called back to fix a faulty machine’.78   
Wiles has devised a total integrated scheme of a single creative act in the created universe, 
and in human acts that are free by virtue of God’s self-limitation.  The theory may be 
speculative, but it has its own integrity. Attributing happenings to God’s direct intervention in 
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the world represents alternative imagery that may be just as ‘true’ for its adherents as more 
complicated theorising is for Wiles and his sympathisers. Edwards’s preference is for retaining 
the possibility of the miraculous events of the Bible as ‘signs’, ‘mysterious and ambiguous, 
needing interpretation by faith if “the finger of God” is to be discerned in them. . . . We may 
say “God did that” while from another angle it is equally right to say that “nature did that”’.  
Indeed, when Edwards writes that ‘There is such a fear of mythology in religion that it is 
thought right to insist that in reality God never intervenes’,79 what is most significant is the 
reference to mythology, since, if mythology is given its true weight, it is possible to insist with 
one way of speaking (the mythological) that God does intervene, and at the same time insist 
with another way of speaking (the rationalist, scientific) that God does not, or even that the 
concept is meaningless.  It is almost as if theism and deism can co-exist, possibly as part of the 
paradox and incoherence to which Wiles refers, inevitable in the face of God’s ineffability. 
8.5 Don Cupitt 
Early on, Cupitt states his problem: ‘If theology’s basic concepts ever become clear and 
specific, it is falling into idolatry: if they are refined away, theology falls into vacuity’:80  
We think about God through human imagery, and yet deny its adequacy: we must so 
think, and we must so deny. The clues to the interpretation of monotheism are the old 
polemic against idolatry, and the insolubility of the problem of analogy.81 
Thus is anticipated Cupitt’s life-long struggle with theism, which culminates in his post-
modernist rejection of any objective realism, and even any metaphysical realism, for God in 
favour of a purely subjectivist, spirituality-based approach.  Spirituality and religion remain as 
undergirding for ethics and ‘aestheticized’ Christianity. By this stage Cupitt can claim: that ‘God 
is love’ inevitably implies ‘Love is God’;82 that ‘God is not an infinite substance, but simply self-
outpouring process, like the Cosmos, and like solar living’; and that God is to be found in the 
welter of human critical processes in humanistic, postmodern human experience.83 
Even in Cupitt’s early, modernist stage what is most creative is what here will be called his 
‘dual approach’, which Gavin Hyman refers to as his ‘two Gods idea’, quoting Scott Cowdell 
about Cupitt’s ‘“working God” of religion . . ., alongside the ineffable transcendent God . . . 
                                                 
79 Edwards, Tradition and Truth, pp. 118, 115. 
80 Cupitt, Don, Christ and the Hiddenness of God, London, Lutterworth, 1971, p. 67. 
81 Cupitt, Christ and the Hiddenness of God, p. 8. 
82 Cupitt, Don, Theology’s Strange Return, London, SCM, 2010, p. 37. 
83 Cupitt, Theology’s Strange Return, pp. 18-19, 41-44. 
131 
 
upon which the “working God” is projected’.84 Qualifying descriptors for God with words such 
as ‘Eternal’ and ‘Heavenly’ accords with classical negative theology which ‘does not distinguish 
theism from atheism’, preferring ‘to say that God is nothing rather than that he is anything, 
because atheism is nearer the mark than even the most refined analogical theism’.  Even the 
notion of existence for God, Cupitt finds inappropriate; and ‘If God were not thus elusive he 
would not be God’. He considers the possibility that theology itself may be not only 
contingently impossible because of the limited nature of human cognitive powers, but logically 
impossible because of God’s absolute nature. This is exemplified in the intractable and 
paradoxical contrast between the immutability and cosmic nature of God on the one hand, 
and the personal, interventionist side of God on the other, and that between the deistic need 
for God to be impassible and the theistic need for patripassianism  (or at least God suffering in 
Christ).85  
Cupitt’s dual approach becomes apparent as he asserts a distinction between theology on the 
one hand and a religious view of God on the other: ‘theology can toy facetiously with the 
notion of God, but only religion can actually present him’. ‘Faith’, he adds, ‘may enable a man 
to apprehend an object which otherwise he could not have apprehended, but it does not 
create that which it apprehends’. So ‘theism . . . is bipolar’ and ‘the practical business of 
religion is transacted in anthropomorphic imagery which believers know to be objectively 
inadequate, and yet consider very important’. If a complete justification of our language about 
God could be found, ‘it would overthrow theism’. ‘God does not happen to be hidden in such a 
way that he might be exposed.  He is his hiddenness.’86 What Cupitt is rejecting are: the realist 
notion of God’s existence shared by theists and atheists; the factual question as to whether 
God exists; and the monotheist view of God as supreme intelligence and intelligible supreme 
reality. Reaching an impasse with both the affirmative and the negative approaches to God, 
Cupitt concludes that ‘God will be spoken of . . . not in a cosmological or metaphysical way, but 
in the context of the spiritual life and as that about which the spiritual life revolves’.87 Religion, 
says Cupitt, lives in a constant state of flux between images and iconoclasm (the second of 
which he sees as little different from agnosticism), with a ‘crucial distinction . . . between . . . 
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the God of practical, institutional religion, on the one hand; and the God who is pure 
transcendent spirit on the other’.88  
Cupitt finds God to be: 
a unifying symbol that eloquently personifies and represents to us everything that 
spirituality requires of us.  The requirement is the will of God, the divine attributes 
represent to us various aspects of the spiritual life, and God’s nature as spirit 
represents the goal we are to attain.  Thus the whole of the spiritual life revolves 
around God and is summed up in God.  God is the religious concern, reified.89 
It is now a short step to God as a moral imperative (over which Thiselton draws attention to 
Kant’s influence90) such that ‘God is the religious requirement personified’. However, 
someone’s religious life cannot depend on any exterior imposition, but must be autonomous, 
with no ‘extra-religious reality of God’, and the aspects of God’s nature – will, simplicity, 
eternity, etc.91 – are psychologically useful in cultivating moral and religious lives. ‘Realism is 
long dead and gone: we live in a time when religion has become fully human, when theology is 
like art . . .’.92  
Ward finds Cupitt’s God an oppressive, demanding deity: the ‘spiritually ideal being who 
cannot exist’ should give way to the Christian God who does exist and is the creator of free 
beings.93 Ward cannot reconcile a realist view of an immense, cosmic God with an idealist view 
of God as a unifying and spiritual symbol, but fails to see that Cupitt is effectively rejecting the 
first as unconnected with religion and espousing the second as religion’s essence.  
Williams doubts whether Cupitt can actually be refuted, but summarises Cupitt’s analysis of 
‘God’ as:  
 the Ineffable, the sum of what is unknown to us – which Williams accepts as 
the basis for mysticism;  
 the Ideal, the personification of the spiritual requirement – with which 
Williams takes issue; and  
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 the mythological person to whom prayer is addressed – which Williams 
accepts as praeparatio evangelica.94 
In ‘the Ideal’, Williams detects the functional nature of Cupitt’s view of God, with ‘“God” . . . 
introduced into moral discourse as a rhetorical device to break the impasse of a threatened 
solipsism’, but wonders how this can happen if the word is known to be a rhetorical device.  A 
functional use of ‘God’, says Williams, quoting Robert Spaemann, and with shades of Anselm, 
‘annuls the very concept of God: that for which God fulfilled a function would be greater than 
God’. However, Williams’s main concern is over what he perceives as a sharp disjunction 
between the contemplative and the ethical, between the Ineffable and the Ideal, and over 
whether Cupitt wants to bridge this gap.  Cupitt, with his dual approach, probably believes that 
it is impossible to penetrate beyond the idealist, ethical understanding of God. However, 
Williams is right that Cupitt claims that ‘God can (must) have no “extra-religious reality”: he is 
not to be spoken of outside our speaking about religious forms of life, he is not neutrally 
demonstrable, not there independently of religious will’.95  
From about 1986, Cupitt’s approach becomes postmodernist. As Thiselton comments (and as 
an examination of Life Lines96 and The Long-Legged Fly97 confirms), ‘by this stage all talk of God 
as an internal symbol or focus for “unifying” a value system, will have vanished’.98 The cultural 
relativity of language, concepts and imagery is important for Cupitt, and over time God has 
become (in Catholic terms) ‘in principle, a publicly knowable inferred entity’, and (in Reformed 
terms) ‘an entity that can be inferred only on the basis of faith’.99 Cupitt’s theory is functional 
and subjective:  
God-talk has a purely empirical meaning. . . . The God of speech is experienced as a 
personal being, who spoke with an audible voice.  The God of writing was a 
transcendent inferred entity. The God of language is a symbol of where words come 
from. He is a symbol for the continuously upsurging creative movement of language 
itself . . . .100 
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What Christ experienced on the cross was ‘deferral of the objective reality of God’, which has 
been reflected in meditation and art over the centuries, and ‘opens the space in which the 
modern world comes to birth’, by allowing people to view themselves from the human-only 
and self-reliant point of view.101 Now, by 1997, Cupitt is having second thoughts about his 
earlier kind of non-realism, which he mischievously says was ‘difficult even for ordinary 
people, and therefore quite impossible for church leaders, to understand’. His solution is to 
‘aestheticize’ religion, to ‘see religious living in terms of artistic practice and symbolic 
expression’ rather than a matter of supernatural beliefs. God is then seen ‘as a spiritual ideal, a 
reference point, an ideal, and a focus of aspiration’, and once more Cupitt in effect returns to 
his dual approach, suggesting a separation of ‘the God of religion from the god of the 
philosophers’. Thus, although some sort of belief in God may yet prove useful, the question of 
whether God exists can be abandoned. Ironically, ‘I still pray and love God, even though I fully 
acknowledge that no God actually exists’, he writes. And the way to religious progress is ‘by 
deconstructing all the binary contrasts’ so as to ‘bring realism to an end, with an effect that is 
it as if God and the self have been melted together’: ‘a dissolving of the soul’, ‘union with God’, 
‘but which others describe as “atheism”’. ‘The dissolution of God, and our attainment of 
perfect union with God, are one and the same thing.’102 
The move from a liberal stance within modernism to a postmodern position is complete. 
Hyman summarizes this progression from liberal theology, to his non-realist interpretation, to 
postmodernism and then to expressionism by 1990.103 By 2010, God as a potential entity has 
more or less disappeared, with the idea of God now ‘a device to think with . . . to show us how 
to become ourselves’.  But Cupitt retains a mixture of projection and anthropomorphism, with 
his requirement for ‘a continual pushing of the God-ideal higher and higher, so that God stays 
firmly ahead of us and continues to lure us forward . . . one full jump ahead of us, and 
unattainable’.104 However, by 2010, Cupitt’s assessment is that, in the secular West, ‘God 
comes down as immanence; God is now the endless, all-inclusive world of human striving and 
human symbolic exchange that produced us and within which we live and move and have our 
being’.105   
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Indeed, Cupitt writes, ‘God’s job is done’, ‘so that he can fade himself out’.106  More than that: 
We ought to go on believing in God (in a way) long after the death of God.  There 
never actually was a god, but that doesn’t matter because in these matters that sort of 
ontological worry is now a waste of time. What does matter is our new postmodern 
realization that we couldn’t have got where we are today without God.  So we should 
feel grateful to God, and honour the past to which we owe everything. Indeed, we 
should love the god [sic] who over many millennia fully created us, and himself died in 
doing so.107 
There is a strange anthropomorphic element here, as Cupitt relies on ‘poetic’ references to 
God, which he would probably class as part of the religious life that he still values. Similarly, he 
says: ‘Either God must progressively hand over everything to man and himself retreat into 
obscurity or die; or alternatively, God himself must actually become man. Perhaps the second 
of these solutions is in Christianity a hyperbolic version of the first’.108 
As Hyman states, Cupitt later abandoned ‘his own transcendent realm’109 in favour of 
subjectivist relativism. By a 2009 interview, Cupitt has given up God in a metaphysical sense in 
favour of anthropocentric spirituality and religion.  Jesus, Cupitt says, is a pioneer of 
modernism in putting human relations first, and we too must find God in ourselves.  He has 
now removed himself from communion (by which he probably means from receiving Holy 
Communion).110 What is not clear is why he should have found a need to do so, given his 
accompanying protestations about the usefulness of Christianity as an ethical base, given his 
retention of ‘aestheticized’ Christianity, and given his earlier dual approach, which allowed a 
religious approach to continue alongside a recognition of its non-realism and the futility of 
striving after God’s transcendent existence.  
Hebblethwaite, in his critique, equates the non-realist position with one of non-theism,111 
which raises issues of whether it is possible for non-realist and realist Christians to co-exist 
within the Church. This could undermine Hebblethwaite’s position that without an objective 
God, Christianity not only would but ought to collapse.  Human beings and the Church – and 
even some sort of grace of an unknowable God – might be subtler than that. Indeed, as is 
apparent from his 2010 writing, even the non-realist, postmodernist Cupitt still finds 
theological language, including the name ‘God’, pragmatically useful, even indispensable, in 
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communicating what is most important and most dear.  Indeed, by 2010, Cupitt seems to be 
combining his postmodernism with attempts to rediscover the Christian tradition. Cupitt’s dual 
approach could offer a way towards unifying the different approaches of the more realist and 
less realist kinds of believers, by providing a basis for maintaining a common spiritual life of 
worship and conduct: ‘So far as everyday religious practice and utterance are concerned the 
non-realist may well be indistinguishable from the realist’.112 
8.6 George Newlands 
Newlands’s God in Christian Perspective has figured in the Literature Review.  His revisionism is 
less pronounced than that of others previously considered in this chapter. 
He recognises the ‘problems of how to speak of a living God who is both creator of time and 
active in times’, the transcendence-immanence paradox. Whatever knowledge we have of God 
has come from God (though Newlands does not clarify how we verify this knowledge), has had 
to be adapted to the limitations of human minds, may extend our present conceptualisation 
into the unfamiliar, and will depend upon an analogical relationship. Analogy is implied when 
Newlands writes that love is ‘a term through which we interpret the activity of God by 
comparison with human experience of and reasoning about love’.  The title ‘Theology of the 
Love of God’ clearly indicates his conviction that ‘God is in his essential nature love’, as 
demonstrated in Jesus Christ, and that this is the key to creating a viable concept of God, 
provided it is given ‘substantive content’.113 Indeed, love for Newlands is: 
[God’s] unity of being, being which is involved in a constant process of complete self-
giving which is also complete self-affirmation, in God himself and in his relations with 
the world. To use the traditional formulations, aseity is at the same time proseity, the 
economic and essential trinity are one.114 
When Newlands writes that ‘To speak of God . . . as the loving God is to speak of God as 
characteristically a personal agent’, this is not to minimise God’s transcendence, but to make 
God’s love not less than human love. God’s love will have the ‘texture’ of ‘ultimate concern, 
providential care, reconciling grace’, and it will reflect a range of human concepts of human 
love. God is not less than a personal agent, but, by transcendence, more than a personal 
agent.115 For Newlands, there is no easy analogical step from the various kinds and levels of 
transcendence experienced in human life, for instance in aesthetic, moral and cultural matters 
and personal relationships.  This is because God is unique, but our language, paradoxically, is 
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not. Divine transcendence is wide, to be discovered in appreciation of God’s creative activity 
and grace, in peace in the natural order and in awareness of God’s overcoming suffering and 
death. ‘Transcendence’ speaks to Newlands of mystery and of freedom from ‘our temporal 
conceptions of what pertains to deity’. Although creative, ‘God is independent of space and 
time except as he chooses to be involved in space and time’. His transcendence is hidden, and 
analogies from the natural, including personal, world are in the end inadequate.  Newlands’s 
speaking of God’s hidden-ness being ‘manifested . . . in his inconceivability’, and of ‘Christology 
point[ing] to this metaphysical opacity of God in creation and redemption’116 displays a 
considerable degree of paradox. So does his assertion that, though God is hidden, activity by 
God should not to be ruled out because it cannot be measured.117 He explains that divine 
creativity is no extension of human or other natural creativity, nor the first link in a chain of 
causes, but rather ‘the basis of all creaturely activity, both separate from such activity and co-
operating in, with and under all creativity in the created order’, though without ‘a causal-
mechanistic’ involvement.118  This relates to God’s immanence, which Newlands insists must 
be taken in the context of transcendence, to avoid ‘the assimilation of God uncritically with 
contemporary structures of society’.  Human experience of God’s immanence is objective 
through the biblical record and subjective through experiencing forgiveness and 
reconciliation.119  
Over the notion of God suffering, Newlands remains open-minded: 
To speak of God as suffering is to use language analogically.  But not all elements of 
our talk of God are analogical, certainly not analogical in the same way. . . To speak of 
God as suffering is no more and no less intelligible than to speak of God as not 
suffering, not subject to change, not affected by happenings in the world. We cannot 
escape the anthropological pole of theology simply by resort to negative theology.120 
However, while accepting his latter statement, one may question the equivalence he attaches 
to speaking of God suffering and speaking of God not suffering. There is something 
foundational about the latter, from which the former is an  – albeit attractive – departure. 
When he explicitly comments on process theology, he is consistent in remaining open-minded, 
despite sympathy with it in comparison with classical impassibility.121 
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God, while personal and not less than personal,122 is not a super-person: there is personality in 
God, rather than personality of God. Nevertheless, Newlands also refers to God several times 
as a person, and sometimes as ‘person’ (with no indefinite article): ‘As person he is a living, 
speaking, acting, communicating being acting through events in human history. He has all the 
optimum personal characteristics of human beings with none of their disadvantages. God is 
the one person for whom to be is to love par excellence. As transcendent person he has all the 
capacities of the creator’. By use of metaphor, God can be said to create; although God does 
not have a body, he does have ‘a mind, or something like it, which allows mental functions. He 
lives, plans, creates, fulfils, relates, communicates, supports’, which, he writes, is why ‘it is 
convenient – even essential, for nothing else will do – for us to use the term person’.123  
Newlands considers the classical attributes of God, such as omnipotence, omnipresence, 
omniscience and eternity, uncontroversially interpreting each of them with cognizance of 
God’s essential nature of love. Love is certainly at the heart of ‘the sacrifice not just of Jesus 
but of God on the cross’.  Newlands says that, on the one hand, ‘God is the subject and object 
of sacrifice . . .’, but that, on the other hand: ‘This does not mean that God dies: not the death 
of God, but death in God is at the heart of the divine mystery’. Newlands recognises the 
danger in such paradox, with: ‘We must be very careful about how we use analogies in relating 
language concerning Jesus to language concerning God. . . . We may perhaps use the events 
concerning Jesus as paradigmatic clues given by grace to the understanding of God. . . . We 
cannot however simply extrapolate from the man Jesus to the divine nature as if there were 
some authorised one to one correspondence, whether through analogy of grace or being.’124 
Newlands and Allen Smith perceive ‘an urgent need . . . to re-imagine God’.  God’s hospitality 
is portrayed not as a contribution to comfort, but as ‘dynamic’, inviting human commitment to 
hospitable action in asserting human rights. The authors portray God as ‘pure hospitality, 
unconditional love’ itself, and hospitality as ‘a trace of transcendence’, although they then 
qualify this, with ‘God is FOR hospitality: God is not hospitality as such.’ ‘Hospitality’ they write, 
‘can be conceived as a mode of God’s being in action. . . . For God, to be is to act hospitably’.125  
Newlands is cautious about natural extensions into process theology and divine suffering. In 
seeking adequate descriptions of God, he turns, more readily than other liberal theologians, to 
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the revelation in Christ, in whom he finds illustration of God’s love and interaction with 
humanity. 
8.7  Summary 
Phillips sets the scene in popular style in 1952, by drawing attention to a growing awareness 
that some views of God are consistent neither with God’s transcendence nor with the 
profound challenges of human experience. Deeper challenges to convention quickly follow, 
most notably, with huge public exposure, the extraordinary phenomenon of Honest to God. 
Although some of Robinson’s historical and philosophical claims are questionable, he brought 
to a wide public many of the liberal concerns that were current in theological circles, 
particularly in the writings of Tillich, Bultmann and, depending on interpretation, perhaps 
Bonhoeffer.  Although he underestimates general levels of understanding about spatial and 
personal references for God, he highlights issues that accord with some popular concern. 
Some of his theology tends in a deist direction, which is an even stronger trend within Wiles, 
whose writing is more cogently argued and more persuasive.  God for Wiles is utterly 
transcendent, and largely known through God’s effects and human experience, particularly 
through the single process of creation, original and continuing.  It is this single creative process 
that accounts for what is often erroneously presented as experience of divine intervention. 
God does not manipulate events, but enables humans to glimpse his purposes. This includes 
God’s self-limiting in the creative act, so as to generate human freedom. Wiles’s message in 
this respect will be difficult for many Christian people, particularly in terms of the clear 
interventionist programme within the Bible. 
For Newlands, humanity is dependent upon God for any knowledge we might have of God in 
his transcendence, and supremely so through the person of Jesus. Thus, although 
understanding is likely to be analogical, it is the product of revelation.  Newlands is not afraid 
of paradox, for instance when he writes of God’s hidden-ness being manifested in his 
inconceivability, and over the issue of God suffering.  He insists on the retention of God’s 
transcendence, and on placing God’s immanence firmly within that context. 
The most thoroughly liberal approach of those surveyed here is that of Cupitt, from whom 
there is a clear development of thinking from his 1970s and 1980s work through to his final 
post-modernist position of the twenty-first century.  The theme he develops early on runs 
through most of his work, at least until the latest stage, and is here called his dual approach, 
distinguishing between theology and a religious view of God.  By the first part of this, he 
considers the logic of God’s transcendence, moves beyond analogy and the via negativa, and 
140 
 
concludes that attempts to describe God are logically doomed. By the second part, however, 
he finds in religion, even faith, a possibility for spirituality and personal ethics, which 
reintroduce the notion of God as the psychologically useful summation of human aspirations. 
As Cupitt moves into his postmodernist stage, cultural relativity of language becomes 
important, with God viewed pragmatically as a symbol of language’s creativity and of human 
striving. He wishes to retain Christianity in an ‘aestheticized’ form, in other words like an art-
form, an expression of this striving, with God solely comprehensible in his immanence.  
There is a progression of liberal theology from Phillips to Cupitt in reaction to western cultural 
and linguistic development and popular thinking. In reaction to the twenty-first century 
postmodernist trend, Cupitt’s dual approach offers a promising outline for the Christian 
community, in providing a basis of intellectual respectability for those for whom 
communication with and worship of God is logically difficult, while enabling those without 
such difficulties to retain their basis of faith. The practical theology within this thesis will 
demonstrate whether such thinking has appealed to the sample of informal theologians.
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Chapter 9: RECLAIMING TRADITION 
 
Many post-war UK Anglican theologians maintain or reclaim tradition in their approach to God.  
The eight theologians surveyed offer an academic rationale for their positions.   
9.1 Austin Farrer 
For Farrer, knowing God is ‘to accord to some real being a conscious recognition’: ‘we cannot 
say even as much as this, without implying something about the logic or the structure of the 
thought affirmative of God’. The corollary is that ‘“To know”, or “to acknowledge as real”, 
when used of finites and when used of God, cannot mean two utterly different things’.1 Platten 
describes ‘Farrer’s conviction that God and man, whilst separated by the necessities of the 
divine transcendence, nevertheless are related intimately’.2 Alongside his development of 
Thomist analogy, Farrer’s reliance for knowing God is upon faith, as in this striking imagery: 
We can love a god whom we know by faith alone; and . . . the veil remains.  All we have 
to say is that the veil, however impenetrable, is not blank.  It is painted with the image 
of God, and God himself painted it, and made it indelible with his blood, when he was 
nailed to it for us men and for our salvation.  We know him through the image, and by 
faith . . . .3 
Faith is similarly implied when he writes: 
Nothing can give substance to our thought of God, but an experience which employs 
our activity in relation to God, where that activity is something other than thought 
itself; always allowing . . . that our activity in the matter is passive towards a prior 
activity of God.4 
Farrer’s apparent retreat from reason towards fideism5  has puzzled philosophers, and among 
them Mitchell. He quotes Farrer’s ‘No progress is possible so long as it is supposed that faith is 
or contains an elementary, or an implicit, or any other sort of philosophy which believers are 
bound to defend, since upon it their confidence reposes’,6 and comments that ‘Farrer, it 
seemed, had become a sort of fideist, content to rest the truth of Christianity upon the 
                                                 
1 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, p. 21. 
2 Platten, ‘Diaphanous Thought’, pp. 30-50. 
3 Farrer, Glass of Vision, p. 61. 
4 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, p. 28. 
5 Farrer’s possible fideism is explored, MacSwain, Robert Carroll, ‘Solved by Sacrifice’: Austin 
Farrer, fideism, and the evidence of faith, A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the 
University of St. Andrews, 2010, (http://research-repository.st-
andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/920/3/Robert%20Carroll%20MacSwain%20PhD%20thesis.PD
F), particularly pp.13-110, downloaded 27.02.2014. 
6 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, p. 14. 
142 
 
believer’s sense of being nourished by the tradition in which he has been raised’.7 Faith is 
certainly implied as a requisite of theology when Farrer writes: 
However orderly our spectrum of the sciences, we cannot put theology in.  Is it 
between the green and yellow? It is not. Beyond the infra-red or ultra-violet? No. The 
theologian is not picking a colour from the rainbow; he is looking at the sun. A system 
of the sciences helps us to compose the picture of finite being.  But all finite beings are 
on one side, and infinite Being on the other, of the great divide.8 
So, theology is not ‘among the ways we have of viewing our environment, except by an 
equivocation,’9 but rather the way of referring to the infinite, a separate exercise both in 
process and in subject matter. The reference to ‘looking at the sun’ is a matter of faith-based 
theology, not philosophical analysis. The distinction is unclear between the intellectual process 
of conceiving and speaking of God, and the more ‘voluntary’ and affective process of believing 
in and relating to God, which can degenerate into emotionalism unless the intellectual basis is 
secure. Nevertheless, Farrer espouses revelation and inspiration as essential for imagery,10 
inter-dependent with faith, which is essential to validate analogy and imagery at the God-ward 
end. 
9.2 Eric Mascall 
Mascall is a staunch defender of orthodox, Catholic theology, offering no new images of God, 
but drawing attention to the inescapable and historic use of analogy in describing God. He 
unashamedly identifies ‘the supernatural’ with ‘another world’, and ‘another world’ with ‘a 
beneficent Creator, upon whose will “this world” is dependent for its existence and 
preservation and in union with whom his own beatitude will consist’.11 Mascall’s language 
about God the Trinity is almost poetical, as he explains that the Trinity is not a doctrine, but 
God, and that the concept of ‘three divine persons eternally united in one life of complete 
perfection and beatitude’ is ‘the secret of God’s most intimate life, into which, in his infinite 
love and generosity, he has admitted us’.  God, he continues, is ‘a personal Being of 
unimaginable splendour, bliss and love’; and, ‘if we want to acquire some remote 
understanding of the wonder and glory of the Christian God, we may well find the poets more 
helpful than the theologians’.12 There are few concessions from Mascall over language or the 
                                                 
7 Mitchell, Basil, ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion’, Eaton and Loades, eds., For 
God and Clarity, p. 177. 
8 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, pp. 20-21. 
9 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, p. 21. 
10 Farrer, Glass of Vision, p. 57. 
11 Mascall, Secularisation of Christianity, p. 191. 
12 Mascall, E. L., The Christian Universe, London, DLT, 1966, pp. 51-53. 
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means of approach to God, because, like Farrer, he recognizes analogy as the expressive 
means to those ends.  
Mascall clearly has linguistic analysis in mind when he writes: ‘My chief desire . . . has been to 
vindicate, against the generally positivist attitude of Anglo-Saxon philosophy . . .  a 
fundamentally and unashamedly metaphysical approach to theism’.13 The language becomes 
meaningful in relevant communities: 
For a linguistic empiricist to declare . . . that he cannot give any intelligible meaning to 
the sentence ‘God exists’ may indicate nothing more than that he has never made a 
serious effort to enter into the linguistic community of those who affirm it. . . . When 
religious people, including theologians, speaking carefully and responsibly, make 
statements containing the word ‘God’, they do understand what they are saying’.14 
For Mascall, there are rational grounds for concluding that material beings ‘owe their 
existence to the incessant creative activity of transcendent self-existent being’. However, the 
limited information about God as a transcendent being that is available ‘is supplemented by 
revelation, that is to say by a deliberate self-communication by God to men’.  It seems that it is 
by faith that specific, analogy-based information becomes available. Mascall uses the term 
‘mystery’ to refer to God and Christian doctrine, which believers must gradually contemplate 
and penetrate in order to gain understanding.  Indeed, ‘the gradual formulation of the 
Church’s dogmas in more and more precise terms went hand in hand with a growing 
understanding of the necessarily analogical character of the terms and concepts employed’.  It 
will depend upon, quite simply, ‘get[ting to know God better . . . as a matter of personal 
experience’15 – in other words, upon analogy backed by faith. 
9.3 David Jenkins 
Despite his Christological notoriety, Jenkins is a defender of conventional theism,16 with a 
commitment to discovering God in the breadth of human experience, from ‘an 
interpenetration of reality and experience which is both intellectual and emotional and 
associated with a way of life and worship’, and not just from ‘a narrowly intellectualist way of 
knowledge’. Thus ‘God is known to be God because he establishes himself as God in the 
experience, response and tradition of those who understand themselves, their hopes and the 
world in relation to him’. From this, says Jenkins, stem the objectivity of God and the givenness 
of knowledge about God. The logic behind both parts of this claim is not stated, and it is 
                                                 
13Mascall, Openness of Being, pp. vii, 14. 
14 Mascall, Openness of Being, p. 32. 
15 Mascall, Word and Images, pp.122-23, 78-80, 83. 
16 Jenkins, ‘Concerning Theism’, pp. 194-206. 
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presumably a statement of faith. He refers to the ‘destructive effects of analytic and scientific 
biblical criticism’, however valid in itself, when it is separated from corporate and individual 
spirituality and taken as wholly and solely normative. ‘God’ can then become a ‘mere concept 
or language-object’ and separated from believers’ stories of God. Attempts thereafter by 
believing theologians to restore something of the faith tend to be ‘very often solipsistic and 
almost always individualistic, [in endeavouring] to restore an existential awareness of “being” 
or of “God”’, at the expense of an objective sense of a transcendent God.17 Tillich and 
Robinson may well have been in mind. 
Lecturing at Cuddesdon College around 1967, having explored linguistic approaches to ‘God’, 
he adapted the Wool Marketing Board’s slogan to ‘There is no substitute for God’18 – in other 
words, there is no other way of capturing what we want to express. Jenkins, as has already 
been seen, is ambivalent about passibility in God, but tends towards God’s immanence 
including capacity for suffering. But he also writes of ‘the unchangeable reliability of God’, 
‘transcend[ing] all change and process’, with God’s ‘personalness’ not restricted by ‘process 
and change’. Replacing transcendence with immanence is ‘destructive of man via the 
demotion of God.  Transcendence without immanence makes nonsense of God, immanence 
without transcendence makes nonsense of man’. In other words, human kind needs a 
transcendent context in order to be fully human.  
Jenkins’s retention of the traditional duality of transcendence and immanence, with, 
effectively, the love of God responding to need but not in essence being changed in the 
process,19 leads to his phrase, ‘transcendence in the midst’, with ‘a saving and fulfilling power 
present in all human situations and for all human beings’. Immanence includes a concern for 
the poor and dispossessed, with ‘God as the Disturber’ of his people in the interests of true 
reconciliation, peace and justice.  God, therefore, is ‘not the mastermind of vast construction 
activity . . . moving to a predetermined and preconceived end.  He (and She and It . . .) is more 
like a master artist (and a mistress artist) . . . committed . . . to an infinite creative activity’, 
characterised by freedom, with the attached risk.20  If God’s nature were such as to intervene 
in material things, but God did not do so in the face of great evil, then, Jenkins writes, such a 
god would be ‘at the best a cultic idol and at the worst the very devil’, and at variance with 
                                                 
17 Jenkins, The Contradiction of Christianity, p. Jenkins, David, E., The Contradiction of 
Christianity: The 1974 Edward Cadbury Lectures in the University of Birmingham, London, SCM, 
1976, pp. 85-87. 
18 The thesis author’s recollection. 
19 Jenkins, Glory of Man, pp. 99, 104, 107-10. 
20 Jenkins, Contradiction of Christianity, pp. 6, 12-13 and 51; God, Politics and the Future, pp. xi, 
xiii, 73, 93, 107, 109 (cf. Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, Love’s Expense, pp. 47-49). 
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God’s loving and gracious nature revealed in the decision to become one of us. The miracles of 
Christ’s birth and resurrection relate to ‘a mysterious collaboration and convergence between 
the intervening power of God and human responses of faith, obedience and activity’.21 
Jenkins’s approach to God is largely conventional, with some ambivalence about God’s 
passibility. 
9.4 Keith Ward 
a.  Language and experience 
Ward writes: ‘Traditional images of God seem to have lost their appeal in modern American 
and European culture’.  Because people tend toward literalism, he writes, God is assumed to 
be such that science could describe, but then turns out to be redundant; so the only hope is to 
return to the roots of religion for reconsideration.22  As W. D. Hudson objects, Ward moves 
rather too easily ‘from philosophical analysis to credal exposition . . . as though the latter 
sufficed to solve the problems raised by the former’.23  Indeed, Ward does rely on faith to 
move between these two ‘expositions’, and, like Mascall, sets considerable store by the 
communal and prayer-based aspect of religious language. For instance, he describes the 
various ‘approaches to the discipline of prayer’ as ‘a search for a true reality and value with 
which man can be in some way united’.24  When Hudson complains that Ward’s credal 
approach causes him to ‘have lost logical contact with [the] concept [of God] altogether’,25 it is 
because he has not grasped that Ward is not attempting a disengaged logical analysis, but an 
analysis of language used in a faith community: 
Language about God . . . is revelatory, enshrining paradigmatic revelatory experiences; 
it is charismatic, functioning in ritual contexts to relate one to sacred powers; and it is 
exemplary, specifying a set of roles or attitudes which are appropriate responses to 
reality, and which extend to the whole of one’s experience.26 
However, he also writes: 
 To speak of God . . . is to affirm a transcendent depth to the world. Knowledge of God . 
. . is achieved through a specific sort of cognitive and reactive attitude to reality, which 
makes the being of God manifest. God is known in and through the world, as the depth 
                                                 
21 Jenkins, God, Miracle and the Church of England, pp. 4-6. 
22 Ward, Keith, God: A Guide for the Perplexed, Oxford, Oneworld, 2002, pp.1-3.  
23 Hudson, W.D., ‘The Concept of God. By Keith Ward’, Mind, Vol. 86, no. 342, April 1977, p. 
311. 
24 Ward, Keith, The Concept of God, Oxford, Blackwell, 1974, p.31. 
25 Hudson, ‘Concept of God. By Keith Ward’, p. 311. 
26 Ward, Concept of God, p. 37; cf., regarding prayer and worship, pp. 42-43, 60. 
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and meaning of the world, encountering the man who is open to reality. . . . What one 
encounters . . . does not appear in one absolutely definite and clear form . . .’.27 
This is because, in Ward’s view, what people encounter, individually or collectively, is 
dependent upon ‘cognitive and conceptual abilities’, with experience conditioned by interests 
and ways of thinking.28 Images of God emerge thus: 
Concepts which spring from situations in which some transcendent reality is mediated 
become images which one can use to evoke specific reactive attitudes and emotions, 
and which may be in some sense confirmed and amplified by personal experiences.29 
Images, like the Judaic ‘king’, ‘shepherd’ and ‘father’, are ‘anthropophanic’ rather than 
‘anthropomorphic’,30 since ‘God manifests the divine in human form, but that is not a form 
which defines the essential divine being’.31 ‘Father’ is metaphorical, ‘to designate it as the 
primal cause of all being’, not gender-specific, but having arisen in response to an 
understanding of the male as the source of life.32 But, for Ward, it was the inadequacy of 
Judaic imagery that precipitated the imagery associated with the Incarnation.33 
There is probable variety in people’s intentions in reciting ‘I believe in God’, ranging from 
‘there is a person looking after me’, to ‘an ineffable infinite reality of supreme value underlies 
all things’. The polysemic nature of religious language, he writes:  
does not lie in what it says about past history or about supernatural realities, but in 
how it enables one to live in the face of a disclosure of an eternal reality in time . . . . 
People may differ about its exact factual content, while agreeing on the more 
important matter of what sort of human attitudes it specifies, and what sort of life it 
enables one to live in the light of a discernment of ultimate value and meaning.34  
With its echoes of Cupitt, this general statement offers legitimacy, surprising in Ward, to a 
variety of understandings of ‘God’.  
b. Transcendence 
The notion of transcendent reality is, for Ward, logically possible, because ‘existence’ does not 
imply ‘spatial’, and because we are familiar with other non-spatial entities ‘in our experience 
                                                 
27 Ward, Concept of God, p. 80. 
28 Ward, Concept of God, pp. 80-81, 112. 
29 Ward, Concept of God, p. 49. 
30 Ward, Keith, Images of Eternity: Concepts of God in Five Religious Traditions, London, DLT, 
1987, pp. 84-86. 
31 Ward, Keith, Religion and Creation, Oxford, OUP, 1996, p. 13 
32 Ward, Keith, God, Faith and the New Millennium, Oxford, Oneworld, 1998, pp. 31-32. 
33 Ward, Keith, The Turn of the Tide: Christian Belief in Britain Today, London, BBC, 1986 (an 
enlarged version of a series of radio talks), pp. 117-119. 
34Ward, Keith, A Vision to Pursue: Beyond the Crisis in Christianity, London, SCM, 1991, p. 3. 
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of feelings, sensations and thoughts’. Michael Durrant complains that, when Ward refers to 
‘reality’, he assumes there is a single reality to which human awe and wonder is directed, 
arguing that ‘reality’ needs to be complemented by ‘of something’, and on its own is not a 
description of anything.35   This complaint seem justified, and, even with Ward’s usual (though 
not universal) juxta-position of ‘transcendent’ and other elaboration,36 the intention of ‘reality’ 
remains unclear. Ward recognises that describing God as purely transcendent is insufficient, 
since humans could not know of God’s existence if totally beyond the universe. Yet, he 
reasons, ‘it is partly because God transcends every spatio-temporal manifestation of his being 
that he is said to be one’, and vice versa – although he has difficulty with the idea of God being 
one, for the doubtful reason that that would imply God to be one among others.37 
That personal attributes such as wisdom, power and purpose can be attributed to a divine 
mind, analogous to human minds, Ward finds possible only by the Thomist principle of analogy 
of proportionality. Although it is not possible to check proportionality in relation to God’s 
mind, it is legitimate to imply by and infer from, for instance, ‘God is wise’ that ‘there is a 
reality which orders things necessarily in accordance with intelligible laws’.  Rather than telling 
us about God, ‘God is wise’ ‘locate[s] the use of the term God in contexts of causality, order 
and purpose, as the reality which is postulated or disclosed in such contexts’, and identifies the 
one described as holy, perfect and good as also ‘the principle of intelligibility in the universe’.38 
Considering God’s infinity, Ward differentiates between ‘inclusive infinity’, which embraces all 
things within God, and ‘exclusive infinity’, which excludes all things finite, and, believing 
neither adequate, reconciles the two approaches in ‘dynamic infinity’.  Similarly, he intertwines 
the terms ‘existent’ and ‘self-existent’, with ‘self-existent’ defined as ‘uncaused’ and ‘self-
determining’, and with only one such self-existent possible. Other interesting definitions 
appear, such as ‘a being without which there would be no possibilities’ and ‘the self-
explanatory being’. And he supports, when it is the result of prayerful meditation (rather than 
logical analysis), Anselm’s ‘“that than which no greater can be conceived”, the self-existent and 
perfect cause of all’. He examines several interpretations of omnipotence, and concludes that 
‘an omnipotent being is one that can do anything logically possible’. With omniscience, Ward 
concludes that God’s knowledge is far more than intellectual knowledge, and, despite God 
being without senses or nervous system, must include feelings, even though these are ‘unlikely 
                                                 
35 Durrant, Michael, ‘Keith Ward. The Concept of God’, RelS, Vol. 11, No. 4, Dec. 1975, pp. 492-
94. 
36 Ward, Concept of God, p. 61, 49. 
37 Ward, Concept of God, p. 106. 
38 Ward, Concept of God, pp. 136-37. 
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to be very similar to human feelings’.  It is incoherent to speak of God as perfect, but senseless 
to speak of God as imperfect.39   
Ward’s attitude to Platonism is hard to fathom.  One the one hand he says that abandoning 
Platonic concepts leaves one: 
free to conceive [God] as the uniquely self-existent individual, containing all possibles 
in his own being (and so being ‘complete’ in the sense that all possible reality is 
exhaustively specified in him), and being immutable and necessarily existent.40 
On the other hand, he still retains ‘the five properties of aseity, necessity, unity, immutability 
and completeness’ as ‘the metaphysical perfections of the Divine being’. This sounds 
potentially Platonic. The impression is reinforced by Ward’s conceiving God as ‘the Mind which 
is the source of all possibles, and therefore of all actuals’, though the Mind is ‘very different 
from human minds’, with God ‘conceivable on the analogy of a cosmic mind, in some sense 
omnipotent and omniscient’.41  It is reinforced again when he states that God, as the maker of 
heaven and earth, is ‘trying to convey that the world is the expression of a reality beyond it’, 
and that ‘the world of finite things is seen most truly when it is seen as the expression of a 
source and origin which is its essential truth and reality’.42 
Ward ponders why, if God is self-sufficient, he should create a world, and how, if necessary 
and immutable, God can exercise freewill to do this. He concludes that, although there is no 
necessity for God to create the world in order to be God, God ‘can only determine his own 
being as self-giving love if he creates and responsively relates to some world’, and therefore 
cannot be totally self-sufficient, but has ‘a form of suffering-with creatures’.  Paradox is 
inevitable: God has control over what for us is the future, not because it is not future for God, 
but because ‘he is everlasting, and his necessary nature [as omnipotent] at each moment of 
change controls what shall be in the next moment’. But God also relates to time – he possesses 
temporality ‘as an uncreated and necessary property, which is the condition of his uniquely 
originative creativity’.43 
In his popular theology, Ward guides the reader through bodily and mental anthropomorphism 
and the via negative to – with a hint of panentheism – ‘God as the one unlimited reality which 
                                                 
39 Ward, Rational Theology and the Creativity of God, pp.1-3, 27-28, 30, 35, 37, 127-28, 132, 
65-66. 
40 Ward, Rational Theology and the Creativity of God, p. 66. 
41 Ward, Rational Theology and the Creativity of God, pp. 65-66; Ward, Why There Almost 
Certainly Is a God, p. 18. 
42 Ward, Keith, The Living God, London, SPCK, 1984, pp. 6-8. 
43 Ward, Rational Theology and the Creativity of God, pp. 73, 85-86, 139, 199, 149-50, 162-63. 
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includes us and the whole universe within itself’. He describes language about God as 
‘something like the language of poetry’, which is not intended to increase knowledge about 
the world, but, in various ways, ‘to evoke in us a certain attitude or way of looking at things or 
feelings about things’. The religious way of looking at the world is an alternative way, alongside 
the scientific, the artistic and the moral.44 In relation to Hebrew scripture, Ward writes: 
 What is the prosaic reality behind the poetry? It is remarkable that the biblical writers 
make no attempt at all to answer this question.  In particular, they do not offer a 
superior, more abstract or philosophical concept which discloses a reality hidden 
behind these very personalistic symbols for the devout.45 
Thus ‘poetic’ statements do not always have to be probed and analysed, but convey their 
meaning in ways more than the purely intellectual. 
c. Conclusion 
Ward’s writings in academic, semi-popular and popular genres are generally consistent, 
although becoming less analytical and more constructive with the passage of time, all with 
faith assumed as the foundation of theology. Unusually for a British post-war theologian, he 
hardly mentions analogy. But he draws on art forms as a means of expressing aspects of God, 
though with warnings about literalism of interpretation (citing Michelangelo’s ceiling and 
William Blake’s Great Designer in ‘The Ancient of Days’).46 His use of expressions like ‘reality’ is 
unhelpful, particularly with a lack of adequate explanation: ‘reality’ is probably part of his 
faith-based vocabulary that has crept into his analytical discourse. Nevertheless, for Ward, the 
notion of the existence of one God is logically acceptable, and accessible on the basis of 
revelation and discernment, based on interpretation of life and the world, with the language 
used dependent upon individual and collective experiences and understanding.  Ward often 
refers to transcendence, without mention of ‘immanence’ as a countering aspect of God’s 
nature. He summarizes his position thus: 
 God is an individual, and existing being, with an immutable and necessary nature, who 
possesses the greatest actual set of valuable properties at every time, and who 
possesses power, knowledge, happiness, wisdom and goodness to a maximal degree. 
He is the one and only self-existent being, the creator of everything other than himself.  
He is the free creator of a universe which realizes a unique set of values, in which he 
                                                 
44 Ward, Living God, pp. 1-3, 6-8. 
45 Ward, Images of Eternity, p. 86. 
46 Ward, Living God, pp. 1-2; Ward, Keith, God, Chance and Necessity, Oxford, Oneworld, 1996, 
p. 102; God, pp. 9-14; with ‘The Ancient of Days’ ironically appearing, despite Ward’s 
strictures, on the dust-jacket of Rational Theology and the Creativity of God. 
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shares, by a complete and direct knowledge and a fully responsive guidance towards 
its fulfilment.47 
9.5 David Brown 
Brown’s interventionist theism is set in the context of modern deism, which, despite its 
attractiveness, he finds wanting. He accepts that some divine activity is non-interventionist, 
including sustaining the world, and moral and aesthetic principles. Even changes effected in 
people by prayer may not be interventionist, though here he takes refuge in the possibility of 
telepathy or Jung’s collective unconscious.  More promisingly, he then identifies two types of 
experience of God as personal, in personal relationship and as personal presence, for which 
deism, he says, has no adequate explanation.48 God, for Brown, is a God who intervenes, 
reveals himself and communicates. He proposes dialogue to describe God’s method of 
revelation, such that, rather than ‘ever imposing a particular viewpoint on a recipient’, God 
prefers it to be internalised or ‘experienced as the recipient’s own insight’. God, he writes 
anthropomorphically: 
will adapt his mode of discourse to the matter best calculated to persuade the 
recipient freely, and at the same time base any further response in the light of the 
recipient’s previous reaction . . . . Even if God does not wish to force a point on an 
individual, God must surely be able eventually to get a point across over the course of 
an individual’s life.  All it requires is persistence . . .’.49  
Immanence and transcendence remain important for Brown, although: 
In the final analysis both words are only metaphors: God is neither quite ‘beyond’ the 
world nor ‘in’ it. More is really being said about how God is consequently perceived, 
and what that means for our relationship with him. It is my conviction that both 
perspectives are in fact essential for any adequate theology.50  
Despite this insight that transcendence and immanence are themselves metaphors, he does 
not recognize that, within his later statement, that ‘God is omnipresent – so is literally neither 
“in” or “beyond” the world, but everywhere or nowhere equally’, the adjectives ‘present’ and 
‘omnipresent’ are as metaphorical when applied to God as are other adjectives.  
Immanence, for Brown, implies ‘sacramentality’, such that ‘God can come sacramentally close 
to his world and vouchsafe experiences of himself through the material’. Transcendence and 
immanence each need the other ‘if transcendence is not to slip over into absence, or 
                                                 
47 Ward, Holding Fast to God, p. 40. 
48 Brown, Divine Trinity, pp. 10, 23-26. 
49 Brown, Divine Trinity, p. 72. 
50 Brown, God and Enchantment of Place, p. 37. 
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immanence into endorsement of this world and nothing more’.51  Brown’s non-verbal, art-
related understanding of ‘metaphor’, ‘symbol’ and ‘analogy’ has already been noted, with this 
usage implying that the terms themselves are then used in an analogical way. As well as 
drawing attention to the difference between conceptualising and speaking of God, Brown 
helpfully suggests that the divide between conceptualising God and experiencing God can 
often be narrow: there is no category mistake in claiming that a God who transcends human 
conception can be encountered through experience; and the fact that God in his totality 
cannot be experienced does not entail that the divine may not be experienced in part.52  
Although Brown’s outlook is consistently conservative towards the nature of God, in other 
ways, a huge shift of approach is evident between his earlier and later writings. His earlier 
concern, with his sights particularly on Wiles, Nineham and Cupitt, is to defeat deism on its 
own terms.  Latterly, however, his approach is more subtle. Recognizing the indispensability of 
metaphor and symbolism, he notes the metaphorical status even of ‘transcendence’ and 
‘immanence’.  He is more accommodating to the intellectual, even spiritual, needs of the 
modern and postmodern world, and seeks out ‘sacramental’ encounters with God in nature, 
place, body and art. While remaining cautious of experience as a rationale for theism, he 
nevertheless places great weight on the reality of experience of God and God’s interventions. 
9.6 David Ford and Dan Hardy 
Ford and Hardy are considered together, in view of some joint authorship, based on a common 
outlook cemented by familial relationship. 
a.  Limitations of language 
The community context is important, as Ford acknowledges the varied understanding of ‘God’, 
and concludes that: 
it is sensible to take as candidate for ‘God’ one which is actually believed in by a 
community where ideas of God have been discussed and tested over the centuries.  So 
my most general working definition of the divine is ‘what is worshipped’. . . . One basic 
task of theology is to ‘think God’ in such a way as to do justice to what intelligent 
believers in God actually believe.53  
                                                 
51 Brown, God and Enchantment of Place, pp. 80, 88, 40. 
52 Brown, God and Grace of Body, p. 3. 
53 Ford, David F., Theology: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, OUP, 1999, pp. 34-35. 
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Augustine, Ford recalls, saw God as more intimate to us than we are to ourselves.54 However, 
the revelation to Moses as ‘I am who I am’ or ‘I will be what I will be’ implies ‘at least that God 
is free to be God in the ways God decides: there is no domesticating, there is “always more”, 
and God can go on springing surprises in history’,55 such as in the Incarnation. And the 
revelation to Moses, withholding human control by declining a name: ‘is more like a riddle, a 
refusal to offer a self-definition, and an encouragement to question, explore, and find out 
more as one lives in line with the promise’.56  
Ford is sympathetic to the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas’s concern at the ‘insidious 
and subtle dangers’ of idolatry, with a need to ‘be most alert against temptations to 
domesticate God, wrongly identify God, reify or objectify God, use language inappropriately of 
God or relate God inappropriately to ethics or to creation’; and to Levinas’s suspicion of 
theology, because it ‘thematises or objectifies what it should not’, because it ‘suggests it is 
possible to . . . have cognitive access to the life of God’, because it ‘argues analogically from 
the world to God’, because it ‘tends to confuse creation with causality’. Ford supports 
Eberhard Jüngel, who similarly finds modern atheism right in finding God not to be within the 
world’s horizon and so not to be necessary in any worldly sense’; who finds instead a God who 
is ‘more than necessary’, of whom communication, relationship and revelation are 
characteristic; and who thus sees the death of God on the cross as representing the absence of 
God upon which he and Levinas agree.57 Barth’s influence is apparent, with preference for 
revelation through incarnation as a starting point, rather than natural theology.  
With this perspective, it is for each theologian to work out God’s attributes and how to 
interrelate them in a context of worship. Ford cites Paul Ricoeur’s distinction and balance 
between the affirmative way through analogies and the negative way of recognising the 
inadequacy of all affirmations.  From Thomas Traherne and Barth, Ford derives key perfections 
that he attributes to God: love and wisdom represent ‘core aspects of personhood, 
fundamental forms of self-transcendence’; love being ‘more to do with will and affectivity, 
wisdom more with intelligence and judgement, and both shaped through desire and vision’. He 
finds these two perfections well based in scripture and tradition, strongly resonating with 
human experience, applicable to God by analogy and at the same time mysterious and suited 
                                                 
54 Ford, David F., The Future of Christian Theology, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, p. 58 
(quoting Augustine, Confessions, III.6.11). 
55 Ford, Theology, p. 36. 
56 Ford, Future of Christian Theology, p. 72. 
57 Ford, David F., Self and Salvation: Being Transformed, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, p. 46, 55, 56. 
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to apophatic recognition of inadequacy. 58 God, Ford and Hardy write, is ‘the very embodiment 
of . . . overflowing abundance and generosity’; neither constricted as ‘rigid, over-ordered and 
over-ordering’ nor ‘an absolute equilibrium – beyond all change and exchange, unaffected and 
invulnerable’. Indeed, the scientific recognition of randomness in the spread of energy, the 
behaviour of sub-atomic particles and genetic variation is liberating for theology, which can 
increase its perception of ‘the basic condition for overflow and abundance’ – though without 
lapsing into a complete randomness, which, they say, ‘would . . . be a denial of God’, as well as 
contradicting science’s position. 59 Although their approach could be seen as accommodating 
theology to current scientific understanding, it could equally be argued that the ongoing divine 
revelation includes the process of scientific gain.  
b. Transcendence and immanence 
The authors find balance between immanence and transcendence in the Trinity: 
Taken as a unity, the Trinity continually dispels illusions and fantasies about God.  It 
applies a corrective to any one type of language, whether talk about the 
transcendence of God in analogies, or sacramental and historical accounts of God’s 
character and presence, or subjective, experiential witness to the immediacy of God. 
So the Trinity is a comprehensive ‘negative way’, refusing to let one rest in any image 
of God.60 
In commenting on the historical tension between transcendence and immanence, Ford and 
Hardy note the refuge of deism, ‘still influential in the British tradition’, and, in contrast, how 
the concept of the passibility of God has developed in reaction to modern atheism’s rejection, 
in the name of human freedom and maturity, of an overbearing, transcendent God.61  Hardy’s 
transcendence-immanence presentation of God is complex: God is ‘indefinite depth’ with 
‘dynamic order’ and has a tendency to approach humankind;62 ‘the order and the energy of 
God’ can be focused by human beings through worship and shared with humankind; and there 
is ‘full differentiation in God, and between God and the world, while still retaining full 
relationality in God and between God and the world.’ God ‘can be called an “energy event”’, 
                                                 
58 Ford, David F., Christian Wisdom: Desiring God and Learning in Love, Cambridge, CUP, 2007, 
pp. 236-37, 215, 239-40. 
59 Ford David F. and Hardy, Daniel W., Living in Praise: Worshipping and Knowing God, London, 
DLT, 2005 (revised version of Ford David F. and Hardy, Daniel W., Jubilate: Theology in Praise, 
London, DLT, 1984), p. 138, 150, 147-48. 
60 Ford and Hardy, Living in Praise, p. 69-70; cf. Ford, David F., ‘Holy Spirit and Christian 
Spirituality’, The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, Cambridge, CUP, 2003, p. 
269. 
61 Ford and Hardy, Living in Praise, pp. 78 (probably true of general British culture, but not 
British theology), 80. 
62 Reminiscent of Tillich, Shaking of the Foundations, p. 63.   
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since ‘God’s “nature” is not comprised of “pure” activities, but of such activities practised with 
at least one particular other, with the expectation that a fullness of the activities requires the 
contribution of this other . . .’.63 
If this is intended as ontological, then it is very anthropocentric, almost to the point of making 
humankind indispensable for God and God’s being, maybe as the inevitable consequence of 
Hardy’s creative emphasis on relationality, since, to our knowledge, it is only human beings 
who can relate to God. 
c. Glory 
For Ford and Hardy, God’s glory has the logic ‘of overflowing, creative love, which freely 
perfects its own perfection and invites others to join this life through praise. The only 
affirmation of God that is adequate is his self-affirmation’, with ‘God’s culminating self-
affirmation in Jesus Christ . . . involv[ing] a transformed understanding of God’s glory’. 
However, they do not examine the biblical import of ‘glory’, or what it is that humans attribute 
to God when they glorify God (for comparison, it not being natural to speak of beautifying 
God). They quote Hopkins’s ‘The world is charged with the grandeur of God.  It will flame out, 
like shining from shook foil’, and ‘Glory be to God for dappled things,’64 where God’s glory is 
discerned in immanence as well as in transcendence.  
d. Conclusion 
The implications of von Balthasar’s notion of ‘theodrama’, approved by Ford,65  will be 
developed in the ‘Informal Theology’ chapter.  
Hardy daringly extends the notion of God’s being to God’s well-being, directed towards 
humanity – though with inherent risk of anthropocentricity. From both Ford and Hardy comes 
an emphasis on God’s contribution to the human conceptual process. Both, particularly Hardy, 
stress theological statements as genuinely referential.  
Deism Ford views as historically paving the way for atheistic humanism,66 and it is not 
unreasonable to infer from this a parallel in some individual people’s mental sequences. There 
may be a collective sequence to be found in Charles Taylor’s ‘theology of pedagogy’ which 
Ford cites:  
                                                 
63 Hardy, Daniel W., God's Ways with the World: Thinking and Practising Christian Faith, 
Edinburgh, T&TC, 1996, pp. 15, 19, 16, 28-29. 
64 Ford and Hardy, Living in Praise, pp. 11, 21-22. 
65 Ford, Future of Christian Theology, pp. 24-27. 
66 Ford, Future of Christian Theology, pp. 52-53. 
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‘God is slowly educating mankind, slowly turning it, transforming it from within . . .’. It 
is a slow pedagogy that can also include leaps and breaks with some earlier forms. ‘We 
might see God as the supreme tennis player, who responds to our bad moves with 
new ways of countering them.’  This is a conception of providence that (whatever we 
make of its tennis metaphor) encourages a drama-centred theology.67 
There are shades here of the development of wisdom and the transforming potential of 
written wisdom, Wisdom being identified with God, as in the book of Job, and with Christ, as in 
1 Corinthians 1.24.68  This way of conceptualizing God grows in significance and develops 
throughout Ford’s writing. 
9.7 Rowan Williams 
a.  Popular theology 
Williams’s ability to communicate theologically with a range of people is exemplified by a 
broadcast interview with Melvyn Bragg demonstrating a blend of personal-ness and divine 
energy and initiative on God’s part: 
God is . . . that depth around all things and beyond all things into which, when I pray, I 
try to sink.  But God is also the activity that comes to me out of that depth, tells me I’m 
loved, that opens up a future for me, that offers transformations I can’t imagine.  Very 
much a mystery but also very much a presence.  Very much a person;69 
and in a letter to a child with its blend of expectations of transcendence, immanence, 
communication, creativity and initiative in God: 
Dear Lulu – Nobody invented me – but lots of people discovered me and were quite 
surprised. They discovered me when they looked round at the world and thought it 
was really beautiful or really mysterious and wondered where it came from. They 
discovered me when they were very very quiet on their own and felt a sort of peace 
and love they hadn’t expected. 
Then they invented ideas about me – some of them sensible and some of them not 
very sensible. From time to time I sent them some hints – specially in the life of Jesus – 
to help them get closer to what I’m really like. 
But there was nothing and nobody around before me to invent me. Rather like 
somebody who writes a story in a book, I started making up the story of the world and 
eventually invented human beings like you who could ask me awkward questions! 
                                                 
67 Ford, Future of Christian Theology, p. 54 (quoting Taylor, Charles, A Secular Age, Cambridge, 
Mass. and London, Belknap, 2007, pp. 668 and 671). 
68 Ford, David F., A Long Rumour of Wisdom: Redescribing Theology, Cambridge, CUP, 1992, pp. 
10-11, 20-21. 
69 Shortt, Rowan’s Rule, p. 14. 
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with Williams adding: ‘And then he’d send you lots of love and sign off.’70 
In a radio interview with Diana Athill, expectation of experience of the infinite is shown: 
But I guess that what it may come down to . . . is a feeling that, when you open up in 
silence to what is there, there is something that’s there that’s not yourself, which you 
struggle to find images and words for, which comes into focus for me as a Christian 
dramatically and decisively in one set of stories.  But behind that is an infinite 
hinterland. You open up, you are silent, you seek to absorb what there is.  And I 
suppose that’s at the root of serious religious practice. 
Then, after Athill expressed misgivings about trying to explain or create story about the 
creator, an account of finding the infinity of God in depth (interestingly, rather than in height): 
I’m not sure that I want to explain [the creator] in that sense. . . . I think I’d rather say, 
for me, looking into that extraordinary fact, is looking, as it were, down and down and 
down and down into something which doesn’t have a bottom, which doesn’t have a 
final point of explanation, but seeing that that very infinity somehow opens out on to 
what I call God, who is not therefore an explanation in the sense that you identify in 
the laboratory what causes what, but the context, the environment in which 
everything makes sense, the bottomless resource of action, and, well, I would say, 
intelligence and love as well, which surges up . . . .71 
b. Transcendence and intervention 
Thus, in Williams’s spirituality, concepts and words give way to silence in the face of infinity, 
which then emerges as initiative with positive attributes. Similarly, his understanding (in 
Shortt’s words) is that ‘God is transcendent; but that he transcends his transcendence, 
expressing his unknowable “essence” in his “energies” – that his, his manifestation in the 
world’.72 Williams himself refers to the divine as ‘not an other, within a system of interlocking 
or negotiating agencies’, and as having ‘no “envy”’, for ‘there is by definition nothing to 
compete for, so that it actually becomes possible to imagine the divine as the source of 
unqualified gift’.73 Interviewed by Shortt, Williams dismisses the concepts of initial watch-
winder and constantly interventionist god, and speaks of ‘an eternal activity which moment by 
moment energises, makes real, makes active, what there is’ – all of this ‘in orderly and 
cohesive ways’, such that the world ‘makes sense, interlocks, balances, works together, . . . 
with what we mean by natural laws’, based on divine rationality.  This he views as within a 
                                                 
70Daily Telegraph, 22nd April 2011, 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/damianthompson/100084843/a-six-year-old-girl-writes-a-
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72 Shortt, Rowan’s Rule, p.79. 
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tradition shared by: Augustine; Aquinas; the Eastern Orthodox divine energy that penetrates 
creation; and (as with Ford and Hardy) Hopkins’s ‘charged with the grandeur of God . . . ’.74 The 
divine energy may sometimes be particularly apparent, when, as previously quoted: ‘the action 
of God. . . is . . . that much closer to the surface than it habitually is’.75 This, along with 
definition of God as ‘what we have not yet understood, the sign of a strange and unpredictable 
future’,76 begs the question of the nature of rationality discernible to God but not to 
humankind, with risk of a ‘god of the gaps’ approach and a challenge to scientific rational 
universality.  
Williams seems to show a tendency towards process theology when he perceives God as being 
in personal transitional events. However, he believes contradiction arises if God, the source of 
all existence yet changeable and capable of suffering, ‘bestows on [lesser agents] a life on the 
other side of the ontological frontier such that they may modify not only each other but their 
source’.77 And in Arius he refers to ‘the error of “process theology”’ as taking the relationship 
between God and the world ‘to be definitive or constitutive of what it is to be God’.78  
c. Ontological spirituality 
We sense God’s prompting, warning, reassuring or guiding, not by ‘the fabric of the finite order 
being interrupted’, but rather ‘with certain configurations of finite agencies, the texture of the 
environment [being] more clearly transparent to the simple act of divine self-
communication’.79  As elsewhere, it is not clear whether Williams is making ontological 
assertions or offering spiritual insights, raising the question whether this indicates an 
unacceptable imprecision or a successful theological blend of philosophical and spiritual 
insights. For instance, he writes that ‘God is the agency that gives us back our memories, 
because God is the “presence” to which all reality is present’.80 Although this sounds like a 
defining description, when he enlarges on it, it becomes more pastoral: 
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So to be with God is to be (potentially) present to, aware of, all of one’s self and one’s 
past; which is why, as St John repeatedly reminds us, presence to God can be 
excruciating, and some will hate and reject the possibility. But when that God is 
revealed and embodied and ‘specified’ in Jesus, the victim who will not condemn, we 
can receive it.81 
Referring to Aquinas’s consideration of whether God enjoys himself, William speaks of ‘a God 
who is not only loving and intelligent, but . . . wholly in love with his own loving and 
intelligence, because it’s the supremely delightful and wonderful reality that can be 
conceived’.82 He writes too of ‘God’s joy in being God’, which ‘diffuses itself and works itself 
through in the life of what is not God’. This is in the context of God’s ‘need’ for human beings, 
which, Williams makes clear, is not need in the ordinary sense, but a ‘need’ for humans to be 
and to be what we are.83 In the context of God’s aseity, this non-human ‘need’ can only be 
‘because of an utterly unconditional generosity’, with no intention of anything in return.  ‘God 
is, in simple terms, sublimely and eternally happy to be God, and the fact that this sublime 
eternal happiness overflows into the act of creation is itself a way of telling us that God is to be 
trusted absolutely . . .’.84  At this point, Williams could simply have acknowledged the 
imperfect nature of analogy, but rather, blending ontology with spirituality, extends the 
imagery: ‘There is nothing that as it were stays at home while bits of the godhead go out to 
understand things and enjoy and love things . . .’.85 
The explanation lies in Williams’s stated intention of holding ‘the analytic and the 
impressionistic together in one interpretative process . . . attempting to keep the devotional 
and the critical’.86 Indeed, he proposes a methodology87of celebratory theology, 
communicative theology and critical theology.88  Celebratory theology concerns worship, 
communicative theology relates to other cultural and even political environments, and critical 
theology develops from communicative theology and can appear as apophatic or even, with 
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Cupitt, ‘atheous’ theology.  Theology is ‘mobile’, allowing the three styles to interact with each 
other, as occurs with his own easy movement between the philosophical and the spiritual. 
d. Language 
Humility, for Williams, is essential, with liturgy a matter of ‘“giving over’ our words to God’ 
rather than ‘seek[ing] to retain distance or control over what’s being spoken of’. Surrendering 
language to God means that ‘speaking of God is speaking to God and opening our speech to 
God’s’.89 Detached theology is not possible: 
God cannot be for us an object at the mercy of our scrutiny, because God is always 
active, never just there over against us like objects in this world. The very activity of 
our thinking minds is what it is because God is activating them here and now.90 
Williams, under Eastern Christian influence, is cautious about analogy. Nicaea and its later 
refinements provide the grammar of speech about God, ‘warning against canonizing in 
theology the tempting idioms of human personal interaction, requiring us to strain beyond 
these if we are to begin to hold to any sense of the radicality of divine gift’. He adds: 
To say that in God there is absolute identity of nature, will and action is indeed to say 
something that challenges the claims of understanding and impels us towards the 
apophatic moment in our theology: it means that the divine nature cannot be 
abstracted from God’s active relationship with the world.91 
On the other hand, God, whose ‘proper name is indeed “I will be what I will be”’ needs no 
clerical protection against wide interpretation, with talk of God sometimes chaotic and even 
odd. 
The moment at which a person senses for the first time that he or she has the liberty 
for such speech should be for us a moment of revelation, of truth-telling about a God 
who risks the divine truth in opening the mouths of fallible people; because to be God 
is to be the generosity of self-communication.92 
Williams recommends ‘informal theology’ being taken seriously within a process of dialogue 
within the Christian community, and dismisses too ready a reduction of ‘the disturbingly wide 
range of meanings and resonances that exist in the “primary” religious talk of story and 
hymnody’’.93 
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God is to be discovered in the significant experiences of life. In his closeness to the ‘9/11’ 
tragedy, Williams found ‘in God’s refusal to interfere with created freedom’ a test of 
‘theological principles about tragedy’, with a risk that,  in ‘try[ing] to make God useful in crises . 
. . we take the first steps towards that great lie of religion: the god who fits our agenda’. His 
response is theological caution: ‘God always has to be rediscovered. Which means God always 
has to be heard or seen where there aren’t yet words for him.’94 However, Williams is less 
cautious over individual ‘psychological’ events with God: ‘in the event which attacks and 
upsets my self-image’; in both positive emotional breakthroughs and negative breakdowns 
into despair or mental illness; in ‘points of intense communion with someone, points of 
apparently unbridgeable distance between me and others’.  ‘It is after experiences like this 
that people say ‘I’ve seen God’, ‘when they’ve seen and felt themselves and their world going 
into a kind of refining fire’.95 And this God, ‘seen’ variously by artist, contemplative and 
schizophrenic, is, says Williams, the one Christian God.  However, two issues are raised here: 
whether  people ‘see’ God in the intense experiences of life, including the negative ones; and 
whether is it helpful to characterize schizophrenic, contemplative and artistic views of God as 
equally ‘true’ in the sense of according with the collective understanding of the believing 
community, even with Williams’s liberality of response to informal theology. 
e. Conclusion 
Williams blends the analytic, the ontological, the impressionistic, the spiritual and the pastoral, 
with significant influence from eastern Christianity. He aims to meet people where they are, 
values the concepts and language of ordinary believers, and believes that theology should be 
experiential. Although his language is sometimes esoteric, almost incomprehensible, at other 
times he successfully bridges the gap between philosophical theology and ordinary people. 
Above all, God must be God, ‘to which every action in some sense refers, that which every 
action manifests or fails to manifest; and, as such, an agent who cannot be compared with 
other agents’.96 
9.8 Radical Orthodoxy 
Radical Orthodoxy, par excellence, sets out to reclaim tradition, aiming to be radically orthodox 
by meeting secularism with a radical return to orthodox roots, the Creeds, the Fathers, 
Augustine and Aquinas. It rejects liberal theology and rather, ‘in the face of the secular demise 
of truth . . . seeks to reconfigure theological truth’. ‘The central . . . framework . . . is 
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“participation” as developed by Plato and reworked by Christianity, because any alternative 
configuration perforce reserves a territory independent of God.’97 Milbank ‘allows for no 
entirely autonomous realms of secular discourse (even where these do not directly concern 
God or redemption)’.98 He mentions Radical Orthodoxy’s affinity with some more ‘Catholic’ 
aspects of Luther, its alliance to the nouvelle theologie, and its finding in Aquinas support for 
the non-autonomy of philosophy, ethics and politics.99 Radical Orthodoxy rejects the dualism 
of separate sacred and secular realms, since: 
the sacral interpenetrates everywhere, and if it descends from above, this descent is 
also manifest through its rising up from below.  Thus to say there is only the sacred is 
equally to say that, for now, within the saeculum, there is only the secular, which is 
nonetheless only human time through its sacral intimations.100 
Milbank proposes a role for Radical Orthodoxy as mediating between the Anglo-Saxon 
linguistic concentration (which he finds arid and leading to a notion that we are ‘“trapped” 
inside language’) and French phenomenology (based on intuitive experience). Radical 
Orthodoxy’s mediation can occur particularly through its emphasis on ‘the mystery of liturgy – 
liturgy which for theology is more fundamental than either language or experience, and yet is 
both linguistic and experiential’,101 though without being limited by either.  
Pickstock approaches human access to truth by reference to Aquinas, who, she says, ‘declares 
that God has an idea of matter and of material things as limited participations in His own Mind. 
It is thus the Platonic notion of participation which perhaps surprisingly allows a more elevated 
notion of matter’.102 The human mind has the capacity to know, by participation, even 
something of the mind of God by virtue of correspondence with it. Laurence Hemming believes 
that this misrepresents Aquinas to support the Radical Orthodoxy contention about the 
relationship of human knowledge to God’s knowledge.103 
James Hanvey applauds Radical Orthodoxy for its attempt to reunite faith and reason by a 
return to God by ‘a form of Neoplatonist strategy which they claim is central to the tradition, 
                                                 
97 Milbank, Pickstock and Ward, Radical Orthodoxy, pp. 1, 3. 
98 Milbank, John, The Programme of Radical Orthodoxy’, Hemming, ed., Radical Orthodoxy?, p. 
34. 
99 Milbank, Programme of Radical Orthodoxy’, pp. 35-36. 
100 Milbank, Programme of Radical Orthodoxy’, p. 37. 
101 Milbank, Programme of Radical Orthodoxy’, p. 43. 
102 Pickstock, ‘Radical Orthodoxy and the Mediations of Time’, p.70. 
103 Hemming, Laurence Paul, ‘Quod Impossibile Est! Aquinas and Radical Orthodoxy’, Hemming, 
ed., Radical Orthodoxy? pp. 79-80, 85, 92-93.. 
162 
 
whereby all being, hence truth and knowledge, is grounded in the divine mind’.104 Milbank and 
Pickstock, James Smith observes, disapprove of Scotus’s univocity of being (paradoxically 
implying for them a separation of creation from God and thus a secular order, leading to 
nihilism) and prefer Aquinas’s priority of God’s being, with analogy.  Smith traces Radical 
Orthodoxy’s positive relationship with Plato in terms of participatory philosophy and antipathy 
to immanentism. Radical Orthodoxy believes that, for Aquinas, parts of the created order can 
be understood only to the extent that they are participating in their Creator, and therefore 
that, ‘As a result, no secular account of things can possibly be true’.105 
Radical Orthodoxy, Hanvey writes, needs to ‘return to the eternally generative task of 
theology: that is, how to speak. . . . If theology cannot make of God an object, then theological 
discourse must speak in order to disclose presence’, particularly within worship, liturgy and 
community. ‘If theology simply remains within the academy, if falls under the illusion of its 
own competence and power; it becomes a language in the present of self, not of Other’.106 In 
fact, Radical Orthodoxy is unlikely to resonate with non-academic-theologian believers, and it 
is not clear that the espousal of the pre-modern concepts within the creeds and the Fathers as 
the counter to modernity is a promising start for those for whom modern assumptions cause 
difficulty in conceptualizing God. Furthermore, its hegemonic attitude on behalf of theology 
towards other, respected disciplines smacks of a certain hubris that is unlikely to appeal to 
those whose disposition already includes an element of scepticism towards theology in the 
face of challenges from scientific and other disciplines. 
 
 
9.9 Summary  
Important for all these theologians, are transcendence (particularly in Radical Orthodoxy) and 
immanence (less so for Radical Orthodoxy), as fundamental to the nature of God and God’s 
relationship with the world, all moving easily between philosophical analysis and faith. This 
feature will figure in the comparison to be made between academic and informal theology. 
Farrer and Mascall both look to analogy to legitimise theology. Philosophers have criticized 
Farrer’s alleged fideism, but fail to recognize that faith is the basis for his conviction that, from 
                                                 
104 Hanvey, James, S.J., ‘Conclusion: Continuing the Conversation’, Hemming, ed., Radical 
Orthodoxy?, p.151. 
105 Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, pp. 98-103, 160. 
106 Hanvey, ‘Conclusion, pp. 168-69. 
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God’s transcendence, relationship with humankind occurs, with theology a legitimate way of 
describing how things are, alternative to other disciplines. Mascall too, with analogy in the 
background, and unashamed of his metaphysical theology of God as transcendent yet 
revealing himself in relationship with humanity, defends his position against logical positivism.  
Jenkins, while retaining a transcendence-immanence balance, particularly protects 
transcendence, as indicated by his rejection of interventionist theology and ambivalence about 
process theology and divine passibility. 
Ward’s mixed references to ‘reality and ‘transcendent reality’ lead to a conclusion that he is 
probably using these expressions ‘poetically’, deriving more from faith than linguistic logic, as 
may also be true of ‘inclusive infinity’ and ‘exclusive infinity, ‘existent’ and ‘self-existent’. 
Brown explicitly rejects deism, and his theism, with God ‘personalizing’ his approach to 
individual believers, is so interventionist that God’s transcendence would be at risk, apart from 
his demand for balance between immanence and transcendence. He uses the terms 
‘metaphor’, ‘symbol’ and ‘analogy’ in relation to non-verbal expression: a useful reminder of 
the variety and significance of human experience and expression of the divine. 
Ford and Hardy explore God’s overflowing love and glory, set within the context of the 
worshipping community, through which God’s order and energy are focused and shared with 
humankind. With pastoral concern, Ford recognizes the limited stretching of many Christian’s 
minds in relation to their faith, and Hardy a general public loss of understanding that words 
about God are more than a human construct.  Ford approves von Balthasar’s concept of 
‘theodrama’, perhaps offering the prospect of the ‘presentation’ of the whole Christian 
‘enterprise’ being viewed as a kind of art-form, which might allow those for whom theological 
language is figurative to retain faith with integrity.  For Williams, supremely among the 
theologians surveyed, ontology and spirituality merge on the basis of faith, theology being 
impossible without both component parts. His proposition that God’s immanent involvement 
is sometimes ‘closer to the surface’ can be seen as miracle deriving from spirituality, but may 
be an unnecessary challenge to scientific rationality. Indeed, whenever Williams locates God’s 
miraculous action in gaps in current human understanding, there is risk of reversion to a god of 
gaps. However, his theology has real reference, and is always humbly subject to God himself; 
theology cannot for Williams be abstracted from creation, but is by divine gift.  His pastoral 
sense is visible in his dialogues; and informal theology, in all its variety and oddity, must never 








Chapter 10: PASTORAL THEOLOGY 
The term ‘pastoral theology’ is used here in a sense different from its usage to refer to a form 
of practical theology. Many theologians surveyed so far demonstrate pastoral concern. This 
chapter surveys a selection of Anglican theologians, some already included, whose pastoral 
concern has led them by popular writing to help ordinary believers conceptualise God. In so 
doing, they have revealed their own concepts of God. Where particular theologians have 
already been included, the references here are to their writings with these intentions. 
10.1  C. S. Lewis 
Perennially popular, with apologetic and pastoral intent, Lewis’s unsystematic theology is 
concerned for ordinary readers. He writes that ‘An essential part of the ordination exam ought 
to be a passage from some recognized theological work set for translation into vulgar English. . 
. .  Failure on this paper should mean failure on the whole exam. . .’.1 
The faith that Lewis found after First World War army service was theistic, though not initially 
Christian: ‘The God to whom I surrendered was sheerly non-human . . . a Person . . . . The 
primal and necessary Being, the Creator, has sovereignty de facto as well as de jure. He has the 
power as well as the kingdom and the glory’.  Lewis’s theism eventually took a conventional 
Christian theological form,2 as in his apologetic Mere Christianity.3 Since he cannot be as 
materialistic as could be construed, he must be tending in a Platonist direction when he claims: 
But if God is the ultimate source of all concrete, individual things and events, then God 
Himself must be concrete, and individual in the highest degree. Unless the origin of all 
other things were itself concrete and individual, nothing else could be so; for there is 
no conceivable means whereby what is abstract or general could itself produce 
concrete reality.4  
Indeed, Lewis prefers to designate God ‘a particular Thing’, ‘the only Thing’ who has created 
other things.  However, God’s mode of existence is very far from that of other things, in that it 
is of a necessary and eternal kind: ‘He is the opaque centre of all existences, the thing that 
simply and entirely is, the fountain of facthood’. He is not ‘universal being’, but rather ‘the 
                                                 
1 Lewis, C. S., ‘Version Vernacular’, ChrCent, vol. LXXV, 31st December 1958, p. 515, 
reproduced, Hooper, Walter, Undeceptions: Essays on Theology and Ethics, London, Bles, 1971, 
pp. 283-84. 
2 Lewis, C. S., Surprised by Joy: The shape of my early life, London, Bles, 1955; edition cited, 
London, Fontana, 1959, pp. 184-85, 189. 
3 Lewis, C. S., Mere Christianity, London, Fontana, 1952 (originally, 1952 as broadcast talks, 
1942-44), pp. 39-42. 
4Lewis, C. S, Miracles: A Preliminary Study, London, Fontana, 1960 (originally, 1947), p. 91. 
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Absolute Being – in the sense that He alone exists in His own right.’5 Walter Hooper writes that 
Lewis was ‘a thoroughgoing supernaturalist’.6  
To a degree, Lewis’s Platonist tendency appears in his children’s novels,7 where he postulates 
another world of activity, which encapsulates theological concepts allegorically (without God 
ever being mentioned). However, this tendency is clearest in the dream recounted in The 
Great Divorce, where the other world (with God only implied) is a parallel one of heaven and 
hell, which inter-relate with earth, in that people can return from the alternative world to 
earth:8  
Earth, I think, will not be found by anyone in the end a very distinct place.  I think 
earth, if chosen instead of heaven, will turn out to have been, all along, only a region in 
Hell: and earth, if put second to Heaven, to have been from the beginning a part of 
Heaven itself.9 
There is little doubt that Lewis, despite his ‘experience’ being a dream, views heaven with its 
contents and people as more solid than earth, with scope for him to grow there into a 
‘Person’.10 ‘Solid’ is a repeated key-word, and is allied to his use of ‘concrete’. 
Lewis’s Platonist tendency is again illustrated when he writes: 
Total Reason – cosmic or super-cosmic Reason – corrects human imperfections of 
Reason. . . . If we attribute a sense of value to the ultimate Reason, I do not think we 
can suppose it to be totally different from our own sense of value. . . ; 
and in: 
The good is uncreated; it never could have been otherwise; it has no shadow of 
contingency; it lies, as Plato said, on the other side of existence. . . . We . . . know what 
lies beyond existence, what admits no contingency, what lends divinity to all else, 
what is the ground of all existence, is not simply a law but also a begetting love, a love 
begotten, and the love which, being between these two, is also imminent [sic] in all 
those who are caught up to share the unity of their self-caused life. God is not merely 
good, but goodness; goodness is not merely divine, but God.11 
In The Problem of Pain, Lewis nails his colours clearly to the Platonist mast, when he 
‘emphatically embrace[s]’ the principle that ‘God commands things because they are right’ 
rather than that ‘certain things are right because God commands them’, which he believes 
                                                 
5 Lewis, Miracles, pp. 92, 91. 
6 Hooper, Walter, ed., Christian Reflections by C. S. Lewis, London, Bles, 1967, p. vii. 
7 Particularly, Lewis, C. S., The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe, London, Bles, 1950. 
8 Lewis, C. S., The Great Divorce: A Dream, London, Bles, 1945, e.g., pp. 20, 22, 61, 91. 
9 Lewis, Great Divorce, p. 8. 
10 Lewis, Great Divorce, e.g., pp. 116, 22, 27, 66, 69, 73. 
11 Hooper, Christian Reflections by C. S. Lewis, p. 80. 
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would imply an arbitrary morality on God’s part.12 And in Reflections on the Psalms, he refers 
to ‘the eighteenth century terrible theologians who held that “God did not command certain 
things because they are right, but certain things are right because God commanded them . . . 
in effect mak[ing] God a mere arbitrary tyrant’.13 For Lewis, writes David Baggett, ‘there are 
objective standards of morality that God recognizes and cannot violate’.14  However, John 
Beversluis believes that Lewis’s position is not always so definitely Platonist.  He notes Lewis’s 
willingness to countenance the possibility that the words ‘good’ and ‘almighty’ might be 
accorded meanings different from the ordinary when applied to God (in order to defeat the 
argument that God cannot be both good and almighty if he allows pain).15 To this can be added 
Lewis writing:  ‘What seems to us good may . . . not be good in His eyes, and what seems to us 
evil may not be evil’.16 Thus Lewis sometimes seems to deny the concept of Platonic universals, 
and some ambivalence about Platonist qualities comes to light. 
A disparity in morality appears between human love and ‘eternal love’, where the former can 
lead to the latter, but with a break of continuity with ‘something in it which makes it easier to 
stop at the natural level and mistake it for the heavenly’. To this Lewis’s narrator replies: ‘I 
don’t know that I dare repeat this on Earth . . . . They’d say I was inhuman; they’d say I 
believed in total depravity: they’d say I was attacking the best and the holiest things’.17 
Although cautious about miracles, which he views as within the processes of nature, Lewis 
believes ‘that accounts of the supernatural meet us on every side, illustrating ‘God’s universal 
activity’.18 By inference from Lewis’s commentary on the virginal and ordinary conceptions, he 
probably shares Farrer’s theory of double agency: ‘For what He did once without a human 
father, He does always even when He uses a human father as His instrument’.19 
                                                 
12 Lewis, C. S., The Problem of Pain, London, Bles, 1940; edition cited, London, Fontana, 1957, 
p.88; similar sentiments, Hooper, Christian Reflections by C. S. Lewis, pp. 55-56 (referring to 
Lewis’s essay, ‘On Ethics’, probably 1943 or earlier). 
13 Lewis, C. S., Reflections on the Psalms, London, Bles, 1958; edition cited, London, Fontana, 
1961, p.54. 
14 Baggett, David, ‘Is Divine Iconoclast as Bad as Cosmic Sadist? Lewis versus Beversluis’, 
Baggett, David, Habermas, Gary R., and Walls, Jerry L., eds., C. S. Lewis as Philosopher: Truth, 
Goodness and Beauty, Downers Grove, Inter-Varsity, 2008, p. 118. 
15 Beversluis, John, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion, Grand Rapids, William B. 
Eerdmans, 1985, p. 104 (quoting Lewis, Problem of Pain, p. 14). 
16 Lewis, Problem of Pain, p, 25. 
17 Lewis, Great Divorce, p. 88. 
18 Lewis, C. S., ‘Miracles (1942)’, pp. 5-16, Hooper, Walter, ed., Undeceptions, pp. 7, 11. 
19 Lewis, ‘Miracles’, p. 11. 
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Lewis emphasises God’s transcendence, and, unlike other theologians, sees in society ‘no 
danger of Deism but much of an immoral, naïve and sentimental pantheism’.20  Lewis finds 
pantheism to be popular, both historically and as a form of abstraction at the last stage of the 
divine gradually losing its anthropomorphic characteristics; however, he rejects it as relating to 
‘what man says about God, and not what God does about man’.21 He is scornful of 
anthropomorphism (which he claims the Church condemned in the second century), not 
recognising it as an inescapable element in much analogy for God.22 At other times, he is aware 
of theology’s poetic nature, including its need to be metaphorical and pictorial.23 Indeed, he 
subscribes to the greatest anthropomorphism, viewing God ‘as a Person’24 (although, shortly 
before, he has denied that God is a person, preferring to reserve that noun for Trinitarian 
definition).25 Yet Lewis agrees that ‘God is beyond personality’, ‘more than a person’ and thus 
‘super-personal’.26 As Fiddes points out, Lewis is here ‘recognizing a necessary apophaticism or 
negative way in all theological language’.27 Lewis adopts the theme of perichoresis to illustrate 
his understanding of the inner nature of God in Trinity, with God ‘not a static thing – not even 
a person – but a dynamic, pulsating activity, a life, almost a kind of drama.  Almost . . . a kind of 
dance.’  For Lewis, ‘Almost certainly God is not in Time. His life does not consist of moments 
following one another’, so that God has all eternity to listen to each individual human prayer.28 
This, writes Will Vaus, helps Lewis avoid the challenge to human freewill that arises ‘from 
thinking that God is progressing along a timeline like us’ though able to see ahead.29 
Lewis seeks to limit God’s omnipotence in The Problem of Pain in an attempt to mitigate God’s 
culpability.  However, as Beversluis points out,30 Lewis’s account is unhelpful, since he confuses 
physical impossibility, which is liable to all sorts of qualifications which are likely to reduce it to 
less than total impossibility, with logical, or ‘intrinsic’, impossibility, which is well recognized as 
                                                 
20 Lewis, C. S., ‘Rejoinder to Dr Pittenger (1958)’, Hooper, Undeceptions, p. 146. 
21 Lewis, ‘Miracles’, pp. 86-87. 
22 Lewis, C. S., ‘Must Our Image of God Go? (1963)’, Hooper, Undeceptions, p. 149; 1944 paper, 
Lewis, C. S., They Asked for a Paper: Papers and Addresses, London, Bles, 1962, p. 160. 
23 Lewis, They Asked for a Paper, p. 161. 
24 Lewis, They Asked for a Paper, p. 193. 
25 Hooper, Christian Reflections by C. S. Lewis, p. 79, from 1943 article. 
26 Lewis, C. S., Beyond Personality: The Christian Idea of God, London, Bles, 1944, p. 15, 
(reproduced without italics, Lewis, Mere Christianity, p. 136). 
27 Fiddes, Paul S., ‘On theology’, MacSwain, Robert and Ward, Michael, eds., The Cambridge 
Companion to C. S. Lewis, Cambridge, CUP, 2010, p. 92. 
28 Lewis, Mere Christianity, pp. 148-49; cf. p. 100 (Fiddes, ‘On theology’, p. 91, believes that 
Lewis is the first writer to picture the Trinity, as opposed to angels or Christ, as a dance); 142. 
29 Vaus, Will, Mere Theology: A Guide to the Thought of C. S. Lewis, Downers Grove and 
Leicester, Inter-Varsity, 2004, p. 52. 
30 Beversluis, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion, p. 105. 
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beyond divine omnipotence. In fact, Lewis’s argument is difficult to follow, when he turns to a 
consideration of the extent of God’s self-consciousness: this, he believes, on a parallel with 
human self-consciousness’s dependency on ‘an environment of other selves’, is a reality within 
the ‘society’ of the Trinity.  Thus, ‘God is Love, not merely in the sense of being the Platonic 
form of love, but because, within Him, the concrete reciprocities of love exist before all worlds 
and are then derived to the creatures’.  Lewis contrasts God’s love with the various forms and 
limitations of human love.31  Human love is conditioned by need, whereas: 
God has no needs. . . . God’s love, far from being caused by goodness in the object, 
causes all the goodness which the object has, loving it first into existence and then into 
real, though derivative, loveability. God is Goodness.  He can give good, but cannot 
need or get it.32 
And if this sounds like aseity, Lewis then shows more ambivalence on the matter, with an 
unexpectedly kenotic explanation: 
If God sometimes speaks as though the Impassible could suffer passion and eternal 
fullness could be in want, and in want of those beings on whom it [sic] bestows all 
from their bare existence upwards, this can mean only . . . that God of mere miracle 
has made Himself able so to hunger and created in Himself that which we can satisfy. 
If He requires us, the requirement is of His own choosing.  If the immutable heart can 
be grieved by the puppets [sic!] of its own making, it is Divine Omnipotence, no other, 
that has subjected it, freely, and in a humility that passes understanding.33 
Elsewhere, his attachment to God’s impassibility is equally clear: ‘But the reason why God has 
no passions is that passions imply passivity and intermission. . . . He cannot be affected with 
love, because He is love’.34 Similarly, over praise: ‘The miserable idea that God should in any 
sense need, or crave for, our worship . . . is implicitly answered by the words “If I be hungry I 
will not tell thee” ([Psalm] 50, 12)’. Thus praise is born not of some need on God’s part, but of 
spontaneous creaturely reaction.35 
However, all the insights of The Problem of Pain are put to a severe test, as Beversluis 
observes,36 with Lewis’s wife’s death. His concept of God is at risk: ‘The conclusion I dread is 
not “So there’s no God after all,” but “So this is what God’s really like”’. In response to being 
told that his dead wife was in God’s hands, he bitterly observes that the hands of God in which 
she resided had proved hurtful: ‘What reason have we, except our own desperate wishes, to 
                                                 
31 Lewis, Problem of Pain, pp. 14-17, 38. 
32 Lewis, Problem of Pain, p. 38. 
33 Lewis, Problem of Pain, pp. 38-39; cf. p. 40. 
34 Lewis, Miracles, pp. 96-97. 
35 Lewis, Reflections on the Psalms, pp. 79-82. 
36 Beversluis, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion, p. 144. 
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believe that God is, by any standard we can conceive, “good”? . . . The word good, applied to 
Him, becomes meaningless: like abracadabra’. Having toyed with the idea of God as ‘the 
Cosmic Sadist’, he prefers the idea of God as ‘the great iconoclast’, who shatters ‘my’ idea of 
God because it is not a divine idea or sacrosanct.  He courageously realises that his personal 
involvement in suffering should be causing no radical change in his understanding or his faith, 
as the basis has not changed: ‘I’ve got nothing that I hadn’t bargained for’.37 This would have 
been part of his recovery of faith.  
10.2  J. B. Phillips 
As outlined above, Phillips pioneered twentieth century popular theology, with a declared 
intention in Your God Is Too Small of helping ordinary people revise their understanding of 
God.38 
God’s transcendence and immanence are balanced as he explains that God is ‘unfocused’, 
unlimited by time or space, ‘a Person with whom, despite vastness, we can establish some 
personal relationship’ and who can have personal claims on us. Clues as to this reality appear 
through spirituality, goodness and artistic and natural beauty, and above all in Christ.  Phillips’s 
implicit rejection of any idea of a god of gaps has already been noted. He is non-
interventionist, reasoning that God’s intervening in human affairs would undermine human 
freedom. However, he goes further, arguing that human concern about innocent suffering and 
natural disasters may simply reflect limited human understanding.39 This inadequate response, 
itself in danger of ‘a monstrously inadequate conception’, displays less pastoral sympathy and 
has implications for the seriousness of the God’s suffering in Christ. 
10.3 Harry Williams 
Harry Williams, on the other hand, draws attention to another kind of false god, ‘the God . . . 
of the Book of Common Prayer [who] seems sometimes to be a merciless egocentric tyrant, 
incapable of love’, who has to be cajoled into forgiveness by the ‘repeated and elaborate 
protestations of guilt’ in the general confession, whose forgiveness has to be confirmed by 
four scriptural quotations, with our unworthiness  again having to be expressed in the Prayer 
of Humble Access40 – the latter fault, it can be added, being replicated in the  general 
confessions of Morning and Evening Prayer and within the options of the 2000 Common 
                                                 
37 Lewis, C. S., A Grief Observed, London, F&F, 1961, pp. 8, 24-25, 26, 28-29, 38, 55, 32. 
38 Phillips, Your God Is Too Small, pp. 8, 11-60. 
39 Phillips, God Our Contemporary, p. 132, and as described in Liberal Theology Landmarks 
chapter. 
40 Williams, Harry A., ‘Theology and Self-Awareness’, Vidler, ed., Soundings, p. 79 
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Worship. He makes a similar point in Objections to Christian Belief, when he describes how 
human guilt can be induced when ‘feelings of a harsh pitiless authority get associated with 
[God]’; or we share H. G. Wells’s Mr Polly’s view of God as ‘A limitless Being having the nature 
of a schoolmaster and making infinite rules, known and unknown, rules that were always 
ruthlessly enforced and with an infinite capacity for punishment, and, most horrible of all to 
think of, limitless powers of espial’.41 
Indeed, the incompleteness of all analogies for God (such as ‘my father, my king, my judge, my 
lover, my friend, the first cause who upholds all things by the word of his Power and who 
directs all things by the operation of his Providence’) is emphasised by perceived failures on 
God’s and people’s part to care for us and order things aright for us. This is a reminder that 
human conceptualising of God is likely to be affected by individual emotion, with ‘large areas 
of my being as yet impervious to my critical reason, and where in consequence [my] analogies 
[for] God are evoking me [sic] by means of all those people in the forgotten past under whose 
control and care I have been’.42 It is also easy, by habit rather than decision, to conceive of God 
as one being among others, such as in declaring ‘for God, King and country’, with a risk that 
this God may be an available substitute when more desirable aims fail, or may be threatened 
by the arrival of new knowledge and understanding – in effect, though Harry Williams does not 
use the expression, a god of gaps.43 He discovers that the God to which he was at one stage 
attached was a neurotic idol-god, a god which needed to be loved and the centre of the 
attention through its adherent’s constant devotions; that was ‘my subconscious projected on 
to the heavens’; that allowed no rivals in affection; that was of ‘pathological parentage’; and 
from which the true, gracious God had to deliver him.44  
 
 
10.4 Bill Vanstone 
In relation to God, Vanstone included in three main books, born of his theological and pastoral 
experience:  
 the theme of God’s creativity, yet vulnerability;  
                                                 
41 Williams, H. A., ‘Psychological Objections’, Vidler, A. R., ed., Objections to Christian Belief, 
London, Constable, 1963 and Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1965, p. 43. 
42 Williams, ‘Theology and Self-Awareness’, p. 76. 
43 Williams, H. A., The True Wilderness, London, Constable, 1965, pp. 113-15. 
44 Williams, H. A., Some Day I’ll Find You: an autobiography, London, Mitchell Beazley, 1982, 
pp. 130-33, 253. 
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 the theme of passibility or impassibility; and  
 ‘There is a reality who so transcends and enfolds the dying of my body and its return 
to dust and ashes . . . And the name of that reality is God . . .’.45 
Vanstone recounts an incident that clearly carried for him immense symbolism of the nature of 
God’s love and nature. Two boys became absorbed in creating from plaster, twigs and other 
materials a model of a waterfall area they had visited.  Careful planning, adjustments and 
adaptations took place, assessing whether additions looked right, with ‘In everything . . . the 
possibility both of “difficulty” and of “coming right”’.46  
Having expended to the full their own power to make, they became the more 
attentive to what the model itself might disclose. They came to discover that which 
they were making, and to be affected by that which they discovered.  The once 
contemptible sticks and stones now had a certain power over those who were using 
them – a power to effect or negate the completion of that which was being made, and 
so to satisfy or frustrate those who were making it. The two boys became vulnerable in 
and through that which, out of virtually nothing, they had brought into being. They 
became concerned for the safety of their models.47 
It is analogous for God’s act of creation: activity and waiting, giving of power over the creator, 
giving of value and status in relation to the creator, self-giving in time and energy to the point 
of hunger and tiredness, efforts of love which give value. God’s love, for Vanstone, transcends 
human love, but is not altogether different from it. Authentic love is precarious, vulnerable, 
and entails surrender of power,48  as he illustrates with a story about a surgeon carrying out 
some delicate brain surgery for the first time: 
In the outcome the operation was a triumph: but it involved seven hours of intense 
and uninterrupted concentration on the part of the surgeon. When it was over, a 
nurse had to take him by the hand, and lead him from the operating theatre like a 
blind man or a little child. This . . . is what self-giving is like: such is the likeness of God, 
wholly given, spent and drained in that sublime self-giving which is the ground and 
source and origin of the universe.49 
This analogy, echoing the Genesis creation account of God needing to rest after his creative 
labours, is highly anthropomorphic and takes kenosis to a new level. 
Although Vanstone seems to be attributing passibility to God, he in fact resists such an 
attribution, as described in the ‘Process and Passibility’ chapter. The evil in the world, 
                                                 
45 Vanstone, W. H., Fare Well in Christ, DLT, 1997, p. 146. 
46 Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, Love’s Expense, p. 32. 
47 Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, Love’s Expense, p. 32 
48 Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, Love’s Expense, pp. 33-35, 102, 39, 49, 52. 
49 Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, Love’s Expense, p. 62. 
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Vanstone writes, does not imply some kind of dualism or being willed by God, but rather is the 
outworking of the precariousness of creation in its otherness from God. But, he says, ‘the 
Creator . . . leaves no problem abandoned and no evil unredeemed’.50 Vanstone’s pastoral 
theme is of God’s kenotic, suffering love in Christ.51 
10.5 David Ford 
An important part of Ford’s conceptualisation of God is as Wisdom, a theme which develops 
from his inaugural lecture52  through to The Future of Christian Theology, marrying theological 
insight with curricular concern. Ford approves Taylor’s ‘theology of pedagogy’, with God 
‘slowly educating mankind . . . transforming it from within’.53   
God ‘desires us’ and ‘desire[s] to relate to us’, responding to ‘our deepest desire to be desired’; 
the mutual desire between God and Jesus demonstrates that God is not totally self-sufficient.  
Albeit pastorally affirming, it is not clear whether the concept of ‘desire’ is ontological or 
paradoxical. Although the object of human desire, God is mysterious, with, ironically, the 
mystery increasing with familiarity, in the way that two people in longstanding relationship 
find that boundaries and secrets remain and are best retained.54 Ford, avoiding 
foundationalism,55 writes: 
I believe in the God who created the universe and who cannot therefore be known like 
an object within the universe. There is no standpoint from which God can be 
inspected.  This God is free in relation to creation, and is free to be God in ways which 
are new to us. Raising Jesus Christ from the dead fits with a creator God who is free to 
surprise us. So my framework is one in which this God is God.  It is tested every day of 
my life, intellectually and practically, and I have a very limited understanding of it, but I 
do not believe there is any bigger or more fundamental framework by which to judge 
it.56 
An opportunity for the believer to discover the inner perichoresis and hospitality of the ‘self-
distributing’ God lies within the experience of meals with friends and strangers57 – with well-
recognised scope for parochial, pastoral practice. However, Ford comments that ‘“mind-
stretching” is not a term most Christians would apply to their learning of the faith’, and also 
that, where congregational study is fostered:  
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the content can easily bypass the deepest questions posed through academic theology 
and other disciplines [that] go to the heart of both Christianity and of late modernity. 
The failure to make appropriate connections here is especially dangerous in a society 
with modern communications and widespread education in other areas, but for those 
called to love God with all their minds it is also a radical failure in integrity.58 
Lastly, Ford’s espousal of von Balthasar’s notion of the ‘theodrama’ by which God, as the 
principal character, has been, is and will be involved with the world, holds promise for 
Christians, versed in the faith, for whom all theological concepts are intensely analogical. He 
describes von Balthasar’s drawing on Hegel’s distinction between drama, epic and lyric: with 
epic being an objective, fact-based, account which describes God as ‘He’; with lyric being 
subjective, self-concerned, addressing God as ‘thou’; and with drama embracing both. Drama, 
such as that of the total story of God’s creation, redemption and continuing sanctification, ‘is 
able to embrace the objective and the subjective, to maintain a sense of plot and purpose 
without suppressing individuality, diversity and the complexity of levels, perspectives, 
motivations and ideas’, and maintain a balance of epic and lyric.  Ford illustrates this theme of 
‘theodrama’ in terms of John’s Gospel, introduced and summarised in the prologue, and then 
filled out in the rest of the gospel.59  Such an approach is consistent with his (and Hardy’s) 
essential context of the worshipping community for theology, the place where pastoral care is 
exercised. 
10.6 Rowan Williams 
Williams’s esoteric reputation is justified by some of his writings, but also belied by his ability 
at other times to communicate with children and ordinary people, as exemplified by his 
sensitive responses cited in the ‘Reclaiming Tradition’ chapter. His constant location of the 
ontological within the spiritual may reflect many ordinary believers’ position. He recommends 
serious attention to ‘the disturbingly wide range of meanings and resonances that exist in the 
“primary” religious talk of story and hymnody’, against the risk of: 
breaking off one of the most crucial conversations he or she is likely to be involved in, 
conversation with an idiom deliberately less controlled, more concerned with 
evocation and suggestion.  The theologian needs to affirm theologically the propriety 
of different styles, and to maintain exchange and mutual critique between them. . . . 
[The theologian should] look to the plurality of style and genre in Scripture as a model 
of the collaborative enterprise that speaking of God can be.60 
                                                 
58 Ford, Long Rumour of Wisdom, p. 15. 
59 Ford, Future of Christian Theology, pp. 24-30. 
60 Williams, On Christian Theology, p. 9. 
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Indeed, by God’s very nature, God needs no protection against diverse interpretation, and talk 
of God can be chaotic or odd.61 
However, one concept of God from informal theology that Williams rejects is that of ‘dreadful, 
stifling, omnipresence . . ., the all-seeing eye in the middle of heaven’, based upon the 
Psalmist’s ‘O Lord, thou has searched me out and known me.  Whither shall I go then from Thy 
presence?’  The resulting despair, he says, is connected with the ‘primitive dread of knowledge 
without love’. Rather, writes Williams, God’s ‘ecstasy’, demonstrated in the Incarnation, is to 
‘enter into the morass of human subjectivity and human motivation’ by an ‘unparalleled act of 
“imagination”’.62 Even the concept of ‘Father Almighty’ can represent an immature projection 
of our desire for ‘an all-powerful father to look after me’, an authority figure to solve our 
problems; or a projection of ‘an idealized mother, always accepting and soothing’.  Rather, 
Williams defines God’s ‘almightiness’ more benignly as God’s ‘capacity to do something fresh 
and different, to bring something new out of a situation . . . patiently struggling to make 
himself clear to human beings, to make his love real to them’.63 
10.7 Angela Tilby 
In Let There Be Light, Tilby likens the difficulty of seeing God to looking in a broken mirror: the 
mirror should be capable of reflecting God’s image in ‘me’, ‘but the capacity has been lost 
through the damage’.64  So the task is to reassemble the bits of image, and the way she 
presents her image of God is indeed in fragments born of different experiences, scattered 
through her writings. She recounts the theological confusion in the minds of some young 
people, as measured in surveys, and deplores ‘the ever-yawning gap between theologians and 
ordinary clergy, and between academically-minded clergy and ordinary Christians’, with 
intelligent lay people’s ‘grasp of Christianity remain[ing] childish and stunted’.65 ‘Religion’, she 
writes, ‘can function in our age of facts as a therapeutic fantasy’, and some believers can even 
combine religious practice with agnosticism or atheism.66 So, for some, in reciting a creed: 
                                                 
61 Williams, Rowan, ‘Teaching the Truth’, Jeffrey John, ed., Living Tradition: Affirming 
Catholicism in the Anglican Church, London, DLT, 1992, pp. 30-31. 
62 Williams, Rowan, Open to Judgement: Sermons and Addresses, London, DLT, 1994, pp. 14 
(quoting Psalm 139. 1 & 7), 16. 
63 Williams, Rowan, Tokens of Trust: An Introduction to Christian Belief, Norwich, Canterbury, 
2007, pp. 15, 20, 16. 
64 Tilby, Angela, Let There be Light: Praying with Genesis, London, DLT, 1989, p. 95. 
65 Tilby, Angela, Teaching God, London, Collins, 1979, pp. 182-83. 
66 Tilby, Won’t You Join the Dance?, p. 18. 
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We imagine God. ‘God’ stands for all that we can think of as powerful and good.  He is 
a focus for our hopes and aspirations. Of course we know that he does not really exist.  
But ‘believing’ in him helps.67 
Doubt, for Tilby, is an important concomitant of faith, whereas, particularly in relation to God, 
belief within the ecclesiastical tradition has too often become ‘the rational acknowledgement 
of the obvious’, rather than, as in the biblical and credal tradition: 
commitment to what is beyond all other forms of knowing. . . . The God who is part of 
our mental furniture cannot be God.  He is an idol.  The God who undergirds a rational 
picture of the universe is only a concept of our minds.  What faith seeks cannot be 
proved or disproved by argument.  That which faith seems must be bigger than all our 
thoughts about him.68 
The concepts of God held by different categories of people vary widely, including: the 
sophisticated mental construct ‘allowed’ to exist by a scientist; the object of unquestioning 
and unintellectual faith; the object of the word ‘God’ which arouses ‘embarrassment, anger, 
awe, nostalgia, assurance, dread, bitterness, hope, shame, revulsion, bewilderment, wonder . . 
. indifference’; ‘a presence and also a heart-rending absence’.  In God’s apparent absence, as in 
the Nazi death camps, Tilby records, some ‘discovered in their suffering a new and darker 
revelation of God, and worshipped’.69 
And so Tilby turns to specific images of God.  Attention has already been given to her feminist 
theology, in the ‘Cultural Relativism’ chapter. But God can be limited in other ways apart from 
gender, for instance as a supporter of the nuclear family at Christmas and Mothering Sunday 
and of nature at Harvest, and as being ‘on our side’ at Remembrance Sunday – in other words, 
as a protector of the status quo and a safe idol. In contrast, Tilby says: ‘The God of the creeds is 
neither safe nor tidy.  He is the big God, without face or name or shape.  He is a difficult God to 
live with,’ and displays cruelty as well as glory, absence as well as presence.70  
Tilby’s association of God’s omnipotence with fatalism on the part of some believers71 may be 
exaggerated, except in relation to a few. There is a trace of process theology as she refers to 
the biblical images of God at war with human sinfulness, yet not in total control, and calling for 
men and women to fight for him. Another such trace appears as she writes: 
God is creating worlds, God is creating me.  I am unfinished and so is the world.  I can 
place myself within ‘the heavens and the earth’ of God’s activity and know that God is 
                                                 
67 Tilby, Won’t You Join the Dance?, p. 18. 
68 Tilby, Won’t You Join the Dance?, pp. 25-26. 
69 Tilby, Won’t You Join the Dance?, pp. 31-34. 
70 Tilby, Won’t You Join the Dance?, p. 47-49. 
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not static, God creates change, and the God who creates change in the stars is the God 
who changes me.72 
The splendour in nature naturally evokes awe; but there is also waste and arbitrariness, 
causing ambiguity for Tilby about God as creator.73 Commenting on Genesis 1.1-5, she writes 
of ‘a balance of power and restraint’, and of ‘an explosion and a holding back, a divine energy 
and a sacrifice of divine omnipotence’.  Creation is thus gentler than might sometimes be 
portrayed, even (though she does not use the word) luring: ‘The universe is given permission 
to be: “Let there be light.”’ In keeping with this, human beings are given freedom and are not 
predetermined.  Again, Tilby seems to be moving in a process direction when she writes that 
‘Time is real to God, as real as it is to us’.  She acknowledges: ‘Christian theology tells us that 
God is eternal and changeless. This immutability is often presented as part of God’s 
perfection’; but then, although she says that perfection comes for humans ‘by being willing to 
be subjected to perfection’, she backs away from making the connections with God’s nature.  
God is not the ‘workaholic’, ‘relentless’ figure depicted by: 
Unresting, unhasting and silent as night 
Nor wanting, nor wasting, though rulest in might, 
but, rather, a God who rests on the seventh day; not just ‘a detached God who rejects the 
creativity of work’, nor just ‘a God who can only work . . . a slave-driver, an insecure God 
whose demands on us are endless’.  So – although the logic is not entirely clear – God ‘comes 
to us in our strength’, and God ‘seeks to know us in our vulnerability’.74  Later she comes 
nearest to an explicit process approach, writing, with a degree of paradox, that, for a universe 
where chaos is now thought to be prevalent, God: 
accompanies creation through its process, a creative, dynamic God, closer to the God 
of the Scriptures than the kind of God whose mind is investigated by Stephen 
Hawking.75 This is the God who invests in becoming, an artist rather than an engineer.  
A God who can be seen as a young God, rather than the traditional Ancient of Days.76 
Tilby considers concepts of God that seem to ‘fit’ the various scientific scenarios of history, 
such as the one who: set in motion the Newtonian universe; who is the ground of all being yet 
inaccessible to human beings; fits the Einstein universe of relativity; ‘plays dice with the 
seething potentialities of the quantum world’; is of the quasi-pantheism of the quantum 
vacuum itself striving for self-realization, also of the quantum world; is born at the beginning 
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of the universe and struggling alongside it even into final entropy of big-bang cosmology; has 
enormous energy and experiment in a universe of chaos. Alternatively, God may be conceived 
as the immanent ‘soul of the universe’, either as the source of everything or as coexisting with 
the universe and giving shape to matter through time.77  
Tilby is not a systematic theologian: her theological insights are scattered through her books, 
and not always presented with total coherence, but are born of pastoral sensitivity and 
presented in language, sometimes paradoxical, suitable for ordinary believers.  Her sympathy 
with process tendency is unobtrusive, but she is aware of the difficulty for the Christian 
community with its biblical and conventional transcendence, Platonic metaphysics and, 
sometimes, modern determinism. She speaks of her own previous sympathy with pantheism, 
but also of her concern that the sort of God who is part of nature cannot be free, because 
controlled by nature, with human beings not free either.78 It may be objected to this that this 
subjugation of God is not a necessary implication either of the more subtle panentheism or of 
process theology, although process theology does risk ‘flattening’ the dialectic tension, 
potentially creative, between God’s transcendence and immanence. 
10.8 Mark Oakley 
Williams identifies Oakley as standing in the liberal strand of theology, concerned ‘to turn the 
soil of tradition, and ‘work[ing] on the borderlines of spirituality and philosophy or the arts or 
sciences’.79  
Oakley contrasts two categories of people within the Church:  ‘those who want to resolve the 
mystery of God . . . to spell out the facts as they are believed . . .’; and ‘those who, instead . . . 
seek to deepen it. . . . [who] are willing  . . . to say “I don’t know”, to embrace the evocative 
multi-layered languages of poetry and music in their search for God, who have come to believe 
that truth is not the same thing as the elimination of ambiguity’.80 God is: 
both omninominabile and, at the same time, innominabile. That is, all true words speak 
of the Holy One who is, but no word or name can ever contain, capture, control or 
reveal him in his fullness – least of all, we learn in prayer’s stillness, one uttered by 
me.81 
There is paradox in claiming that ‘God’s hiddenness . . . is not closure and self-concealment but 
a persistent revealing of God’s self for the nurture of those he loves’, and that ‘strangely, he 
                                                 
77 Tilby, Science and the Soul, p. 237. 
78 Tilby, Science and the Soul, pp. 180, 238, 239-40. 
79 Williams, Rowan, Anglican Identities, London, DLT, 2004, pp. 82-83. 
80 Oakley, Mark, The Collage of God, London, DLT, 2001, p. 8. 
81 Oakley, Collage of God, p. 9. 
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hides himself in order to make himself more known’. Sometimes God’s activity goes 
unrecognized when it conflicts with ‘tidy expectations’.  Oakley is drawn to R. S. Thomas, for 
whom ‘man . . . is always about to comprehend God; but inasmuch as he’s a creature and finite 
he will never succeed . . .’.82 Oakley’s strength is in describing how we can and cannot discover 
God, rather than in describing God’s nature, which he sees as an impossible task: ‘as we try to 
articulate God we discover his elusiveness, his receding before us.  God gives us just enough to 
seek him, and never enough to fully find him’, since ‘to do more would inhibit our freedom 
that is so dear to him’.83 
He implies that an appreciation of God’s transcendence is necessary for human faith to be 
balanced and healthy, rather than self-absorbed or parochial on the basis of immanence alone. 
When we encounter God, ‘We become aware of our idolatrous ability to drag God down to our 
own level with all its cultural and individual limitations’. Rather, ‘we relate to God and our 
relational language consequently takes on the nature of the language of love, awe and tears’; 
and ‘relating to God . . . can only be done in the context of both nearness and distance’. ‘Even 
our proudest doctrinal statements . . . need to humble themselves’, ‘fighting’, as they are, ‘for 
truth in a variety of figurative literary forms in the hope that something of the divine nature 
might be caught inside them’.84 Indeed, Christianity’s strength is in its figurative and poetic 
language and in the imaginative and the symbolic.  
In his earlier writing Oakley was able to take a relatively relaxed position towards non-realism, 
accepting breadth of understandings of God and names for God on the part of realists and 
non-realists:  
Can non-realists use language about God in a non-referential way and still remain 
within the Christian tradition? Personally, I do not see why not. All of us have our own 
interpretative skills when praying to and talking about God, no matter how 
unconscious we are of them.  The non-realist worshipper is not different from the 
religious believer in this respect.85 
He aligns himself with ‘critical realists’, who have deserted ‘the Celestial Controller’, but are 
reluctant to ‘deny totally God’s existence in re’: ‘To use a Kantian framework, the fact that God 
is in the category of the noumenal . . . rather than the phenomenal . . . does not make God less 
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real’.  ‘We need to acknowledge the inevitable anthropological character of all that we say and 
think about God . . . .  Relativism does not necessarily imply non-realism.’86 Later, he is less 
tolerant of non-realist theologians, particularly Cupitt, arguing that they have emphasized the 
importance of symbol and myth, and the limitation of reality to the earthly and human, to a 
degree that has almost caused God to be lost. Oakley does not accept non-realists’ non-
objectivity of God, writing that ‘Scepticism about metaphysics is not the next step in revision of 
concepts of God that do not relate to our understanding and experience’.87 
Oakley is aware of a yearning within humanity for God, which the Church’s formularies may 
not answer, but which its more ‘poetic’ and ‘cultural’ products may do. He quotes Williams: 
‘God always has to be rediscovered.  Which means God always has to be heard or seen where 
there aren’t yet words for him’. Oakley likes Meister Eckhart’s delightful description of God as 
‘like a person who clears his throat while hiding and so gives himself away’.88 This typifies 
Oakley’s priority in theology and its pastoral application. He never contradicts the traditional 
credal formularies, but sits lightly to their use.  
10.9 Summary 
Out of their pastoral concern, several of these theologians express anxiety about the lack of 
theological development opportunities for the variety of ordinary believers, and about gaps 
between professional theologians, the clergy and ordinary believers. This appears to have 
been borne out by the enthusiasm, sometimes well informed, of many who consented to take 
part in the survey for this thesis, and desire on the part of some for further exploratory 
opportunity. 
Lewis’s intention is apologetic, although his writings are notable for his personal, if 
idiosyncratic, Platonist-leaning exploration of God. Philips raises important questions about 
limitations in popular conceptions of God, but, despite his pastoral intent, takes an 
unsympathetic position over human suffering. Harry Williams and Vanstone, like Lewis, draw 
on personal life experiences – Harry Williams from a false, neurotic image of God; and 
Vanstone from understanding of God’s fragility and mutuality of dependency with humankind, 
although he ultimately retreats from God being passible. 
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Ford’s more academic contribution introduces von Balthasar’s interpretation by theodrama, 
with its potential for widening the scope for analogy in relation to the whole of the Christian 
‘presentation’. Williams champions the role of ordinary Christians in formulating valid, if 
unusual, theological concepts, but, like Harry Williams, rejects overbearing images of God. 
Tilby too accepts the need for breadth in concepts of God, beyond the safe and domestic, 
focussing on the variety of scientific, historical and natural loci in which God must be 
discovered; to this end, she flirts with process theology and with God’s mutability. Lastly, 
Oakley attends more to the ways of discovering God than to actual concepts of God, and his 
writing is characterised by unashamed ‘poetic’ paradox coupled with theological realism. 
These theologians have in common a healthy reliance on their own hard-won spirituality to 
achieve their pastoral relevance and effectiveness, a kind of spirituality that is also 
demonstrated by academics who engage with the ‘Informal Theology’ described below, and by 
the informal theologians, or ordinary believers, whose views were captured in the 








This Practical Theology section turns to the practice of informal theology. The first chapter 
contains a review of writings in the field about the place of informal theology in relation to 
academic theology, and records some observations in practical informal theology. The second 
chapter is an account of the exercise in practical theology carried out for this thesis, and 
contains evaluations of the results of this exercise that used questionnaires and semi-
structured interviews with a sample of ordinary believers/informal theologians.  
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Chapter 11: INFORMAL THEOLOGY 
After describing the nature and place of informal theology, this chapter sets out to record 
some prominent features and instances: in some observations of recent popular UK views of 
God; in relation to new approaches to God; and with some exemplar approaches. It next 
reviews the phenomenon of Contextual Bible Study, as an example of rooting Bible study in 
participants’ experience, particularly of social disadvantage; then the work of a principal 
proponent of informal theology, Jeff Astley.  Finally, it considers the concept of poetry or 
drama as a possible means of providing scope for believers of all theological persuasions and 
positions on the academic-informal spectrum to make common cause in worship, prayer and 
spiritual life. 
11.1  The nature of informal theology 
As well as describing and analysing what academic theologians and ordinary believers think, 
this thesis attaches great importance to informal theology, or, in Astley’s term, ‘ordinary 
theology’, understood as the theology of ‘ordinary’ believers without formal theological 
education. It includes, for Williams, ‘the “informal” theology of prayer, art and holy action’, 
with professional theology having its ‘practical and historical rootedness in the informal 
theologizing of the community as it develops’.1 Pastoral practice must be broad enough to 
encompass all positions on the spectrum between academic and informal theology, all degrees 
of awareness of analogy, and insights from ordinary believers. Williams writes: 
 A person shaping their life in a specific way, seeking discipline and consistency in 
relation to God, is: theologising . . . .   The believing artist or hymnographer is likewise 
engaged in a theological task . . . . The deep suspicion with which churches habitually 
regard theologians . . . overlooks the preconscious reflection, the ordering of 
experience, that is constantly going on in the Church, the ‘informal’ theology of prayer, 
art and holy action. [There is a risk that] the would-be professional theologian can so 
understand his or her task as to forget their practical and historical rootedness in the 
informal theologising of the community as it develops.2 
Religious discourse must remember that it utilises ‘a sufficient imaginative resource for 
confronting the entire range of human complexity’. Thus, for theology, integrity can only be 
retained by refusing to claim too much as the basis of authority: ‘In other words, religious and 
theological integrity is possible as and when discourse about God declines the attempt to take 
God’s point of view (i.e. a “total perspective”)’.3  Humility is essential for theologians, who: 
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3 Williams, On Christian Theology, p. 6; cf. p. 13. 
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can fall into the assumption that the mode of critical austerity in their utterances is 
something to which other people’s speech should conform; or else . . . seeks 
prescriptively to reduce the disturbingly wide range of meanings and resonances that 
exist in the more ‘primary’ religious talk of story and hymnody. . . . The theologian 
needs to affirm theologically the propriety of different styles, and to maintain 
exchange and mutual critique between them.4 
Those theologians surveyed in this chapter are engaging in that conversation.  
Williams supports the validity of experiences in worship (most graphically in glossolalia), and of 
‘apophasis, the acknowledgement of the inadequacy of any form, verbal, visual or gestural, to 
picture God definitively, to finish the business of religious speech . . . and the expression of this 
recognition in silence and contemplation’. Above all, it is prayer that enables theology to step 
aside from totalitarianism in religious language ‘by articulating its own incompleteness before 
God’. Thus language about God is possible with integrity only on the basis of some kind of 
relationship with God, such language needing to be surrendered or given to God.5  
Laurie Green too is clear that theology is not just for the professionals, but for ‘those who 
know God best’ and ‘in the hands of the whole Christian community’. The Divine is to be 
sought within all our experience’ as a ‘prime motive’ for what amount to exercises in informal 
theology, rooted in the context of locality and culture; his emphasis is on ‘discerning . . . the 
presence and activity of God in the world and adoring God there’, and, from that, ‘learn[ing] 
more about God’s nature and action’ and moving to ‘the transformation of ourselves and 
society’, what he calls ‘value-committed theology-in-action’. He commends the relationship to 
current culture employed by Paul with local Greek expectations, by Aquinas with analogy and 
by Tillich with existentialism.  God will thus be both in culture and the traditions of the faith, 
and each will learn from the other.6 
Margaret Kane derives from her theological work in the north-east of England a conviction that 
theology is not simply an intellectual matter’, but arises from reflection on experiences in the 
context of God, so that ‘theology is essential to every Christian and to the church’.  ‘Most 
people’, she writes, ‘have some sort of theology . . . some sense of the transcendent (though 
they may not call this God), and everyone has some feeling and searching after what is beyond 
their immediate grasp’.7 
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Ian Fraser champions the validity of lay theology arising from experience more than book-
learning. He approves the ironical cartoon of a layman saying to a laywoman: ‘If I didn’t 
happen to know that you have had no theological training I would have said that your last 
remark was something of very great significance’. Theology, Fraser says, can consist of groups 
of people in vastly differing situations across the globe seeing ‘what God is doing and asking of 
them’. And he follows Williams and Ford in insisting that ‘theology and spirituality must not be 
separated’. He deplores the restriction of theology to professional theologians that he believes 
has taken place, with the ‘withdrawal from the mainstream of life; and the lack of lively 
contact with the language and daily experience of so many people’8 that he sees in academic 
education. He applauds what he sees as theology having now become a shared, community 
activity, involving specialists and non-specialists together. He quotes with approval Father Ed 
de la Torre,9 who, Fraser says, pronounced: 
 You really need to hear the peasants and farmers telling in their own way the 
theological perceptions they are coming to.  I cannot go as deep or speak as clearly as 
they can.  You see, I am an educated cripple – I had seminary training.10 
Fraser decides that ‘the theological specialist has no special [or separate] access to knowledge 
of God’, because theology is equally available to all: ‘God is made known not by the convincing 
force of intellectual argument, but by the way life is lived’. Within the Church, ‘illiterates now 
make perceptive contributions to the church’s theological understanding’.  Indeed, sometimes 
the ‘cripple’,11 needs the non-specialist to make up the theological skills the specialist lacks. He 
writes : 
a. Theology for living cannot be got from books.  Books are an auxiliary aid to 
what can only be learned through doing God’s will. 
b. . . . People in the thick of life, struggling to make sense of it in difficult/hopeful 
situations, who search the scriptures together as a source of light, have the 
equipment to do theology . . . . 
c. Theology is not a matter for the drawing board . . . or the wind-tunnel . . . .12 
Despite the value that Fraser attaches to the process of informal theologising, he does not 
tackle the issue of fundamental, Christian, theological content, or the difficulties some have in 
conceptualising and speaking of God. 
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Melody Briggs reports Andrew Village’s survey of a sample of Anglican reactions to a Gospel 
healing story.13 The most significant variables relating to interpretation included education, 
personality type, experience, and charismatic practice, with education playing a significant part 
in shifting readers from literal to more liberal biblical views, while age and gender had no 
significant effect.14  Some of those Village surveyed were willing to countenance modern 
biblical scholarship: ‘my impression . . . is that the kind of scholarship associated with 
modernity, with its heavy emphasis on rationality and rejection of the supernatural, does not 
play well in many congregations’.15 From Village’s advocacy of a tolerant acceptance of a 
variety of interpretations and of the value of interpretative communities can be extrapolated a 
similar approach towards concepts of God.16  
A poignant example, quoted by Davie and Astley, is that of the survey respondent who, to the 
question ‘Do you believe in a God who can change the course of events on earth’, answered, 
‘No, just the ordinary one’– displaying theological profundity in a legitimately sceptical 
response, and perhaps reflecting common informal belief tending in a deist direction – just as 
does some academic theology, such as that of Wiles.17 
11.2 Recent popular English concepts of God  
Past assumptions, writes Cole Moreton, were that ‘God is English’ or even ‘God is an 
Englishman’,18 God emerging after World War I as: 
part Father Christmas, part W. G. Grace, a thoroughly decent, sporting sort of chap to 
have woven into your language, culture, society and governance at every level. He now 
avoided confrontation wherever possible, preferring compromise and influence to the 
terrible alternative [war] that He knew so well. . . . still a moralist, still ready to oppose 
                                                 
13 Mark. 9. 14-29. 
14 Briggs, Melody, ‘The Bible and Lay People: An Empirical Approach to Ordinary Hermeneutics. 
By Andrew Village’, HeyJ, Volume 50, Issue 1, 27.11.2008, p. 179, citing Village, Andrew, The 
Bible and Lay People: An Empirical Approach to Ordinary Hermeneutics, Aldershot, Ashgate, 
2007,  pp. 51, 160. 
15 Village, Bible and Lay People, p. 24. 
16 Briggs, ‘Bible and Lay People’, citing Village, Bible and Lay People, p. 117. 
17 Davie, Religion in Britain, pp. 36-38, 41, 75-76, 79, 1, 79; Astley, Jeff, Ordinary Theology: 
Looking, listening and learning in theology, Farnham, Ashgate, 2002, pp. 45-47 (quoting 
Abercrombie, Nicholas, Baker, John, Bret, Sebastian and Foster, Jane, ‘Superstition and 
Religion: The God of the Gaps’, Martin, David and Hill, Michael, eds., A Sociological Yearbook of 
Religion in Britain: 3, London, SCM, 1970, p. 106). 
18 Moreton, Cole, Is God Still an Englishman?: How Britain Lost Its Faith (But Found New Soul, 
London, Little, Brown, 2010, pp. 17-19 (quoting the 1589 Bishop of London and George 
Bernard Shaw, respectively). 
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the heathen and the foreign, and if a selfless sacrifice was needed then He was ready 
to make it . . . .19 
The 1950s, and the immediate post-war period, were, in Davie’s words, ‘an Anglican decade, in 
which the social role of the church was confirmatory rather than confrontational. The sacred 
(at least in its Anglican forms) synchronized nicely with the secular in this predominantly 
conservative period’.20 Chapman et al. find a connection between the British monarch and 
concepts of God, with the 1953 coronation: 
significant for what it reveals about the ‘high’ God of the time. It symbolizes the 
continued relevance of the traditional Christian expressions of a God who promotes 
order and embraces the whole nation. . . . distant, stern and presiding; a Judge or 
Monarch. He supported virtues of duty, obligation and obedience. . . . was not 
expected to intervene in the affairs of the world, although . . . undeniably in charge.21 
Such, these authors, say, is the abiding influence of The Book of Common Prayer, with its 
emphasis on God as Father and Judge and the need for repentance. ‘This high, sovereign God’ 
continues to appear in state openings of Parliament, remembrance services and the like.22 (To 
this can be added a parallel between a constitutional monarchy and a quasi-constitutional 
status to which God is currently often relegated, with no expected power, but invoked on 
ceremonial occasions.)    
Moreton also refers to ‘a strong tradition of dissident faith in England, proposing a God whose 
bounty is for all the people, not just the people in power’, but usually ‘pushed to the fringes of 
society and not allowed near “the English God”. . . the God defined and promoted by the 
Establishment’.  Moreton says this Establishment God lingered into the 1960s and ’70s; 
however, in some English quarters, such as Cathedrals, this God remains in the twenty-first 
century in popular civic and royal events. Moreton’s landmark in questioning this model is not, 
as with most commentators, the publication of Honest to God, but, rather, the arrival of David 
Jenkins as Bishop of Durham, his alleged Christological views and his criticism of the Prime 
Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and the National Coal Board management.  By now, Moreton 
reports, ‘the English God was looking confused.  The traditionalists and the radicals had 
swapped places. Was He supposed to fight injustice and comfort the poor, or pore over His 
company accounts and wave a wad of cash?’  Alongside this development, as Moreton 
                                                 
19 Moreton, Is God Still an Englishman?, pp. 20-21. 
20 Davie, Religion in Britain, p. 31. 
21Chapman, Mark, Naguib, Shuruq and Woodhead, Linda, ‘God-change’, Woodhead, Linda and 
Catto, Rebecca, eds., Religion and Change in Modern Britain, London, Routledge, 2012, p. 175. 
22 Chapman, Naguib and Woodhead, ‘God-change’, p. 175. 
188 
 
illustrates throughout, are the theological assumptions of charismatics, fundamentalists and 
extreme evangelicals, in whose understanding God often engages in direct emotional 
intervention with individuals through dramatic preaching, expecting instant conversion of life 
and a commitment to a particular form of corporate church life. This God, for Moreton, is far 
removed from the liberal God of either the Establishment or of social protest.  But the final 
death of the Establishment God Moreton identifies with the funeral of Princess Diana in 1997: 
when ‘He had been up there in Balmoral with the Queen’, recommending ‘discipline, decorum, 
routine. That was not what the majority of the people . . . wanted. Indeed, the folk religion 
that followed Diana’s death ‘was culturally post-Christian’, and God, perceived as either 
present or absent, was peripheral. Thus emerged ‘a new, looser, wider way of relating to God’,  
who became ‘a more generous, more feminine, more compassionate deity with His – and Her 
– arms flung open to everyone’.23 
11.3 New approaches to God 
For ordinary Christians, Chapman et al. claim, the earlier high doctrine of God has been 
displaced by trends associated with evangelical and charismatic Christianity or with liberal, 
mainstream movements.  In the former, ‘God was principally at work in the heart’, even as ‘an 
intimate friend, even a lover’, to the detriment of cerebral theology, and with hymns of more 
contemporary idiom, often displaying intimacy with Jesus or the Father.24 (Such thinking is, of 
course, not new within Christianity.) Other Anglican hymnody, however, began to redefine 
God differently, with the 1969 100 Hymns for Today: depersonalising God with ‘God of 
Concrete, God of Steel’; and projecting on to God calls for social action in ‘Sing we a song of 
high revolt’, and for us to ‘revolt and fight/with him for what is just and right/to sing and live 
Magnificat/in crowded street and council flat’.25 Here, doctrine became secondary to social 
action, characterised by the 1985 Faith in the City report.26 This, with Honest to God, the work 
of Jenkins and Cupitt and the feminist movement, encouraged an inclusive and less sharply 
defined picture of God.27 An isolated example of a hymn reflecting liberal theology, also in 100 
                                                 
23 Moreton, Is God Still an Englishman?, pp. 23-24, 77-81, 104-107, 158, 222, 248 (Moreton 
does not reflect any reversal that may have occurred with the subsequent funeral.), 249 (cf. 
pp. 284-85), 250. 
24 Chapman, Naguib, and Woodhead, ‘God-change’, pp.  175-76. 
25 By Jones, Richard G. and Kaan, Fred, reproduced, Hymns Ancient and Modern New Standard, 
Norwich, Hymns Ancient and Modern, 1983, pp. 819, 921. 
26 The Archbishop of Canterbury's Commission on Urban Priority Areas, Faith in the City: a call 
for action by Church and nation, London, Church House, 1985. 
27 Chapman, Naguib, and Woodhead, ‘God-change’, pp. 177-80. 
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Hymns for Today, is ‘Father, Lord of all Creation’,28  echoing Tillich with ‘Ground of Being, Life 
and Love’29. Sydney Carter’s 1960s songs contributed to a freshening of popular 
understanding,30 and, generally, much 1960s, 1970s and 1980s liturgical language reflected the 
British God becoming less stern and remote, more accessible and intimate.  
For Callum Brown, this marked ‘the end of Christianity as a means by which men and women, 
as individuals, construct their identities and their sense of “self”’. Whether ‘the death of 
Christian Britain’ can be extrapolated from the incontrovertible decline in church allegiance 
and explicit Christian belief remains to be seen, with growth occurring in some parts, and 
marks of a Christian state remaining; and, as Brown himself recognises, quantitative research 
cannot take into account informal or ‘folk’ religion.31 Furthermore, Brown insists that the 
decline in religion does not imply the: 
death of churches, for . . . they will continue to exist in some skeletal form with 
increasing commitment from decreasing numbers of adherents. Nor is it the death of 
belief in God, for . . . it may well remain as a root belief for people.  But the culture of 
Christianity has gone in the Britain of the new millennium.32 
Davie describes the late twentieth century ‘Re-emergence of the Sacred’, with a multiplication 
of evangelical Church of England parishes and groups; with environmental concerns bridging 
the gap between the secular and the sacred and the emergence of New Age spirituality. Davie, 
like Brown, also describes what she terms ‘common religion’, the consequence of ‘privatized 
religion’ by which individual Christian’s beliefs, though shaped by the Church’s culture, become 
idiosyncratic, even superstitious, with a drift from Christian orthodoxy.33 These are factors that 
influence ‘informal theology’, as already exemplified in the wider definitions of God implied in 
some of the surveys mentioned above.  
11.4 Liturgy 
One significant change that has confronted Anglican believers is the gradual, though still 
partial, shift from The Book of Common Prayer and its derivatives to modern language liturgies, 
including the Church of England’s Common Worship, accompanied by other Eucharistic 
                                                 
28 By Fred Kaan, Hymns Ancient and Modern New Standard, p. 801. It also echoes Bonhoeffer 
by addressing Jesus as ‘the Man for Others’, Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 165 
(although the translation here is different). 
29E.g., Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume I, p. 124. 
30 http://www.stainer.co.uk/carter.html, downloaded 28.10.2013. 
31 Brown, Callum, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding secularization 1800-2000, 
London, Routledge, 2001, pp. 1-3, 11. 
32 Brown, Death of Christian Britain pp. 197-98. 
33 Davie, Religion in Britain, pp. 36-43, 75-84. 
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liturgical changes. Some of these changes can be interpreted as reflecting and encouraging a 
shift of emphasis from God’s transcendence to God’s immanence, although Bishop Michael 
Perham is definite that no doctrinal shift was to be engineered by the Church of England’s 
Liturgical Commission.34 In defence of the partial shift from ‘thee’ and ‘thou’ language, John 
Fenwick and Bryan Spinks point out ‘that, although Cranmer did indeed address God as ‘thou’, 
he also called Mrs Cranmer ‘thou’ and his horse ‘thou’:35 a personal, even intimate, form of 
address. However, ‘thee’ and ‘thou’ had largely disappeared from common English usage by 
the end of the twentieth century,36 and became a purely ‘hieratic language’ for most people 
even earlier.  The change from this and associated language began in the Church of England in 
1971,37 to a mixture of continuing acclaim and regret,38 the regret often associated more with 
perceived detriment to God’s ‘otherness’, than with any loss of the intimacy possibly implied 
by the second person singular (comparable with the French ‘tu’).  Still there is no consensus in 
favour of Common Worship’s ‘modern’ version of the ‘Our Father’.39  However, Clifford Longley 
writes: ‘The idea that God must be addressed in different, more dignified and more archaic 
language than everyday speech . . . unduly emphasises the transcendent at the cost of the 
immanent’40 – although such language does also emphasise difference. 
The issue for Alana Harris is whether historic liturgy safeguards, in David Martin’s words, ‘a 
massive prior objectivity, historically given, (within which) the self can be forged’, or whether 
more informal liturgy with everyday language would facilitate what Kierkegaard calls ‘deeper 
immersion in existence’ and drawing near to God.41  As the debate progressed, opposition 
came from: the Dean of Guildford, who contrasted a new rite with historic liturgy as 
                                                 
34 Conversation with Bishop Michael Perham (a member of the Church of England Liturgical 
Commission, 1982-2001), Gloucester, 23.07.2013; Perham, Michael, ‘The silent music of our 
praise’, Papadopulos, Nicholas, ed., God’s Transforming Work: Celebrating ten years of 
Common Worship, London, SPCK, 2011, pp. 28, 29. 
35 Fenwick, John. R. K. and Spinks, Bryan D., Worship in Transition: The Twentieth Century 
Liturgical Movement, Edinburgh, T&TC, 1995, p. 149. 
36 Except in pockets, in the researcher’s West Riding recollection. 
37 Fenwick and Spinks, Worship in Transition, pp. 149, 151. 
38 The researcher’s pastoral experience and a few of the interviews for this research. 
39 E.g., Common Worship: Services and Prayers for the Church of England, London, Church 
House, 2000, p. 36. 
40 Harris, Alana, ‘“The Prayer in the Syntax?”: The Roman Missal, the Book of Common Prayer 
and Changes in Liturgical Languages, 1945-80’, Garnett, Jane, Grimley, Matthew, Harris, Alana, 
Whyte, William and Williams, Sarah, eds., Redefining Christian Britain: Post-1945 Perspectives, 
London, SCM, 2006, p. 36 (quoting Longley, Clifford, ‘The Language of Prayer’, Tablet, 
17.11.1979, p. 1114). 
41
 Harris, ‘“Prayer in the Syntax?”’, pp. 37 (quoting Martin, David, Christian Language and its 
Mutations: Essays in Sociological Understanding, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002, pp. 141-42); 
Kierkegaard’s expression from Robinson, Honest to God, p. 47. 
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‘transforming the divine into the ordinary and reducing the vision of the city of God to the 
likeness of a landscape in suburbia’;42  Fenwick and Spinks, who felt that ‘the obsession with 
intelligibility has driven out the glory, mystery and holiness’;43 and Simon Reynolds, who wrote 
that ‘clarity of meaning was prized above rhythm, allusion, metaphor, or tracing the poetic 
contours of texts’.  The Anglican ‘Parish Communion’ movement, liturgical changes 
(particularly the presiding priest facing the congregation across the altar) and the reordering of 
some churches may have contributed to cultivating a sense of God’s immanence. Reynolds 
contrasts ‘the principle intentions of the Church’s worship [of] an invitation to glimpse 
something of the otherness of God’, and ‘a liturgical climate where divine immanence, and 
accessibility of meaning, is the principal emphasis’.44 It can be added that, although 
‘accessibility of meaning’ and ‘divine immanence’ are separate issues, modern liturgy may 
engender popular confusion between them. Fenwick’s and Spinks’s negative view that ‘The 
westward celebration of the Eucharist creates a closed human circle from which God is 
excluded’45 misses the points that: the celebration is by the people together, priest and other 
ministers included; God is evoked in the midst as well as beyond; and the Last Supper did not 
exclude God. Indeed, Perham believes that westward facing presidency can contribute to a 
sense of unity without loss of the transcendent, particularly if accompanied by effective hand 
and eye movements by the presiding priest.46 Fenwick and Spink’s position presents an 
example of how liturgical change and multiplicity of practice are capable of varied 
interpretation by different people.  
More recent Church of England liturgy includes less compulsory penitential material than the 
Book of Common Prayer liturgy, although Perham is clear that this reduction was not 
consciously intended, but resulted from attempts to return to early church practice and 
simplicity.47 Along with this has arisen a higher incidence of sitting for prayer, even penitential 
prayer, in Anglican churches, which may be having a subliminal effect in encouraging a less 
deferential, or more ‘comfortable’, relationship with God.  Standing as the norm for prayer, as 
in Jewish worship, (with the Common Worship Eucharistic Prayer B even including the words 
‘we thank you for counting us worthy to stand in your presence and serve you’48)  may 
                                                 
42 Bridge, Tony, Letter to Editor, Times, 23rd November 1979, p. 15. 
43 Fenwick and Spinks, Worship in Transition, p. 173. 
44 Reynolds, Simon, ‘Believing in a God who sings’, Papadopulos, God’s Transforming Work, pp. 
93, 91. 
45 Fenwick and Spinks, Worship in Transition, p. 173. 
46
 Conversation with Perham. 
47 Conversation with Perham. 
48 Common Worship, p. 190. 
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encourage a sense of human maturity and responsibility before God, as well as greater 
awareness of the Christian community around. 
Recent Church of England liturgy contains few concessions to more recent theology, except 
the frequent substitution of ‘keep you in life eternal’49 for ‘bring you to everlasting life’,50 
reflecting, consciously or unconsciously, a more existentialist and less eschatological view of 
God’s presence. Although formal doctrinal change may not have been intended, the Common 
Worship Eucharistic Prayers51 have produced an interesting variety of theology. Prayers A, B 
and C are not new in Common Worship, and are conventional in their Trinitarian approach to 
God, with varying emphases on Jesus and his sacrifice.52  Prayers D to H are new in Common 
Worship, and contain mostly conventional theology. Prayer D contains the non-immanentist 
imagery of ‘your face is turned towards your world . . . Your Word goes out to call us home to 
the city where angels sing your praise’.53 Prayer G is the most creative, describing God as ‘our 
light and our salvation . . . From the beginning you have created all things [perhaps tending, 
wittingly or unwittingly, towards Wiles’s view of creation as a continuing divine activity] and all 
your works echo the silent music of your praise’.54 Prayer G also contains the only concession 
to using female metaphors for God, with ‘As a mother tenderly gathers her children, you 
embraced a people as your own’,55 and the only use of the name ‘Mary’, in contrast with ‘a 
woman’ in Prayer A, ‘the blessed virgin’ in Prayer in B, and no mention in the other prayers. 
Neither the collects within Common Worship offer any new theology, nor the authorised 
Additional Collects.56 Jim Cotter57 devised a huge set of alternative, unofficial collects,58 
remarkable for the forms of address. Nearly all incorporate the word ‘Presence’, mostly ‘Living 
Presence’, but also a wide variety of other epithets, which fall in to a number of groups.  These 
                                                 
49 E.g., Common Worship, p. 171. 
50 The Book of Common Prayer, London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, p. 303. 
51 Common Worship, pp. 184-205. 
52 Perham draws attention to other ways Trinitarian theology is prominent in Common 
Worship, Perham, ‘silent music of our praise’, pp. 21-22. 
53 Gooder, Paula and Perham, Michael, Echoing The Word: The Bible and the Eucharist, London, 
SPCK, 2013, pp. 79-80. 
54 Phrase drawn from St John of the Cross, Gooder and Perham, Echoing The Word, 2013, p. 92. 
55 Gooder and Perham, Echoing The Word, 2013, p. 93. Reference to Matthew 23.37, Luke 
13.34, both echoing Deuteronomy 32.11, Psalms 17.8, 36.7, 57.1, 63.7, 91.4. 
56 Additional Collects, London, Church House, 2004. 
57 A Welsh Christian writer who describes himself: ‘I have been exploring , as a pilgrim soul, 
what it might mean to unfold afresh my spiritual and religious inheritance . . . to try and 
connect that tradition with the experiences of being gay, undergoing . . . serious depression, 
and . . . living with leukaemia’, http://www.cottercairns.co.uk/, downloaded 13.09.2013. 
58 Cotter, Jim, Unfolding the Living Word: New Kyries, Canticles, Gospel Acclamations and 
Collects for Holy Communion Year A, B & C, Norwich, Canterbury, 2012. 
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include: adjectives expressing transcendence, such as ‘Mysterious’, ‘Holy’ and ‘Shining’; some 
expressing immanence or relationship, such as ‘Loving’, ‘Transforming’, ‘All-embracing’ and 
‘Open-hearted’; and a few indicating more definite involvement, such as ‘Rescuer, Liberator’ 
and ‘Saving, healing and liberating’. Others ascribe particular attributes to God, such as 
‘Disturber of false peace and uneasy truce’. Others seemingly refer to Christ, such as ‘Breather 
of the Air’, ‘Lion of wrath’ and ‘Wounded, glorified Healer’, but then prove probably not to be 
doing so when Jesus is explicitly mentioned later, so might reflect process theology. Cotter’s 
collects, following the abstract ‘Presence’, usually revert to more picturesque or 
anthropomorphic language as they proceed. An earlier set of collects by Janet Morley, 
previously Anglican, includes some explicitly feminist prayers, e.g., addressing God on 
Mothering Sunday as ‘God our mother’, and a version of a psalm beginning ‘I will praise God, 
my Beloved, for she is altogether lovely’.59 
11.5 Some exemplar approaches to informal theology 
a.  David Tacey 
David Tacey (an Australian psychologist) charts a revolution in spirituality for many young 
people, who believe that ‘Within the true self God is to be discovered and engaged’,60 
indicating a subjectivism that, while familiar to mysticism, is foreign to much objectivist 
theology and conventional self-repression.61  Tacey quotes Maitland as having ‘no problem 
about the existence of God’, but as having ‘a problem with much of the language that is used 
about God’. This accords with Tacey’s view that the notion of God, without the image that was 
toppled by science, is becoming acceptable within postmodernity, ‘because it is an archetypal 
idea, and such ideas are eternal and enormously valuable’.  The God of tradition, he says, is 
dead, being associated with humanly-invented objectivity, unattainable moral perfection and 
‘a persecutory superego’.  Former sacred images always need renewal; while images (to which 
he probably has a univocal outlook) must die, ‘the holy is always above and beyond our formal 
categories, and no matter how familiar we seek to make God we have never succeeded in 
capturing God’.62  Tacey is firmly on the side of theological immanentism and panentheism, 
rather than of supernaturalism and interventionism: 
                                                 
59 Morley, Janet, All Desires Known, expanded edition, London, SPCK, 1992, pp. 9 and 91; 
Perham explained, conversation, that one collect was used in Common Worship as Trinity 3 
Post-Communion Collect. 
60 Tacey, Spirituality Revolution, p. 82. 
61 Tacey, Spirituality Revolution, p. 83. 
62 Tacey, Spirituality Revolution, pp. 82, 83, 160, 154 (quoting Maitland, Sara, A big-Enough 
God, London, Mowbray, 1995, p. 15), 155-56, 162. 
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This is not to say that spirituality’s God is not transcendent and sublime, but that this 
transcendence is imagined differently, not through miracles and magic, but through 
the radical presence of divine being. God is not conceived as an extrinsic or outside 
super-reality, but as a mystery at the core of ordinary reality.63 
Tacey envisages God as ‘as a circle whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is 
nowhere’.  He maintains tradition with: ‘God is radically present with us and closer even than 
our own breath’.64  
b. Terry Pratchett, Richard Harries and Margaret Kane 
Pratchett may be partly right that ‘the majority of people in this country use the term God as a 
marker for our inborn sense of awe at the majesty and apparent order of the Universe . . . 
includ[ing] a number of scientists’.65 Harries describes how a popular view of God as unfeeling 
despot and ‘male boss’, prompts some to reject formal religion in favour of their own 
spirituality.66 Kane found informal theodicy in north-east England, in a common belief that 
‘God was either powerless or immoral in allowing things to go on as they were’; thus,  neither 
‘a remote, all powerful, impassive God’ nor ‘a soft indulgent God who takes no account of 
injustice’ would suffice, but only ‘a God who suffers in the sufferings of humanity’.  Some 
images of God, which should recapture previous experience of God, rather than attempting 
definition, no longer resonate, others amount to idols if they are taken as actual descriptions, 
and some are, ‘wrong’, in that, like ‘husbandman’ and ‘vinedresser’ they relate to an agrarian 
society, with even ‘Lord’, ‘Master’, ‘King’, and ‘Father’ tending to perpetuate outdated 
attitudes in an urban/industrial society. However, the new models Kane proposes, such as 
wind and fire, are hardly new.67  
Other unconventional images of God have already been noted, as by Clark-King: an old man, a 
comforting armchair, a welcoming mother-in-law, colour and light.68   
c. Tania ap Siȏn 
A good test of some informal theology might be the anonymous prayer requests, uncluttered 
by research intervention, at a cathedral. ap Siȏn analysed 1156 prayer requests left at Bangor 
Cathedral between 2005 and 2009. Her first categorisation reveals nine views of God’s activity 
                                                 
63 Tacey, Spirituality Revolution, p. 164. 
64 Tacey, Spirituality Revolution, p. 165. 
65 Pratchett, Sir Terry, Letter to Editor, Times, 4th September 2010, p. 23. 
66 Harries, Richard, God Outside the Box: Why spiritual people object to Christianity, London, 
SPCK, 2002, pp. 3-6, 10. 
67 Kane, What Kind of God, pp. 8, 39, 21, 118-21, 128-29. 
68 Clark-King, Theology by Heart, pp. 63-68, 77, 81, 127. 
195 
 
in the world, as ‘gift-bestower, confidant/e, intervener, protector, intermediary, revealer, 
strength-giver, helper (general) and comforter’, with the order here representing the greater 
incidence to lesser.  ‘Gift-bestower’ refers to gifts such as love and peace; ‘confidant/e’ to 
active unburdening to God; ‘intervener’ implies miraculous intervention (though sometimes 
qualified by references to God’s will); ‘protector’ refers to matters such as sickness and 
danger; ‘intermediary’ to God’s potential role in human relations; and ‘revealer’ to 
understanding and guidance69. ap Siȏn concludes that this illustrates belief in a God ‘actively 
involved in human concerns’70 at an individual and global level, particularly when human 
control of a situation is limited. For comparison with those surveyed for this thesis, her survey 
needs treating with some caution, since the nature of the background faith of those leaving 
prayers is not demonstrable. 
d.  Francis Spufford 
The novelist Spufford’s informal theology includes an account of God’s apparent absence in 
not intervening in response to emergency prayers.71  Then he describes an incidence of 
discovery of God as he meditates in a church:  
I feel what I feel when there’s someone beside me. I am being looked at . . . known . . . 
seen from inside, but without any of my own illusions . . . seen from behind, beneath, 
beyond . . . . On one level I can feel that this is absolutely safe. A parent’s safe hold is 
nothing compared to this. I’m being carried on the universe’s shoulder. But on another 
level, it’s terrifying . . . . This is utterly exposed.72 
He acknowledges a likely physical basis of his experiences, but grasps the possibility of dual 
explanations of the same events: ‘These explanations . . . of how my feelings might have arisen 
. . . don’t explain my feelings away [or] that there was nobody there for me to be feeling them 
about’.73 
It’s elusive and it’s a foundation. It’s a wisp of a presence, as deniable as vapour, which 
you feel is holding the house up.   It’s a presence which may well not be there, but 
which can draw out of you, when you feel it, a trust that is the thing that precedes all 
things, us included; that it is first, and last and largest and lowest; that it exists without 
                                                 
69 Remainder not discussed. 
70 ap Siȏn, Tania, ‘Ordinary Prayer and the Activity of God: Reading a Cathedral Prayer Board’, 
Astley and Francis Exploring Ordinary Theology, pp. 147-55. 
71 Spufford, Francis, Unapologetic: Why, Despite Everything, Christianity Still Makes Surprising 
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terms and conditions. That you can come to it in need and know what you’re forgiven. 
That it shines.74 
Despite these shades of Tillich’s existentialism and Schleiermacher’s experientialism, this is not 
subjectivist: Spufford is adamant that God is not a puppet for manipulation or projection of 
messages, expectations or (like polytheism) superhuman attributes. In company with most 
theologians, Spufford insists that God will not be ‘fixed, bounded, tied down’ or ‘stay within 
the limits of . . . your imagining’, but is always exceeding expectations. Conversely, God is ‘God 
of everything’, everything with whatever degree, humanly viewed, of goodness or badness, 
beauty, utility and desirability; and omnipresent in time and space, even in the acute suffering 
of humanity.  Here Spufford is immanentist, since ‘Power is not exercised from the top of any 
hierarchy. It does not radiate from any local point within the universe . . . . It works entirely 
through presence’. Being unrivalrous, God’s power is unlike any human kingly semblance, and 
one can never ‘be humiliated by Him (Her, It) . . . He is as common as the air. He is the ordinary 
ground. And yet a presence. And yet a person’. But later, as Spufford grapples with theodicy, 
the approach becomes more deist and reminiscent of Wiles: God doesn’t intervene to avert 
calamity; ‘He’s pretty damn remote, withdrawn from the whole thing as a condition of existing 
at all – He still bears a maker’s responsibility for what goes on inside [the cosmos]’. Although 
God’s love ‘need not be exhausted by the human definition of love . . . it must not contradict it 
either, if He is to be worth worshipping.’75 
e. Contextual Bible Study 
Contextual Bible Study’s roots are in African and American practice, particularly as 
promulgated by the South African theologian, Gerald West, who describes Bible study within a 
particular (black South African) culture. Contextual Bible study ‘takes place within the 
framework of liberation hermeneutics’, and includes: starting from ‘the experienced reality of 
the organized poor and marginalized, their language, categories, concepts, needs, questions, 
interests and resources’; ‘read[ing] the Bible communally . . . [with] power relations . . . 
acknowledged and equalized as far as possible; using  scholarship and local critical resources; 
and commitment to social transformation’. However, West reports, ‘The biblical and 
theological resources for those struggling with the God of life against the forces of death were 
not always apparent’.76 
                                                 
74 Spufford, Unapologetic, p. 73. 
75 Spufford, Unapologetic, pp. 76, 79  77-78 , 81-83, 85-86, 90-91, 88, 97.    
76 West, Gerald O., The Academy of the Poor: Towards a Dialogical Reading of the Bible, 
Sheffield, Sheffield Academic, 1999, pp. 25-26, 35. 
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West describes a process of dialogue between questioning believers and local biblical scholars 
that resulted in contextual Bible study, and then to a scholarly consideration of the political-
philosophical tensions underlying this kind of work. Referring to ‘the various postmodernisms 
and poststructuralisms within biblical studies’, and their usefulness in ‘encourag[ing] . . . 
critical attitudes towards all philosophical traditions’, West views postmodernism as a way in 
which biblical scholars can be allowed ‘to abandon their quest for the certainty of the “the 
right” reading in favour of the more human concern for useful readings and resources’.77  
However, he does not consider appropriate or inappropriate understandings of God for 
particular cultural settings, in the way that liberation theology has done. 
Green’s immanentist trend, noted above, includes a rabbinic story about a traveller from 
village to village asking where he could find God, but constantly dissatisfied with conventional 
answers. He discovered, however, that sometimes he had met God, and ‘he knew that God 
was within himself and within other people’. Green concludes that God is to be found ‘where 
you are’, ‘in servanthood’, ‘at the edges’, ‘in the issues’, ‘in repentance’ and ‘in the ordinary’.78 
Green refers to the apophatic approach, and to analogy, symbolism, poetry, symbol and 
myth.79 Generally, his approach is intensely pastoral, addressing the needs of those wishing to 
find or deepen faith through contextual Bible study, God becoming available existentially 
through situations and relationships. However, a consequence is that anyone without the kind 
of experience represented by his story, or any other relevant experience, may be left bereft of 
God. 
The background is Green’s inner-city parish work and training of clergy, where basic questions 
were raised as ‘What is the nature of theology? . . . Why has theology become the preserve of 
specialists?’ He speaks of the importance of ‘theology from the roots up, which actually 
derives from the context in which it is set and incarnated, and which is discovered and mined 
out by those already experiencing the full subtleties of that context’.80  Green recognises the 
invaluable importance of informal theology, when he says, referring to groups drawn together 
from churches for contextual Bible study: 
 It is to be hoped that group members will be trying to express the values that they 
hold dear, and this will all help uncover something of the innate theology [which he 
probably does not mean literally] with which they have come to the group. For 
although few, if any, will call themselves ‘theologians’ as yet, they will all be carriers of 
an implicit theology by which they already operate their faith in the daily routes of life.  
                                                 
77 West, Academy of the Poor, pp. 57-58. 
78 Green, Let’s Do Theology, pp. 159-65. 
79 Green, Let’s Do Theology, p. 182. 
80 Green, Let’s Do Theology, pp. vii, ix. 
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Even members who would not normally call themselves Christians may find that they 
are imbued with some sort of ‘popular faith’ or ‘folk religion’, which is their attempt to 
express something about God which they feel, but perhaps have great difficulty in 
articulating and defining.81 
Green recognises the considerable ‘gap of language, or culture, of expectation and perception’ 
between biblical and present cultures, making for difficulty in ‘making sense of what was in the 
minds of those who lived during those early Christian centuries'.  However, taking his example 
involving the social sciences, recognising that ‘God-talk’ is, for many, now dispensable, he 
maintains that only ‘God-talk can work with the raw material which, within his example, the 
social sciences have unearthed ‘to look for the deepest meanings and sense the relationship 
that the transcendent God has with it all’.82 
11.6 Jeff Astley 
Astley is the strongest exponent of ‘ordinary’ theology, with his desire ‘to take seriously the 
beliefs of “non-theologically educated” churchgoers and other Christian believers, and of those 
outside the churches’, which, he says, have not received much academic attention, even from 
practical theologians.  ‘Ordinary theology’ denotes ‘the theological beliefs and processes of 
believing that find expression in the God-talk of those believers who have received no 
scholarly theological education’. 83 It is what this thesis, with Williams, calls ‘informal theology’. 
Astley’s starting point for authentic belief is subjectivist rather than revelatory: 
We have to accept that what we value determines which of the concepts of God on 
offer we are willing to adopt, which sort of God we will regard as ‘worthy of worship’. . 
.  For . . . [a] God to be my God, I would have to recognize in the narrative a character 
of supreme worth.84 
This resembles Graham Shaw’s emphasis on our responsibility for our concepts of God: ‘The 
only reality of God lies in the use of that word by human beings’.85 Astley writes that informal 
theology may ‘work’ for those who own it, and even be, for them, ‘salvific – healing, saving, 
making them whole . . . help[ing] people spiritually and religiously’; but ‘not . . . every part of 
the unsystematic bricolage that makes up most Christians’ ordinary theology works in this 
way’; and even some, though apparently helpful, may get in the way of a spiritual life and 
                                                 
81 Green, Let’s Do Theology, p. 45. 
82 Green, Let’s Do Theology, pp. 80-81. 
83 Astley, Ordinary Theology, pp. viii, 1; cf. p. 56. 
84 Astley, Ordinary Theology, p. 44. 
85 Shaw, Graham, God in Our Hands, London, SCM, 1987, p. ix (quoting Shaw, Graham, The Cost 
of Authority, London, SCM, 1983, p. 282). 
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finding meaning. So Astley suggests that the whole of someone’s belief system must be salvific 
if it is to continue to be held.86  
Astley explores whether informal belief can be ‘too concrete and anthropomorphic’, rather 
than abstract.  He records James Fowler’s findings of the proportion – albeit small – of adults 
still at a concrete stage of ‘Mythic-Literal Faith’, and surmises that ‘many other adults will 
regularly utilize concrete thinking in their theology, although developmentally they are able to 
operate at a more sophisticated level’.87 Astley believes that: 
it is more important that Christians endorse the personal metaphors, analogies and 
narratives that are employed by the Christian tradition to render the ‘moral’ and 
‘personal’ character of God, than that their non-literal or mythic status be appreciated. 
To affirm that God is human – or even male – is certainly to make a theological 
mistake; but it is not as big a mistake as denying that God is in any sense a ‘father’ 
(creator, provided, carer, guide) to us.88 
This may be so.  But the researcher’s pastoral observation is that many who are sceptical 
about Christianity are reacting to concretistic views of theological doctrine beyond which their 
capability for abstract thinking, demonstrated in other parts of intellectual life, indicates they 
could move. This is confirmed by the experience of those, including one of the interviewees for 
this thesis, who found relief in reading Honest to God. For that reason, it is reasonable to infer 
that Christians should grasp the importance and nature of analogy. Astley highlights the 
disabling effect of refusing ‘to apply any analogies or metaphors to the deity, particularly when 
speaking of the character of God . . . . That way total agnosticism lies.’89 He offers an exercise 
in such practical theology, an example of how intelligent believers can begin to bridge the gap 
between ordinary and academic theology, a study tool for individuals and groups who have 
undergone basic courses in Christianity and want to explore theological concepts like 
metaphor, model and myth, analogy, truth and mystery.90  
Ordinary theology reflects personal spiritual experiences, which, like ripples on a pond, 
gradually . . . affect the surface at the edges, namely . . .  academic theology. Ordinary and 
                                                 
86 Astley, ‘The Analysis, Investigation and Application of Ordinary Theology’, pp. 1-3. 
87 Astley, Ordinary Theology, pp. 129-32 (citing Fowler, James W., Stages of Faith: The 
Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning, San Francisco, Harper & Row, 
1981, p. 318). 
88 Astley, Ordinary Theology, p. 129. 
89 Astley, Ordinary Theology, p. 130. 
90Astley, Exploring God-talk: Using Language in Religion, pp. 18, 40. 
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academic theology should be viewed as a ‘continuous spectrum, the extremes of which are 
more easy to distinguish than are the intermediate (or “mixed”) forms’.91 
I hold that the difference between ordinary and academic theology is only a matter of 
degree – no pun intended.  Even academics normally begin by doing theology in an 
ordinary way, and this ordinary theology often continues to underlie their more 
academic theological expressions.  And, historically speaking, the academic mode of 
theology owes much of its origin to – and develops alongside – this less conceptual, 
technical or systematic form of theology, which begins as a ‘cognitive disposition and 
orientation of the soul’ that represents the ‘wisdom proper to the life of the believer’ 
and becomes a personal, autobiographical and aphoristic ‘irregular dogmatics’.92 
Conversation between the two is, he writes, ‘essential for the full critical development of 
theology’, and ‘crucial to those whose cognitive and spiritual make-up means that they really 
want or need this sort of conversation with academic theology’.93  
Astley has not covered the ground envisaged for this thesis, not having sought individual views 
of God or of how individuals’ concepts have changed during their lifetimes. Nor has Astley 
compared those shifts of view with the shifts in professional theology over the same period, to 
discover what degree of correspondence there has been. 
11.7 Theology as Poetry or Drama 
Sophistication of theological language has less importance if the whole Christian presentation 
of God is a ‘poetic’ presentation of the indefinable. Ford comes close to this position, 
approving of von Balthasar’s notion of the ‘theodrama’, as has been described in the ‘Pastoral 
Theology’ chapter. This brings von Balthasar close to the possibility of the whole Christian 
presentation of God as a dramatic art-form. Jane Garnett and her colleagues also come close 
when they explore the concept for Christianity of ‘performance’, in the sense of drama or 
liturgy.  The term ‘performance’ can easily lead in unhelpful directions modelled on plays or 
concerts, such as that of repetition or linguistic effort, or be narrowed to refer to human 
activity, liturgy or leading worship.94 But Stanley Hauerwas captures the fuller essence with: 
This is a deep misunderstanding about how Christianity works. Of course we believe 
that God is God and we are not and that God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit but that this 
                                                 
91 Astley, Ordinary Theology, pp. 86-87. 
92 Astley, ‘The Analysis, Investigation and Application of Ordinary Theology’, p. 1 (quoting 
Farley, Edward, Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education, 
Philadelphia, Fortress, 1983, p. 35; Farley, Edward, The Fragility of Knowledge: Theological 
Education in the Church and the University, Philadelphia, Fortress, 1988, p. 88; Barth, Karl, 
Church Dogmatics, 1/1, Edinburgh, T&TC, 1975, pp. 277-78). 
93 Astley, Jeff, ‘Ordinary Theology and the Learning Conversation with Academic Theology’, 
Astley and Francis, Exploring Ordinary Theology, p. 47. 
94 Garnett et al., eds., Redefining Christian Britain, pp. 75-76. 
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is not a set of propositions — but is rather embedded in a community of practices that 
make those beliefs themselves work and give us a community by which we are shaped. 
Religious belief is not just some kind of primitive metaphysics, but in fact it is a 
performance just like you’d perform Lear. What people think Christianity is, is that it’s 
like the text of Lear, rather than the actual production of Lear. It has to be performed 
for you to understand what Lear is — a drama. You can read it, but unfortunately 
Christians so often want to make Christianity a text rather than a performance.95 
So, although Christianity can be represented in drama or liturgy, what is being addressed is the 
concept of Christianity as a whole being, figuratively, a drama or dramatic ‘world’ or ‘system’, 
into which people can step to find God, without needing commitment to any degree of realism 
or myth. The concept can be seen as supported by Wright’s view of metaphors as ‘mini-stories, 
inviting the hearers into a world where certain things can be seen more clearly through this 
lens’; or ‘ways in which . . . words in relation to the creator and redeemer God can be truly 
spoken’.96 
The concept is illustrated by a 2009 BBC television series of advertisements for Radio 3, in 
which people in the street encountered glorious music when they entered a circle on the 
pavement with the words ‘Please Step In – BBC Radio 3’, the music ceasing when they moved 
away. So people could encounter a whole new world by accidentally or voluntarily stepping 
into the circle, but resume more prosaic, alternative outlooks when moving away. The 
catchphrase in each advertisement was ‘Step into our world’.97  The circle does not represent 
the Church, but rather the whole Christian theological enterprise, with the latter not a 
Platonist Narnia entered and exit-ed through a secret door,98 but rather a mental and spiritual 
construct in which we can participate by our ‘presence’.  Like all images, it is an incomplete 
description – human beings do not move neatly from one ‘world’ to another and back again, 
and whatever ‘worlds we inhabit’ constantly overlap. However, the image might bridge some 
of the differences that characterise the Church as a human-inhabited institution. Unlike the 
theatre, there is no audience: all are players. Despite the risk of accentuating any sense of 
superiority at the two ends of the spectrum, the model has the potential to draw together into 
one worshipping community all Christians, wherever they stand on the spectrum of realism,99 
                                                 
95 Hauerwas, Stanley, Bonhoeffer: The Truthful Witness, 
http://www.homileticsonline.com/subscriber/interviews/hauerwas.asp, downloaded 
30.01.2013; partly quoted by Garnett et al., eds., Redefining Christian Britain, p. 74. 
96 Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, p. 135. 
97 BBC television advertisement for Radio 3, Red Bee Media, 2009, sample at 
http://www.campaignlive.co.uk/thework/897977/, downloaded 04.02.2013. 
98 Lewis, Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe. 
99 Including non-realists like Hart, who, like his mentor, Cupitt, accepts, the usefulness of 
worship (even creeds) for non-realists, with liturgy and ritual ‘our attempt to gather together 
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whether or not they believe that ‘God’ refers, whether their inclinations are subjectivist or 
objectivist, and whether their theology is informal or academic.  
The Australian poet, Les Murray, also comes close to a similar interpretation with: 
Religions are poems. They concert 
our daylight and dreaming mind, our 
emotions, instinct, breath and native gesture 
into the only whole thinking . . . 
and God is the poetry caught in any religion, 
caught, not imprisoned. Caught as in a mirror 
that he attracted, being in the world as poetry 
is in the poem, a law against its closure.  
. . . . 100 
Spufford seems to sense this when he recounts his experience of discovering joy and 
unhappiness, guilt and mercy in Mozart’s Clarinet Concerto, which, he says, ‘is not some wishy-
washy metaphor for an idea I believe in, [but] the thing itself. My belief is made up of, built up 
from, sustained by, emotions like that. That’s what makes it real’. It was not, he continues, that 
a deity micro-manages the universe to the extent of providing ‘a timely rendition of the 
Clarinet Concerto’, but that Mozart ‘had succeeded in creating a beautiful and accurate report 
of an aspect of reality’.101 
11.8 Summary 
Mark Oakley records Voltaire as having commented that ‘God made man in his own image and 
man returned the compliment’.  Oakley’s response is likely to be representative of that of 
many when he adds: ‘I could see now [in the face of another’s suffering and death] how I had 
crafted God just as I wanted him, but he was not big enough to contain the experiences I had 
never felt before’.102  Thus he emphasises both the inevitability of all human understanding of 
God within informal theology being influenced to some extent by earthly experiences, for 
instance of parenting, but also the need for that understanding to develop – often widen – in 
response to further experiences, including suffering. 
                                                                                                                                               
with our chosen community of spiritual “soul friends” and give expression together in symbolic 
form to our deepest spiritual yearnings’, Hart, Faith in Doubt, pp. 69-70, 77-78, 87. 
100 Murray, Les, ‘Poetry And Religion’, http://www.poemhunter.com/poem/poetry-and-
religion/, downloaded 03.02.2013 (italics added); partly quoted by Oakley, Mark, Sunday 
Worship, Radio 4, 03.02.2013, www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01qdr2f, downloaded 
03.02.2013. 
101 Spufford, Unapologetic, pp. 15-17, 19. 
102 Oakley, Collage of God, pp. xiv. 
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Among the writers surveyed here, there is commitment by theory or actual practice to the 
validity and value of informal theology, most graphically in Spufford’s extraordinary, 
unsystematic and sometimes contradictory, but moving and colloquial, account of Christianity. 
Williams’s advocacy of humility in theology extends to a willingness to listen, without relying 
totally on ecclesiastical tradition or authority. 
Sociologists have traced a shift in popular understanding of God, at least on the part of some 
believers, since 1945, moving from images relating to earthly monarchy and formality in the 
direction of some reflecting immanence and inclusivity.  The current decline in church 
membership, with a greater sense of the church as an identifiable community, could have 
propelled Christian images of God in an exclusivist direction, such as sometimes arises with 
sects. However, the sexuality debates may well push the images further in an inclusivist 
direction. Spufford gives voice to an increasing awareness – encouraged by modern scientific 
awareness – that God is unlikely to be interventionist, but is immanent to the point of 
identification with and involvement in the world, including its suffering.  
In any attempted analysis of hymns and prayers in church use, it would be impossible to 
remove the influence of hymnody and liturgy compilers and choosers, most of whom would 
not be ordinary theologians.  This thesis has therefore relied on interviews to produce hymn 
and prayer-related references, and on analysing the extent to which modern language in 
worship has hindered or enhanced a sense of God’s presence.  Clues have been sought as to 
whether images from worship have been formative or reflective of believers’ informal 
theology. It is likely that late twentieth and twenty-first century Anglicans have been 
unconsciously influenced by the changes that have occurred, including the movement from the 
1662 Book of Common Prayer through to the 2000 Common Worship, the recovery of the 
centrality of the Eucharist in many churches and the growth of much informal worship and 
music. Most notable in respect of the Eucharist is a shift of emphasis from God’s 
transcendence and human unworthiness in The Book of Common Prayer to God’s immanence 
and human self-sufficiency symbolised by nave altars, westward facing priests, less penitential 
material, the use of ‘you’ and ‘your’ and, more recently, a preference for sitting for much 
prayer instead of kneeling103 or standing. 
Throughout, one theme is prominent in informal theology, as it is in the experience of the 
practical theology respondents for this thesis, that of God as ‘Presence’. Experience, on this 
basis, counts more than abstraction in informal theology, as ‘lived’ theology. ‘Presence’ was a 
                                                 
103 Rowell, Geoffrey, ‘There’s nothing wrong in kneeling before a loving God’, Times, 31st July 
2004, p. 45, where kneeling for penitence, supplication and adoration is commended. 
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frequent form of abstract description of God on the part of the respondents, thus turning 





Chapter 12: QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEWS 
12.1 Introduction 
The informal theology described or invoked by writers surveyed in the previous chapter is now 
complemented by an account of practical theology. 
An initial sample of 31 people completed questionnaires and were interviewed by the 
researcher, with one further questionnaire included, although returned late. The sample was 
recruited by some parish clergy following the researcher’s presentation to the Winchester 
Deanery Chapter, and by an item in a circular email from Winchester Cathedral to those, not 
just from the immediate Cathedral community, who had requested emails on ‘Education and 
Spirituality’ topics.  So there was a considerable degree of self-selection by those who 
participated. All attended Winchester Anglican churches, although some also attended 
elsewhere: the six 18-35 year old undergraduate students and army recruits also attended 
home churches;1 some attended more than one Winchester church; and a number of 
Cathedral attenders sometimes attended churches in the Hampshire villages of their 
residence, so that there was some rural Anglican representation. While roughly balanced in 
gender, the sample is not fully representative of the over-18 UK population by age, location, 
educational attainment, race, social class or affluence. Despite particular efforts, it was not 
possible to recruit anyone of a non-white background. The sample did include a few people 
the researcher assessed as being from less affluent backgrounds. However, the process was 
what Pete Ward calls an ‘attempt to discover an authentic voice [or voices] rather than a 
representative or reliable sample’, to ‘capture the authentic voice of the participant . . .’.2 
The process followed that set out in the ‘Methodology’ chapter. All those interviewed 
received, completed and returned questionnaires, with arrangements then being made for 
individual interviews to be held, most in respondents’ homes, some on church or Cathedral 
premises, and two in the researcher’s home.  No respondent accepted the alternative of a 
focus group or group interview. All but two interviews were recorded, with transcripts then 
being available for analysis; the researcher made brief notes throughout all interviews. The 
interviews were semi-structured, in that the researcher had a list of topics to be covered, but 
opened each interview by reference to some item or items in the respondent’s questionnaire, 
with the order of proceeding varying but with most topics covered in all interviews.  Most 
respondents expressed appreciation of the process, with a significant proportion indicating 
                                                 
1 3 Church of England, I Methodist, I Baptist, 1 Evangelical 
2 Ward, ed., Perspectives on Ecclesiology and Ethnography, p. 8. 
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afterwards that their thinking had developed through the process, and some requesting a 
follow-up study course. 
The format of the questionnaire is in Appendix 3, and the researcher’s list of interview topics 
in Appendix 4. 
12.2 Quantitive Analysis of Questionnaires 
All questions were open, with narrative answers sought, the categories below being largely 
derived from the responses during analysis. 
Of the 32 respondents:  
GENDER Male 13 
 Female 19 
 
AGES 18-35 6 
 36-45 2 
 46-55 2 
 56-65 10 
 66+ 12 
 
EDUCATION (highest) O Level/GCSE 2 
 A Level 4 
 Diploma3 8 
 First degree 9 




                                                 










 Army 2 
 Artistic 1 





 St Paul’s 3 
 University 1 
 Christ Church 1 
 University and Christ 
Church 
1 
 University and 
Cathedral 
1 
 University, Christ 
Church and Cathedral 
1 
 St Mark’s and 
Cathedral 
1 
 All Saints’ 1 
 Holy Trinity 3 
 St John’s 1 
 John Moore Barracks 2 
 St Bartholomew’s 1 




                                                 
4
 Following higher education and training 
5
 Summary of each church’s self-description in Appendix 5. 
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a. Questions about encountering God 
On average, apart from prayers and services, how many times a day do you think of God? 
1-5 times 17 
6-10 times 2 
10+ times 5 
Indefinite answer 6 
No answer  2 
 
On average, how often do you pray each week, at church, at home, or elsewhere? 
1-6 times 10 
7-14 times  12 
15+ times   6 
 Frequently  2 
 No answer  2 
 
Do you associate God with any particular earthly places, or not? 
Yes  25 
No  5 










If you do, what place or places do you associate God with?6 
Churches and holy 
sites 
22 
Countryside, etc. 19 
People 4 
Everywhere 3 
Solitary places 2 
‘Thin’ places 2 
Garden 2 
Starry nights 1 
Home  1 
Spiritual books 1 
 
b. Questions about how you envisage God 











                                                 
6








Force, power 1 
Anchor for thoughts 1 
Amorphous cloud in 
sky 
1 
         




Male with female 
aspects 
3 
Both/both & neither 4 
Unsure 1 
    
If you don’t think of God as female or male or both, how do you think of God? 
16 answered, with other abstract descriptions, e.g., immanence, presence, life 
essence, protection, controlling intelligence, human shape but not recognisable as 
human. 
Do you think of God as vast, tiny, both or neither? 
Vast 20 
Both 4 
Both & neither 1 
Neither 7 
                                                 




     
Where do you think God is? 
Everywhere 16 
Beyond and within 6 




Everywhere and ‘thin’ 
places 
1 
High in the sky 1 
High in heaven 1 





Which, if any of these, best describes God’s location: up there, down there, out there or in 
here?  Or none of these?  If none of these, can you suggest an alternative? 
Out there and in here 10 
Everywhere 10 




Up there 4 
None of these 2 
In human hearts 1 
In infinity 1 
 






Did God create the world?  If so, how? 
Yes, by big bang &/or 
evolution 
13 
Yes, unclear how 13 





   






Do you think God needs us? 
No 13 
Yes 11 
God wants us 1 
Unsure 6 
 
















Not literally 1 
No 1 
   
Does God speak to human beings or not? 




a variety of means 
2 
No 2 
Unsure   2 
  
c. Anything else you would like to say 
There were 13 various expressions of faith and comments about prayer, the problem of evil 
and the difficulty of saying anything about God. Relevant comments are generally subsumed 
into the overall account, below, but a few particular ones are: 
We’re hitting some deep theology here . . . ours is a faith of paradoxes . . . I have to try 
as best I can to understand intellectually my experience of God. But I know I’ll never 
make it (and there are times when the poets and songwriters will speak to me more 
deeply than the theologians). 
I think I think that we can’t put labels on God. We don’t have the vocabulary, 
understanding or anything. I am not trying to make him remote, I don’t think He is. . . . 
But we want to confine him within our own limited understanding – and I don’t think 
we can – or even should. 
I believe that some of the traditional attributes of God conflict. E.g. I struggle to 
comprehend how an omnibenevolent God can be omnipotent and omniscient at the 
same time in [the] light of the problem of evil. 
My ideas of God are very unformulated.  Because he is infinite, vast, a mystery, I think 
they have to be but I also wonder whether I am a little lazy. 
I’m sorry my answers are so vague and not much help, but we’re so small and the idea 





12.3 Commentary on the analysis of the questionnaires 
More respondents held ‘evangelical’ theological views than those associated with (Evangelical) 
Christ Church, and more held ‘Catholic’ views than those associated with (Anglo-Catholic) Holy 
Trinity: there was considerable breadth of view on the part of many participants. The 
researcher had no preconceptions about relationships between personal factors and 
theological responses, but was interested to discover any that existed. However, it has not 
been possible to detect any relationship at all between the backgrounds of respondents and 
their responses, age, education, work or even tradition of church attended, or in terms of 
respondents’ daily thinking of God or weekly prayer patterns. The only exception to this 
related to gender, about which comment is offered below. The incidence of more picturesque 
views of God, for instance, is not associated with levels of education, and understandings of 
God’s creation of the world are not associated with any particular age groups.  
There was a high incidence of association of God with earthly places, particularly with general 
and specific ecclesiastical and natural locations.  A majority had no mental image of God, with 
a clear majority of that majority offering an abstract portrayal, such as: ‘Pure beauty/love, not 
really in a form as we’d see it here’, and ‘God is universal and transcendent.  He is too great to 
be understood and cannot be visualised. Any description must include omnipotence, music, 
art, beauty and compassion’. Several identified God with light, sometimes very graphically, 
such as one person, for whom ‘He often appears as a bright light, which reappears when I have 
“got the message”’8. However, six offered graphic descriptions of a father-figure, sometimes 
embellished as a kindly, elderly man with a beard. At the time, none identified the images as 
analogical, although, as will be seen, it became clear that at least some were doing so. 
Although none identified God as female, a minority identified God as male, with around half 
preferring God as neither or both, or as male with some female aspects. Predictably, a clear 
majority envisaged God as vast rather than tiny, although a few opted for ‘both’.  A clear 
majority located God as ‘everywhere’, a few implying both transcendence and immanence, 
and a few others offering abstract locations, but with two locating God as ‘in the sky’ or ‘high 
in heaven’. One respondent represented the majority with the response: ‘I’ll settle for “out 
there” and “in here” as ways that transcendence and immanence can make personal sense to 
me.  But . . . “out there” probably comes more naturally’. Half located God as both inside and 
outside nature, although there was no clear correspondence with previous location of God as 
‘everywhere’; roughly equal proportions preferred ‘inside’ or ‘outside’. 
                                                 
8 Another questionnaire example is described, the interviews analysis, below. 
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The question about God’s creating the world elicited some uncertainty: although nearly half 
expressed no difficulty with the idea of God creating by the natural means identified by 
modern physics and biology (and others may have done so if pressed), many others were 
uncertain as to how God had created.   One envisaged God’s creation as a continuing process: 
I fully accept the findings and speculations of modern science and see no difficulty in 
reconciling that with faith in a divine creator.  I don’t have any conception of what that 
creative act is.  I do believe that Creation is happening continuously and is not 
something that took place in the past. 
One denied that God created the world or universe.   
Over God’s relationship with humanity, a high proportion believed God understands our 
problems, one commenting: ‘Yes. He knows our thoughts even before we think them and He 
lived as a human being, how could he not?’ Nearly as high a proportion believed God suffers 
with us (although some, unsurprisingly, identified God’s suffering with Jesus’s). Comments 
included: ‘I believe God suffers when he sees man’s inhumanity to man’ and (from two people) 
‘Yes, as a parent suffers with a child’, with one suggesting that to claim otherwise would be to 
limit God. Similarly, a high proportion stated that God speaks to human beings – by a variety of 
non-vocal means, such as the Bible, prayer, events and other people. A small minority was 
unsure about God’s relationships with humanity, and one denied any relationship as 
represented by these questions. There was uncertainty over the question about God needing 
humanity. Half thought God does (with two amending the criterion to God wanting us), some 
answering: ‘Yes, as God created everything for a purpose . . .’; ‘Yes!! As his hands, ears, voice . . 
.’; and ‘Yes . . . to spread the word of salvation’. Almost as many were clear that God does not 
need us (‘Why should we be special?’); and several were unsure, one commenting: ‘Not in [a] 
sense we may understand.  Or at least not in an emotional sense. He possibly would get bored 
without us!’ Another commented, ‘God does not need us (in the modern sense) but we are 
part of Him’, adding somewhat Gnostically, ‘We all have within us that divine spark which is 
part of God and comes from Him’. 
Points of interest include: 
 the lack of discernible relationship of concepts of God with any of the 
preliminary aspects of the respondents (noting the generally high level of 
educational attainment); 
 considerable abstraction (as, for example, beauty, love, presence, energy or a 
force) in concepts of God on the part of most; 
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 the lack of resonance with locating God ‘up there’ or ‘down there’, etc. (of 
concern in Robinson’s 1960s Honest to God); 
 the degree of support for the semi-panentheistic view of God being in nature, 
with one saying that humans are part of God; 
 the general and easy acceptance of a relationship, visualised along human-to-
human lines, between God and human beings; 
 the degree of support for themes articulated by process theology, particularly 
the concept of God suffering; 
 the degree of support for the concept of God needing humanity (as advanced 
by Williams and Macquarrie); and 
 the support from one person for the concept of God’s continuing creative 
activity (as suggested by Wiles). 
 
12.4 Qualitative Analysis of the Interview Transcripts 
a. Abstract thinking 
In this sample of informal theology, a considerable degree of abstraction was evident, 
particularly in the basic conceiving and describing God, which may reflect the relatively high 
level of education of the sample. Around eight were explicit about the inadequacy of image 
and language to describe God, one speaking of the inappropriateness of words ‘to try to 
describe God . . . outside words . . . not confined in a definition of words’, and several warning 
of the danger of anthropomorphism. Many more implied similarly by offering abstract 
concepts of God, with ‘a Presence’ and ‘everywhere’ (or, in one case, ‘everywhere and 
nowhere’) being frequent descriptors, sometimes accompanied by the word ‘person’, although 
in other cases ‘person’ was resisted as too anthropomorphic. A few described God in terms of 
light, in a clearly figurative sense, with one speaking of ‘energy and light’ in a non-physical 
‘protected realm’; another spoke of ‘partly light as something shining, but also light meaning 
enlightenment’ and, in the questionnaire, had likened God to ‘a half-hidden light that I almost 
glimpse, like a light behind a screen, but if I try to concentrate on it, it disappears’. One 
respondent spoke of imagination being enlarged by the need ‘to get away from the stereotype 
of the man with the white beard . . . in the sky, which is a sort of child’s view’. However, a 
small minority retained a very univocal attachment to concepts and images that others 
accepted as necessarily metaphorical. In particular, a respondent gave in the questionnaire a 
mental picture of ‘a father figure . . . a man in the clouds, with a beard, on a throne . . . 
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surrounded by angels and bright blinding light’; however, at interview, she was more 
measured, clear that ‘we can’t comprehend God’, perhaps indicating that the previous picture 
was presented as a non-literal image. An equally concrete description was given, from a 
contrasting background, by an early retired graduate professional: the questionnaire described 
God as ‘an amorphous cloud high up in the sky containing a creature “God”’; probed at 
interview, the respondent claimed that God was God just of our solar system, with the 
possibility that one day space explorers might find God, described thus: 
My picture and vision of it [sic] is one that possibly has arms and legs . . . and they 
would extend from a body that’s rectangular in shape, so that sort of gives a 
humanlike appearance, and it has a . . . strange head . . . not two eyes and a mouth . . . 
something a bit different from that. 
This person’s distinctive image was accompanied by later implications of a virtually total lack of 
interaction with the respondent or humankind, with only one of the traditional images that 
were explored with most respondents (see below) striking any chord. 
b. Direct experience 
Although direct experience of God was not directly addressed, some respondents recounted 
less or more subtle forms of ‘contact’.  One, for example, described God as ‘source of all 
initiative, source of all ingenuity . . . an influence that’s always with me, always available, 
experienced perhaps’, but also expressed ambivalence as to whether this God could be ‘a 
person’. One respondent described an experience of amazing peace with a warm inner glow 
while ironing and gazing out of a window on a sunny day, with a certainty that this was God; 
although the respondent seemed to discount the natural warmth from the ironing and the 
sunny day, there was a later recognition that ‘we probably all mould God to suit ourselves . . . 
to some degree’. Two others spoke of experiences of unexplained ‘great warmth’ that were 
attributed to God’s presence. Another – the only man to recount an experience of this kind – 
described once feeling that just he and God were present on ‘a calm beach after a storm . . . 
the waves coming up and going back’. Two respondents spoke of ‘thin places’, where the 
boundary between earth and heaven is said to be blurred, and one identified the garden as 
such, where ‘another area of consciousness’ had been experienced; two others spoke or 
particular encounters in Christian healing centres, and one of these of ‘God incidences’, in 
which God was identified with what others might call helpful coincidences in life. Another 
spoke of a vigil experience in a cathedral: ‘I can only say it was me and God in God’s living 
room’. 
c. Theism, deism and concepts 
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As indicated, there was general reserve about attributing personhood to God.  However, three 
went further, explicitly or implicitly indicating deist tendencies. One person: couldn’t conceive 
of God as ‘a person who looks into every single being on earth’; agreed with an unnamed 
philosopher who said that ‘God is like a sort of security blanket, or a big brother . . . who will 
sort things out for us, because we’re frightened’; admitted to preferring transcendence to 
immanence and to being closer to deism (even atheism) than theism; but continued to search 
and attend church regularly. Another shared a tendency, attributed to the modern Church at 
large, of understanding God as non-interventionist, since there is no evidence of intervention, 
but curiously, in the same breath, spoke of God ‘operating’ (i.e., being active). The third, who 
gave the distinctive ‘rectangular’ view of God quoted above, was clear about God as ‘almost 
like an overseer without any physical interaction, mental interaction’. 
In order to explore theism more thoroughly, four traditional descriptors for God were posited 
for responses. When the researcher did not raise a descriptor in earlier interviews, the survey 
sample was in effect reduced by this number for these images. 
i.  Father 
 
   
Of those who found the image helpful: three were concerned to broaden the image to 
include parenting and/or motherhood, and one to emphasise that ‘father’ was real 
enough to be considered more than a metaphor; several explicitly mentioned their own 
good experiences of their fathers, and three their poor experiences (with one 
spontaneously recognising the possibility that the fatherhood of God might have been 
adopted as a compensation: ‘Who knows what goes on deep in our psyche?’).  Positive 
qualities that were mentioned included helpfulness, guiding, unconditional loving and (by 
a young student) allowing self-determination. 
All three of those ambivalent mentioned or implied their own poor experience: two 
referred to ‘distant’ fathers, and one to a father who was always trying to catch the 
respondent out (although the respondent was quick to add that God was not to be 
construed as compensation). This person found her experience of her mother’s 
Not raised by 
interviewer 
2 





outstanding love a better model for God’s love; but some ambiguity remained, with her 
saying ‘So that helps in understanding what the Father’s love is like’, and, in the 
questionnaire, unequivocally describing God as male. 
Five  respondents indicated particular difficulty with the notion of God as Father: one 
because the term is ‘male and patriarchal’; two due to their own poor experience of their 
fathers; and two offering no explanation. 
Although 72.4% of the respondents found the image ‘Father’ helpful, 27.6% did not. On 
the basis of this small sample, experience of poor human fatherhood (on the part of five) 
is more likely to coincide with difficulty or ambivalence (on the part of eight) over the 
image of God as Father than with finding positive compensation in the image. Several saw 
compensation as a theoretical possibility, but only one came even near to acknowledging 
it as a factor in her concept of God: ‘Well, it used to be a terrifying concept. But I suppose 
I’ve learnt over the years to see God as the father I didn’t have, to have the qualities that 
I’ve needed. I don’t see them as wholly male, ironically’. 
 
ii. King 
Not raised by 
interviewer 
0 




Those who found the image helpful sometimes spoke predictably of God’s power, activity 
in creation, authority, control and strength. Those who were ambivalent were concerned 
at the inadequacy of the term, to some extent in the light of human theories and 
experience of monarchy (one ‘not a monarchist’ and one who claimed republican 
tendencies). The reasons why the image was unhelpful varied: one, old fashioned and too 
anthropomorphic; four, too hierarchical (one contrasting Jesus’s humility); two because of 
republican tendencies; and two giving no reason. 
 
With ‘King’, a majority (58%) did not find the image clearly helpful. In a few cases, there 
was mention by the researcher and/or respondents of the chequered history of human 
monarchy (including presidency) and/or of the constitutional nature of the British 
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monarchy. As with ‘Father’, it was historical and modern experience of human monarchy, 
along with other issues of appropriateness, which seems to have caused difficulty for some 
respondents, indicating a tendency on the part of some towards a degree of univocity. 
 
iii. Shepherd 
Not raised by 
interviewer 
13 




Most responses were positive, with attributions of leadership and care, but with a few 
qualifications: the retention of human freewill; not expecting individual attention; the 
image being more applicable to Jesus; and the image being too small. Two gave the 
positive illustrations of being ‘shepherded’ by a Hindu neighbour in a time of depression, 
and of the heroic work of some nomadic Moroccan shepherds. The ambivalent respondent 
and those who found the image unhelpful gave no clear reasons. 
 
On the basis of the sample (discounting those with whom it was not addressed), 
‘shepherd’ was clearly the most favoured of the three images.  This could relate to the fact 
that shepherding was beyond the experience of most respondents, unlike the previous 
images, so without the challenges that experience of shepherding might have evoked in a 
farming environment. 
iv. Great – an adjective, therefore a concept rather than an image 
Not raised by 
interviewer 
5 
Helpful   22, though with some 
reservations 




Clearly more popular than any of the images except ‘Father’, with which it was roughly 
equal in popularity, it proved to have wide interpretation. Five responses referred to great 
size, but two denied that the reference was to size. Those favouring the concept used 
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terms such as ‘powerful’, ‘marvellous’, ‘majestic’, ‘awe-full’, ‘mighty’, ‘worthy’, ‘above 
mortals and our life-span’, ‘cool’ and having ‘omnicity’9.  
 
Several expressed reservation about the adequacy of ‘Great’, with its loose meaning in 
common parlance. Indeed, the reasons why respondents found the concept unhelpful was 
its overuse almost to the point of meaninglessness, and its failure to express God’s 
relationship with the respondent. 
 
From the evidence of the three images, the strong support for ‘Father’ and ‘Shepherd’, 
coupled with significant resistance to ‘King’, suggests a preference for an intimate relationship 
with God, although a few, as instanced above, found it inconceivable that God should be 
interested in the affairs of billions of people. The researcher had unwittingly chosen three 
male images, and regrets not offering a female one, such as that of a mother nurturing her 
young.  The strong support for ‘Great’ suggests recognition of God’s transcendence. What is 
evident is a general conception of God as transcendent, but with whom one can relate.  
Relationship does not of itself imply immanence, although the respondents did show other 
evidence of immanence, particularly the frequent references to ‘Presence’ and ‘Everywhere’, 
and the relating of experiences of God. Two people unwittingly subscribed to panentheism, 
one even possibly pantheism with ‘I believe he is in and is everything, including me’. Some 
unconscious process theology was implicit when one respondent reflected: 
 
I don’t necessarily believe that God is perfect . . . . I think he’s very human, more 
human than we like to admit. . . . There’s many people that believe that God is this 
absolute perfect being . . . he was made that way, he’s always been perfect.   But 
actually I think perfection is something that you earn . . . perfection is something that 
develops. [The respondent draws a parallel with Thomas Edison making many trial 
light bulbs before producing a ‘nearly perfect design’.] . . . I actually think God is quite 
similar, and I think that through creating his creation he’s actually developing himself, 
and therefore . . . will become more knowledgeable, more wise with every step he 
takes. 
 




                                                 




When, without the word usually being used, theodicy was addressed, a universal theme was 
the reality of human freewill accounting for much suffering. A small number attributed even 
‘natural’ disasters to human freewill, on grounds of human ability to avoid or prevent disasters 
oneself or for others, with one respondent particularly insistent on human freewill echoing 
God’s own freewill. Common were sentiments like ‘It’s the way the world is/is made’, ‘The 
world is imperfect’ or ‘life realigning itself’ to explain natural disasters, although no theories 
were offered as to why God had made the world this way.  The idea that God might, out of his 
omnipotence, have decided voluntarily to deny ‘himself’ the power to intervene and allow 
human freewill, when advanced occasionally by the researcher, found no support. However, 
many thought God could intervene but refrained from doing so to avoid compromising human 
freewill, or even in some undefined sense freedom of the world at large, in a non-deterministic 
world. One respondent would ‘much rather have what it is now, rather than some kind of 
sterile environment, where everyone is safe but then doesn’t have their own freewill’. One 
went so far as to attribute natural disasters to the earthly disruption that followed from 
original sin, which ‘broke the world, and so now we have famines, we have droughts, we have 
tsunamis, floods, earthquakes, tornados, any kind of natural disasters, because of ourselves 
breaking the bond between us and God’. 
 
Some linked human suffering with the notion of God suffering with humankind, and many, in 
one case a journalist, with graphic conviction, were clear of God’s presence in the midst of 
episodes of human suffering. There was occasional reference to good emerging from tragic 
situations. The uncertainties and, sometimes, contradictions that prevailed in handling this 
topic only served to confirm the similar struggles of academic theologians with theodicy.  
 
e. Shifts in view 
Each respondent was given an opportunity to recount any shift in understanding of God during 
adult years, mainly in relation to the Church’s changing liturgy and hymnody. The majority did 
not grasp the issue being considered, reported no shift of view or described a shift from 
childhood views.   However, eight were more forthcoming, and had all noticed a shift from 
what amounted to more transcendence to more immanence. One respondent, with some 
theological self-education, had spotted significance in the verbal changes between The Book of 
Common Prayer and Common Worship Eucharistic liturgies and between the eastward and 
westward presidential positions. Two commented on the greater familiarity with God in newer 
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liturgy, one with appreciation of God being at hand to help, the other with regret at 
‘unwelcome mateyness’ from the loss of ‘thee’ and ‘thou’ language. One spoke of God having 
become ‘more personal and more immediate, rather than distant’. One spoke of the guilt-
based relationship of The Book of Common Prayer and the comparative lightness and love of 
replacement liturgy, which nevertheless retained depth. The same person deplored the 
assumed intimacy of some Evangelical worship. One 18-35 person reported a shift from ‘a big 
guy on a throne . . . [to] more of an entity and a spirit that lives in everything and is 
everywhere at once’, and another, older, person a shift from a more abstract understanding to 
one with ‘more substance’ based on art, with newer liturgy emphasising ‘God working through 
God’s people’. 
 
Although most in this sample had not made theological connections with liturgical changes, it 
cannot be assumed that there have been no unconscious effects; indeed, it is difficult to 
believe that there have not been.10  And eight respondents had to some degree or other made 
a connection with a subtle shift from more transcendence to more immanence in liturgy and 
its celebration. Although the matter of changes in hymnody was raised in almost every 
interview and views were expressed in response, no respondent was conscious of any 
significant influence over concepts of God. 
 
f. Conclusions from the Interviews 
 
During interviews, and especially when some respondents indicated awareness of the 
metaphorical nature of much religious language, the researcher sometimes posed the 
possibility that the whole of the Christian ‘presentation’ might be an expressive ‘poetic’ system 
of a picturesque nature, but this found no resonance. A few respondents commented on the 
value of poetry and other artistic media to express ideas about God, and a few expressed 
awareness of the metaphorical nature of some or all images of God and of liturgy.  
 
Some were explicit in their realist assumptions, for example, with ‘Yes . . . there is definitely 
something out there’. Overall, there was a general attachment to theism, although a few 
recognised their tendency towards deism.  Some balance of transcendence and immanence 
characterised most respondents, though with a predominance towards God’s transcendence 
coupled with a supportive relationship with humans.  Among the images that were presented, 
                                                 
10 No research evidence on this matter has been identified. 
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‘King’ stands out as being of only moderate usefulness, with a significant proportion not 
finding it helpful, despite its connotations of transcendence.   Although it is prominent in 
Scripture and Tradition, it may be a metaphor that is ‘dying’, correspondingly with the political 
and social shifts that surviving human monarchies are undergoing. It that proved to be the 
case, there would be massive implications for traditional theology. 
 
12.5 Some conclusions from the whole process 
 
‘It’s a very loose church. . . . we agree on very little. . . . Start talking to our members and you’ll 
find we hold a thousand different views’. So said a fictional Bishop of Southwark.11 Certainly 
this research has uncovered a variety of basic views in Anglican churches of Winchester, but 
also some interesting commonality. Only a few respondents were conscious of their images of 
God having been influenced by liturgical change. Hymns were hardly mentioned with 
reference to God, despite explicit mention by the researcher in most cases, and versions of 
Scripture not at all. 
 
Common features, derived from the questionnaires and interviews together, include a general, 
though not total, preference for abstract terms in describing God, and transcendence on God’s 
part (with transcendence and impassibility probably recognised by those who were ambivalent 
about the notion of God’s needing us).  However, the transcendence was balanced by 
immanence, represented by God’s presence – omnipresence – with human beings.  Although 
transcendence was also complemented by God’s relationships with humans, there was 
considerable reticence about God being a person, with a conscious recognition, at least on the 
part of some, of the metaphorical, nature of all images for God.  The expectation of 
relationship was characterised by a general, though not complete, preference for the images 
of ‘Father’ and ‘Shepherd’, but also by a majority believing that God understands our 
problems, suffers with us and ‘speaks’ to us. Only a minority identified God as distinctly male. 
The majority believed God to have created the world, with the majority of that majority 
understanding creation as having taken place (or, in one case, as continuing) by the means 
described by modern science. 
 
In view of Clark-King’s discovery of the support for a male image of God by a sample of 
working-class women, and Davie’s observations that women concentrate more on ‘the God of 
love, comfort and forgiveness’ and men more on ‘the God of power, planning and control’, 
                                                 
11 Hare, David, Racing Demon, London, F&F, 1990, p.3. 
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some comparative analysis has been carried out on the data from the current questionnaires 
and interviews. Clark-King’s discovery is partially supported by the current analysis, in that 
52.63% of women thought of God as male, compared with 30.77% of men. Combining the 
proportions believing that God understands our problems and the proportions that God 
suffers with us, as indicators of God’s love, 94.74% of women supported these beliefs, 
compared with 73.90% of men. Every woman who viewed God as male also viewed God as 
loving (although most other women did so as well). So, a significantly higher proportion of 
women than men in the sample viewed God as both male and as loving and understanding.  
Measuring the proportions understanding God as powerful, planning and controlling was more 
difficult, and combined three factors: quantitative analysis of ‘whether God created the world’; 
qualitative interview analysis as to whether God as ‘King’ was viewed in this light; and 
qualitative interviews analysis over theodicy and divine intervention. The combined scores 
from these three factors were 57.89% of women and 56.41% of men viewing God as powerful 
and controlling. However, removing the nearly 100% scores for God creating the world by 
some means or other, the scores are reduced to the more realistic levels of 36.84% of women 
and 38.46% of men viewing God as powerful and controlling. However, it should be noted that 
power and control were not strong elements in most participants’ beliefs. No significant 
correspondence has emerged between the various factors analysed to indicate, for instance, 
that men who did not view God as understanding tended to view God as controlling. So, Clark-
King’s and Davie’s observations are roughly, but not dramatically, supported by the present 
research. Using the same factors, it is clear that there is no pattern of correspondence with the 
different age groups of the participants. 
 
The preference for abstract concepts coincides with Village’s finding that literalism in 
interpreting the Bible declined with increasing education, especially theological education, 
except amongst evangelicals.12 Most of the Winchester sample was comparatively well 
educated, and only one participant’s worship was restricted to the church describing itself as 
Evangelical, the others who attended this church also attending others. The evidence suggests 
that this sample of believers have been sufficiently influenced by the prevailing postmodern 
climate to freely express their views, however, in some cases, unusual or divergent. The 
emphases on divine transcendence, immanence and interaction suggest balance on the part of 
most respondents, but with freedom for individualistic expression. There is evidence of 
considerable intellectual and spiritual sophistication on the part of many within this sample of 
                                                 




informal theologians, who showed an overall ability to hold creatively together, in paradoxical 
tension, competing concepts such as immanence and transcendence, person-hood and more 














This concluding section contains just one chapter, in which conclusions are drawn, particularly 
about the relationship between post-1945 academic theology and the informal theology of the 
survey sample of ordinary believers. Some proposals for further research are made, along with 
some recommendations for consideration over the practice of the Church of England.
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Chapter 13: SOME CONCLUSIONS 
 
13.1  Introduction 
The thesis has surveyed different accounts and genres of academic Anglican UK theology, 
including popular theology, since 1945. It has turned to practical theology, taking into its 
purview some sociological studies and the results of an exercise involving questionnaires and 
interviews with a sample of Winchester Church of England members. The Anglican propensity 
towards divergence of views, with a liberal attitude to conformity with councils, creeds and 
doctrine, encourages variety in academic and informal theology. Comparisons will be made 
between academic theology on the one hand and informal theology on the other, particularly 
from the Winchester survey. The reference of words like ‘resonate’ is to the juxtaposing by the 
researcher of concepts or insights from academic theology and informal theology, after the 
pattern outlined by Christopher Rowland and Zoë Bennett with reference to Scripture, 
approached with critical awareness, and practical theology.1 
At least two-thirds of respondents had lived through most of the period under investigation, 
and had therefore been aware, and potentially affected by, the shifts in religious belief and 
behaviour that had taken place since 1945. The 80% of Britons believing in God in 1956 had 
shrunk to 76% in 1975; the 71.82% describing themselves as Christians in 2001 to 59.3% in 
2011, and, most relevantly, the 43% believing in a personal God in the 1940s and 1950s to 30% 
in 2012. However, in 2013, although only 13% of the population believed in a personal God, 
59% believed in a least one spiritual being and 30% in God as a universal life force – figures 
which seem to indicate a spirituality that could be associated with a wider description of God.2 
                                                 
1 Rowland, Christopher and Bennett, Zoë, ‘“Action is the Life of All”: The Bible and Practical 
Theology’, Contact, no. 150, 2006, pp. 8-17. 
2 Bruce, Steve, God is Dead: Secularization in the West, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002, pp. 71-72; 
Sigelman, Lee, ‘Multi-Nation Surveys of Religious Beliefs’, JSSR, Vol. 16, No. 3, Sept. 1977, p. 
290; Office for National Statistics, Focus on Religion, October 2004, 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/search/index.html?newquery=focus+on+religion, leading to 
focusonreligion_tcm77-73363(2).pdf – Adobe Reader, both downloaded 16.01.2013; Office for 
National Statistics, Religion in England and Wales 2011, released 11.12.2012, 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-
england-and-wales/rpt-religion.html, downloaded 19.01.2012; British Religion in Numbers, 
Western European Religion, www.brin.ac.uk/news/2012/western-european-religion/, posted 
16.03.12, downloaded 15.01.2013; YouGov-Cambridge Survey Results, Fieldwork 24th February 
– 6th March 2012, 
http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/6xufjlailj/Eurozone%20Cri
sis%20-%20Cross-Country%20Report_06-Mar-2012_F.pdf, downloaded. 15.01.2013 (‘Personal 
God’ not defined). 
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The context, therefore, for the practical theology within this thesis is a general diminution of 
belief in a personal God, but a persistent sense of God, drawn more widely. Within the context 
of Church of England membership being reduced within the lifetime of most respondents by 
over half between 1950 and 2011,3 it is reasonable to assume that the respondents have an 
increasing sense of their identity as active, rather than nominal, Christians, which would 
explain the candour of the whole sample. For the respondents, ‘speaking of God in public’, or 
at least with the researcher, was not affected by the taboo of not doing so, described by 
Chapman et al.4 Garnett and her colleagues describe ‘the “subjective turn” in religiosity – 
which has postulated a definitive movement from collective, mostly church-based spirituality 
towards privatized, individualized beliefs and personalized practice’, along with demand for 
‘authenticity’ and ‘self-fulfilment’. All this is likely to have impinged on the spirituality and 
practice even of regular church attenders.  So too will have what Garnett et al. call ‘habitual 
religious experiences [which] lodge in the memory of the believer and become available for 
personalization and re-activation as a necessary underpinning for meaningful choice and an 
integrated identity’.5 In other words, for some churchgoers, traditional elements of religion 
can be re-discovered as meeting subjective, individualized needs. 
Fortuitously, the proportions of men and women among the respondents corresponded 
roughly to the proportions of men and women believing in God in 1989. As has been noted, 
particular analysis has been undertaken to relate the proportional tendencies between the 
genders to observations by Clark-King that, in her solely female sample, women preferred a 
male image for God, and by Davie, that women concentrate more on ‘the God of love, comfort 
and forgiveness’ and men more on ‘the God of power, planning and control’. The current 
analysis partially supports Clark-King’s, with a higher proportion of women than of men 
viewing God as male – though with only 52.63% of women nowhere near Clark-King’s 
assessment of ‘predominan[ce]’.6 Davie’s contention is clearly supported by 94.74% of women, 
compared with 73.90% of men, preferring a ‘loving’ image of God, with a higher proportion of 
women than men in the sample viewing God as both male and as loving and understanding.  
However, the analysis does not support Davie’s contention about men preferring an image of 
                                                 
3 Guest, Olson and Wolffe, ‘Christianity: loss of monopoly’, p. 62, with boundaries and 
‘membership’ not fully defined; Archbishops’ Council Research and Statistics, Statistics for 
Mission, London, Archbishops’ Council, 2013, with membership defined by Parochial Electoral 
Rolls. 
4 Chapman, Naguib and Woodhead, ‘God-change’, p. 173. 
5 Garnett et al., eds., Redefining Christian Britain, pp. 21-27. Cf. Bruce, God is Dead, 
throughout; Barley, Lynda, Christian roots, contemporary spirituality, London, Church House, 
2006, pp. 6-7. 
6 Clark-King, Theology by Heart, p. 65. 
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God as powerful, planning and controlling, with scores for both genders similar; and these 
characteristics figured highly for very few respondents. 
13.2 Religious language and culture  
The issue of the meaningfulness or validity of religious language, addressed by Ayer and 
Mitchell, and fundamental for theology, was not raised by any respondents, despite their 
questioning natures. Some of the dialogue of the interviews would have been of limited 
comprehensibility to someone from outside the Church. This accords with Mascall’s, 
Loughlin’s, Lindbeck’s, Thiselton’s and Ford’s emphasis on the importance of the community 
context for understanding theological language, and is comparable with D. Z. Phillips and 
Lindbeck’s more pronounced suggestion, in Loughlin’s account of them, that ‘coming to belief 
in God is not so much a matter of reasoning, as of “learning a language, assimilating a culture, 
entering a textual world . . .”’.7 One respondent, an amateur hymn-writer, keenly valued the 
place of the poetic in hymns, and also recognised the inevitability of paradox in theology, 
matching the thinking of Macquarrie, Wiles and Ward.  He clearly also valued the ‘poetic’ as an 
effective means of communicating what Mascall refers to as ‘the wonder and glory of God [for 
which] we may well find the poets more helpful than the theologians’; this accords with, in 
Ward’s words (with Ford writing similarly), ‘something like the language of poetry’.8 
Nevertheless, the researcher found no resonance, in the instances of proposing the idea, with 
the whole Christian ‘presentation’ being of a ‘poetic’ nature or even a ‘world’ one can enter, as 
expressed by the 1987 Doctrine Commission report and as ‘theodrama’ by Ford.9 
Culture changes occur within society and the Church, and Nineham, Cupitt and Wiles draw 
attention to the potential effect on understanding God, not least across the temporal gap since 
biblical times. Respondents’ views unconsciously reflected this in several ways. Particular 
images for God resonated to different degrees with different people.  Respondents who 
described having grown up in a less than satisfactory family ‘culture’ did not necessarily find 
‘Father’ the most useful descriptor; and many found ‘King’ an unsatisfactory image, 
interpreted from a current standpoint. More significantly, in temporal terms, eight 
respondents reported shifts in their understanding of God through the vagaries of life, but 
particularly as a result of changes in church liturgy, with the resulting understanding tending 
more in an immanentist direction, with greater divine love, less judgement, and a greater 
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degree of abstraction. One respondent echoed Harry Williams’s dislike of the constant 
reiteration of guilt in The Book of Common Prayer. 
 
Most academic theologians and philosophers have accepted the inescapability of analogy, 
metaphor or model to express the inexpressible. Trying to differentiate the literal or 
metaphorical nature of images was indicative of the different language games that were 
possible, as suggested by D. Z. Phillips.10 Most respondents preferred abstract concepts for 
God, with a majority saying in their questionnaires that they had no mental picture, and 11 out 
of 32 offering abstract mental pictures, such as omnipotence, beauty, love, a force or energy. 
This reflects the general trends in the British population, indicated above, in terms of a wide 
and often abstract understanding of God, although the respondents’ majority retention of a 
personal relationship with God is at variance with the social trend. For comparison, Edwards 
writes that ‘in deepest reality the natural processes of creativity from the one Source are 
sustained by the one Force, the Source and Force called God’.11 Lewis would not agree with 
this priority, at least by the standard of his contention that ‘what is abstract . . . could [not] 
produce concrete reality’ (although he goes on to write of ‘the Absolute Being’).12 There was 
no hint in any of the responses of Platonism or dualism (in theological or ethical terms) akin to 
Lewis’s, although many would share the value he implicitly attaches in his Platonic trend 
towards the poetic and picturesque. Some respondents unknowingly reflected Williams’s 
depiction of God as ‘an eternal activity which . . . energises, makes real, makes active . . .’, and 
Polkinghorne’s description of God ‘act[ing] in the world through his energies, not his essence’13 
– both drawing on Eastern Christian tradition.  The word ‘analogy’ was hardly used, if at all, by 
respondents, but ‘metaphor’ was used or implied by a significant number, particularly in 
expressing the impossibility of describing God adequately. These respondents were, 
unknowingly like Mackinnon, finding analogy the middle way between anthropomorphism 
(which several mentioned as a risk) and silence (which some saw as a possibility).14 Some 
respondents’ anxiety about anthropomorphism accords with Lewis’s concern,15 although, 
unlike Lewis, they tended to recognise the need for a degree of anthropomorphism for analogy 
to succeed; it accords too with Ward’s concern (with various tentative solutions) about 
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whether attributes such as wisdom, power and purpose can be attributed to the divine mind.16 
Most respondents recognized the provisionality of language, comparable with Wiles’s 
conclusion that God is ‘infinitely resistant to our finite systematizations’,17 even if no worked-
out theory of analogy was articulated. Two explained that:  
I have to try as best I can to understand intellectually my experience of God. But I 
know I’ll never make it (and there are times when the poets and songwriters will speak 
to me more deeply than the theologians); and  
we’re so small and the idea of God is so enormous that I can’t hold it and express it in 
words – the words slither away. 
 
Here are similarities with Williams’s ‘struggle to find images and words [against] an infinite 
hinterland’.18 
But the precise differentiations made by some academic philosophers and theologians 
between ‘analogy’, ‘metaphor’ and other verbal devices were not exemplified by any 
respondent. There was one example of Alston’s partial univocity, when a respondent 
suggested that ‘Father’ was too real to be just metaphorical. This was similar to the partial 
univocity that the 1987 Doctrine Commission report suggested was applicable just to some 
terms for God, including ‘all-knowing, faithful or loving’,19 although the example of ‘Father’ is 
more concrete. The majority of respondents who found the concept of ‘Father’ helpful did so 
with the same connotation as did Mitchell, namely, that of protective care, rather than that of 
‘physical progenitor’.20 One particular image explored with respondents, that of ‘king’, showed 
signs of beginning to lose its usefulness on grounds of inappropriateness, some respondents 
perhaps preferring abstractions to convey God’s transcendence. In connection with ‘King’, 
MacKinnon writes of the danger in The Book of Common Prayer of ‘a levelling down of the 
transcendent to the form of a magnified, supra-human reality’.21  The loss of usefulness of 
‘king’ detected during the interviews was of the kind recognised in the 1987 Doctrine 
Commission report, but was different from the ‘death’ of a metaphor outlined by Soskice, for 
whom an expression ceasing to have metaphorical connotations is through familiar usage, as 
with a ‘flow of electricity’.22 No respondent showed signs of the dangerous phenomenon 
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described by Thiselton of a person becoming fixated with one particular metaphor.23 Evidence 
about individual respondents’ appreciation of the analogical use of language has largely, 
though not entirely, to be inferred from their general approach to images of God; however, 
there is no evidence that particular difficulties with specific images, like ‘Father’ or ‘King’ are 
associated with any individuals having difficulty with analogical usage generally. 
Brown applies ‘metaphor’ to non-verbal aspects of art, with some paintings, particularly icons, 
communicating God’s transcendence and immanence’.24 Two respondents spoke of art in 
similar terms, but another was less receptive. One found in statues of the Virgin in France ‘a 
great presence . . . very strengthening and protective . . . a sort of guiding strength . . . . A little 
bit of a feeling I get from these icons in [Winchester] Cathedral here. . . . I feel like I can feel the 
Kingdom of Heaven there’. Although later she explained that in the icons the sense of presence 
was that of Christ, the thinking coincides with Farrer’s, when writing of God having painted an 
image in blood on the veil between God and humanity.25 Another, who specialised in 
photography, said: ‘You can come to a photograph open minded, and relax, and you allow it to 
speak to you; then the presence of God can become more evident’. However, the third, with a 
fine art qualification, denied that her very graphic image of God (‘high in the heavens, sitting 
on his throne above . . . attended by angels and archangels . . .’) was like a picture, the image 
being understood as three-dimensional and a picture as only two-dimensional. This reserve 
coincides with that expressed by the Doctrine Commission in 1987 about the limited 
applicability of images in hymns, poetry, liturgy and art,26 and Ward’s caution about literal 
interpretation of art.27 However, the acceptance of graphic images of God (on a throne, etc.) 
by a number of respondents contrasts with a common dismissiveness towards such images, 
including that of Tom Wright.28 The evidence from this limited survey suggests that, balancing 
the respondents’ majority abstract thinking and contentment with a conventional relationship 
with God, Nineham is right that God may be calling us into a different kind of relationship from 
that which obtained in biblical times.  There is, however, a tension in the evidence from the 
respondents, as there is in Nineham, between these two approaches.29 Brown’s assertion that 
art and theology have ‘symbolic worlds’ in common, ‘where the relation between symbol and 
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literal fact is at last acknowledged to be a highly complex one’30 would find resonance with a 
respondent who spoke of the danger of applying analytical process to the kind of figurative 
language contained, in, as an example, Sydney Carter’s songs. The respondent reported:  
a tendency to . . . say ‘Exactly what do these words mean?’ . . . and at this point 
[Evangelicals] start backing off the imagery, and they start often just setting biblical 
passages. Now that’s a false reading of what’s going on. . . . [taking] a highly analytical 
view of something that is fundamentally poetic. 
In all respondents who recognised the communicative value of art in its various forms, there 
was unknowing support for the views, not only of Brown, but also of Thiselton, with his insight 
into the way in which corporate memory is transmitted and reiterated through verbal and non-
verbal means, influenced at each stage by fresh insights.31 
13.3 ‘Honest to God’, Images of God, God of the Gaps and Cupitt  
Robinson’s seminal Honest to God, something of a turning point in popular British theology, 
was heavily influenced by the existentialist tendencies of Bultmann and, above all, Tillich, with 
the latter in particular seeking new concepts for God in a post-supranaturalist Western culture. 
Existentialism, while not directly addressed in the questionnaires and interviews, did not figure 
at all in the responses, probably reflecting the loss of its erstwhile appeal. It can therefore 
safely be inferred that Macquarrie’s existentialist Christian interpretation and that of others 
would not find particular resonance. Indeed, Macquarrie himself values spirituality that 
includes concrete images for God, such as were explored with respondents, while he 
recognised their ultimate inadequacy32 – as did some of the respondents. 
Many respondents’ implicit acceptance of the place of analogy in theology, outlined above, 
meant that Robinson’s alleged stumbling blocks of mythological, supranaturalist and 
metaphysical projection did not figure in their accounts of God. Nor did the allegedly difficult 
concept of God ‘out there’,33 with a majority locating God as ‘everywhere’ (or similar), and 
those with more literal descriptions of location finding no problem with their understanding. 
Neither ‘ultimate reality’ nor Tillich’s ‘ground of being’ with allusions to depth psychology 
figured in any accounts. The concept of transcendence appeared frequently in the survey 
responses, either explicitly or implicitly, but not with any need, such as Robinson finds, to 
develop its significance in worldly terms, or with any conflict with immanence, but rather as a 
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prelude to a balanced faith, as Oakley envisages.34 Honest to God seems on the evidence of the 
responses to be confirmed as a product of its time and generally no longer of immediate 
relevance, although Robinson’s emphasis on love as a fundamental concept was replicated by 
many respondents. The predominance of transcendence in the responses accords with Lewis’s 
preference, and most respondents would probably fulfil Lewis’s and Mascall’s expectation that 
most people’s use of spatial imagery for God is imaginative in nature. Mascall explicitly 
mentions ‘Father’ and ‘Shepherd’ as examples of images that both ordinary Christians and 
academic theologians recognise, implicitly or explicitly, as analogical.35 The respondents’ 
comments support this, with no evidence that any viewed these images as other than 
figurative, with one or two respondents specific on the point (for instance that God’s 
fatherhood involves no literal procreation), but with one indicating partial univocity, as 
described above. Certainly, the respondents were all realist in their theology, as Cupitt 
concludes was Robinson.36 Indeed, Cupitt’s conclusion is supported by Robinson’s affinity for 
Buber’s ‘I-Thou’ relationship in terms of God;37 personal relationship with God was assumed by 
all but one, or perhaps two, respondents. 
Similarly, and despite Nineham’s sympathy for those for whom supranaturalism is a problem, 
the respondents showed no evidence of issues over supranaturalism, with most respondents 
simply offering abstract descriptions of God, or else, in a few cases, unselfconsciously offering 
more concrete descriptions. On the other hand, some would certainly appreciate Nineham’s 
advocacy of imaginative ‘pictures’ for God that are attuned to the prevailing temporal culture, 
like a ‘half-hidden light’, an ‘amorphous cloud’, a warm inner glow.38 Parallels can be seen with 
Clark-King’s discovery in Newcastle of images of a comforting armchair, a welcoming mother-
in-law, colour and light,39 the ‘armchair’ evoking Williams’s image of ‘that depth . .  into which . 
. . I try to sink’.40 
Like Phillips,41 a preponderance of respondents was aware of God’s vastness, coupled with the 
possibility of a personal relationship with God, and an understanding of creation having 
occurred through natural means. Despite Polkinghorne’s explicit dismissal of any God of the 
gaps, with God as ‘the guarantor of [the physical] law . . . sustain[ing] the world in being’, he 
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still shows a slight tendency to seek particular loci for God’s activity.42 Among the respondents, 
however, there was no hint of a God of gaps. Indeed, there were signs that most respondents 
took a holistic view of God as underlying the whole of existence and the created order: their 
general preference for abstract terms for God; the preference on the part of nearly half for 
God’s creation being by ‘natural’ means identified by science; and the semi-pantheistic 
support for God being in nature. There was no support for the alternative figurative 
descriptions of God’s location considered in Honest to God, and there was no indication that 
those who reported experiences of God’s particular presence saw God’s presence or activity as 
limited to those occurrences. However, for one person, who had ongoing difficulty with faith, 
the God with whom the  person had difficulty certainly seemed to be of the gaps, God being 
described as ‘a sort of security blanket, or a big brother . . . who will sort things out for us, 
because we’re frightened’ – projections of the kind deplored by Williams.43 Respondents’ 
generally holistic conceiving of God meant that there was little risk of God being eclipsed by 
new knowledge or understanding, as envisaged by Harry Williams.44 
No respondent had progressed in Cupitt’s direction of acute subjectivism and projection of 
God as a summation of values. One respondent had read one of Cupitt’s books, but had 
dismissed his thesis on grounds of his assumption that the existence of God was on a par with 
the existence of a table. No respondent came anywhere near Cupitt’s questioning the notion 
of existence for God, his total rejection of theological realism alongside retention of spirituality 
and religious practice, or his reifying of ‘religious concern’.45 God was too real in the 
experience and theology of most respondents to be merely a working hypothesis,46 or, in 
Cupitt’s post-modern terms, simply ‘a transcendent inferred entity’.47 
13.4 Human relationship with God 
Although most respondents with a mental picture of God gave abstract descriptions, a high 
proportion also assumed some sort of relationship with God, expecting from God: 
understanding of problems; suffering with (or, in one case, ‘suffering for’) human beings; 
and/or speaking to humans. Expectation of relationship with God does not imply a sense of 
immanence, although some respondents did have such a sense (a topic to which this chapter 
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will return). The person-hood of God, important for Newlands among many others,48 arose one 
way or another in most interviews, with one respondent in particular representing a dilemma 
that others felt:   
I think that he is a person, but I don’t think he’s formed . . . as soon as you see him as a 
form, you make him small.  I think he is a person, but I just don’t think he’s person as 
you and I are. 
This recognition of at least partial analogy reflects Farrer’s conclusion that God, while not a 
person, has to be thought of ‘as a somewhat in a certain not exactly defined relation to 
personality’,49 and Ricoeur’s (quoted by Thiselton) that the ‘personal model . . . needs to be 
qualified by divine transcendence and hiddenness’.50 From an existentialist background, 
Macquarrie shows similar refusal to describe God as a person, and even reticence in ascribing 
personal qualities to God.51 No respondent advanced Polkinghorne’s idea of ‘impersonal 
models of divinity’ (alongside personal models) to express ‘the insights of natural theology’; 
but there would have been overwhelming support for Polkinghorne’s dislike of pure 
abstraction instead of interaction with the world.52 One respondent represented others in 
recognising that the very love of God is of a different order from even the best human love:  
I think that God’s love, yes, is like my mother’s love, but so much bigger that I can’t 
possibly get my head round it. I’ve tried to think about it, but it does my head in. I 
can’t grasp that at all. 
This example of analogy by proportionality accords with Ramsey’s insistence that even ‘love’ in 
connection with God has to be qualified as ‘infinite love’ in order to be appropriate, with 
tautological expressions like ‘infinite love’ straining language for the sake of expressing 
commitment.53 It is comparable too with Macquarrie’s view that it is better to ascribe 
‘goodness’ to God, despite its inadequacy, than to describe God as ‘not good’.54 
Despite such reservations about univocity over God’s qualities, there was strong support for 
the concept of human relationship with God, and thus, implicitly, little support for 
Macquarrie’s rejection of ‘an “I-thou” meeting’ because of the lack of physicality, reciprocity 
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and mutual knowledge.55 Indeed the examples, above, of awareness of God’s person-hood and 
love indicate resonance with some facets of Radical Orthodoxy. The respondents’ general 
preference for God’s transcendence above immanence coincided with Radical Orthodoxy’s 
view that immanence ‘tends to remove the mysterious diversity of matter in assuming that 
appearances do not exceed themselves’.  Their general understanding of creation as part of 
God’s activity, even though the physical methodology was often not defined, also pointed in 
Radical Orthodoxy’s directions of not treating any of the ‘diverse worldly phenomena . . . apart 
from God’.56 There was much evidence, too, of awareness of the interpenetration of the 
sacred and the secular, similar to the position of Radical Orthodoxy, particularly in the 
appreciation of religious art. Although the Eucharist was addressed with the respondents in 
respect of liturgical change, there was no evidence of the particularly high place for the 
Eucharist advanced by Radical Orthodoxy. Nevertheless, most respondents assumed the 
Eucharist to be central to Christian life, with one person perceiving and regretting a shift in a 
direction of more liturgical immanence. No respondent took the concept of metaphor as far as 
Radical Orthodoxy’s particularly high doctrine of analogy, as more than metaphor and defining 
the whole relationship between humans and God and even between human beings.57   
As in the 1987 Doctrine Commission report (highlighted by Ward), there was no echo of 
process theology in its fullness, for example with polarity in God between God’s essence and 
God’s actuality; and references to God suffering sometimes related to Jesus.58  However, 
resonances with process theology were evident:  
 from the respondent who asserted God’s perfection as being a developing 
phenomenon: ‘through creating his creation, he’s actually developing 
himself’; 
 in the description of God as ‘source of all initiative, source of all ingenuity . 
. . an influence that’s always with me . . .’, comparable with Norman 
Pittenger’s view of God as a luring influencer of occasions;59  
 in echoes of Pittenger’s insistence on a mutuality of relationship between 
God and humanity60 from the half of respondents who, with various 
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interpretations, concluded that God needs human beings; and, most 
significantly, 
 from the clear majority who believed, again with various intentions, that 
God suffers with humans. 
Just a few respondents shared Wiles’s deist tendencies, particularly as there was a general 
reluctance on most respondents’ part to espouse divine intervention, apart from in the 
Incarnation. But this was offset by the theism indicated by the popularity of images such as 
‘Father’ and ‘Shepherd’, by which the respondents shared Wiles’s conviction that  God’s 
relationship with humanity must not be viewed in less than personal terms.61 Although there 
was a general sense of God being in relationship with humanity, God’s immanence was a 
weaker theme than God’s transcendence. So, on that basis, Brown’s strong emphasis on God’s 
intervention, or his patent anthropomorphism,62 would not resonate strongly. 
13.5 Creation and Experience 
Farrer writes that that ‘it is only through, in, and as creative activity that the infinite can be 
grasped by the finite’. He follows Aquinas’s ‘double agency’ thinking, whereby God’s creative 
activity extends to human activity within finite events.63 All but one respondent believed that, 
by some means or other, God created the world, in tune usually with Peacocke’s insistence on 
God’s creativity being ‘unveiled by the sciences’ along with elements of chance,64 but also with 
Farrer’s clarity that theology and the sciences have separate aims.65 So those surveyed were 
generally aware, at least unconsciously, that natural and supernatural causation are not 
mutually exclusive, that causation can be viewed in a variety of theistic and deistic ways, and 
that faith is still possible. One person’s conviction that God’s creative work is continuing in the 
present echoed Mascall’s doctrine of God’s ‘incessant creative action’.66 However, there was 
no kinship with Wiles’s theory of immanence through intervention being subsumed into the 
one divine creative act,67 since the resulting risk of divine-human relationship being supplanted 
by deism was far from the theology of the respondent in question. Implications of ‘double 
agency’ arose in two contexts: in the matter of how God speaks to us, when ‘through other 
people’ (or the equivalent) was cited alongside the Bible, prayer and events; and in the matter 
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of God needing us, with several people suggesting that God’s purpose was for us to act as his 
caring and/or evangelistic agents. This accords with Pittenger’s idea of God calling us into 
partnership.68 Although no respondent explicitly supported the 1976 Doctrine Commission 
Report’s contention that the notion of ‘Creator’ ‘has to be heavily qualified when applied to 
God’,69 the common recognition that God’s creativity is exercised by the means described by 
science could have led to some, if pressed, recognising a need for qualification of ‘Creator’. As 
will be seen when dealing with theodicy, below, there was an almost universal rejection by 
respondents of intervention by God, out of respect for human freewill; this accords with 
Wiles’s contention that ‘We cannot . . . speak significantly of God or of his acting in an 
objectified way, wholly separated from the human response . . .’.70 Although miracles were not 
specifically raised with respondents, they did not figure as violations of natural law in any 
responses, as Wiles envisaged them.71 
Some respondents graphically reported experiences of God’s presence. Wiles accepted the 
possibility of experiences of God, but with God lying behind such experiences, so that we are 
able to speak of God only indirectly by describing the experiences. While the respondents with 
such experiences may not consciously have made this subtle distinction, or consciously 
recognised the possibility of cultural conditioning, they did not identify God with the actual 
experiences themselves. No respondent claimed actually to have experienced a direct call from 
God (as opposed to new understanding from spiritual experiences), of the kind about which 
Wiles is nervous.72 Clearly, respondents with vivid experience of God’s presence would support 
Brown’s rejection of a logical incompatibility between such experience and asserting God’s 
transcendence.73 There was some correspondence between the respondents’ conviction that 
God is everywhere and experiences of God’s particular presence; and a general 
correspondence with Milbank’s conviction that ‘the sacral interpenetrates everywhere, and if 
it descends from above, this descent is also manifest through its rising up from below’.74 
13.6 Immanence and the location of God 
Although only a few respondents used the words ‘transcendence’ or ‘immanence’, awareness 
of God’s transcendence was a prevailing theme in questionnaire and interview responses. For 
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instance, a large majority viewed God as vast, omnipotent, omnipresent, initially creative and, 
often, beyond description. This accorded with Mascall’s (and many others’) theology, as did 
two respondents’ awareness that their sense of transcendence bordered on deism. Stannard’s 
Trinitarian expression of ‘God over us, God with us, God in us’ found echoes in the majority of 
respondents who located God as everywhere and both within and outside nature.75 
Polkinghorne too concludes that God is to be found everywhere, ‘the ground of physical 
science, not a participant in it’.76 No respondent showed awareness of the metaphorical nature 
of transcendence and immanence, highlighted by Brown,77 or, by extension, of the 
metaphorical nature of presence and omnipresence. 
Most respondents demonstrated a necessity for both transcendence and immanence and the 
balance advocated by, among other theologians, Jenkins, Brown and Leech. Newlands in 
particular stresses the importance of transcendence, to prevent immanence slipping into 
identification with society.78 They had no difficulty holding the two together, and few 
postulated either of the two extreme positions of a deist watch winder or a constantly 
interventionist god, between which Williams steers a course, preferring ‘an eternal activity’, as 
quoted above.79 There was a clear appreciation of immanence, expressed in several ways, and 
most simply in God’s omnipresence, which prevailed as ‘everywhere’ in answering the 
question of ‘Where do you think God is?’, and in choosing a location for God between ‘up 
there’, down there’, ‘out there’ of ‘in there’ (or a proposed alternative). Immanence was 
directly implied by six answers of ‘beyond and within’, and by thirteen of ‘out there and in 
here’, ‘everywhere and thin places’ or ‘in human hearts’. Several recounted vivid experiences 
of the presence of God, in some cases involving experiences of warmth or light, and these 
accorded with Ramsey’s concept of ‘cosmic disclosures’.80 ‘Presence’ was also one of the 
abstract terms used of God in various contexts.  
Amid the lists of earthly places with which some respondents associated God were, for two 
respondents, ‘thin’ places, a concept shared by Williams when he considers the possibility of 
‘the fabric [being] thinner’ and ‘the act of God [being] a little more transparent’ as incidents of 
miracles.  Some of the places with which respondents associated God were of the variety 
exemplified by Hopkins’s ‘grandeur of God . . . like shining from shook foil’, commended by 
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Williams and Ford with Hardy,81 such as different aspects of countryside, hills and beach. There 
may be signs here of influence from contemporary environmental awareness and eco-
spirituality. There is certainly unconscious agreement with Brown’s conviction that ‘God is 
found in nature and gardens, in buildings . . .’, and a willingness, with Brown, to find God in 
areas beyond the Church.82 Some respondents also shared Williams’s sense of God prompting 
and reassuring, not by interruption of the normal order, but through the environment,83 
describing their experiences of God’s presence or ‘speaking’. Although Radical Orthodoxy’s 
understanding of immanence as referring to the created order might resonate with some of 
the respondents, there were no indications of rapport with its denial of immanence to the 
essential nature of God (as opposed to immanence in Christ).84 
13.7 Vulnerability on God’s part 
Despite his emphasis on human freewill, Wiles, with his deist tendency, insists that God is 
impassible.85 Ramsey writes of believers talking a great deal about an indescribable God, 
transcendent yet immanent and impassible yet loving,86 and Pittenger understands 
transcendence as of ‘exhaustibility [of love and concern], not . . . remoteness’.87 However, 
Macquarrie contemplates a more symmetrical and reciprocal relationship between God and 
humankind than traditional attributions of immutability and impassibility imply, and therefore 
some vulnerability.88 A clear majority of respondents was clear that God suffers with us (some 
of these with Jesus in mind, but others clearly referring to God as a single divine entity). 
Associating God with Christ in relation to suffering is, of course, inescapable for Christians, as 
Jenkins makes explicit, though with ambivalence on his, Newlands’s and others’ parts about 
the nature of God’s suffering.89  Of the half of respondents who thought that God needs us, 
some explained the need as answering God’s purpose or for us to act as his agents – with 
shades of double agency – though others were less certain, hinting that God’s goodness might 
be at risk. This practical need appears different from ontological need or need for human 
worship, such as Lewis rejects, with firm commitment to God’s impassibility.90 God’s need, in 
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the respondents’ view, was different from Williams’s understanding of a need for us simply to 
be what we are, ‘because of an utterly unconditional generosity’, God’s happiness overflowing 
in humanity’s favour.91 The way in which, by these means, some respondents echoed 
Pittinger’s and process theology’s insistence on a mutuality of relationship and influence 
between God and humanity has already been noted. Macquarrie’s and Pittenger’s concept of 
reciprocity leads in the direction of panentheism, supported also by Peacocke,92 with just one 
respondent speaking of our being in God and God in us. If the question to respondents about 
God needing humanity is taken as representing the wider question of why God created the 
world, then comparison can be made with Ward’s conclusion that, without any necessity, God 
created and relates to the world out of his self-giving love, extending to ‘a form of suffering-
with creatures’.93 As has been noted, there was ambivalence on the part of the respondents 
about God needing humanity, with at least one explicitly concerned at the risk of hubris in 
concluding that God needs us, but some others sensing, whimsically but with insight, that God 
might be bored without us, or, slightly panentheistically, that we are part of God or that 
something of God is in us. 
God’s immutability was particularly challenged by one respondent, who commented: ‘I think 
it’s easier for people to believe in a God who never changes. I actually don’t believe in an 
immutable God. I think he does change, because I think you can’t be loving unless you do’, 
giving the example of a parent who comes to accept a child’s different way of thinking. Here 
Pittinger’s position is unconsciously espoused, with immutability on God’s part viewed as 
‘inadequate to the facts . . . about the world’, particularly science’s evolutionary theory.  More 
particularly, his and Polkinghorne’s emphasis on God’s suffering as ‘the deepest and most 
intimate compassion or sympathy’, being ‘affected’ by and sharing in the world’s suffering, 
though not overcome by suffering,94 was echoed by the majority of respondents who, in 
different ways, had decided that God suffers with humanity. It is interesting that this majority 
easily exceeded the number of those who felt God needs us, where there was much greater 
uncertainty.  This may reflect the traditional Christian emphasis on Christ’s suffering, even 
though Jesus’s dependency on his apostles and disciples is also a clear Gospel theme. 
Polkinghorne’s additional assertion of uncertainty on God’s part about whether suffering was 
always vindicated, as Jesus himself experienced,95 was not matched in any response, although 
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those who were unsure about the extent of God’s omniscience (particularly in the context of 
human freewill) could be inferred as sharing Polkinghorne’s view. 
However, two respondents were less certain, one writing: 
Whether [God] shares all suffering exactly as we experience it is a different question, 
because we must assume that in some cases at least He is more aware that it will 
eventually be turned to a good that we cannot see. 
Several were unsure about aspects of God’s suffering, and in one case the effect. This person 
had described a life of considerable disturbance and mental pain, and had just answered the 
question ‘Do you think God understands our problems?’ with ‘Most definitely. Firsthand 
experience.’ She then answered the following question ‘Do you think God suffers with us?’ 
with ‘Again, most definitely. It doesn’t lessen the pain’. Another respondent, in a medical 
profession, shared Pittenger’s distinction between God’s suffering (as described above) and 
the physiological/psychological nature of human suffering,96 answering the question about 
God suffering with ‘Not suffers literally, but understands our pain and suffering and is 
compassionate’; another spoke of the danger of anthropomorphism in attributing suffering to 
God. The contrast between respondents is indicative of the tension between the emotional 
‘sense’ of God suffering in response to human need, and the intellectual ‘sense’ that suffering 
is incompatible with God’s transcendent nature. The contrast corresponds with the tension 
between liberation theology borne of human suffering and its rejection in the name of 
conventional theology. It coincides also with Newlands’s view that ‘to speak of God as 
suffering is to use language analogically’, since to claim that speaking of God either suffering or 
not suffering is unintelligible.97  However, most respondents would have difficulty with 
Milbank’s locating God’s suffering only in Christ;98 and the preponderance of respondents 
believing God suffers with us is in keeping with Vanstone’s illustration of the vulnerability of 
creator as well as the created, in his model-making parable for God’s handing over of power.99 
13.8 Theodicy and human freewill 
One respondent well expressed the issues, reporting a ‘struggle to comprehend how an 
omnibenevolent God can be omnipotent and omniscient at the same time in [the] light . . . of 
evil’. In similar vein, Jenkins, while recognising the unacceptability of a god who could 
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intervene in disasters but did not, concludes that intervention would be incompatible with 
God’s loving nature, demonstrated in the granting of freedom within creation.100 
Among respondents, there was consistent protection of human freewill, with, for some, the 
risk of compromising it the reason why they believed God does not intervene; they would 
support Polkinghorne’s assertion that ‘neither God nor man is . . . caught in the grip of 
relentless causal rigidity’.101 There was no explicit concern about omniscience, which doctrine 
Shaw sees as an insidious means of social control.102 On the other hand, there was no 
resignation in the face of overwhelming divine power as Clark-King found in Newcastle,103 the 
contrast probably reflecting the differing fortunes and sense of personal power on the part of 
very different constituencies. The respondents shared a general belief in a non-deterministic 
world, such that much earthly suffering (including, for a few, natural disasters), was attributed 
to human freewill. Despite opportunities to do so, no respondent elaborated in terms of the 
compatibility or otherwise of freewill and a divinely deterministic world, such as in the scientist 
Stannard’s various theories;104 and no-one advanced any theory in any way like his, of the 
logical necessity of evil to highlight God’s goodness.105 
A few respondents envisaged good emerging from tragedy in God’s economy, some out of a 
sense of God’s presence in disastrous situations, thus echoing Macquarrie’s, Lucas’s and 
Vanstone’s confidence in this respect.106 Some respondents showed affinity with Peacocke’s 
and Pittenger’s rejection of divine intervention, on the basis of rejecting also a God who 
sometimes but not always intervenes to avert disasters; they were more in accord with 
Nineham’s reluctance to acknowledge intervention unless God has given good grounds.107 One 
said of intervention: ‘I’m not sure it’s consistent with his nature, actually.   Clearly he could, 
but . . . that would take away the freedom that humans have’; this matched Polkinghorne’s 
theory of God’s omnipotence being constrained by God’s own nature as respecting reason and 
rejecting arbitrary intervention.108 One 18-35 respondent suggested that God’s non-
intervention, like that of a human father, was out of respect for his mature children. However, 
even when the researcher suggested the idea in a few cases, only one respondent offered any 
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solution approximating to Polkinghorne’s idea that, without sacrificing omnipotence, God, with 
voluntary curtailing of power, is not in total control.109 This respondent said of natural 
disasters: 
I . . . don’t think he can stop them. I don’t think he has the power. I believe that he’s 
very creative and all this . . . . I don’t think, physically like that, because actually that is 
the world he’s created . . . and things have got to go wrong. 
Indeed, two respondents who found the image of ‘King’ unhelpful wanted to dissociate God 
from power. Several attributed natural disasters to the way things are, ‘to do with the created 
order which . . . has a limited life’, resonating with Polkinghorne’s image of God, ‘in his great 
act of creation . . . allow[ing] the whole universe to be itself’.110 But none advocated 
Polkinghorne’s place for chance.111  
Wiles associates frequent occurrences of natural disasters with God as immutable; and 
associates understanding such occurrences as natural and inexorable, with God as a free, 
personal being.112 The majority of respondents saw natural disasters as a natural outworking of 
the natural world, and some respondents seemed to fulfil Wiles’s second association. For 
example, someone who put natural disasters down to ‘just the world taking its natural course’, 
having an inner freedom of development within its evolutionary process, had an 
understanding of God’s freedom even to the extent of God’s being ‘an amazing God, not 
necessarily one that is completely good’. However, not all respondents made the second 
association. For instance, the respondent quoted above (‘I . . . don’t think he can stop them . . . 
.’) did not attribute to God a ‘character as a free, personal being’. And another respondent 
who viewed natural disasters as part of the natural order tended towards a cerebral and 
analytical view of God rather than a relationship with God, such that ‘God’s character as a free, 
personal being’ seemed of less importance than God’s transcendence (though this was 
coupled with the suffering of Jesus). 
It was clear that the respondents, like the academic theologians, were nonplussed so far as 
theodicy is concerned, and could only offer tentative and incomplete explanations, avoiding, 
like Williams, any glib creating of ‘ the god who fits our agenda’, but constantly seeking to 
rediscover God.113 
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13.9 Liberation and Feminist Theology 
Although Leech’s full liberation theology114 did not figure directly in the questionnaires and 
interviews, awareness of the mystery and indescribability of God was certainly a feature of 
many responses, as outlined above, along with awareness of the horror of past and present 
suffering and the challenge it presents to Christian theology. A majority of respondents 
believed that God suffers with humanity. 
The respondents shared Maitland’s view over God’s gender, that identifying God as female is 
as ‘ridiculous’ as believing God to be male.115 Although 43.8% identified God as male, and 
65.6% as neither male nor female or with male and female characteristics, none insisted that 
God was female. No respondent used female pronouns alongside male ones, however, in the 
way that Maitland and Leech do, or tried to find neutral words for God.116 The respondents, 
both female and male, identifying God as exclusively male were in accord with Clark-King’s 
universal experience with working-class Newcastle women; and six respondents described a 
kindly elderly man with a beard, which accorded with images recorded by Clark-King, 
particularly Edith’s.117 Some respondents were, like Tilby,118 unhappy about attributing 
overbearing power and authority to God by describing God as King. In terms of roles, the 
‘unconditional love’ that Clark-King sees as a vital model for women’s relationships119 and 
Ward’s suggestion that ‘Father’ is metaphorical and not gender-specific120 were exemplified by 
the respondents who found experiences of their mothers’ love better models for God’s love 
than their fathers’. 
For one respondent, the change from ‘thee’ and ‘thou’ language in liturgy had a wider 
liberating effect that ‘led to me being perfectly happy with God as our Mother as well as our 
Father’. This apparent non sequitur can plausibly be explained by the change of language 
having been the trigger that liberated the respondent from the gender assumptions that he 
had hitherto associated with ‘thee’ and ‘thou’ applied to God. On the other hand, a female 
respondent, who lives and works in a mainly male world, said that ‘I just can’t see it [sic] being 
a female’. 
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13.10 Implications for academic theology 
This thesis is an exercise in what Astley calls the correlation and conversation ‘between the 
learner’s ordinary theology and the contributions of a more “extraordinary” theology, largely 
derived from the academy [or] ecclesiastical theology’ (which latter theologies may, of course, 
not always coincide, particularly when academic theologians branch out into experimental 
areas of thinking). Trained theologians (believing or not) are themselves informal theologians 
first (believing or not), and theological educators, Astley asserts, ‘should begin with ordinary 
theology’, inviting the learners’ informal theology as a starting point. However, Astley does not 
stay at the academic nexus, considering the conversation only a prelude to an ordinary 
Christian’s potential progression to academic theology, but senses an obligation for the 
academic to ‘occupy the mediatory role of a translator, fluent in both languages, whose 
primary task is to convey the sense of academic theology . . . in a tongue that is “understanded 
[sic] of the people”’.  Astley complements Green’s references to the importance of 
‘resonances’ and ‘sensitivities’ by commending the notion of spiritual imagination to link 
theology with experiences, for example in creating divine metaphors. Thus, with ‘ordinary 
theology . . . rich in figurative language . . . and the concepts of academic theology [based on] 
metaphors, models, analogies and narratives’, a common linguistic background emerges as a 
basis for ‘hermeneutical conversation’121 and for a perpetual circle of influence. 
There is considerable commonality between the informal theology revealed in this research 
and academic theology, in that only one theme displayed by the respondents was not 
replicated by academic theologians (as outlined below).  The commonality includes: the 
inadequacy of language; awareness of analogy/metaphor; the personhood of God; and 
attempts to achieve a balance – with varied results – between transcendence, immanence and 
involvement/relationship, and between deism and theism. Awareness of analogy enabled 
most respondents to hold together ‘poetic’ images and general scientific understanding 
without difficulty, just as is the case for academic theologian.  
The distinction between informal theology and academic theology therefore largely arises 
from the ‘technical’ philosophical, linguistic, historical and biblical training that enables 
academic theologians to pursue further the fundamental issues that they share with informal 
theologians, and which enables dialogue with non-theological scholars. It is at this point that 
                                                 




academic theology can become remote from informal theology and the immediate needs of 
‘ordinary’ Christians. However, with respect to ordinary believers, there is an intermediary tier 
of parish clergy and other teachers. Just as in other disciplines, such as medicine or 
architecture, theological academics need to be in initial and continuing dialogue with 
practitioners in order to resource them for their work, and for their work to be informed by 
practitioner experience. However, although practising doctors and architects can, if necessary, 
treat unconscious patients and produce buildings for uncommunicative clients, albeit less 
satisfactorily, a parish priest always needs continuing communication with conscious 
parishioners: even physical, sacramental ministry is largely dependent upon verbal and sensual 
communication. So there are two crucial stages of communication in theology: initial and 
continuing academic training of practitioners: and ongoing two-way communication between 
priest and people and by academics directly with people. Clergy, along with writers of popular 
theology, share informal theology with ordinary believers, but are also filters for academic 
theology. The practical theology in this thesis illustrates the commonalities and breadth of 
views that can emerge from listening to informal theologians, as do others’ examples cited 
here, such as that of Clark-King. Richard Pratt points out the importance of listening, since ‘all 
religious authority . . . is dependent on the assent of the believer’, and quotes ‘vox populi, vox 
dei’.122 He goes further, supporting Astley’s suggestion that Christian orthodoxy ‘may be partly 
based on empirical facts about the beliefs that are actually held (widely, consistently and 
regulatively) by [the Christian] community’, with consequent shifts over time in what is 
considered orthodoxy – ‘the traditional notion of the consensus fidelium . . . reaffirmed by the 
Second Vatican Council as a criterion for the authentic faith of the church’.123 Respectful 
listening to informal theology by each ‘extraordinary’, or academic, theologian, is the key to 
the ‘ordinary’ (informal) theologian within himself or herself:  
Inside every extraordinary theologian is an ordinary one that he is usually trying to 
keep hidden in there, or that she just hasn’t yet noticed. We shall understand our own 
scholarly and academic theology much better if we attend to our own ordinary 
theological background and origins with more sympathy, more respect and more self-
understanding.124 
13.11 Final thoughts about informal theology 
The enjoyment that respondents derived from the questionnaire and interview process in this 
research, with several expressions of desire for further study, demonstrated a desire for 
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learning opportunities to tackle the taxing, fundamental issues of theology, as opposed to the 
more common Bible and thematic study. It confirmed the lack of ‘mind-stretching’ 
opportunities for many adult Christians’ learning identified by Ford and Hardy and Tilby, along 
with a failure to grapple with ‘the deepest questions posed through academic theology and 
other disciplines’.125 Hardy detects, even among many Christian people, a loss of the universal 
referential nature of words about God, so that faith and its expression are accepted as being a 
human construction.126 There is therefore much scope for research into informal theology, so 
that academic and practitioner theologians’ work can be informed by the patterns and trends 
that are revealed, and to inform the Church’s development of liturgy and other practices. 
Consultation with the Church of England’s Education Division127 has revealed that no research 
is currently undertaken or commissioned in this respect. 
It may be that informal theologians display something of the balance that is sought but then 
lost by some academic theologians. An example is process theology, with some basic tenets, 
like divine mutability, finding affinity in some respondents, who might, however, like Ward, 
baulk at the loss of omnipotence and transcendence that is implied; and might, like Peacocke, 
baulk at God being just an influencer, rather than the creator of actuality.128 Similarly, with 
panentheism, many respondents had a strong sense of God’s presence and participation in the 
world, but only one showed any conviction that the world and humanity are in God. ‘Presence’ 
was so common an expression on the part of respondents, as it is in the Cotter’s unauthorised 
collects, which therefore coincide in that respect with much informal theology.129  
The respondents’ informal theology was marked by insight and subtlety. There was a 
preference for abstract descriptors for God, an anxiety at anthropomorphism and a ready 
acceptance of in inescapability of metaphor and the ‘poetic’. Transcendence was more 
prevalent than immanence, with elements of deism and a general reluctance to countenance 
divine intervention. However, this did not undermine the personal-ness of God, God’s 
relationship with creation or the idea of God’s suffering with humanity. So there was no 
evidence of progression in Wiles’s deist or Cupitt’s extreme subjectivist directions. The 
concerns of Honest to God were shown to be no longer relevant, with existentialism not 
figuring  in responses, and ‘supranaturalism’ and expressions of God’s location not constituting 
problems. God being generally conceived as ‘everywhere’ and all-pervasive meant that the 
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respondents were not afflicted by a ‘god of the gaps’. Although a significant proportion of 
respondents accepted a male identity for God, a higher proportion viewed God as gender-
inclusive or gender-neutral. It was notable that a high proportion of individual respondents 
were able to hold together a variety of concepts of God, even with some tension between 
them: for instance over God’s gender and, more fundamentally, God’s transcendence with 
capacity for relationship.   Michael Ramsey, responding to Honest to God, dr attention to 
human capacity to hold together ‘poetic’ theological language with acceptance of earthly 
reality.130 The respondents’ leaning towards transcendence with involvement and relationship, 
according a lesser place to immanence, is of particular significance, resonating with some more 
‘traditional’ theology, such as aspects of Radical Orthodoxy, and resonating less with more 
immanentist theology, such as process theology.  This particular holding together of 
transcendence with relationship is not obviously common to any trend in academic theology. 
Oakley’s categorization of Christians into ‘those who want to resolve the mystery of God’ and 
‘those who . . . seek to deepen it’131 may be too simple: although some respondents tended in 
one direction and some in the other, both trends were evident in most, with a predominance – 
in this largely self-selecting group – towards the latter. An issue that was not addressed in the 
questionnaires and interviews was inter-faith theology and the alternatives of exclusivism, 
inclusivism and pluralism on the part of Christianity,132 and occasional allusions by respondents 
were insufficient for drawing conclusions.   
Although there were some common features among the respondents, not least their relatively 
privileged environment, a variety of experiences and understandings was apparent, leading to 
different concepts of God. This confirms Ward’s assertion: 
Concepts which spring from situations in which some transcendent reality is mediated 
become images which one can use to evoke specific reactive attitudes and emotions, 
and which may be in some sense confirmed and amplified by personal experiences.133 
Three prominent examples of experiential variety were: the different appreciations of the 
image of ‘Father’ in the light of childhood experiences; a seasoned journalist’s vivid sense of 
God’s presence in disaster areas; and another’s experience of God’s presence in another 
person (of a non-Christian faith) during a period of profound loneliness – the latter reminiscent 
of Williams’s example of God being in an event of despair.134 Williams has warned against 
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disregarding the kind of ‘disturbingly wide range of meanings and resonances’135 that can been 
seen in the respondents’ informal theology. Despite some respondents’ past – and in at least 
one case, continuing – deep-seated tribulations, none showed signs of the neurotic projections 
on to God of which Harry Williams and Williams write.136 
The sample of respondents was drawn from worshipping communities, so that a greater or 
lesser degree of faith can immediately be predicated.  As with a philosopher, or a 
philosophising theologian like Farrer, responses such as theirs might be characterised as 
fideistic;137 however, in all cases, faith was accompanied by reason as part of informal 
theology, with attempts to reconcile tradition with reason and experience. The respondents 
were following Ward and Williams in blending spirituality with reason: ‘the analytic and the 
impressionist . . . the devotional and the critical’.138 It was not possible to detect any 
correspondence between approaches to God and age or ‘churchmanship’ (so far as indicated 
by church(es) attended); however, the partially self-selecting origin of the respondents (and 
the congregations from which they were drawn) may have produced a more questioning and 
open-minded group that was not totally representative of their congregations. The limitations 
arising from a small Church of England sample drawn from a small, southern, English city are 
recognised. However, the respondents were from a variety of social and educational 
backgrounds, with all demonstrating sensitivity to some of the theological issues involved in 
conceiving of God. Inevitably, there has been more emphasis on the comparison within this 
chapter on the resonances between academic and informal theologies than on lack of 
resonance.  There are whole areas of ‘technical’ academic constructive theology for which 
little similarity is likely to be found in informal theology, such is the nature of the academic 
task. The varieties in academic theology include the more Evangelical, with a greater emphasis 
on revelation and on Christology, the more Catholic and the more Liberal, the latter two 
categories frequently overlapping. However, there is clear evidence that, across the board, 
academic theology is working and re-working the fundamental issues of the nature of God, 
some of them, like theodicy, insoluble, that are recognised by all Christians. On the part of 
both theologies, academic and informal, there is evident what Oakley calls ‘a deep yearning 
within humanity for God, which the Church’s more ‘poetic’ and ‘cultural’ products may 
answer.139 Farrer writes: ‘Poetry and divine inspiration have this in common, that both are 
                                                 
135 Williams, On Christian Theology, p. 9. 
136 Williams, R., Open to Judgement, p. 14; Williams, H. A., ‘Psychological Objections’, p. 43. 
137 MacSwain, Robert Carroll, ‘Solved by Sacrifice’, pp. 13-110. 
138 Williams, Resurrection, p. xiii. 
139 Oakley, Spiritual Society, Secular Church?, p. 5. 
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projected in images which cannot be decoded, but must be allowed to signify what they signify 
of the reality beyond them’.140 The evidence suggests that at least a sample of ordinary 
believers, uncluttered by literalism in understanding theological language, recognises the role 
of image and symbol. On that basis, although idols ‘have mouths but do not speak; eyes but do 
not see’,141 God is perceived with no mouth or eyes, but yet as speaking and seeing. 
Undetectable, God relates to us: 
If I go forward, he is not there;  
or backward, I cannot perceive him;  
on the left he hides, and I cannot behold him; 
I turn to the right, but I cannot see him. 
But he knows the way I take . . . .142 
Above all, it has been important to detect informal theology that is ‘from the heart’ because 
rooted in experience, albeit on the back of, and in the language of, traditional theology. The 
‘authentic voice’ (authentic voices) as opposed to ‘a representative or reliable sample’, has 
been obtained,143 and set alongside voices from academia, with comparisons drawn. Although 
the concept of theology as drama or poetry hardly figures explicitly in the practical theology 
responses, it remains possible that such a concept could provide a medium by which Christians 
of all stages of belief and all levels of theology and scepticism could share the same faith and 
communal practice. It may be that the notion of Christianity as drama, or poetry, or a way of 
thinking into which world one can step (and step out), presents a way to achieve the 
comprehensiveness represented by the ‘choral theology’ advocated by Clark-King, by which all 
can listen to one another and sing in harmony.144 
Further research into informal theology of all kinds is likely to be useful in indicating trends of 
which academic theologians and practitioner church leaders should be aware, and in directing 
areas for systematic support and resourcing for the Church. This could be particularly useful in 
gauging understanding of and attitudes to the Church’s worship, for example about Common 
Worship, particularly the Eucharist, such as proposed by Ford.145 Specific areas for future 
research include: 
                                                 
140 Farrer, Glass of Vision, p. 148. 
141 Psalm 115. 5. 
142 Job 23. 8-10. 
143 Ward, ed., Perspectives on Ecclesiology and Ethnography, p. 8. 
144 Clark-King, Theology by Heart, pp. 212-15. 
145 Scharen, Christian, ‘Ecclesiology “From the Body”: Ethnographic Notes toward a Carnal 
Theology’ (quoting Ford, Self and Salvation, p. 138; Ward, ed., Perspectives on Ecclesiology and 
Ethnography, pp. 52-54). 
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 the responses of a larger sample of people from different socio-economic 
strata and of greater diversity, to ensure that the respondents views in this 
research are typical of a wider social spectrum;  
 relating informal theology to biblical images and to levels of familiarity with 
the Bible; 
 enquiring into Christological and Trinitarian issues within informal theology; 
 noting respondents’ ambivalence over the image of ‘King’, more detailed 
investigation of the import and usefulness of a wider variety of images of God, 
and drawing out the implications for liturgical texts and popular theological 
writing; and 
 investigation and comparison of informal theology in other mainstream 
English Christian churches and in English Judaism and Islam.  
It is respectfully recommended that church leaders give credence to the validity of informal 
theology for the ordinary believers in question, and for informing the direction that mission, 
pastoral interaction, liturgy and hymnody might take. In particular, the following have 
emerged from this research as important areas in this respect: 
 being aware of trends in understandings of God within the population at large 
and, on the basis of this sample of respondents, thinking church members, and 
providing opportunities for the development of informal theology, sometimes 
moving into academic theology, on the part of such members and enquirers; 
 for this purpose, conducting or commissioning ‘market research’ in relation to 
proposed developments of liturgy and mission; 
 noting a preference for abstraction in identifying God and God’s ‘location’, for 
God’s transcendence above all, as well as for God’s immanence, but not for 
divine intervention; 
 despite the importance of the ‘Kingship’ metaphor for Christian tradition, 
avoiding over-reliance and over-emphasis on this metaphor, at least pro 
tempore; 
 retaining an expectation of a personal relationship between God and 
individual people, with a strong expectation of God ‘speaking’ to us (on a 
double-agency basis), understanding our needs and suffering with us; and 
 together with an emphasis on transcendence, fostering a sense of the ‘poetic’, 
alongside an acceptance of the principles of modern science, so that the 




13.12  This thesis 
This thesis set out to:  
 survey UK Anglican academic theology since 1945 according to themes that have 
proved relevant and significant for informal theology; 
 describe some examples and accounts of informal theology; 
 recount an exercise in practical theology, assessing informal theology through 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the results of a local survey; and 
 while recognising the limited nature of survey, draw some conclusions about the 
extent of coherence between academic and informal theology, and make some 
proposals to inform the Church of England’s life and mission. 
 
All aspects of this original piece of research have been completed.  
 
This thesis has demonstrated that ordinary believers’ informal theology mostly coincides with 
academic theology over fundamental issues of understanding God, differing only in the degree 
to which theological analysis takes place. Many ordinary believers are able to assimilate and 
hold a variety of views of God, and to do so in creative tension, sometimes despite paradoxes 
of apparent contradiction. For some people, despite a desire to develop such thinking, there is 
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APPENDIX 1:  SOME INFLUENCES ON THE CURRENT CHURCH OF ENGLAND 
Evangelical influence 
The Evangelical Revival can be traced back to John Wesley, but gained strength more firmly 
within the Church of England with Charles Simeon (1759-1836), whose influence was 
consolidated within the parochial system by the Simeon Trust’s acquisition of livings around 
the country – including Christ Church, Winchester.  This was followed by the formation of the 
lay Clapham Sect at the end of the eighteenth century, which led to renowned social action in 
the nineteenth century, particularly William Wilberforce’s opposition to the slave trade, and to 
missionary endeavours around the world.1 
In the second half of the twentieth century, amid the High Church prominence during most of 
the twentieth century, Church of England evangelicals, while adhering to their overall doctrinal 
and ethical positions on, for example, the primacy of Scripture, the need for conversion on 
parents’ part before infant baptism and sexual matters, began to participate more willingly 
than previously in national and local Church of England affairs.2 Indeed, some aspects of 
Evangelicalism, such as house groups, spiritual healing and informal liturgy and hymnody 
became accepted as part of the mainstream of much Anglican life and worship, with even the 
charismatic movement of the 1970s spilling into less Evangelical Anglican churches.3  Open-air 
festivals, such as Greenbelt and Spring Harvest later replaced mid-twentieth century crusades 
by evangelists such as Billy Graham,4 and have enjoyed wide appeal, particularly to young 
people and families across the ecumenical spectrum.  Similarly, the Alpha courses pioneered 
by Holy Trinity Church, Brompton have gained widespread support, mainly but not exclusively 
from Evangelical churches, and have prompted the promotion of courses similar in structure 
but of more Catholic doctrine, of which the most well-known is Emmaus.5 
Anglo-Catholic influence 
Meanwhile, the ritualism and some of the doctrine of the Anglo-Catholic movement also 
influenced the broad sweep of Anglican church practice.6 The ‘High Church’ movement also 
had its origins in the eighteenth century, in response to the weakness within the Evangelical 
                                                 
1 Moorman, John R. H., A History of the Church in England, London, A. and C. Black, 1953, pp. 
302 and 315-24. 
2 Chapman, Mark, Anglicanism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, OUP, 2006, pp. 71-72. 
3 Holloway, Richard, Leaving Alexandria: A Memoir to Faith and Doubt, Edinburgh, Canongate, 
2013, pp. 203-13. 
4 Hastings, Adrian, A History of English Christianity 1920-1985, London, Collins, 1986, p. 454-55. 
5 Chapman, Anglicanism, pp. 72-74. 
6 Welsby, History of the Church of England, p. 215. 
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Revival in its concepts of the Church and its ministry. It flowered in 1833 with the inception of 
the Oxford Movement, led by John Keble, Edward Pusey and John Newman, and the 
publication of Tracts for the Times as an appeal for defence of matters like the Apostolic 
Succession, the liturgy and fasting. The Church of England was challenged to see itself as a true 
part of the historic Catholic Church, and ritual and vestments were introduced into 
participating churches.7    
Serving the Church of England more generally, the Parish and People movement, from 1949 to 
1968, aimed ‘to make the 9 a.m. (or thereabouts) Eucharist the principal Sunday service and to 
relate the rest of parish life integrally to that central sacramental moment’.8 The Parish 
Communion was established as the main service9 in an increasing majority of non-evangelical 
churches, with many Evangelicals beginning to see the Holy Communion as ‘the main service of 
the people of God’.10 Although some degree of coloured vesting and other features of 
‘Catholic’ practice characterised the majority of churches, Anglo-Catholicism in its more 
rarefied form became a minority position, often with a single stronghold in many towns – such 
as Holy Trinity, Winchester. But some of the marks of Anglo-Catholicism, as with some marks 
of Evangelicalism, found their way into, and remain part of, mainstream Anglican life, such as 
Anointing the Sick and individual Confession/Reconciliation for those who want. 
 
                                                 
7 Moorman, History of the Church in England, London, pp. 308, 338-47 and 367-71. 
8 Hastings, History of English Christianity, pp. 441 and 549. 
9 Chapman, Anglicanism, p. 88; Beeson, Trevor, The Church of England in Crisis, London, Davis-
Poynter, 1973, p. 77; and Furlong, C of E, p. 116. 
10 Welsby, History of the Church of England, p. 212, quoting ‘The Congress Statement’ from the 
Keele Congress of 1967; and Hastings, History of English Christianity, p. 442. 
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APPENDIX 2:  PLANNING OF QUESTIONNAIRES, INTERVIEWS AND ANALYSIS 
 
The processes of interviews and analysis of the results was planned as follows. The text here is 
almost identical to that in the Ethics Release Form approved by the University Ethics 
Committee. 
1. The objectives will be to collect personal and group views about current and past 
beliefs and disbeliefs in God. The locations will be various, but are likely to include Anglican 
church premises and/or church members’ homes and other residential homes in Winchester, 
and possibly University premises. The methodology will be one of focus groups and individuals 
discussing propositions and questions put to them, together with the use of questionnaires 
(the precise content of which will be devised in the light of earlier stages of the research 
project). 
2. The intention will be to gain the support of local Anglican clergy in inviting individual 
people to offer themselves to take part in the study.  Sample sizes are likely to be dictated by 
the willingness of people to take part. 
3. Those of 18 or over will give their own consent, and it is not envisaged that any 
younger will take part. 
4. The main risk is of embarrassment before peers within focus groups, and 
embarrassment before the researcher in focus groups or individual interviews, coupled with 
possible temporary distress if the discussion evokes painful memories. It is possible, also, that 
the experience may raise significant issues of faith for some participants. In the event of visible 
distress, participants would be given opportunity to withdraw temporarily or permanently, 
and/or to discuss their concerns briefly with the researcher after the session. They would be 
offered the suggestion that they might speak with their clergy or other leaders if they wished, 
and, if the a participant felt that this was not appropriate, the researcher would undertake, if 
the participant wished, to put him or her in touch with a suitable person who could offer 
appropriate pastoral care (chosen to suit the needs of the situation). 
5. Sample information sheets and consent forms are appended below. 
6. The Code of Practice of the British Sociological Association will be followed. 
7. No other disciplines or local ethics committees will be involved, apart from preliminary 
advice from within the university about methodology. 
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8. The exercise will be anonymous, and no names will be recorded at any stage. 
Participants will be able to refuse the use of an electronic recorder if they wish or decline to 
complete questionnaires. Any participants who wish to check tapes or notes will be able to 
contact the researcher in order to do so and request changes or ask for all data relating to 
their participation to be erased. The resulting data will be stored on a password-protected 
computer and destroyed three years after completion of the degree. 
9. No payment will be made to participants. 
10. No external financial support will be required or obtained. 
11. Participants will not be recruited until later in the period of research, and no person or 
organisation has placed or is likely to place any restriction on the publication of results. 
12. Recruitment will be carried out and the exercise conducted in a pastorally sensitive 
manner. 
13. The proposed information sheet and consent form are appended below. 
 
 
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences 
Participant Information Sheet 
Project Title 
Changing patterns in belief in God in Britain since World War II 
Invitation 
You are being invited to take part in a research project.  Before you decide to participate it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you 
wish.  Ask if anything is unclear or if you would like more information. 
Purpose of Project 
As part of his research leading to a PhD degree, Canon Richard Lindley wishes to gain 
understanding about the nature of the beliefs in God on the part of a sample of Church of 
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England church members across the city of Winchester.  He wishes to invite individual church 
members to meet him in groups or as individuals to engage in discussion about their beliefs in 
God and how those beliefs have changed over the years and to complete a questionnaire on 
the same subjects. 
Why have I been chosen? Do I have to take part?  
Participation is entirely voluntary, and you are invited to take part in a group discussion or 
individual interview with the researcher. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this 
information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
Those taking part will be invited to complete questionnaires and to meet with Canon Lindley at 
mutually agreed times for no more than one hour (unless all those concerned wish to continue 
longer), and everyone will be free to leave at any time they wish, even if the meeting or 
interview has not ended.  Individual views may be recorded by electronic recorder and in 
written notes, but no-one’s name will be recorded at any stage, and no-one will be identifiable 
in the records or thesis that result. Anyone who wishes will be able to contact the researcher 
to hear any tape that has been recorded or see any notes that have been taken at the 
meetings, and to request changes, or to ask for all his or her data to be erased. The researcher 
will be pleased to discuss with anyone who wishes how they can best be offered pastoral 
support if issues arise that cause anyone to feel such a need. 
What if something goes wrong? 
Should you wish any further information or advice the contact details of the supervisor of this 
project can be found at the end of this Information Sheet. The contact details of the 
University’s Data Protection Officer are also provided. 
Will my participation be kept confidential? 
Yes. The records that will be kept will be anonymous and you will not be able to be identified 
with your responses. Any data will be stored and retained in accordance with the 1998 Data 
Protection Act.  
What will happen to the results of the research project? 
The research will form part of the researcher’s thesis.  
Who is organising and funding the research? 
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The research is being organised by the Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Faculty 
of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Winchester. It is being conducted today 
with the full knowledge of your church and its leader. 
Contact for further information, including questions about the research and participants’ rights:  
Researcher’s Director of Studies:  
Professor Liz Stuart 






For questions relating to the University’s Data Protection policy please contact the University’s Data 
Protection Officer:  
Mr David Farley 
Martial Rose Library 









Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences 
Participant Consent Form 
Project Title 
Changing patterns in belief in God in Britain since World War II 
Invitation 
You are being invited to take part in a research project.  Before you decide to take part it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  
Please take time to read the information sheet carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  




I understand that I am giving my consent to taking part in a focus group or individual interview 
about my belief in God and the way my belief may have changed over the years.  
Data consent 
I understand that my responses are entirely anonymous. I will not be able to be identified with 
my responses. My responses will contribute to the writing of an academic thesis.  
Statements of understanding 
I have read the information leaflet about the research project in which I have been asked to 
take part and have been given a copy of the information leaflet to keep.   
What is going to happen and why it is being done has been explained to me, and I have had 
the opportunity to discuss the details and ask questions.   
Right of withdrawal 
Having given this consent I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the programme 
at any time without disadvantage to myself and without having to give any reason. 
Statement of Consent  
I hereby fully and freely consent to participation in the study which has been fully explained to 
me. 
Participant’s Name__________________ Researcher’s Name_________________ 
Participant’s Signature_________________ Researcher’s Signature______________ 
Date_________________________  Date__________________________ 
Contact Details 
Researcher’s Director of Studies:  
Professor Liz Stuart 







For questions relating to the University’s Data Protection policy please contact the University’s 
Data Protection Officer:  
Mr David Farley 
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Martial Rose Library 









APPENDIX 3: THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Your name, only for initial identification: ................................................................... 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
IS PART OF RICHARD LINDLEY’S RESEARCH INTO: 
‘The position of traditional Christian theism in Anglican theology in the UK since the Second 
World War in the light of difficulties in conceiving and speaking of God’. 
He is very grateful for your participation in this research project. 
________________________ 
Please could you enter your name at the top of this sheet?  Your name is only to identify you 
now, and will not be used in the resulting thesis or revealed to anyone else. 
Please enlarge on your answers if you would like to – as much as space permits! 
A. QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU 
1. Please put a X after your gender: M   F  
2. Please put a X after your age bracket:  18-35     36-45     46-55     56-65      66+   
3. Please state your highest educational attainment. 
4. Please state your main work, paid or at home, present or past? 
5. Which church do you usually attend? 
B. QUESTIONS ABOUT ENCOUNTERING GOD 
1. On average, apart from prayers and services, how many times a day do you think of 
God? 
2. On average, how often do you pray each week, at church, at home and elsewhere? 
3. Do you associate God with any particular earthly places, or not? 
4. If you do, what place or places to you associate God with? 
C. QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW YOU ENVISAGE GOD 
5. When you think about God, do you have a mental picture or not? 
6. If you do, how would you describe that mental picture? 
7. Do you think of God as female, male, both or neither? 
8. If you don’t think of God as female or male or both, how do you think of God? 
9. Do you think of God is vast, tiny, both or neither? 
10. Where do you think of God is? 
11. Which, if any of these, best describes God’s location:  up there, down there, out there 
or in here? Or none of these?  If none of these, can you suggest an alternative? 
12. Did God create the world? If so, how? 
13. Is God within nature, or outside it? 
14. Do you think God needs us? 
15. Do you think God understands our problems? 
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16. Do you think God suffers with us? 
17. Does God speak to human beings or not?  
D. ANYTHING ELSE YOU WOULD LIKE TO SAY? 
 
PLEASE COULD YOU RETURN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE BEFORE THE DATE OF YOUR  INTERVIEW?  
 IF YOU ARE RETURNING IT BY POST, PLEASE ASK FOR A STAMPED AND ADDRESSED 
ENVELOPE, OR SEND IT TO: Canon Richard Lindley, 28 Denham Close, Winchester, SO23 7BL.  
IF YOU ARE RETURNING IT BY EMAIL, PLEASE SEND IT AS A WORD OR JPG. ATTACHMENT 




APPENDIX 4: RESEARCHER’S LIST OF INTERVIEW TOPICS 
1. Points from questionnaire 
2. Please describe God in your own words? Easy or difficult? 
3. How has this changed over the years? Effect of liturgy and hymns? 
4. Times God has been especially real or absent? 
5. Helpfulness of:   Father? 
   King? 
   Shepherd? 
   Great?   
6. God is Love, why suffering?  
7. Can God intervene to avert disasters if we ask him? 
8. Watch for: Natural/supernatural alternative explanations 




APPENDIX 5:  SUMMARY OF CHURCHES’ SELF-DESCRIPTIONS1 
All Saints: area of relative deprivation, mostly Eucharistic worship, moderately Catholic with 
open theology, range of beliefs and traditions in congregation  
St. John the Baptist: area of relative deprivation, totally Eucharistic Sunday worship, 
moderately Catholic with open theology, range of beliefs and traditions in congregation 
University: aims to be inclusive of whole community; worship and ethos 'liberal Catholic'; high 
value place on sacramental worship, intelligent preaching, silence, flexibility, and some 
contemporary worship music alongside traditional hymnody. 
 
St Paul’s: provides worship to meet diverse needs; facilitates spiritual growth; provides care 
and the Gospel for the community; aims to attract, welcome and retain; rejects exclusivity and 
distinctions between those who belong and those who do not; and recognises that certainty 
can be the enemy of faith. 
 
St Bartholomew’s: Eucharistically-centred for Sunday worship and central-to-modern Catholic 
by tradition, seeking to develop further accessible worship for young families, encouraging 
collaborative ministry and lay participation in worship and pastoral care, in learning and 
teaching the faith and in mission to our community. 
St Mark’s: a dual-purpose building serving Olivers Battery within St Luke’s parish, with less 
than 10% of the electoral roll living outside the parish. It is on the modern high side of middle 
of the road with vestments, reserved sacrament, sung Eucharist as central to its worship. It is 
liberal in its views, committed to social justice and inclusive in its mission and ministry. 
Christ Church:  under the patronage of the Simeon Trust for over 150 years, inspired by the 
early evangelical revival in England. It has an electoral role of 850, with over 2000 regularly 
attending worship, drawn from across Winchester and the surrounding villages.   The 
spirituality is evangelical and charismatic with an emphasis on “Word and Spirit” and “Knowing 
Jesus and making Him known”.    Many members work in public service and the caring 
professions, and are involved in voluntary philanthropic, community and charitable initiatives 
in the city. 
Holy Trinity: A church in the Anglo-Catholic tradition, maintaining traditional Catholic theology 
and teaching with a modern Catholic liturgy.  Showing a welcome to all who come through its 
doors and with a mission of encouraging adults and children in their faith. 
John Moore Barracks:  The Light Division Chapel is a modern building and part of the Army 
Training Regiment Winchester. The non-denominational Sunday service is aimed at the 17 to 
32 years old recruits, many with little or no church experience. The recruits’ training lasts for 
fourteen weeks, so the ‘congregation’ is always changing. The church is used for baptisms and 
occasional weddings and funerals. 
                                                 
1 Descriptions were sought from the clergy of the churches mostly attended by participants.  




Winchester Cathedral: The Cathedral aims to gives space for all comers to discover and live out 
the beauty of holiness – in worship this happens through the invitation to be caught up into 
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